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Looking for Europe

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Looking for Europe

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

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Preface to the Issue "Looking for Europe"

IT IS FIFTEEN YEARS since the editors of *Daedalus* last thought to offer a synoptic view of Europe in our time. In that earlier issue, entitled "A New Europe?," a group of predominantly European authors joined with a smaller company of Americans in considering how West European society was evolving and what the import of major political, social, economic, and intellectual developments might be. Because so many, both in Europe and the United States, seemed persuaded at the the time that "traditional" Europe was dead—that remarkable transformations had already taken place and that even greater changes were almost certainly impending—it was a propitious moment to look critically at such claims, to see what merit they might have. The evidences of innovations and reform were incontestable; so were the indices of growth. No one argued over whether significant change had taken place. The controversy—insofar as it existed—had to do with the character of the change and its long-range consequences and meaning. Many informed Americans agreed with their European colleagues that fundamental mutations had indeed occurred, in European politics, certainly, but in other aspects of society as well, and that the end of this happy progress was by no means in sight.

A number, however, who wrote for the 1964 *Daedalus* issue were not wholly persuaded by those who argued in such lyrical terms. Dubious of arguments that proclaimed the death of the nation-state and of nationalism itself, they asked whether many of the expectations for Brussels and its new Communities were not somewhat exaggerated. They wondered also whether ideology, class, revolution, and war—suddenly discarded on the ash heap of history—were indeed as anachronistic as some wished to believe. Western Europe had clearly made an impressive recovery from the economic ravages of the Second World War; it did not follow from this success that Europe's recovery was equally impressive in other respects. Hence, the title of the 1964 *Daedalus* issue, "A New Europe?" The question mark was absolutely essential; it was intended to make the reader pause, to reflect on the easy optimism of those who imagined that Europe, moving toward some sort of political unity, had turned a crucial corner, and that it was traveling a path not too different from the one taken by Americans in the eighteenth century.

It is easy to forget how influential the United States was in establishing certain objectives for Europe in the period immediately following the Second World War. American social scientists contributed not a little to providing a rationale for theories that made certain sorts of political, social, and economic developments seem almost inevitable. When, at the Villa Serbelloni in Italy, early drafts of many of the 1964 *Daedalus* papers were first discussed, a number of American participants and their European colleagues argued as though Eu-

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rope had only one set of options, and could be expected to move in only one direction. Confident of their analyses, and comfortable with prophecies solidly based on economic statistics, they often extrapolated from what had just happened, taking the recent past, with its economic growth and political stability, as an augury of a condition that would persist perhaps indefinitely. So sanguine a view did not appeal to everyone. Voices were raised, and not only because passions were engaged, but also because implicit in all such argument was the idea that Europe had taken irrevocable steps toward unity, and that if the unity was not complete, the fault lay wholly with a handful of traditionalists, men like Charles de Gaulle. It is easy to forget that the French president was the single most important uninvited guest at the 1964 *Daedalus* conference; he crowded out all others, making his influence felt in ways offensive to those who thought him a political and intellectual anachronism, a potential wrecker of the European dream. Many of the arguments—in the closed meetings, but also in the volume—had to do with how one estimated de Gaulle's purposes.

In these circumstances, it is scarcely surprising that the French veto of the British entry into the Common Market should have figured, or that other recent developments should have drawn the attention of participants. Yet, what makes the volume unique is that the preoccupation with all such matters is almost secondary; the willingness of almost all the authors to concern themselves with longer-term issues is conspicuous. Many who wrote in 1964 were clearly elated by the Europe they were discovering; even the problems they detected were thought to be largely on the way to resolution. If there were significant differences among the authors—and there were—those satisfied with Europe's progress, or at least hopeful for its future, greatly outnumbered those who had serious misgivings.

This is clearly not the situation that obtains today; if the mood set by the articles published in 1964 was on the whole optimistic, the same cannot be said for those published in this *Daedalus* issue. "Looking for Europe," the first of two volumes on Europe's condition at this time, cannot be read simply as a document of doom and gloom; no one, however, will mistake it for a testament of hope or promise. Whether Stanley Hoffmann's "lament of a transplanted European" is read as an indictment of contemporary European culture or as an *apologia* for a set of higher expectations, it is certain to prove disconcerting to anyone who is at all sanguine about European society today. The essay expresses a mood so fundamentally different from any that existed in 1964 that one is forced to ask how such radical change can have occurred so quickly. How can Europe have lost so rapidly its confidence in its own future? Why does it appear so bewildered about certain fundamental issues, about how it can make use of its own past, and about how it ought to prepare for the difficult times that may lie ahead?

No catalogue of recent major or minor catastrophes affecting Europe will explain the current mood. It is not enough to ascribe it to continuing inflation, with all the uncertainties produced by that situation. Oil (and other basic raw material) price increases do not, by themselves, explain the new misgivings. Nor can one dwell simply on the insidious effects of terrorism and of political instability more generally. Even the widespread frustration generated by social grievance will go only a certain distance in explaining the unease. Beyond the

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incontestable disappointments experienced by major groups in society—including many who are well educated, young, and anxious to realize what was once so blithely promised them—and beyond the fears of those who have only recently become prosperous and propertied, there are many others who have a diminished sense of well-being and security. Europe, as represented in these pages, appears not so much fearful as bewildered. The spirit of Europe seems curiously subdued; few compelling possibilities, new or old, seem to commend themselves to wide segments of the society. New alliances and new thinking are constantly called for; the old is generally thought to be insufficient, but it is not at all obvious where the new is to be looked for and how it is to be incorporated.

When one considers what Suzanne Berger says about European politics, about the reasons why many of the old parties are losing their appeal, and how certain new interest groups, by asserting themselves, are showing new potentialities for power and influence, this development alone would seem to offer the possibility of major innovation. Yet, we are told that many Europeans live with a sense of crisis not too different from the one described by Gramsci when he depicted the Italy of the 1920s: "the old is dying and the new cannot be born." Berger writes of the "pervasive sense of living through a period of transition in which the old forces that provided stability, government capacity, and legitimacy have been played out and new ones have not yet come to maturity." Believing that "the secularized political parties of the seventies can no longer generate among citizens the loyalties, discipline, and total commitment that Church and Party molded throughout the first three quarters of the century," she asks whether they will be able to forge unity among the new interest groups that have arisen. What future role can one conceive for ecologists, feminists, regional ethnic movements, and the like? Does the future of European politics rest with such interests?

European politics are quite obviously in a state of transition. So, too, not surprisingly, is Europe's economy. Albert Bressand employs a few well chosen statistics to suggest the impressive progress that Western Europe has made in recent years, but as he proceeds to analyze Europe's economic strengths and weaknesses, he emphasizes the "unprecedented innovations with regard to economic policies" that are imperative. Bressand is very specific when he says that "no less is required than redeployment of industries and finding ways to distribute the costs of these adjustments, redefining the economic role of the state, and finding new relationships with both the advanced economies of the United States and Japan and the growing economies of the Third World." Can one imagine a more difficult agenda of economic reforms? How are these things to be achieved? And, as if these tasks were not difficult enough, Bressand reminds us that neither Keynes nor Monnet provided Europe with the economic theory it now has need of. Not only must there be major structural and institutional changes, but an intellectual revolution as well, capable of transcending the parochialisms of an earlier day. The tasks are indeed herculean.

The story told by David Watt suggests that a comparable situation exists in Brussels. Writing about the European Economic Community, he recognizes how remote are the expectations today from any that existed the early 1960s. Describing only a handful of the problems that confront the Community at this time, Watt dwells particularly on the complex issues raised by the prospect of

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Community expansion to accommodate economies considerably less developed than those of the Nine. Acknowledging the quite substantial successes that the Community achieved in its first years—not least in resolving certain age-old problems, including the historic French and German antipathies—Watt recognizes that such earlier accomplishments provide no guarantee of equivalent performance in the future. The challenges confronting the Community at this moment are overwhelming. In another time, they might have been thought appealing in that they tested the abilities of both statesmen and men of affairs. Today, they are seen as unnecessary complications that many would have preferred to avoid. Few in the Community exult in the prospect of having to admit new members, even when they recognize that such admission may significantly contribute to strengthening newly established democratic regimes. The issue is a sufficiently sensitive one to impose a certain discretion on those who are willing to speak about it; still, it is only one of many causing embarrassment, anguish, and misgiving.

Uwe Nerlich, in considering Europe's relations with the United States, and Pierre Hassner, in considering Europe's relations with the USSR, communicate the same mood of reticence and doubt. Neither is inclined to predict an imminent catastrophe, but both recognize the very substantial dangers that lurk in the prevailing situation. Nerlich, concerned to show that the United States and Western Europe are not simply drifting apart, but that each is now compelled to contend with domestic forces largely unsympathetic to the assuming of major new responsibilities to the other, recognizes the hazards of this political development. The absence of common purposes on both sides of the Atlantic is becoming increasingly apparent, and, in Nerlich's view, this is leading to an increased European dependence on the United States while, coincidentally, many Europeans think it perfectly reasonable to insist on a measure of autonomy that would have been almost inconceivable in an earlier time. Beyond the day-to-day differences, which may be patched over, there are more substantial difficulties that call out for attention. While Nerlich refrains from explicitly calling for a rethinking of the alliance and a recasting of its structures, many who read his account may conclude that such an exercise is long overdue.

Pierre Hassner, in considering Western Europe's attitudes toward the Soviet Union, knows that there is little in common among the opinions of groups in countries as different as France, Germany, Italy, Great Britain, Spain, and Greece. Because all these relations are complex, on the governmental level, but also because they involve the major political parties in the West, Hassner makes no attempt to generalize about them. Instead, he seeks to give the reader a sense of how various are the interests that are engaged. Looking to the future, Hassner suggests that we may see a "relatively fragmented Europe, where several countries or groups of countries will continue to entertain competing and contradictory bilateral relations with the Soviet Union." In this situation, he says that we must expect the Soviet Union "to retain the initiative and to use both its increased military weight and stepped-up peace campaigns to influence domestic evolution and foreign attitudes." Recognizing that behind the "screen" of détente—as some choose to see it—the Soviets have greatly increased their military capabilities, Hassner dwells also on the fact that Soviet interests in this period appear to have become global, while American interests seem sub-

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stantially reduced by comparison. This unbalance is causing concern in many quarters in Europe today, and is only one of many such conditions creating a sense of unease.

The 1964 issue of *Daedalus* was almost silent with respect to Eastern Europe; its concentration on Western Europe was so complete that even the countries of the south, except for Italy, were scanted. Both these omissions are remedied in the present volume: Archie Brown writes about the People's Democracies; Juan Linz considers Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Italy. While both accounts contain observations that another generation might have found encouraging, in the context of the present volume neither essay offers an analysis that many will find hopeful. While Brown accepts that "a liberalization of the Soviet regime in the proximate future is possible," and recognizes the immensely advantageous consequences for Eastern Europe in such a development, he believes that such a change in the Soviet Union is the least likely of several outcomes that may be looked for. Recognizing that what happens in Eastern Europe will depend not only on events in the Soviet Union but also on developments in the West, Brown reminds us that the record in Europe recently has not been very encouraging. High rates of inflation and substantial unemployment are not conditions calculated to have much appeal for the peoples of Eastern Europe; neither provides the model of industrial development likely to commend itself for Communist emulation.

Juan Linz, surveying the Mediterranean and southern Atlantic world, particularly the recent moves in the direction of democracy in Spain, Portugal, and Greece, accepts that these events have generated some enthusiasm. Still, like others of his colleagues, he dwells also on the extraordinary difficulty of the political problems that confront the leaders of all these countries. Whether any of them will be able to make the transition to "more advanced forms of production, to a more efficient use of resources, to a greater integration into the world market of the advanced countries" is very questionable. So, also, is the issue of whether they will be able to make major technological and scientific breakthroughs, while at the same time confronting the serious crises of political integration that are necessarily preoccupying. Linz, looking at the strong internal pressures for redistribution, and knowing how the problem of national identity is playing havoc with other political purposes, is naturally wary in predicting the future. The rise of major new democracies in Europe might have given hope, in other circumstances, to men and women discouraged by the growth of authoritarian regimes elsewhere in the world. Although Linz refrains from saying so, developments in the Iberian peninsula and Greece clearly have not generated the enthusiasm abroad that might have been looked for.

We are led back to a conclusion that is unavoidable. The mood that existed in Europe in 1964 simply does not exist today. It is not enough to say that today's opinion is largely the result of the events of 1968, the oil crisis of 1973, inflation, unemployment, and terrorism. All have obviously played some part in creating the contemporary climate, but they do not together explain the feelings of frustration and uncertainty. The gloom of the moment contrasts starkly with the more buoyant enthusiasms of an earlier day. Even when authors were reticent in 1964—dubious about certain of the claims made for Europe—they assumed that they knew the dimensions of the problems confronting the Old

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World. Alessandro Pizzorno, for example, writing in "A New Europe?," accepted the fact that much of the change that so delighted others might prove to be ephemeral; with great insight Pizzorno wrote: "The fact that Europe has relieved itself of its empires and at the same time has achieved among the highest rates of development in its history should not lead anyone to imagine that this continent has become self-sufficient, and that it has set in movement an endogenous mechanism of progress and renewal destined to last indefinitely. All appearances to the contrary, the mechanism is not internal and if we wish to predict whether it will continue to function or break down, the most important facts (or, if you will, the independent variables) should be considered in the light of the network of cultural, political, and economic relationships which link Europeans to others throughout the world."

May this seemingly modest statement not contain the key to many of Europe's problems today? Is it indeed possible that we have never realized the extent to which Europe's sense of well-being, material as well as moral, depended on the "network of relationships" that Pizzorno writes about? Has this network perhaps gone into a state of disrepair recently? Have relations deteriorated, not in the sense that Europe's trade is now substantially reduced, that tourism has fallen off, or that political leaders no longer communicate across the Atlantic, but in the sense that the enthusiasm for "links" and the comprehension of their utility is now significantly diminished? Some say that the United States has retreated into its shell in recent years, certainly not in the manner of the 1930s, but in infinitely more subtle ways. Is it possible that Europe has done the same, with consequences even more dire?

Americans almost certainly exaggerated the prospects for Europe in the 1960s; many lived with largely false illusions about the kinds of mutations that were occurring, some going so far as to believe that Europe would in time be a society not very different from the United States. The hubris in such a view need scarcely be commented on. Still, all such optimistic illusions were based on a fundamental premise, highly flattering to Europeans, which has been acknowledged only too rarely. Europe was seen as a force to be reckoned with, and not only in the economic sphere. The United States believed that Europe counted; it expected that Europe would one day count for even more. A generation of Americans, with personal memories of the 1930s and 1940s, acted as if the achievement of European unity was a moral no less than a political imperative. Some may have been genuinely naïve in their hopes and expectations, but no one would suggest today that a comparable enthusiasm for Europe exists, in the United States or anywhere else.

Indeed, a serious question must be asked: whether Europe has not become almost peripheral to many in the world today, notwithstanding its economic successes. If this is so, then the problem of European "identity" takes on a wholly new dimension and becomes something more than the issue of whether it is moving toward specific Community objectives, a common European currency, a European parliament, or the like. Europe may be in danger today of losing one kind of "vocation"—overwhelmingly intellectual and cultural—without acquiring another. It is not only that Europe may have lost its sense of its past, or that it is genuinely bewildered about its future, but that it senses its marginality, and is desperately and rightly concerned that it is a society more

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acted upon than acting. Political rhetoric will generally deny this; truth, however, is not always shaped by the pride or interest of politicians.

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S.R.G.

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STANLEY HOFFMANN

Fragments Floating in the Here and Now[1]

Is there a Europe, was there a past, and will there be a future?
or
The lament of a transplanted European

I

LET US TAKE ANY WESTERN EUROPEAN NATION in the nineteenth century—say, France, the one I know best. At any given moment, a visitor could have heard vigorous discussions of its past: the nature, flaws, and benefits of the old regime, the causes of its fall, the respective virtues and crimes of the different phases of the Revolution, the reasons for the restless and unsuccessful quest for political stability that followed it, the effect on the nation of the dramatic fracture in its history brought about by the Revolution, the lasting impact of Bonapartism. All of these questions were constantly examined along clear-cut ideological lines and were reassessed by each generation of historians. History played a large part in the school curriculum, and the nation's past was imprinted thereby on the minds of its future citizens. "At age thirteen," says Jean-Marie Domenach—now in his mid-fifties—"my image of France was solidly formed. It linked the recent glory of the fatherland to Greek and Roman antiquity, with the help of classical humanities, which consisted in . . . an aesthetic and moral impregnation."[2] At the same time, intellectuals and politicians were offering various models of the future. Even a society as keen on tight self-protection against economic and social upheavals as that of nineteenth-century France never stopped arguing about what the future might bring and, above all, never stopped believing that it was ultimately up to its citizens to shape that future—whether by the restoration of a beneficial past or by the realization of one or another vision of progress. What struck observers most was the depth and multiplicity of disagreements. But the concern with the past and the future—the conviction that the latter would emerge from acts inspired by a proper reconsideration of the past; the belief that past and future were inextricably linked, less by historical determinism than through one's own consciousness of them; the idea that one was seeking one's future in one's stand toward the past; and that the future ought to be the enactment of the lessons learned from the past—all this seemed perfectly obvious and appropriate.

It may, therefore, appear obvious and equally appropriate to ask whether the same questions are raised in Western Europe today. But when its citizens consult the mirror on the wall to find reflections from the past or intimations of the future, they find a broken mirror and a blurred image. For Europe remains a

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virtuality, the past is mere spectacle, and the future is a riddle. Why this is so takes us into the story of postwar Europe's political, social, and cultural transformation, as well as of Europe's role in the world.

II

The reasons for Western Europe's failure to coalesce have been described so often—particularly by the author of this essay—that they do not have to be repeated here.[3] The economic success story of postwar Europe, before and even in spite of the recession (success in terms of GNP, trade, per capita income, etc.); the cohesiveness of the EEC despite such serious challenges as Gaullism in the 1960s and the economic storms of the 1970s; the line of anxious applicants waiting to be admitted; the network of agreements that associate large numbers of non-European states with the Community; the coming election of its Parliament by universal suffrage—none of these facts invalidates my point. Western Europe remains a collection of largely self-encased nation-states. The various governments of Western Europe have found it useful to establish common institutions to deal with their common problems for the following reasons: most of them are advanced industrial societies and have open economies; they are all sandwiched, so to speak, between a potential foe endowed with massive military might and the only ally that can balance and deter Russia's might (yet the latter often exhibits an economic dynamism, and makes economic, monetary, or military demands that risk overwhelming its partners); and for the most part they have preserved the ties with their former colonies, whose development may now serve their own interests. But the basic unit of concern remains the nation-state, however inadequate.

There was, to be sure, a collective *projet* at the outset; its very ambiguity about ends—federalism or confederacy? a strong entity or a contribution to global solutions? free trade or common *dirigisme*? a new power bloc in the world or an exercise in transcending power politics?—helped it grow in the beginning. But later, when each new step seemed to require clarification of the final goals, its ambiguous nature began to plague it. The differential effects of outside pulls—from the US, the USSR, the so-called South, the monetary crises, the recession—have kept the Community members apart and forced the Commission and the Council to spend most of their time in trying to keep them all in the same boat, rather than in charting a course for it. No sooner was the battle provoked by de Gaulle's insistence on defining their course his way ended by his retirement, than a new setback hit the champions of *relance*: Western Europe was buffeted by new, global problems—energy, currency, the quest for a new international economic order. Their solution not only was, as usual, envisaged in different terms by the Community's members, but also (as in the earlier and lasting case of defense) did not seem capable of being adequately provided by the existing institutions and within the framework of Western Europe. Broader institutions, often dominated by the US, or a global framework, as in the North-South talks, seem to make more sense. But these approaches are a kind of devaluation of the EEC and seem to provide new reasons for each member to play a separate game. As J.-F. Deniau, a seasoned practitioner and faithful advocate of European cooperation puts it,[4] Europe, when it speaks with one voice,

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has little to say and, anyhow, sounds *dépassée*. It is only when the foe or the dominant ally seems to push its advantages or privileges too hard—Stalin in the early 1950s, Kissinger in the summer of 1973, the Carter administration in recent months—that a reflex of self-defense throws the Western Europeans together. As soon as the pressure gets lighter, however, internal divergences and separate priorities regain the upper hand.

Es ist eine alte Geschichte. But it has gotten worse, not better. There are several reasons. Paradoxically, the greater the scope of the Community's activities, the more complicated the agreements become: each area is in the hands of technicians and specialists who excel in the display of obstacles. Progress requires cross-issue bargaining; but the latter, in turn, requires a common sense of direction. Summit meetings, on the other hand, merely record a desire to overcome obstacles and a decision to send each issue back to its experts—the vigilant guardians of national differences. Secondly, the oil crisis, the recession, and the expansion of the Community from six to nine have sharpened heterogeneity and deepened the gap between the most efficient and least unstable—Bonn—and the others, as well as among the others themselves. Thirdly, the generation of true believers—the founding fathers of European integration, many of whom were American—has no heirs. Its successors are pragmatic. They do not doubt the advantages that cooperation, overall, brings to their nations, or the augmented influence that "speaking as part of Europe" can give them. But they are determined to measure whether in each instance the benefits really exceed the costs; and precisely because they take the usefulness and existence of the Community for granted, they are not overly worried by temporary setbacks or general aimlessness. As one French writer put it in discussing the fate of syndicalism, one has moved from the age of apostles to that of administrators.

There is a difference between a corporation and a club, between a government and a committee. Europe may still be seen as a giant from afar, especially by those who, through some irony he would have bitterly enjoyed, mistake its function for de Gaulle's vision.[5] Looked at closely, however, Europe is a great idea that has been tamed, leashed, and co-opted. Just as, in French public affairs, every scheme for decentralization has ended up absorbed into the traditional administrative patterns, the revolutionary idea of a united Europe has ended up routinized. As Deniau, again, puts it, its Commission has not become a substitute for the governments but a supplementary one. The European movement grew out of a particular historical situation and represented a broad aspiration. But this longing, and the cunning procedures Monnet devised for its fulfillment, have not succeeded in creating a common will. Europe, today as in the 1950s, is a necessity and a possibility; but it is not a will, it is no longer much of an ideal, and, as a result, it may end up being, like so many necessities, a missed opportunity. All too often, the Community forum has become a dumping ground for problems that are insoluble in the nation or the region or even within the narrow Western European framework. Periodically, the dwindling "Europeans," the worried Eurocrats, and national statesmen who measure the limits of the nation-state, seek an injection of fresh blood: the *relance* of Messina after the debacle of EDC, the *relance* of the Hague after de Gaulle, and now, after the buffeting of the past five years, renewed monetary cooperation and the popular election of the Parliament. But the danger this last move entails is not at

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all the realization of Michel Debré's nightmare: the sudden assertion of a supranational will in which a majority of Atlanticized Europeans override and overwhelm France's national interests (with the support of consenting and blinded French parliamentarians). Rather it is the opposite, a demonstration—either of the strength of the particular over the united (whether the particular takes the form of a transnational interest group or of sharp national differences tearing apart the fabric of transnational parties) or of the persistence of collective impotence (manifested through common stands that would either be resisted by the governments—as in the old Council of Europe—or, in matters of diplomacy and defense, would consist in mere deploration). In other words, the model may well be, not a States-General turning into a National Assembly at the initiative of the Third Estate in June, 1789, but the Parliament of the Fourth Republic.

There is no need to indulge once more in the *No Exit*-like attempt to apportion guilt and blame. Was it the fault of Western Europe's situation (another name for it, especially among French analysts, being the United States)? Or was it rather the failure of Europe's consciousness, its inability to shape a *projet* and to overcome the situation? It matters little, except insofar as each side's faults have become an alibi for the other. (Why should the US pay more attention to a bunch of nations that fails to get together to "share the burden" or to carry their own weight? How can the Europeans do great things when the US leaves them no breathing space, treats them as dependents, refuses to discipline its economy, or uses the pretext of free enterprise to crowd out European industries, etc.?) What does matter is the convergent effect of progressive disappointment and habituation to the EEC as it is: since there is neither ground for sudden worry nor reason for much hope, what has, throughout, been at the root of (partial) failure—that is, the resilience of the nation-state (whose failings explain the need for and partial success of cooperation)—is more prominent than ever. Wherever "Europe" was at first seen as almost a way to salvation, the loss of faith is most visible. In West Germany—because it has recovered status and influence so hugely—the European avenue, while economically advantageous, is by no means so essential as it once seemed. In Italy the domestic crisis leaves no room for the old myth of Europe as the undoer of national knots. In both cases, Europe remains necessary—as an outlet for German goods and a cloak for Germany's naked strength and as a source of material and moral help in Italy's lonely ordeal. But we are dealing with a utilitarian Europe. In France, the original faith has been eroded by years of "theological" disputes. If it sometimes seems as if it is most alive among British Europeanists, it is only because they are neophytes who have just entered the temple; their own representatives within behave far less like high priests than like bargainers closing deals in the City.

For the European enterprise to succeed, two closely connected things were necessary: (1) a kind of collective decision to repudiate or transcend the separate national pasts that had pitted the European nations against one another so often and (2) a collective determination to build a common future, a new European society and culture, and a new role in the world. The paradox, or the tragedy, of postwar Europe lies in this fact: if these common decisions are nowhere to be found, it is not because each nation-state has clung so fiercely to its separate vision of its past and its future, but because it has lost touch with the past and the future. To repudiate or transcend the past supposes that it is sufficiently

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alive to be resented or to inspire a will to break with it and to start afresh. Otherwise it is seen as so much dead weight, so irrelevant to the new situation that it has to be given up, traded in for a deliberately built new future. Shaping such a common future requires a kind of faith and political creativity—which is precisely what has been missing.

III

A superficial observer might marvel at the way in which the Europeans seem to have left behind the feuds and alienations of their past. Whatever happened to hereditary enmities? Spain, so marginal to European history for so long, except in the tragedy of its civil war, hurries to restore the old connection. If Northern Ireland fascinates, it is not only because of the Irish, it is also because there is something anachronistic about such hatreds and passions in Western Europe. And yet, if the hostilities entailed by separate pasts appear to have evaporated, the separate pasts have not; each European country is still concerned only with its own history, insofar as its people look back at all. Attempts at producing common history textbooks have succeeded only in smoothing the edges. To be sure, scientific history often deals with someone else's past—the best history of modern France in a long time is that of Theodore Zeldin—but in only a few countries is there a tradition of transnational investigation. The French have thrown little light on Germany's past, and Elie Halévy has had no successor. Popular history and the mass media deal almost exclusively with the national past. The media, of course, sometimes report on a neighbor's present—communism in Italy, for instance, is of concern to the French. But generally, television delves into a neighbor's past only when it is connected to its own national experience: German television showed *The Sorrow and the Pity* and a recent film on Pierre Laval because of Germany's involvement in wartime France.

The fundamental questions therefore are: How is the national past being examined? and What parts of it are considered important? The two queries are linked, for what is striking is a concentration on the recent past and a way of looking at it that I would call escapist. Here again, the media are informative. Television, the movies, and popular history have mass-produced stories about the troubled past of the 1930s and 1940s. What could be more normal, given its traumatic nature? The parades of the 1930s and the shadows of the war years fill French screens; Mussolini and Hitler obsess the Italians and the Germans; the British endlessly contemplate their finest hours; and Spanish novels and films, before Franco's death, posed poetic or picaresque riddles about and around the civil war. Does this preoccupation demonstrate a willingness to come to terms with a harrowing experience and to derive once again, for present and future behavior, painful lessons from it? I wish I could be sure. Instead I find in it something far softer and more superficial, perhaps because much of this quest is driven by little more than curiosity about the behavior of people who are still alive and present, or nostalgia about one's own earlier years. (Thus what seems like a turning to the past is really little more than an attempt to catch the beginnings of the present before they fade away.) Perhaps a deeper look, a confrontation with the tough moral questions raised by these grim years, is still too

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painful or (as the Occupation is for France) too divisive; nations, like individuals, repress the humiliating and the harrowing and would rather look at the picturesque than ponder shame or guilt. And so, what we get—in the case of Spain, for example—is a longing for humane normalcy, rather than a search for the reasons behind past inhumanity. Sometimes, as in Germany, there is a fascination with now-incomprehensible phenomena of mass hysteria and evil that has very little to do with soul searching. One looks at the spectacle as if what happened had been either a collective hypnosis perpetrated by one extraordinary man or a march behind the pied piper undertaken by only a part of the people, most of whom followed him into the abyss. Sometimes, as in France, we encounter an intellectual appetite for exercises in ambiguity; it is another way of putting distance between oneself and one's past. The German way tells us that what happened was exceptional, and from the exceptional there is little to learn. The French way tells us that each of us, like Lacombe Lucien, could have been a resister or a collaborationist or, like some of the characters in *The Sorrow and the Pity*, a hero, a criminal, or a coward; this is a subtle way of debunking the past, or reducing it to a moral shrug. Sometimes, as in England and in Italy, one reenacts the heroic hours—the Battle of Britain or the Italian Resistance—a melancholy yet exalting way of escaping from the sadness of the present and of reassuring ourselves about our highest potential. Thus one tries to bolster one's self-esteem: it has not been all bad, indeed some of it has been glorious. But when one finally realizes that one has been drugging oneself, what a sense of fall—witness *We All Loved Each Other So Much* or *The Glittering Prizes*.

For such concern with the recent past to transcend curiosity and spectacle, one needs elites—governments, intellectuals, educators—determined to connect the present and the whole of that recent past—not just its heroic or inspiring features, but also the ugly ones—in order that they may never be reproduced or that they may be finally erased. This is not what we find. Governments, politicians, those who are loosely called opinion leaders, have been willfully selective or evasive. They have either (like the British) diverted their people from looking at their present or (like Adenauer) protected them from their past by plunging them into the imperatives of the present. (Even scholars have occasionally behaved like hurt citizens when a foreigner has revealed an unwelcome truth: Robert Paxton's fine book on Vichy France[6] was not well received by an establishment that prefers to see in Vichy a set of grievous, often well meaning blunders rather than a deeply rooted logic of reactionary defeatism.) It is easier to tell oneself that moral choice is a matter of temper and circumstance, that one has been heroic, or that what made one evil is gone, than to tell people that their recent performance has often been shameful or that their recent valor has not prepared them at all for the very different challenges of the present (and indeed may have bled them white). To proclaim the former is easily dismissed as masochism or as an obstacle to getting people to improve their current lot, for one does not inspire others by rubbing their noses into past dirt. To proclaim the latter is equally discouraging—it rubs their noses into present dirt. *Lacombe Lucien*, with its romantic yet degrading love affair between the Jewish girl and the young collaborationist, was far more popular than the stark and unsparing *Black Thursday*, which showed the French police rounding up Jews for the Germans.

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As for the intellectuals, while some—a Böll, a Grass—have done what they could, many others, like Sartre, have used the terrible experiences of the recent past only as demonstrations of universal timeless paroxysmic dilemmas. Such a paradoxical, and in the end narcissistic, contemplation of one's finest or most villainous hours, such a variety of escapes, however useful in the present, have not only amounted to a refusal to draw any valid lessons; they have also often incited the next generation to rebel against their too easily satisfied parents, whether the rebellion takes the form of mere cynicism or of actual terrorism—the gentler or the stronger form of nihilism. But this connection has not been and still is not widely recognized.

At least the recent past is alive, if only as a horror show, a pageant, or a pep pill. What is striking is the growing disconnection from the more distant past. Of course, scholars continue to study it, often with great verve, new methods, and original interpretations. But their works rarely reach the general public, except when the authors have, thanks to television, become fashionable or objects of a cult (in which case their books are bought because of the author's fame rather than read because of their substance). One can sometimes hear learned writers arguing fiercely on the radio or the television about bygone events or personalities (one of the most heated debates I ever heard on France's famed *Dossiers de l'écran* concerned the fate of poor little Louis XVII). But these programs deal with the froth or the scum, not with the waves and their movements. The past is becoming an object of erudition or diversion, rather than a part of one's own being, through family or school transmission. What the French called *le passé vécu*, the experienced past, is displaced by the past as a product of specialists, a consumer product, a subject matter for scholars, or a spectacle.

One might be tempted to look for the explanation in the process of democratization. In traditional societies the elites derive their authority from the past and preserve it through the maintenance of customs and values (such as deference) whose very purpose is to delay change and to safeguard hierarchies. In democratic societies, preservation of the rites and habits of the past needs justification; the individual defines himself through his achievements and demands that authority be grounded either on his consent or on its own accomplishments; no democratic generation believes it has either much of a debt to its predecessors or much of a duty to do as they have done. If, as Tocqueville argued, the drive toward equality is the motor of modern society, the matrix of modern history, then the past always risks being rejected, both because it is a prehistory of inequality and because, if it were allowed to become a straitjacket slipped by each generation onto its successor, it would cripple that dogma of perfectibility, that belief in progress, which Tocqueville described as one of the biggest differences between democratic and aristocratic peoples.

But we must beware of such sweeping generalizations. For if we look around us, we find democratic societies in which *le passé vécu* has not receded. It may well be that the ideal type of democratization (the one Tocqueville tried to erect in the second volume of his great work) entails a destruction of ties, both to the past and between the members of that vast crowd of similar and equal men and women, restlessly left to their egoistic pursuits and panting to give themselves small, vulgar pleasures amidst the collapse of old beliefs and barriers.[7] But in order for this severing of ties to happen, democratization must be accompanied

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by a number of other quite separate and distinct destructions. This is precisely the situation we find in postwar Europe—but not everywhere. Let us admit that democratization may push away the past; still, we find by looking at some countries (say, Switzerland) that the distance between past and present can be either quite small or, when countervailing forces temper the innate "present-orientation" of democracy without preventing democratization itself, can even be nonexistent. In most of Western Europe, however, we find not counterweights, but reenforcements.

The most obvious of these is the speed of social change, the sweeping away of old customs and rites, the disappearance or transformation of old occupations, the reshaping of class distinctions, the revolutions in mores and morals, and the collapse of traditional modes of social control, all of which have been catalogued by sociologists (serious and pop). Yesterday, the past was all around us, and the relative stability of the social order preserved the relevance and meaning of old and durable controversies about the past. As long as traditional institutions, practices of social ascent, economic structures, religious dogmas, and personal values persisted, there were people who wanted to preserve them and others who argued for change; both groups had to evaluate the past for their enterprise. Today, so much of the past is dead that there is little left of it to preserve. The old solidarities and communities are gone; often even the old landscapes, along with the rituals, customs, and costumes, have disappeared. The advocates of change argue from the inequalities and perils of the present. Yesterday, there were conservatives and reactionaries; the former were rooted in the past (and tried to prevent rapid change, political or economic); the latter thought there was enough still left of the blessed past to make it possible to bring back what had, unfortunately, been toppled. Today, a conservative is someone who merely wants to slow down the pace of change or (like Pompidou) to make inevitable changes smooth for the individual. The reactionary is the real radical: he argues—as a particular New Right does in France—not for a return to the past, but on behalf of abstract principles—inequality between races and sexes, hierarchy and authority—which he is wise enough not to connect with any particular time or place.

The speed of change is one of the reasons the past seems so little relevant, but there is another related, but slightly different reason: a gradually growing sense of radical discontinuity. After the ordeals of the 1930s and the war years, the loss of the colonies, the seizure of political predominance by the superpowers, Western Europeans feel, more or less confusedly, that their normal historical development has been interrupted, that their past has been devalued, that their highest achievement—nationality—has plunged them into disaster followed by impotence, that they have moved from the age of self-determination to that in which the outside world determines their fate. The more distant past thus seems alien—not a prelude to the present; it is perhaps even a reproach.

This discontinuity is both expressed in and magnified by modern European historiography. Romantic history is gone, replaced by scientific history. Of course, romantic history was symbiotic with the nation-state; it was indeed a form and an agent of nationalism. It showed how the modern nation emerged from the tribes and the tribulations of the dark ages or triumphed over the

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machinations and oppression of foreigners. Present-day historians still operate, with a few grand exceptions like Braudel, within the limits of a nation; but the nation is no longer their object. The focus is often on culture and *mentalités*, but the approach is ethnographic, not political; it is the investigation of worlds we have lost, a sampling of vanished riches, not a celebration of how every stone fits into the national monument and every jewel into the nation's crown. Indeed, it often becomes an indictment of the nation, a kind of digging up of the bones of all those local cultures, cults, or customs that were killed by the national Molochs. It allows one to contrast the beautiful diversity of the past and the frantic ugliness of the present; but, unlike romantic history, it stresses both the discontinuity between past and present and the impossibility of reviving the dead. If, as one Frenchman put it, culture is what is left when everything else has been forgotten, the quest for bygone folkways is what is left when one wishes to forget everything else. Often, biography fills most of the gap opened by the demise of traditional history; it at least attracts many readers. But biography too is a kind of denationalization: in romantic history, the hero was the people, suitably idealized or idolized; today we indulge either in the nostalgia of past peoples or in curiosity about individuals.

A third accompaniment of democratization has contributed to the demise of the past: ideological disillusionment. We never used to see the past "objectively." We looked at it through the lenses of ideologies—liberalism, socialism, varieties of conservatism, Christian democracy. (I shall come back to this point in my discussion of the future.) None of these old prisms seems sufficiently helpful for examining the present stage, whether it is the social scene—with its (often immigrated) *Lumpenproletariat*, its stratified and not-at-all pauperized working class, and its proliferating and largely salaried middle classes—or the political scene—with its welfare states in precarious coexistence with a free, but by no means competitive market, and its formidably organized and encrusted interest groups. The situation of the individual—part-time member or free rider of one of these groups, part-time rebel against state and groups, integrated yet overadministered citizen, or "marginalized" and helpless victim—is unlike any that these earlier visions of the meaning and movement of history predicted. Thus, through speed and the savagery of history, we have not simply lost touch with the world that is behind us; it also appears that this world said many things that turned out to be false and thus has nothing more to say to the average European. There are three ingredients in this disaffection. First, the predictions turned out to be incorrect, and the past as the matrix of all good things to come stands discredited. Second, there were too many predictions: it is as if they had canceled each other out or annihilated one another, as religious dogmas do when too many sects argue about their meaning. There never was a single common faith in Western Europe. The closer a country comes to having one—for instance in England—the less disconnected it is from the past (although there is some disconnection precisely because past creeds and present realities seem unrelated). The differing views of the past that, only yesterday, made history seem present to the French or the Italians, have, by losing much of their meaning in the present, devalued the past for them. Finally, some of the predictions were not merely wrong, they were murderous; they turned Europe into a field of ruins: "the ideologies of nation, race and class have fed the fire. Everything, or

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almost, is burnt out now."[8] The fading away of the past is part of a general repudiation of totalitarian ideologies and of the totalitarian implications of ideologies.

Why does the same disconnection not exist to any comparable degree in the United States? Because, I believe, the three destructive forces I have listed have not operated here. In the first place, social changes have been vast and often disruptive, but they have come as organic changes within an established democratic society rather than as the searing agents of democratization—that is, as the gravediggers of values, hierarchies, social patterns, and constellations that were still predemocratic, a mixture of fading aristocratic and narrowly bourgeois societies. Paradoxically, because there has been, ever since the nation's birth, an expectation of quick mutations—the shedding of old skins and the growing of shinier ones that will, in their turn, be discarded when progress next requires it—change looks not like instability but almost like the condition of stability. The past can still be seen as the incubator of the present. This implies, of course, that such change must not be catastrophic. And indeed, in the second place, America has had no reason to experience radical discontinuity: this is the century of its emergence as the most powerful nation on the world stage, a rise for which its whole history has prepared it. In America we are still in the age of romantic history, in the midst of a love affair with the nation. Finally, and most important, we must go back to Tocqueville, or Louis Hartz, and the liberal consensus or common faith. The speed of social change may well be the same as it is in Europe (although one could argue that postwar Europe has been hastily catching up with America's brand of industrial society); but the irrelevance of past beliefs does not appear at all obvious to Americans. Whatever its transformations, their polity still seems in harmony with an unfolding of the "Lockean faith." Tocqueville would probably have some trouble recognizing his preindustrial small-town America; but the basic principles are still there, and the new institutions that have developed since his day are based on them.

The American creed has survived because the United States has been (or appears to the world and to its own people to be) a success story. Both this creed and other powerful bonds—ethnic loyalties, religious communities, class solidarities, or neighborhood associations—have mitigated the effects of social change and crises. In Europe, such ties have, on the contrary, been weakened or destroyed by a combination of factors: the speed and magnitude of change, a disastrous history, the corrosion of religion (and of such a quasireligious force as the early working-class movement) by secular ideological involvements and struggles, and the poverty of associational life in centralized nations. Therefore, contrary to what might have been expected, the democratic society par excellence, the United States, is closer to its past than the historical societies of Europe—a fact that confirms the impossibility of deriving any firm conclusion about politics or culture from a social ideal type such as democracy. The bones tell us nothing about the flesh or about the spirit.

A collective image of the past and the possibility of being inspired by this image thus depend on the preservation of collective ties, in the form of institutions or common values, among the citizens. Religion, the nation, and ideologies (which played so large an integrating role) partook of both forms. In Western Europe there used to be one group that defined its mission either as the

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defense of established institutions and values or as the mobilization of the people to create new ones: it was the intelligentsia, a kind of secular priesthood that owed its audience to the decline of organized religion and old regimes and to its frequent association with liberalism and nationalism (even though its prestige and authority were firmly rooted in persistent aristocratic values—which may help explain why it never played a comparable role in this country). Today, however, its attitude contributes to the erosion or erasure of the past. The relation of the intelligentsia to the past is, needless to say, far from simple. Let me take only the case of France. There we find every possible attitude, on the part of the intelligentsia, and yet somehow every one of them contributes to the break with the past. Malraux, in his quest for death-defying acts, became a celebrator of mankind's past artistic achievements and of France's national record. But his very style—his dazzling ellipses and his instinct for the difficult or the inaccessible, his heroic yet impractical hope of bringing the highest to the common man, his sumptuous threnodies, his fascination with exceptional men, and his part-whimsical, part-desperate doubts about humanity's future—somehow widened the distance between the past and us. Sartre, with his frenzied view of consciousness defining itself (and all of us) by throwing itself into and acting toward the future and his somewhat manichean view of the historical process as a discontinuous series of surges of spontaneity that fall back into the *pratico-inerte* as soon as organization and institutions take over, looks at the past both as a struggle of alienated beings driven by scarcity and as a record of failure. By contrast with Malraux, he was never concerned with its meaning for us (since we shall find meaning only through what we do next). Yet, in his long confrontation with Marxism, he at least proclaimed that whatever meaning history has lies in the acting out of human consciousness. Other intellectuals have rejected history altogether, or tried—to use the jargon of the time—to "evacuate the conscious subject": Lévi-Strauss asserts the importance of structures that owe nothing to man-made history and expresses his nostalgia for those societies that live outside history, "surrounded by (its) substance and . . . impervious to it";[9] Althusser reduces Marxism to a set of structural laws; Foucault discovers hidden structures of knowledge that dictate their rules to men; Deleuze and Guattari see man as a mere collection—not of feelings, desires, or ideas that can properly be called his own but of *machines désirantes* that drive, or rather push and pull him. It is not surprising that the confrontation with events has made it difficult for several of these writers to be consistent: events are clearly man-made, not just structural outputs; and in such confrontations, when writers had to decide—concretely—who was at fault, who caused the harm they deplored (and not simply what structure or what clash of machines resulted in what action, institution, or *discours*), they fell back not on history but on ideology. Foucault has shifted from the archaeology of knowledge to capitalist alienation, and the authors of *L'Anti-Oedipe* have denounced capitalism (and indeed, the whole modern system of production) as the root of poor Oedipus's schizophrenia.

Is there, then, nobody who wants to preserve the connection to the past? Surely many do, but for reasons that turn out to have rather little in common with the desire to nurture a sense of historical continuity or to use this sense as an enrichment of the present or an inspiration for the future. (De Gaulle was the

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last postwar statesman, along with the aging Churchill, to look at history in this way; and it is not merely a matter of age, since Adenauer, for many reasons, did not do so.) Ancient monuments are, of course, being piously restored; but is it because of what they mean today or because they are part of the "artistic patrimony" of the nation and, therefore, of its overall resources? Old buildings are being renovated and visited by eager groups, but is it a way of keeping the past in one's midst, or is it an alternative to a relief from the unmistakable horrors of much of modern European architecture? Old regional feasts and fairs are turned into festivals, but is this a means for reaching into the past or into the pocketbooks of tourists? National holidays are being celebrated, but is this done for the reasons a Robespierre once gave when he advocated such ceremonies or in order to provide governments with a moment of contrived harmony, and citizens with a day off?

The real reachers for the past fall into two groups. Paradoxically, the Marxist Left and its intellectuals—the heralds of change—have become the curators of the revolutionary museum. Radicalism has become a tradition. Since the present has a mixed record, the past can be used to show the depth—in time and scope—of the present evils. (For example, *Que la fête commence*, a quite wonderful film, uses the Regency of 1715 as a way of denouncing the social and political ills of today.) The past can also be used to assure the faithful that the day of reckoning will come, as well as to put them on guard against repeating the errors that have doomed revolutions in the past. But when turning to the past as a way of lecturing us about the present and expressing hope in the future becomes the last resort of revolutionaries, what appears at first as reconnection turns out to be one more escape. (I am thinking of the abundance of French literature about the Commune and of recent plays about the Revolution.) For such a turn is no longer a search and a scrutiny of the past. It is a consolation for the present—a series of parables that keeps us warm for a while in the middle of a very cold here-and-now. One leaves such books, plays, or movies feeling, contrary to the authors' wishes, that insofar as things were always so bad, there is little hope indeed; the past mainly serves as an explanation of and a diversion from present failure. Often today the best historians are either Marxists who are, personally, sufficiently unrevolutionary—that is, conservative—to use Marxist insights as a tool of historical research rather than using historical examples as an ersatz goad to Marxist revolution; or else they are ex-communists who have given up the promised land of utopia for the historian's territory. So we again find scientific history as a repudiation, overt or covert, of ideology, and as a way of looking at the past that disconnects it from the present.

The other group that goes after the past is made up of ethnic and regional minorities: as the majority grows distant from its past, these groups rediscover (or invent) theirs. The present is the age of *their* romantic history. This, too, is an old story—that of nationalism among peoples long deprived of sovereignty, for whom a digging up of alleged or real antiquity is a rebellion against the oppression of the recent past and the present. But just as there is something pathetic about the *passéisme* of Marxist revolutionaries, there is something ungainly about that of Corsican, Occitan, or even Scottish rebels. For here, the past is used not, as it was among the Germans, Italians, or Slavs of the last century, as a cultural basis for a modern creation—a nation—but as a protest

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against (largely) economic inequalities. Usually there is insufficient popular support (or often even desire) for establishing a separate nation in a Europe where the present nation-states suffer from multiple impotence (which new ones would only reproduce) and yet still have the capacity to defend themselves against secession.

In the educational system the teaching of history regresses. It used to be a major component of mass primary education and of the secondary education that a minority of privileged *and* gifted not-so-privileged youngsters received. Today, this preeminence is challenged by more practical or by more scientific disciplines. In a democracy, the authority of the teacher *qua* teacher is rather low. It rests on his expertise, not on his calling; and the prestige of his expertise depends on the usefulness of the knowledge he imparts. In France, the traditional supremacy of letters and history has ended: glamour glistens on mathematics. High school history is being diluted into social studies—the study of the contemporary. The hold of history in the school thus depends, above all, on the importance of the school as a seminary for teaching a civic faith that is rooted in history. In the United States, schools are often still such seminaries; on the other side of the Atlantic, they no longer are.

Those who find silver linings in every cloud might want to stress one advantage of this demise: will not young Europeans stop learning, internalizing, and reliving the ideological and national quarrels of the past? Maybe; and yet, such potential gains in tolerance and détente (the French word for which has become *décrispation*) are more than offset by important drawbacks; for the unexamined past lives on, and disconnection from it merely makes it more difficult to understand and cope with its formidable residues. It lives on, first of all, in the form of would-be but unfit masterkeys. Since the human mind craves comprehensive explanations for complex events and general causes for disparate effects—especially in countries such as those of Western Europe, where education used to be a missionary branch of the Enlightenment rather than a service for practical adaptation—what is more natural than trying to account for the bewildering array of contemporary changes in the sweeping terms of a seemingly "scientific" philosophy of history? Hence the persistence of Marxism, despite repeated, careful demonstrations of its inadequacy (a la Raymond Aron)[10] or periodic denunciations of its temporal incarnations (a la *nouveaux philosophes*, twenty-five years after Camus). A system of thought rooted in history has become an obstacle to understanding much of the present precisely because the growing evidence of its divorce from historical evolution is obscured by the decline of historical consciousness.

The past lives on, also, as a series of problems, tensions, atavisms—old institutions, modes of authority, or, to quote Michel Crozier,[11] models of rationality that no longer fit the advanced industrial societies of Western Europe, and constitute so many obstacles to individual desires, group aspirations, or collective efficiency. If the problems of class conflict are muddied rather than clarified by a clinging to old dogmatic formulas, the problems of persistent but counterproductive authoritarianism are made worse by the frequent failure to examine its historical roots, to understand why it has proven so resilient despite vast changes in social organization and in values, and despite the transformation or the weakening of many institutions (such as the family, the Church, and the

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school system) that used to be its props. The lack of historical reflection thus breeds the illusion of quick remedies or encourages the growth of anti-authoritarian utopias (like *autogestion*) that are too impractical, too naïve in their hope of doing away with power altogether, to do much harm to their foe; or, on the contrary, they foster the belief that new challenges to social order can best be met by "re-enforcing authority" (as in West Germany's reaction against terrorism). What a writer recently called postwar West Germany's confusion of democracy with anticommunism,[12] like Italy's confusion of democracy with a mix of parliamentarism and *clientelismo*, or France's confusion of democracy with bureaucracy legitimized by universal suffrage, is the joint result of an inadequate confrontation with the recent past and a growing estrangement from the more distant one.

It has been said that bad conscience—fed by the failures or crimes of the past—may at least have the virtue of instigating commitment. But when it is pure of historical understanding, it leads to blind nihilism. And when that same purity is not accompanied by any bad conscience, the failure of memory through disconnection from the past leads to a failure of imagination and will in connection with the future: the destruction—partly willed, but largely unwitting—of the past has not been the prelude to the construction of a new destiny.

IV

The future too, of course, is viewed in national terms because of the same idiosyncrasies that have kept the Western European nations from building a common state; they are partly deep residues of the past, partly distinctive features of their present political and social systems. Old blinders or worries, present crises, and opportunities loom large in such visions. The British, after years of vivisecting their malaise (the "British disease"), see a brighter future thanks to the combination of luck—the North Sea oil—and traditional virtues—rediscovered self-restraint and incomes discipline. The Germans, despite a party system that strikes foreign observers as more consensual than any outside the United States, worry about law and order and argue about the best way to protect a democratic system whose fresh roots are growing in a society where liberalism remains conditional—dependent on efficiency. Italians are entirely absorbed by the drama of the permanent crisis, and see as the only alternatives either a total breakdown—followed by some still unpredictable rule of violence and terror—or a coalition of the two huge secular churches—the Christian Democrats and the Communists. This coalition would feed the skepticism or anxieties of those who belong to neither party, those who trust one but not the other, and those who fear that the union of the two mastodons would give a colossal, final proof of impotence. The French oscillate between a new pragmatism that may turn out to be another word for complacency and immobility and an addiction to political divisions whose only merit is to keep alive the illusion of real choice. What is remarkable is how little each national vision is affected by the others. It is even more remarkable that none of them amounts to a national design.

They have one thing in common: a combination of two sets of experiences and expectations, which does not beget a vision of the future. For many years, Western Europeans have lived on the moving escalator of economic growth.

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The social dislocations and political changes it has brought about have, as I have already stated, riveted their minds on the present. At the same time, especially as governments for so long have suggested that (or acted as if) the solution to all tensions would be provided by further growth, the citizens were led to believe that the future could be summed up as a continuing and growing manna—the condition of the fulfillment of individual ambitions and desires, the prerequisite of greater social justice, and the way to equality of opportunity and results. In this sense, the imagined future was no more than a projection of what was most welcome in the present and the hope that what was currently unwelcome would be eliminated or tamed. The British, whose growth was smaller, told pollsters that they felt happy, happier than the continentals. But their own leaders worried about the effects of the lower rate, and the continentals showed a remarkable consensus in rejecting any thought that their tensions and frustrations might be relieved by a slowdown. If we mean by the word *political* a consideration of one's relation to others, to groups, to the community, and to the state in terms of values, beliefs, and power, the prevailing vision was singularly apolitical: its blandishments were bland, its appeal lay in its being so easy.

It was precisely because this vision of quantitative happiness, this somewhat mindless faith in a self-propelled expansion that apparently required no more from each citizen than his labor and a minimum of social integration, this failure to imagine another model of society, another kind of individual fate, another destiny for the nation seemed so tepid or boring to many of the young, that the "events" of May, 1968, occurred. But a rebellion is not a construction: no alternative vision came out of it. May, 1968, showed how the death of *le passé vécu* and the failure to bring a new design to life are linked. The young rebels may have thought they were reliving a revolutionary past, but they were only going through the motions: they acted, they did not reenact. A liquidation of what had become secondhand or bookish memories led nowhere—except to a deluge of books. Most of the young, whether they took part in this "happening" or not, seemed, in fact, to accept the common vision and to think of their own future in terms of individual security amidst general prosperity.[13] There seemed to be nothing between unlimited alienation and limited horizons, a rejection *in toto* of the prevailing values or a somewhat passive acceptance of them.

Then came the experience of the recession. It shattered the expectations of an ever-rising escalator. It revived old critiques of capitalism, old discussions about its final crisis. But no new alternative vision has emerged; it is as if people remained glued to the motionless escalator and waited for it to get well. The Europeans' own "revolution of rising expectations" made its sudden stop that much more jarring. But despite some talk about new models of growth or qualitative rather than quantitative growth, governments and citizens were joined in a desire to put the escalator back in motion; the only disagreements between or within nations have been over rates of recovery, fears of inflation and unemployment, and obligations of mutual solidarity. In other words, little has been learned from the troubles that have blurred the easy vision. No more-political action or proposal has appeared. This older and somewhat uninspiring vision—what French rebels had called *métro, boulot, dodo*—has simply been proven unreliable. The recession and its inequities confirmed the rebels in their rejection of the model (and probably helped turn some of them from spon-

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taneous psychodrama to organized terror), while the passive acceptance of this model by the others lost some of its former complacency. And the millions, neither rebels nor conformists, who subscribe to the critique of capitalism offered by the Marxist Left, nevertheless live a double life or practice double-entry bookkeeping. They have seen their reasons for distrusting the model vindicated, yet they see no future other than one of economic growth. (They only wish the authorities in charge to be less distant, unreliable, greedy, or unfair than the profitmakers who have managed it so far.)

This brings us to a query about the institutions and forces that used to be, so to speak, the incubators of designs, the shapers of the collective will, or the sources of collective utopias. Among the most potent of these were the ideologies political forces offered to the citizens. What visions of the future do they now propose? Nothing much, really. One can divide these forces into several categories, which do not always correspond to distinctions between parties. First, there are the managers: the French *majorité*, the Italian Christian Democrats, the bulk of the three West German and the British parties, and the Spanish establishment that developed under Franco's shadow. They are the high priests of the prevailing model of growth, and all subscribe, with national or party nuances, both to Pompidou's conviction that the state's role is to straighten or smooth out (nothing more) the natural effects of continuing industrialization, and to Giscard's dictum that governing is just the art of "*gérer l'imprévisible.*" There may be a vision here, but the least one can say is that it lacks inspiration. To quote the earlier French president—de Gaulle—"marrying one's century" may well be necessary, but does it prepare one for the next? De Gaulle, it is true, was not simply a manager; he had a vision, both of the past and of the future, and he still believed in national history and national will in the grand double drama of internal togetherness and external struggle. But his was, above all, a vision of rallying for and acting on the world stage. He talked of French and European might, not of French or European social and political organization (beyond the need for a strong state). When, at the end, he realized that this was the area in which a vision was most needed (given France's and Europe's limited range on the world scene) and when he came to see that without such a vision no dream of the world stage, however modest, could ever be realized, he fell—both because many of his own supporters showed no desire for imagination and because his own was ill at ease in this realm.

Next to the managers, there are the challengers: the Communists, the Labor and SPD Left, and the French Socialists. They too have had trouble with the future. Sometimes, as in England, their vision is so insular and goes so much against the common scriptures of growth as to appear almost perverse—thoroughly unappealing to the unconverted and singularly austere even to the faithful. Sometimes, their programs are not prophecies or calls to arms but mere critiques of present injustices and acute expressions of present discontents. Sometimes, as in the case of the French Socialists, they seem caught between residual (or is it revived?) utopianism—as in the drive for *autogestion*—against "professional politics" and against the centralized state that pretends to express the general will. The drive comes, if not like de Gaulle's view of France, *du fond des âges*, at least from the oldest Socialist and syndicalist fund[14]—as well as from rather routine sources of social democracy. Sometimes, as in the case of the

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Communists, the challengers are split between those who seek, at least temporarily, to collude diffidently with the managers—because of the scars left by past Fascist experiences and, therefore, the need to give priority to the establishment or survival of democracy (however "formal")—and those who, like the French, cling to a Leninist model of revolutionary break with the established order while trying to de-Leninize the model just enough to capture voters whose ideal for the future is definitely not Leninist. In other words, they behave like a church that is afraid both of losing its distinctiveness by throwing out too much of a now-unappealing dogma and of losing its appeal by not throwing out enough (not an inaccurate description of the present Roman Catholic church). The compromise is neither stable or popular within, nor convincing outside.

Thus, the great ideological "spiritual families" of the past have either disappeared or propose no relevant future. What do Christian Democrats offer, except a plea for law and order, a spectacle of decay, or a touching faith in European integration as the *deus ex machina*? Has socialism succeeded in preserving its identity? Or has it not rather been endlessly torn between the managerial temptation, a stern egalitarianism, and a welfarism that accepts, in order to reform it, capitalist society; and when the costs of welfarism become unbearable as growth slows down (and welfarism tends indeed to slow growth by drying out investment), what more does socialism offer than a nostalgia for a new *projet de société* it cannot quite define? Has liberalism succeeded in moving beyond the reconciliation of political liberty with democracy, or the compromise between the market and some government control, which date from much earlier times? What can old conservatism offer when whatever it wanted to conserve is gone? What is the communist ideal, once you erase the Soviet Union from it—and even if you leave it in? The notion of the death of ideology has been accepted too easily and buried too soon. Its celebrators grandly overrated, in their Saint-Simonian faith in science and production, the degree to which the advent of postindustrial society would inject pragmatism, erase class differences, tame class conflicts, modernize party systems, and eliminate Luddite extremists. Ideologies are still there, though, especially on the Left—as is normal since the Left is the refuge and hope of those who dislike the established order. Traces of ideological thinking can be found all over the picture; but insofar as ideologies offered plausible visions of the future, the much-rejected notion was not so wrong. Either there are no such visions or else they are not plausible, like those spun out by hundreds of *groupuscules*. They describe the ideal future as what will miraculously arise when the present society has been entirely destroyed—a grand release of spontaneity, a fusion in fraternity, but no discernible social order. And the visions are based less on faith than on hate, as in the beautiful scene of destruction at the end of Antonioni's *Zabriskie Point*. Marxism is still present—often omnipresent—and diffuse. But it serves as a tool for analyzing the flaws of the status quo and as a goad for proposing the demise of the present—not as a blueprint for the future. Societies that depend on growth, and whose citizens expect it even when they criticize its present motors; societies, moreover, that have been bitten, or have barely escaped being bitten, by the "carnivorous idols" Bernanos talked about in the 1930s, ask formidable questions of each ideological vision of the future. The questions were often either not raised before or were deemed secondary—Will it work? At

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what costs? Societies that have suffered from the disease of unrestrained ideologies on a rampage, and have put their hopes in the benefits of economic growth, now impose a reality test on political visions, even if their own vision of the future is singularly unpolitical and unreal.

Those who announced the end of ideology believed that the advent of a pragmatic age would propel Western Europe toward a plannable future—post-industrial society. But such pragmatism presupposes either that political problems have been reduced to technical ones (to be solved by experts) or that the old ideologies are to be replaced by a new one—the ideology of advanced liberal capitalism—which would dampen and thus help resolve disputes. If both postulates are wrong and the old ideologies are dead or dying, one is left immersed in a dreary present, a jungle of group conflicts, with no standard for their solution. And the very intensity of the struggle for power and product, the very absence of any grand cause, the very myopia of each class, profession, and association concentrating on its claims makes it almost impossible for any vision of the future to emerge.

The other forces from which such visions used to emanate are in no better shape. I have already mentioned the Catholic church. Its image of the future used to be shaped by its conception of the past, by the accretion of values and dogmas transmitted from generation to generation. Inevitably, now that this heritage is being liquidated—partly because it is incompatible with the dynamics and mores of the modern world and partly because it has been compromised by past collusions between the Church and antidemocractic political ideologies and elites—the Church is left without a vision of the future and exposed to another kind of collusion—with the political and social activists of reform or even revolution. Yesterday's involvement with secularism condemned the Church to unpopularity; but the secularists on whom it used to lean had borrowed their own design and dogmas from the Church. Today, it is the Church that does the borrowing—from people caught in or drifting amidst the troubles of the present.

The army also used to offer a vision of the future. But it was one of a struggle against other European nations for revenge or supremacy, or against the barbarians for law and order and civilization. Of course, the willingness to resort to force, the usefulness of force, indeed the greatness of force, were essential to this vision: as de Gaulle wrote, "the sword is the axis of the world, and greatness cannot be divided."[15] Force today is doubly devalued: pragmatically because the risks are too great and the rewards too slim, and intellectually because its prestige in Europe has not survived the orgies of violence of two world wars. Armies reduced to deterrent and latent or oblique functions or to "punctual" rescue operations have trouble finding volunteers or keeping draftees from displaying their boredom. At any rate, they too are in a limbo, between a past they can only celebrate with ambivalence and a future they cannot like.

Again, the intelligentsia offers no more vision of the future than of the past. It may once have played a role as the purveyor of utopias, but there are not many utopias to be found today. Marxists abound—as critics of the present. But they are now bereft of a future. It was relatively easy to propose one—as there was no socialist society anywhere—before 1914. Now there are too many, and the most orthodox is the biggest disappointment of all. When reality begins to

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shackle the imagination and to betray hope, resentment alone remains—and sometimes indeed, as in France in the past months, the resentment turns away from the present toward a wholesale repudiation of Marxism altogether. To be sure, Italian and French syndicalists and their sympathizers have, as I said before, articulated the utopia of *autogestion;* but in their drive to appear responsible—that is, not utopian—the revolutionary force of the idea, which was still considerable after May, 1968, and the "hot Fall" of Italy, has been eroded. Pragmatic proposals have replaced the Sorelian myth. Intellectuals are still the experimenters, but their experiments have been, so to speak, privatized: they deal with the realms of aesthetics, linguistics, theater, and the movies, with psychoanalysis, and with poetry. Sometimes their experiments carry them into local social-welfare operations, like the French *Lacaniens* and antipsychiatrists after 1968; but this occurred precisely because the wider political scene had proven so disappointing.[16] As Crozier points out, the traditional role of the intellectual—to serve as a self-appointed conscience and guide of the nation, and thus to propose ideals and to speak out about its present and its future—has to a considerable extent disappeared. Sartre's last active years as a writer have been spent on his negative identity, called Flaubert.

For a while, in the 1960s, it seemed that the old intellectual would be replaced by the new problem-solving social scientist, who would lend his expertise to the managers and lead them to careful reforms. But on the one hand, the multiplication of "perverse" (or counterintuitive) effects, the latent dissatisfaction of many of the experts with a role that seemed to them like a fall from the pedestal of the past and like mere service of the prince, the impatience of the managers with experts more concerned with their own research priorities than with those of the state—all doomed or at least dwarfed that experiment. On the other hand, social science, especially when it divorces itself from public philosophy, rarely goes beyond what Max Weber called the disenchantment of reality—revealing, unveiling, and debunking. Now, any vision of the future must go beyond this point or, rather, stay on this side of total lucidity, if it is to be a call or guide to action. For one cannot act without somehow underestimating difficulties or overestimating those whom one wants to rally. Intellectuals *qua* prophets had idealized the People; the social scientists' job is to describe the real, not the imaginary people. Action simplifies, social science complicates.

Insofar as social engineering continues, with carefully reduced expectations, it reflects what I said about the citizenry as a whole: its practitioners have demonstrated little imagination about the future and have proven that even its limited promises may not be kept after all. Members of the intelligentsia who have turned away from that troubled partnership in social engineering have gone in one of two directions, and sometimes in both. One is specialized, scientific research or arcane experimentation. This choice preserves that distance between the intellectual and the average man, that equation between intellectual work and prowess that is a legacy from the aristocratic age—although it is now divorced from the nineteenth-century artist's desire to lead the masses into a promised land. Of course, among those who choose this direction, very little is being said about the problems of everyday life, ethics, institutions, work, and leisure. The second direction is a residue of this grand claim—a kind of debased

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nostalgia for it: it is the desire to be "popular," fashionable, a media *habitué* or a media event, a troubadour of spontaneity or a mod synthesizer of concepts that are in or on the air. (Witness the sudden discovery in France, in 1977, that power is everywhere. What would Molière have done with that?) But in this case, the once-prophet becomes a mere critic, who peremptorily denounces what the powermongers have done, but who refuses to say what they should have done, since all politics is contemptible. A narcissistic, self-appointed spokesman for the victims of the universal Gulag, he abdicates all responsibility for imagining a better world, merely calls for resistance whenever the powers-that-be step on the little man's toes, or sympathizes with the longings of adolescence. This has happened to the *nouveaux philosophes* (they were not reluctant), and it also characterizes much of the writing of Alain Touraine. Even a work as careful in its attempt to avoid both esoterism and grand rhetoric as the Crozier-Friedberg call for a new kind of social theory strikes one as singularly ahistorical and modest about the future:[17] change must come through experimentation *à la base*, through the gradual learning of new collective capabilities; there is no way to describe it in advance, nor should too much of it be attempted at any given moment, since people cannot stand a heavy dose of upheaval. It is as if much of the European intelligentsia, after witnessing the shambles and crimes perpetrated by the "isms" it used to embrace, had turned away in horror, not merely from such "isms" but also from the kind of *prospective* they provided and perverted. The welcome rediscovery of those virtues dear to Camus—modesty and limits—has led to a retreat from political thought altogether. Since the air was foul, those who helped make it so have decided to stop breathing.

The intellectuals, through their writings and through the role they played in and around political parties, used to peddle visions of the future. While their wares may have reached only a small portion of the public, their influence was much broader; their ideas became known not only through the parties, but also because of another transmission belt—the system of education. Nowhere was schooling merely a set of training techniques, a transmission of accumulated usable knowledge, or a machine for "social reproduction." Not only in the Gymnasium, lycée, or public school attended by the few, but in primary education for the many, the school system transmitted values, formed citizens (some as responsible participants, some as obedient subjects), and provided them, more or less overtly, with images of the future. The educational system of the Third Republic, whose textbooks were written by distinguished scholars and intellectual administrators, propagated a vision of the future that combined the preservation of traditional French bourgeois values and the progressive unfolding of the Enlightenment—science, rationality, material gains, and increasing possibilities of self-determination for individuals long oppressed by routines or dogmas, as well as for nations. It was a remarkable blend of the traditional and the revolutionary, well-fitted to a society that resisted rapid changes in behavior and habits yet was permanently in love with the idea of change, the ideal of emancipation, and a self-image as a beacon of light. It is not a coincidence that the most influential intellectual godfather of schoolteachers before the First World War was Jaurès, a visionary who was also the finest product of his nation's culture and the very symbol of nineteenth-century optimism.

As in the intellectual world, we are now witnessing an eclipse of the future in the school system. It has been replaced with "present shock": a proliferation

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of options and subjects, an often frantic or overstuffed attempt at putting into the hands of the young as many tools as possible to help them understand and navigate in the present (hence a high rate of obsolescence and a breathless, permanent revision of curricula). To be sure, there is much of this kind of scurrying in America as well; but there, the beliefs of the *angewandte Aufklärung*[18] surround and give meaning to the disconnected bits and pieces. This is not the case in Western Europe. The public cult of growth is not a substitute, for it is a cult of means, not ends; and if there is one group that is often sullen, bitter, and hostile toward the cult, it is the teachers. Not only is their prestige falling, as I have pointed out before. But, trained to transmit established knowledge to pupils whose function it is to receive it, they are confronted instead with the need for their own permanent reeducation, with the duty to transmit methods and data that in a short time may prove to be wrong and with young men and women who are increasingly impatient with the old-style pedagogy. Both in reference to what is to be taught and how best to teach it, the very speed of change, already found partly responsible for the receding of the past, also contributes to the blackout of the future. The school is caught between students concerned above all with their own opportunities in nations marked by disruptive changes—as well as by vast surges for collective social ascent—and teachers who do not always comprehend the changes, and who often feel that in growth-obsessed societies they have lost much of the high ground they held in the days when efficiency, consumption, and the production of goods were not the highest values. The only function of the school seems to be running after (or behind) adjustment: its fate parallels that of European societies, which used to see themselves on top of their own fate in a world shaped by them. Yesterday, the school was a force for social integration that taught values drawn from the past and expectations about the future. Today, if it is such a force at all, it is as a purely functional agent of preparation for the present.

If "no model of civilization emerges from the present-day drifting culture, no call for reform and pioneering,"[19] if radical criticism so often turns out to be no more than criticism without a vision for replacement of what is to be destroyed, there is still another reason: the displacement of the intelligentsia by the media, or perhaps the rush of the intellectuals themselves to become (pardon the expression) "communicators" rather than creators. This is often seen as a means of remaining "relevant" in nations where the public no longer turns to its great writers for guidance—unless they write for mass consumption or appear on the screen. Indeed, the media have become a screen between the intellectuals and the public. The former feel that their only alternatives are isolation (which they fear) and capitulation (which they often seem to crave). I call it capitulation—not merely joining what one cannot fight—because the media impose their own constraints. Whether—depending on the country and the medium—they revel in muckraking or in celebration, they too tend to emphasize the present, either to condone or to condemn it. The past is a source of entertainment, the future a dangerous bone of contention. A few moviemakers may invent futures, but it is rare, and usually only to warn us about present trends (for example, Truffaut's *Fahrenheit 451*, which is based on a story by American Ray Bradbury). Television, in Europe, shuns the controversial for political reasons (as in France), scrutinizes the present to heighten citizen awareness (as in Eng-

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land and West Germany), or endlessly serves up old movies and adaptations of novels. The press, with few exceptions, sees its role as purveyor of information and analyses of the present; the recently created "ideas" page of *Le Monde* almost seems designed to highlight the plight of the modern intellectual—he sounds esoteric when he talks of his own research, and puerile when he tries to walk in the steps of the older thinkers and muse about anything outside his own field.

If the media are the daily opium, the provider of food in the citizen's daily life is the bureaucracy. Just as the media have pushed aside or domesticated the intellectuals, who used to invent futures, the bureaucrats have taken over the state, which used to choose one and build it. Ruling has become managing, and the bureaucracy manages us all, or almost all of us. "Marginalized" people—immigrant workers, or workers and employees who live in the shadow economy on which the visible one often relies for survival (as Suzanne Berger has shown),[20] shopkeepers, artisans, and peasants on their way out, or students parked in university ghettos with no job possibilities when they come out, may fall outside the bureaucracy's net. They are either living in a hopeless present or "recuperated" by nihilists. The citizens who perform in the carnival of growth, those who are under the net—with their bargaining power, institutions, and associations that are the essence of modern corporatism—are, for all the weapons at their disposal, *administrés*. Pressuring the bureaucracy on whose benefits, directives, incentives, and guidelines they depend is their constant concern as producers or consumers. (This is one reason why the use of the word *corporatism* is misleading: in orthodox corporatist theory, the groups are autonomous and have taken power away from the state; today, they are tied to it in symbiotic alliance or contest.) The bureaucracy also contributes to the general immersion in the present. True, there is some official concern with planning the future, but it is less a matter of vision than a question of deterrence; without foresight, without an evaluation of trends, an extrapolation of curves, there will be disasters, and the bureaucracy's role is to insure smoothness. But, almost by definition, it cannot begin with a utopia and provide the means to bring it about. It must start with the present, with today's notions of what is desirable (full employment, no inflation, better housing, the stability of families, adequate health care and schooling, growing productivity, sufficient supplies of energy, better working conditions); it then tries to insure that tomorrow will meet the standards and demands of today. I do not mean to suggest, as Henry Kissinger did, that bureaucracy is the born enemy of creativity and imagination; I would only point out that this is not its domain or its duty. The vision must come from somewhere else; when there is none, when no people or leader give them directives about the kind of future that ought to be created, then the bureaucracy's essence—the middle range, coping with what exists, trouble-avoidance, and predictability—occupies the whole scene. Its own weight, its importance in the daily affairs of Western European societies, tends to be rather overwhelming anyhow (much more so than in the United States, even in a country such as Italy, where the state is weak and the bureaucracy is far from efficient). The reasons are many: parliaments cannot cope, or else they try to do little more than protect special interests; so many ministers are managerial types or are easily tamed by the bureaucrats; the margins of choice are so small; and, above all, the economic and social functions of the state are so large. This situation not

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only seriously limits the leaders' capacity to realize whatever vision they may have; it also inhibits their ability to shape any vision at all. Everywhere in the capitalist world, the state that wants to avoid recession and inflation finds that its margin of maneuver is severely constrained by the dynamics, domestic and international, of the capitalist economy; the more extensive the functions and bureaucracy of the state, the more visible these constraints and the more inhibited the state's capacity to imagine and prepare a different future. It was fascinating to watch, in the French Socialist party, the struggle between the utopians and the "realists" (and, sometimes, between utopian and "responsible" fragments of a same personality, such as Michel Rocard). Societies doomed to constant efficiency and success are deadly not only for ideologies but for all far-reaching visions of the future.

Thus, none of the forces or institutions that used to breed visions of the future, and that also served as instruments of social integration and control, perform as innovators anymore. Another factor obliterates visions of the future. There are no outside models to inspire one and to allow one to say: see, my future is no utopia, since it already works somewhere else. Neither superpower is an inspiration. There are many reasons why America is not—even though Europe's model of growth and the techniques for promoting growth are borrowed from the United States. To Europeans, America is a supermarket, not a religion; one turns to it for recipes and goods, not for its spirit or for its value as a model of society. There is also the simple fact of America's power and presence: can the heir to a long and glorious past, the dreamer of a united Europe (whatever the failure of will and the blurred image of the past) legitimately accept the master's way of life as an ideal? Indeed, the more they lift or imitate, the more Western Europe's societies begin resembling America, at least superficially, and the more they are bound to proclaim that the borrowing is a means to something original. The difference in world power strengthens and inflames an old European tendency to cultural snobbery—how can one take as an ideal a nation whose cultural achievements do not measure up to one's own? This pose remains important, even in places such as England and Germany, where the next reason is not so strong. Europe's traditional ideologies, however irrelevant or faded in their power to describe a future, remain, with the single exception of liberalism, distant enough from American experience to serve as screens between it and the Europeans. It is not surprising to find in France, side by side, a Marxist critique of American capitalism and imperialism and a right-wing onslaught on American egalitarianism, commercialism, homogenization of cultures, pernicious universalism, and lack of aesthetic sense. "A corpse in good health," a source of perversion, degradation, and infection, a country which "drops everywhere the eggs of its ugliness"—these themes are spun by some Gaullists and also some neo-Fascists.[21] (However, the critique of capitalism and imperialism sometimes comes from the Right, the aesthetic critique from the Left, as in Werner Herzog's unforgettable movie *Stroszek*, whose antihero finally kills himself in the wasteland of America, the country of the cold and of artificial hens gone mad in an amusement gallery.) Moreover, as Aron has pointed out, America is a country whose idea of the future is nothing but the fulfillment of its ideals at birth:[22] it is not a prophecy, but a vindication (so that any crisis of values or institutions breeds a kind of fundamentalist revival). The Western

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Europeans find no such decalogue at their origins: their revolutions are either unfinished or have failed. For all these reasons, there have been more piecemeal imitations than overall celebrations of the American model. Finally, America's own ideal (but do Americans understand it?) is highly nationalistic: it is the realization of America's mission, it is the triumph at home and abroad of a certain conception of man's relation to God and to government, which was born in rebellion against and developed in separation from Europe. And so we have come full circle.

If America never became the ideal even when it was the example, the Soviet Union has ceased being either. "Eurocommunism" is not a very helpful concept. But what the three Communist parties of France, Italy, and Spain have in common is a deliberate distance from the Soviet Union—whether in the form of an open attack on the essence of the Soviet system, as in Carrillo's case; as jerky repudiations of key elements of the Soviet state and ideology, as in Marchais's; or in polite and friendly estrangement, as in Berlinguer's. The French example shows that it is more difficult to jettison the Nessus's tunic of a Leninist organization and frame of mind, than to get rid of the concept of proletarian dictatorship and the single-party state. Yet the lesson is clear: no significant Western European Communist party, except Portugal's, proposes the Soviet Union as a model of socialism; each one explains that Western European circumstances make it irrelevant. Moreover, the new generation of Communist voters knows more about the crimes of Stalin, thanks to the media, than older party members were ever allowed to guess. As for the savage kinds of communism or extremist Marxism, they are orphans. Whether they were of Trotskyite origin or not, they had always looked askance at the Soviet Moloch. They used to believe that the sun would rise in the Far East, in Mao's China; but the end of the Cultural Revolution and the fall of the Gang of Four have made them aware of a bitter fact: the Chinese model may not be so different from the Soviet one after all, whatever the national enmities and differences in levels of development and policies between the two. (One such orphan, the *Tel Quel* group of French intellectuals, having moved beyond Red China, has now discovered the United States as a country where, given capitalism's constraints, little may be accomplished but a lot is permitted: artistic experiments, group rebellions, experimentations—who would have thought that the search for spontaneity would cross the Atlantic, or rather the Pacific?)[23] Yugoslav workers' control is a dubious case; Guevara is dead; Castro is a Soviet client; and Régis Debray is a prize-winning novelist.

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We have once again come full circle. The fading of the national past could have meant the giving up of a narrow identity in preparation for and in favor of the adoption of a new broader European one. But this would have required an image of, a will for, a common future. *Tout se tient*: with no clear visions of the future, how can Frenchmen, Englishmen, etc., desire a *projet* for Europe? And if they are encased in their national present, how can they do anything but lose contact with a past that is both increasingly less vivid, less present, less relevant, and something of a reproach? How can they be more than conformists com-

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plying with a perplexing present, half-citizens half-protestors, or pure rebels whose revolt, when it does not merely express itself in terror, takes, as in May, 1968, the form of a half-finished blend of disparate, uprooted old ideas thrown into a Cuisinart for quick concoction? For a vision of the future as pure release, à la *Zéro de Conduite*, what slogan is more telling than "under the pavement, the beach"?

The disappearance of the past is partly a disappointment with that past—with what history and human action have wrought—thus it is very different from that deliberate historical break that revolutionaries intent on building a new order and creating a new man provoked in 1792, or in 1917, or in 1949 in China. It means exhaustion, not energy; drainage, not arson. In turn, the lack of a sense of the future has further depressed, devalued, and discolored the past; when one does not know where one is going, when there seems to be nowhere to go and nothing new and better to accomplish, what is the point of retracing one's steps? It takes a combination of faith in, ideas about, and will to build one's future to keep an interest in the past from becoming mere scholarship or leisure. There has been enough democratization, in the sense of a liquidation of the residues from the nondemocratic past, enough denationalization—even in France—enough "dis-ideologization" (pardon the word) to disenchant the past. But the result is a vacuum, not a will to build either a common European future, or a new national one. As we have seen, this is a story in which cultural, political, economic, and social factors all mix.

In the nineteenth century, the nations of Western Europe were marked by an original combination of lively, even heated ideological quarrels about different visions of the future, especially the political future; there was broad public consensus about the social order, the general direction, and the nation's role in the world. Those who felt left out had their own vision. Today, the quarrels are more about the present, and the public consensus, almost everywhere, is what I once called, for France, a consensus by default—the present is embraced less for its virtues than for its benefits (when they flow), less for its values than because any alternative is seen as either worse (whether it is the return of a frightening past experience or the imposition of the Soviet model) or more divisive. As a result, the continent that has always prided itself on its sense of roots and innovation appears more uprooted and less creative than the other model that makes Europeans so uncomfortable—the United States. Tocqueville's nightmare of disconnected individuals under a tutelary state is more present in Europe than in America. What he did not foresee was that individuals would also be disconnected from the past and the future, that voluntary associations (in which he saw a corrective to disconnection) would often only add group egoism to individual acquisitiveness, and that the state would be both bloated and trapped.

We are left then with two questions for morose or worried speculation. First, can one live forever in the economic present, comforting oneself with comparative statistics and a half-cozy, half-worried enjoyment of goods, freedom, and rights? Second, to what extent are the poverty of inspiration and imagination, the concentration on the here and now, related to the European nations' fall from international eminence? Are images of the past and visions of the future tied either to struggles for national identity or to the possibility of

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strutting on the world's stage, to fighting or speaking out for a great cause, national or not? France's intellectuals lost their voice at the moment when France ceased to be a pacesetter for other nations and a leader in world affairs. Britian's inability to have a clearer vision of its future than its partners cannot easily be explained as a result of the cult of growth (although it results in part from the penalties that must be paid for forgetting the criterion of efficiency). It can be explained in part by the "end of ideology"; for even though the scope of ideological battles was not as wide there as on the Continent, Britain was once inspired by deep political and religious creeds. Still, this explanation does not go far enough. Was not Britain's image of its future always associated with a vision of a great role in the world—and was not de Gaulle's intuition about the necessity of such a role as a goad to internal creativity correct after all? If there is such a connection, the plight of Western Europe is not likely to end. For if the fall from the heights has broken that part of the *élan vital* that expresses itself, not in daily work and often-successful responses to the challenges of growth, but in the ability to find stimulation in the past and to will a future, then the very imprisonment in the present, the vital impulse's engulfment in the daily adjustments and crises, make the recovery of a sense of time (backward and forward) and the discovery of a common will unlikely. And so, each nation remains encased in its present self, giving an occasional backward glance at the recent past for remorse or consolation and a worried glance at the near future. Only a uniting Europe that could look at the whole of its fragmented past would be able to will a future. But how can it emerge, if its members have neither the drive nor the necessary incentives to transcend themselves into Europe?

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[1]I want to express my gratitude to my friend and colleague Judith Shklar, whose comments and suggestions have been invaluable—as usual.

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SUZANNE BERGER

Politics and Antipolitics in Western Europe in the Seventies[1]

IN THE 1964 ISSUE OF *DAEDALUS* ENTITLED *A New Europe?*, the stability of the state and the predictability of the course of politics in advanced industrial European nations lay beyond doubt. Fifteen years later, these are the points most in question. The critical issue for Western Europe today is the capacity of the principal agencies of political life—party, interest group, bureaucracy, legislature—to manage the problems of society and economy, and, beyond coping, to redefine and rediscover common purposes.

Among the institutional failures of the past decade, those of the political parties stand out as critical. The late sixties and the seventies have been times of massive politicization and mobilization. That this surge of collective activity and new high levels of participation nowhere led to political transformation or even to major reforms but only to dead ends and deadlocks is principally due to the political parties: to the Left's failure to link its transformative vision to contemporary social conflicts and to define alternative strategies and outcomes; to the Center-Right's failure to replace the worn-out formulas of the fat years of growth with reformist strategies for the lean years; in general, to the parties' incapacity to translate new aspirations into political projects.

The question that this argument raises but cannot answer is whether the political parties are now at a point that lies along a curve of indefinite downturn and disintegration or, rather, whether the point we have now reached is the bottom of the curve. Such a problem did not arise in the earlier *Daedalus* issue, for there the evolution of politics appeared firmly hitched to the locomotives of social and economic development, and they ran along predictable and universal tracks. In retrospect, this linear developmental model, and the failure of those who interpreted societies in this way to understand the cyclicity of the social phenomena whose course they were charting by extrapolation from current trends, led to the flawed anticipations of the future. Today a loss of faith in the evolutionary/developmental view of industrial societies underlies the uncertainty about the future of politics. It inspires in this essay a far more modest ambition than that revealed in the first *Daedalus* issue, for the intellectual premises that would support construction of a picture of the Western European future based on this account of current dilemmas have been entirely undermined.

However sobering the current predicament of Western European government and opposition parties, we can hardly conclude that their continued stag-

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nation is inevitable. They still possess considerable resources—organizational, ideological, and material—to rebuild their bridges to society. The pressures on them and within them to do so are great and growing. And there are no obvious candidates to replace them. Where there are no parties, they are reinvented, as in Spain, where the party system that reemerged after forty years of dictatorship replicated the parties of the major European systems. Where parties are reinvented, the shape of the old prototypes molds the new materials, as in the new French Socialist party, which has reproduced the currents and struggles of the old Socialist party. The *cru* of the seventies may well end up in the bottles of the fifties.

I

From the perspective of the *Daedalus* authors of the sixties, the evolution of politics appeared to be traced out by the major social and economic transformations of the postwar period. That politics itself could become problematic is a possibility that barely surfaced in those essays. However mistaken and improbable, the assumption that the stability and efficacy of the contemporary state can be taken for granted must be considered seriously, if only because it was the point of departure from which disillusion and outright revolt began in the late sixties. The themes of the *Daedalus* essays reflected widespread expectations in West European societies as well, themes that were a source of optimism for the elites of the governing parties. Even the Left's concerns in the fifties and early sixties mirrored these social science predictions and general societal beliefs, as, for example, in the debate over whether the working class, the historic bearer of the Revolution, had become so integrated or deluded by the values of consumer society or so fragmented as no longer to be a revolutionary class.

The argument in brief was this: that modernization and industrialization—and the economic growth, affluence, and widening opportunities for education they generated—were erasing the lines of cleavage that generated antisystem conflict within European societies. Radical movements and ideologies of both Left and Right fed on discontents that were drying up in contemporary societies. The inequalities of income, status, and power that had given rise to all-out challenges to the state in the past were diminishing. These changes would, above all, be significant for the working class, which had been the least well integrated of all social groups in modern European states because of its poverty, dependence, and vulnerability and its consequent rejection of capitalism and the political system. Modernization and economic growth were making the working class affluent; the strength of working-class organizations compensated for the superior economic power of the capitalists. At the same time, universal education and the advent of mass consumer society were reducing the social significance of those goods which by nature can only be possessed by a few—titles of nobility, a Rolls-Royce, an Oxford education—and were replacing them with those goods which are available to all who have some money—Volkswagens, televisions, and university degrees. Thus the very wide differentials of income, status, and power of European societies in the past would be progressively narrowed, and the distinctive class groupings of these societies would disappear.

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The emergent social groups, so the argument ran, would be essentially the same all over Western Europe. What accounted for different axes of conflict in various European countries and for different patterns of social stratification was history. But with the spread of modern technologies, the expansion of the market, the diffusion of national institutions and values, and the disappearance of preindustrial vestiges, social and economic structures would develop that would be distinctively those of mature industrialism and no longer those determined, in any significant fashion, by the peculiarities of different national histories. The imperatives of industrialism would constrain the evolution of economic, social, and political systems and shape responses to new problems, thus producing a gradual convergence of all industrial societies, Western European included. Where "feudal," preindustrial classes, economic structures, or values were found, they could be explained as vestigial: destined to disappear without critically affecting the dominant structures of the industrial societies in which they incongruously continued. Where differences among Western industrial societies persisted, they were regarded as transitional or insignificant: transitional insofar as they affected the operation of the economy and the allocation of critical resources; insignificant if they were without consequence for efficiency, productivity, and growth. Politics, in this view of the world, appears to be a kind of residue: the precipitate of economic and social forces which it does not create or even set into motion.

The diversity of views on the proper scope of state intervention in the economy among the various Western European nations was great, but wherever arguments were advanced for a positive, activist role for the state, they tended to be the same ones: to push the economy and society along tracks laid down by the inherent properties of industrial economies. Such a push is needed, it was argued, to rectify the distortions and deficiencies that arise in societies in which the "logic of collective action" of rational self-interested individual actors makes it difficult or impossible to provide public goods through voluntary association. And secondly, action by the state may be needed to encourage economic actors to see and move in the direction of their own long-term interests, which the market, for whatever reasons, does not always reveal. By remedying the deficiencies of the market, the state would increase the likelihood of the pursuit of economic advantage by individual actors; in this way, the state would contribute to economic growth. Planning, for example, was seen as an exercise in coordination. The state brought together all economic actors and, by doing so, made it possible for them to acquire information and a kind of certainty about the future that they could not get from the market.

But whether the good the state was to provide was a plan or anti-inflationary measures or investment subsidies or highways, the expectation was that state intervention would be most effective when it served to reinforce and accelerate "natural" economic tendencies, and would be least effective when it aimed to change society and economy in accordance with political priorities. If political considerations led governments to decide to protect traditional producers against competition, or to build Concordes, or to introduce workers' self-management, then policy would bump into the inevitable constraints of running an industrial economy and would succeed in distorting its course only at costs so high as to make likely an ultimate reversal in course. Even those who advo-

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cated these "political" interventions usually admitted that constant pump-priming would be required to sustain them.

It would be impossible to overstate the extent to which this view of the role of the state in the economy depended on an assumption of economic growth: the indefinite progress of societies whose essential features were shaped by productive processes and whose systems of production were experiencing continuous innovation and expansion. Once the energy crisis and the deep economic recession of the seventies raised doubts about the possibility of continuing the postwar course of economic expansion, much of what had previously been taken for granted in society and the state was called into question. We are most concerned here with the impact of these changes on perceptions of the role of the state. The role of politics and of the state in advanced industrial nations had been obscured by rapid economic growth and by the far-reaching social transformations of the first two postwar decades. The radicality of these changes and their apparent autonomy from political direction had lent credence to the set of beliefs described above about the diminishing importance of choice and conflict within industrial societies. These views received fullest expression in the analyses of the end of ideology, a perspective that dominated the discussion of politics in the earlier *Daedalus* volume.

With the end of growth and the urgency of dealing with unemployment, stagnation, and inflation, and as the possibility loomed that problems of distribution could no longer be "solved" by increased affluence, the irreducible issues of priority, value, choice, and conflict lay once again exposed. There is no reason to believe that the role of the state in favoring the interests of certain producers, social groups, and regions over others was any less significant in the years of growth than over the past five years of recession. But where in the past the expectation of ever-larger slices of a growing pie tended to obscure both the inequality in the sizes of the pie slices and the role of the pie-server, today both of these points become salient. In short, the role of the state in society and in the economy has become far more transparent than ever before in the postwar period.

The main thesis of this essay is that the new transparence of the state's impact on daily life and a new perception of the relative autonomy of politics combine with the declining capacity of political institutions to produce a widespread reaction against the state, at the same time that they promote high levels of participation in politics. It is this disjunction between the growing politicization of everyday life and the decay of the parties that in the past articulated and aggregated demands, that best characterizes the current phase of Western European politics. The principal manifestation of these shifts can be found in the antiparty and antistate values of virtually all new political movements of both the Right and the Left in Europe today.

Obviously, this analysis of the current state of European politics applies better to some countries than to others. The cases of France and Italy are best accounted for by this diagnosis. But even in Britain and in West Germany, where the alternation of the major parties in power has maintained the vitality of party life, and where the absence of antistate challenges has left governments with room for maneuver and reform, many of the same symptoms are appearing. Whether or not the solutions found for Scotland and Wales "break up Brit-

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ain" into a federal state; whether or not the ecology and antinuclear *buergerinitiativen* ultimately replace the Free Democrats in the West German party system; still, the striking fact is that these challenges and others like them have acquired great significance in even the most stable of the European states. It will not be possible here to consider how much each of the countries is affected by similar tendencies, or even to look at the differential pattern of diffusion and impact of these trends. Rather, considering these tendencies as general ones today in advanced industrial societies, albeit with greater or lesser effect in various countries, we will try to explain why these issues arise now, what chances exist for a reabsorption of these discontents into traditional political channels, and what possibilities are opened for a transformation of European politics.

II

Three other long-term trends preceded and then converged with the end of growth to produce the new transparence of the state in society. The first was the growing responsibility of the state for matters that in the past had been left to the market or to individuals or to families. The expansion of the role of the state in the postwar period in regulating the economy and in providing security and welfare for individuals meant, as Walter Dean Burnham has put it, that the government was "now explicitly responsible for 'managing prosperity' . . . that governments and parties became widely perceived as accountable for decisions which affected the political economy. No longer was it a question of 'the nature of the times,' or things in general, but of concrete decisions which were made by identifiable individuals, and which could be unmade by themselves or by another set of individuals."[2] Expanded state intervention, in short, led to a politicization of matters that previously were perceived as outside the reach of political solutions.

At the same time, and working in the same direction, there was a long-term process of integration of the periphery. As industrialization, urbanization, and mass communications spread out into parts of European nations that had previously been sheltered by isolation and traditional structures, the state, too, extended and deepened its penetration and control of the periphery. These changes worked to make more visible the links between local and national societies and to underscore the dependence of the outlying regions on the centers of economic and political power. Economic vulnerability, which in a traditional agricultural economy appears as the consequence of man's dependence on nature, in the newly industrialized periphery appears as the consequence of a policy of industrial decentralization that leaves head offices and plants with advanced technologies in the center while "putting out" those parts of industrial operations that are most subject to conjunctural fluctuation. Political dependence, which once meant negotiating with local notables, now increasingly requires dealing with agents of the central government. The issue is not only one of a change in the cast of characters; but, equally important, of a vast increase in the number of interactions with the state.

The third and most recent shift that worked toward the rediscovery of politics was revival of debate in all political quarters over the purposes of the

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state. In the first two decades of the postwar era, the answers to "where are we going" seemed evident. Left and Right saw different long-term outcomes, but there was considerable agreement in the assessment of the short run, and within each camp, though not between them, considerable certainty about the shape of the future. The question of "where *ought* we to be going" did not appear to be on the agenda.

One reason for the absence of debate on the latter question was its implied voluntarism about the uses to which state power could be put in directing society and economy to desired ends. The ideologies of Right and Left in the first postwar decades all assumed too mechanistic a relationship between social and economic transformation and politics (albeit with different political outcomes in Right and Left scenarios) to make the question a meaningful one at the level of "high" political debate. It was not that consensus prevailed: indeed, various studies suggested wide disagreement within many of the Western European societies on the ends and means of politics.[3] For whatever reasons, these disagreements did not surface in any important way until the mid-to-late sixties, at which point they exploded everywhere.

The most spectacular challenge to the system arose in France in May, 1968, with a massive questioning, at first by students, but then by substantial segments of virtually all social groups, of the ways of life and relations of authority promoted by advanced industrialism. In Italy, too, protest was widely diffused in society and its target was all major social institutions. In West Germany and England, social and political protest was largely concentrated in universities, but even in these countries, where few groups beyond students were directly involved, the resonance of the themes the challengers raised and the mobilization of a massive counterattack against them suggested the questions had struck home.

In retrospect, two aspects of the challenges of the late sixties are striking. First, the protest movements everywhere preceded the economic crisis and thus reflected a rejection of a society and state that were perceived as affluent and expansive. These are not reactions against new deprivation and insecurity. Although a worsening of the job market for university graduates and a slight increase in unemployment in France and Italy have been held responsible in some accounts for the outbreak of the revolts in universities and factories, the case that these challenges reflect an anxious premonition about threatened affluence is not supported by the magnitude of the labor market shifts, or by the change in fortunes of the groups that were mobilized, or by the themes of the protest itself. Rather, in all the countries what seems to have been at stake was an explosion of doubt about the quality and direction of life in advanced industrial societies, about the kind of human relationships that develop in mass consumer societies, about the irreconcilability of the kinds of organization required to run an industrial society with the values and personal relationships that are necessary for the satisfaction of deep human needs. This was a protest not against the failure of state and society to provide for economic growth and material prosperity, but against their all-too-considerable success in having done so, and against the price of this success.

The second striking fact about these movements was their essential similarity, despite variation in the triggering causes and in the specific national targets.

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Three themes were central. The first was a rejection of affluence as an adequate justification for the existing social arrangements or as a sufficient goal for political action. What was involved here was not so much a rejection of material prosperity in and of itself—though in some places this note was sounded—but a refusal to consider that a state and society are legitimized merely by the provision of ever-increasing sums of material goods to its members.

Next, these movements rejected as mechanical and irresponsible the dominant theories of social evolution of both the Left and the Right. The new radicals could justify neither the elites' confidence in the indefinite progress of societies made ever more harmonious and prosperous with the advance of science and technology, nor the Left's confident expectation that history would, despite all apparent reverses, bring the Revolution and the promised land of socialism. The new radicals argued that men can make history as they will and that those who yield before economic or technological or social determinisms are abdicating responsibility for their own fates. In this discourse, spontaneity, imagination, will, and politics emerge as the critical human activities.

Finally, while making collective action the key to achieving the society they desired, the new radicals rejected recourse to the traditional political agents. They were determinedly antiparty, anti-interest group, antibureaucratic, anti-institutional. The protesters of the sixties were the first to express that rejection of the state which was to become the common core of belief of much of the new politics of Western Europe.

The end of growth, the expanded role of the state, the protest of the sixties—though each of these had distinct and autonomous origins and was fueled by different forces and pressures—all converged in a single result: the increased transparence of political power and of the state. That this should produce massive political reactions is hardly surprising. But in the past in Western Europe, movements that formed in response to a newly perceived salience of the state usually tried to *capture* the state and turn it to their ends. In the seventies, the dominant political response to the new transparence of the state has been to try to *dismantle* it, not to take it over. While this response is not without precedent in European history—the conservative Right often proposed this in the nineteenth century—never before has this conception of politics shaped new political ideas on both the Left and the Right. What has to be explained is why virtually all new political groups and thought in Western Europe have come to focus, in one way or another, on the issue of the breakup of the state; why virtually all new political organization has taken place outside the orbit of the political parties.

III

The convergence of the new politics of Left, Right, and Center on the issue of dismantling the state reflects a deep loss of confidence about the possibility of using the state to good end. This pessimism has its origin in three distinct considerations that, however mutually contradictory, nonetheless reach the same conclusions. The first is an analysis that finds the state less and less able to perform even its traditional functions as society becomes "ungovernable." The second is in a way the opposite view: that the state is becoming infinitely more

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powerful and individuals and society less and less capable of resistance. And the third view is one that holds that the existence of the state with its current scope and attributes is incompatible with the realization of fundamental human aspirations (for ethnic self-determination, for participation, for preserving the natural environment, and so forth). From these very different premises, all three of these lines of argument conclude with the call to reduce the scope of state authority, either by parceling it out to subnational groups (regions or citizens' groups or producers' associations) or by supplanting political modes of allocation of resources by other mechanisms, the most commonly proposed being the market.

The "Crisis of Governability"

Those who define the current dilemmas of European politics as a "crisis of governability" have lost faith in the efficacy of government because of what they see as a permanent and widening gap between the demands placed on the state and what the state can do. The evidence marshalled to prove the existence of such a crisis is invariably drawn from the state's failures in social and economic policy. In trying to cure inflation with unemployment, governments have only succeeded in bringing about "stagflation." In trying to reduce inequality, governments have succeeded only in creating disincentives for investment and in institutionalizing a "welfare class" whose new entitlements are a growing drain on state resources. In providing university education for larger and larger segments of the population, the state has not really promoted mobility, but it has created an educated population whose expectations about jobs cannot be satisfied. The common feature of these failures—the list of which could, indeed, be considerably lengthened—is that the action of the state is doubly counterproductive. Not only does state policy fail to achieve its objectives, but in attempting to do so, it creates new expectations that become just as many new problems.

Different accounts of the crisis of governability stress different factors in its etiology. On the Left, James O'Connor's widely debated analysis of the fiscal crisis of the state explains the overburdening of government by state expenditures to support capital accumulation and the profitability of private enterprise.[4] In bailing out capitalism, the state becomes more and more heavily indebted. Center-Right theories of the crisis of governability in part overlap O'Connor's account in stressing the weight of new demands on government. But where the Left finds business at the source of government's increasingly heavy commitments, the Center-Right focuses on public expectations about governmental provision and performance. Expectations have become inflated both because of the postwar experience of continuous increase in standards of living and because of the democratic system, which promotes a competitive bidding by parties for the electorate that drives up public expectations of governmental performance.[5] Equally important in overtaxing government capability is the growing complexity of societies, hence the increasing difficulty in trying to resolve social and economic problems from the center, or, indeed, in trying to solve them at all.

On the supply side, those who find the ungovernability of society the problem of our times point to inherent features of advanced industrial societies that

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reduce the political resources necessary for stable, effective government. In particular, a decline in respect for authority, deference, and compliance, and increases in political interest and desire for participation deprive the state of forms of support that have been crucial in the past. Samuel Huntington has argued for the United States that the "excess of democracy" of the sixties—the surge in participation and politicization—has increased expectations while diminishing authority. In democratic societies with liberal, participatory, and egalitarian ideals, governments work well only as long as there is no mass mobilization around these values, that is, as long as too many groups do not draw on the bank at the same time. He writes: "The effective operation of a democratic political system usually requires some measure of apathy and non-involvement on the part of some individuals and groups. In the past, every democratic society has had a marginal population, of greater or lesser size, which has not actively participated in politics. In itself, this marginality on the part of some groups is inherently undemocratic, but it has also been one of the factors which has enabled democracy to function effectively."[6] In advanced industrial and post-industrial societies, with the integration of all major social groups and their increased participation, the leeway for government is reduced, with a consequent "danger of 'overloading' the political system with demands which extend its functions and undermine its authority."[7] For England, John Goldthorpe has argued that inflation must be explained sociologically, by the disappearance of such preindustrial attitudes as deference that once restrained the working class from punching its full weight in the marketplace.[8] These conclusions, like Schumpeter's before them, rest essentially on the view that the values needed to legitimize and stabilize mature industrial states cannot be generated within them but can only be drawn from outside them, from some precapitalist or predemocratic stock. When the stock runs out, the only hope—and it is a slim one—is that people will be so satisfied with the material rewards provided by their societies, or so apathetic, that questions about purpose and priority remain unasked.

If the fundamental sources of governmental overload and incapacity were in fact tendencies inherent in democratic, mature industrial societies, it would follow that the decline in authority cannot be reversed, at least not by public policy. All the state can and should do is prevent a further inflation of claims that it will not be able to honor. For this, it ought to be relieved of functions it cannot perform. And yet, the evidence for a radical and irreversible postwar transformation of values, attitudes, and expectations is not clear. Despite unemployment at levels unknown since the Great Depression, falling real wages, and wide inequalities, there has been no mass protest in Western European societies, nor even any major shifts in patterns of partisan support that can be attributed to disappointed expectations. How can one then argue that government's inability to implement an economic policy that would effectively stop inflation is due to public pressures to maintain and raise the current standard of living?

The heart of the matter is, rather, pessimism about the efficacy of the state, and this persists even when society demonstrates remarkable stability and passivity in the face of economic problems unprecedented in the postwar period. Even if it were the case that societal changes explain the weakening of the state's grip on the world, few remedies could be proposed at this level. Rather, the

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only solution that proceeds logically from this perspective is to transfer tasks currently performed by the state to some other area for decision. Indeed, in much of the literature on the "new corporatism" the argument is that the state has *already* responded by shifting to major producer groups the authority to make binding decisions for all within their jurisdiction, and that in exchange for this delegation, the groups relieve the state of some of the burdens it can no longer shoulder. Although commentators on corporatism are many, its advocates are few. More numerous are the supporters of two other mechanisms for unloading the state: political decentralization, on the one side, and a transfer of decisions out of politics and into the market, on the other. However logically distinct corporatism, decentralization, and the market are as resource-allocating processes, they serve analogous functions in this analysis of the decrease in governmental capability.

The Modern State as "la barbarie à visage humain"

While one cluster of politicians, intellectuals, and publics has proclaimed the impotence of the contemporary European state, another set has discovered that this state is only too powerful. Unless the state is resisted, they say, and unless all efforts to extend its authority to new realms, as socialism would, are resisted, mankind is condemned to servitude.

In the new attack on the state as a Leviathan advancing only by crushing individual and societal initiative and autonomy, two different enemies are sometimes distinguished, sometimes confounded: socialism and political power as such. Reaction against socialism has taken different forms in Western Europe over the past two decades. In some countries antisocialism remains primarily anticommunism of the traditional variety. This is the case in West Germany, where the proximity of the East keeps alive fears about communism, and in Italy, where the Communist party is the principal challenger of the Christian Democratic majority. But in none of the European countries has traditional anticommunism entirely lost its appeal. Jacques Chirac's campaign demonstrates how well the old themes still work even where anticommunism and foreign policy preferences work at cross-purposes and where the Communist party has no chance of forming a government.

Two other phenomena are at work to make antisocialism salient for groups in the population that are relatively unaffected by the old anticommunism. First, there is a reaction against socialism in the form of the welfare state, for stifling individual initiative and autonomy, for excessive social leveling, for forcing social life into a bureaucratic corset. This kind of protest has become important especially in Scandinavia and in England. In Scandinavia, it has fueled the advance of new parties (Glistrup in Denmark) and contributed to the electoral defeat of the Social Democrats in Sweden. In England, Margaret Thatcher's rise to the head of the Conservative party owes much to the same shifts in opinion that are at work in the Scandinavian countries. Neo-laissez-faire economics here combines with traditional conservative antisocialism.

The second and more recent source of antisocialism comes from the "new Left," those radical groups that grew up outside of—and against—the traditional parties of the Left. The first crystallization of these currents to the left of the

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Communists formed around Maoism, perceived by the radicals as a system of political ideas and organization that has realized communism without the bureaucratization and technocratic rationality that triumphed in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and to which the local Communist parties are tied by their commitment to the Soviet Union. Although there were very few Maoists, the resonance of their ideas was considerable. A denial of technological determinism, an egalitarianism that is deliberately antieconomistic, the high value set on spontaneity, participation, and mobilization, the rejection of political and social hierarchy and of their bureaucratic embodiments in factory, party, and state—these themes repeated and kept alive the ideas of 1968 in France, 1969 in Italy. The Maoists linked them to a long-term political project: to occupy political space on the left of the Communist parties, and from there to launch attacks against both the parties of government and the traditional Left, seen now as two embodiments of the same bureaucratic will to dominate and regiment society. In one case we have the power elite of the dominant social classes; in the other, the power elite of the Left that aspires to power; in both, bureaucracies that deploy the groups they claim to represent as troops in battles whose stakes are not the transformation of state and society and the liberation of man, but only the transfer of power from one set of rulers to another. As André Glucksmann, one of those who moved from Maoism to the "new philosophy," expressed it:

> Marx was fooling himself. What did one gain by replacing a capitalist by a bureaucrat? Axiom: the masters only hand over power to other masters. Not because of bad will or egotism. Because, whether "capitalist" or "socialist" power remains the power to abstract, and because abstract reasoning, conceptualization, is domination. (Hegel) The *maîtres penseurs* have never gone beyond delicate, subtle, and interminable commentaries from the point of view of the rulers. In their eyes, the ruled, limited by their concrete and particular concerns, do not have a point of view.[9]

This argument had widest resonance in Italy, where the Communist party proposed a "historic compromise" that would bring it into power with the ruling Christian Democrats. Here the space to the left of the Communist party was occupied first by the Manifesto group, intellectuals who had broken with the party, and then by a wildly proliferating and diversifying cluster of parties and circles: Maoist, Marxist-Leninist, *autonomi*, "metropolitan Indians," and varieties of terrorists.

Although these groups proclaimed themselves communist and socialist, they failed to develop any clear political, social, and economic projects. Their strong anti-Communism had the effect of reinforcing antisocialist currents fed by other sources in society. They are the direct ancestors and inspiration for the *nouveaux philosophes*, a group of French intellectuals who have moved to an all-out attack on socialism. The apparent catalyst for their appearance and crystallization as an intellectual force was the publication of Alexander Solzhenitsyn's *Gulag Archipelago* and Solzhenitsyn's subsequent expulsion from the Soviet Union. Since the facts recounted by Solzhenitsyn were hardly unknown in the West, it is curious that their "discovery" by a group of young French philosophers should provoke such a shift of intellectual climate. One reason may be the relative imperviousness of French culture to facts reported as such and its relative open-

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ness to literary productions.[10] But the deeper cause of this popular success surely lies in the new philosophy's reformulation of the antipolitics of May in a full-scale assault on political power. It is not simply socialism that leads to the concentration camp, in the view of the new philosophers; it is all of modern political thought from the Enlightenment. In this argument, "the totalitarian state—the state reinforced, objectified, completed—is the quintessential state."[11] As Bernard-Henri Lévy argued, all political conceptions of the world are oppressive, and the only moral stance is to resist the powers-that-be and the powers-that-would-be.[12]

Finally, the *nouveaux philosophes* in their affirmation of the autonomy of politics focus on the consequences of the rejection of economic and technological determinism that was first expressed by the Left at the end of the sixties. Here they seized on Pierre Clastres's anthropological studies of "societies without states."[13] Clastres concludes:

> The major division of society, the one that gives rise to all the others including undoubtedly the division of labor, is the new vertical relation between base and summit: the great political gap between the wielders of force, whether armed or religious, and those dominated by force. Political power relations precede and found relations of economic exploitation. Before being economic, alienation is political; power is before work; economics is derived from politics. The emergence of the State determines the appearance of classes.[14]

If politics is at the root of all human oppression, there is no need to ground political projects in socioeconomic analysis. In fact, the problems of inequality, scarcity, exploitation, unfulfilling work, the values of mass consumer society—all the issues that were at the heart of the concerns of both the liberals and the Marxists in the postwar period—evaporate from the new philosophy.

The New Politics Outside

However curious the antipolitics of the *nouveaux philosophes*, the far more significant response to the experience of the state's deadening weight in individual and social life is that expressed in the vast new wave of collective activity outside traditional political institutions. The ecologists, the regional ethnic movements, the antinuclear power protesters, the *autogestionnaires* of the French Socialist party and the Confédération Française et Démocratique du Travail (CFDT), the feminists, even the new *poujadistes* are all working out of similar analyses of contemporary politics and, in the process, reinventing common political ideas and forms of participation. The first notion that these disparate groups share is a rejection of the determinisms—economic, technological, historical—of the old ideologies. The ecologists and the antinuclear power protesters attack the view that advanced industrial societies must pursue economic growth at all costs, including those of destruction of the natural environment and the risk of nuclear disaster. They reject not only the notion of a technological imperative, but also the exercise of power by technocrats, whose expertise camouflages under the cover of false necessity the real political stakes in the choice of particular technologies and forms of industrial organization. The new *poujadistes*, Nicoud's Comité d'Information et de Défense-Union Nationale

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de Travailleurs Indépendants (CID-UNATI), the left-wing peasant organization Mouvement de Défense des Exploitations Agricoles Familiales (MODEF), make much the same argument in defense of their property and economic activity, against the claim that "progress" requires that they be left to the tender combined mercies of the market and the Plan (whether that of national or Common Market experts), and eventually eliminated.

For the ethnic nationalistic movements, the determinism that must be exposed and exploded is that of the inevitable triumph of the (British, French, Belgian, Spanish) nation-state within its present boundaries. Here the enemy is a double one: the liberal economistic notion that small states are not viable; and the Marxist view that the bourgeois state can only be toppled by a working-class revolution. As Tom Nairn, a Left partisan of Scottish nationalism, has summed up the Marxist critique:

> Proletarian socialism is supposed to be the grave-digger, and no one else will do. So they tell the nationalists to drop their shovels and put up with the pathetic limits of "devolution": the revolution will solve their problems along with the others. Meanwhile they should wait until the time is ripe—i.e., the time for socialism—taking a firm grip on their petty bourgeois, backward-looking impulses.[15]

To the liberals the ethnic nationalists reply that Scotland or Brittany or Wales or Catalonia might well be better off without the albatross of the metropolis around its neck (in Scotland, read "around its oil"). To the Marxists they argue that "neo-nationalism has become the grave-digger of the old state . . . and as such the principal factor making for a political revolution of some sort," and that the "breakup of Britain" will accelerate the advent of Socialism.[16]

The second common theme of the new political activists is the discovery of the centrality of power for the realization of their projects. In the case of the ethnic nationalists, the point is obvious: they want not just cultural expression in their own language, schools, folklore, or whatever, but a state.

In the early sixties the rise of citizens' movements oriented to concrete economic and social reforms or to local and regional issues was often read as a symptom of depoliticization, since these organizations did not identify themselves with any of the traditional ideologies of the Left or the Right. But today, even groups of this kind who reject recourse to the state to achieve their ends are clearly political movements; what is new is that collective action to transform relations of power in society is not equated with action through the state and traditional political institutions. The new groups believe that their objectives can only be reached through politics, but through democratic, participatory politics. Where Jacobins and Marxists see power as legitimate when put in the hands of the people's representatives and exercised for the common good, the new radicals denounce the illusion of the "general will" and demand that both the goals and means of politics be left to natural constituencies. The *autogestionnaires* demand that authority in the factory be regulated through the participation of all workers; the ecologists claim that a region's population should have the power to control changes in its environment. The locus of critical choices and conflicts in contemporary societies is not, in these analyses, at the level of high politics, but rather in society itself. Alain Touraine has written: "Today, social movements can have no other aim than the very existence of social life

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against the growing technocratization of society and against the system of rules, decisions, and information which leave no room for exchange, discussion, and communication, because they permit the concentration of power within the apparatus."[17] The role of intellectuals is to identify and work within these new "class conflicts" in order to preserve and to enlarge the autonomy of social initiative and choice.

The new agents, conflicts, and values are political; but they cannot be integrated into traditional political institutions. The third common ground of the new politics is the discovery that the state and the parties are insurmountable obstacles to the satisfaction of important social needs. Only by dismantling the state and limiting the sphere of competence of the parties can these new objectives—whether particular policies, or types of participation, or kinds of social relationships—be realized. Political parties and the state both pretend to a global representation of the interests of the citizenry; in fact, they limit, constrain, and ultimately undermine these interests. Jacques Julliard has expressed better than anyone this struggle between the new politics and the old political institutions in *Contre la politique professionnelle.* He concludes with an attack on parties in general—"You say you want to give back power to workers and to citizens? To make the state wither away? So begin by withering away the party!"—and on his own party, the Socialists, in particular:

> Will the Socialist party, rather than becoming the pale shadow of Leninism of which the CERES dreams, innovate and find sufficient social imagination to design a new type of political group, based on openness, rather than on discipline, on contract rather than loyalty oaths? Will it agree to be the Trojan horse of a civil society in full expansion, in full vitality, rather than the repository of all the old recipes and moribund doctrines? It would be wonderful—but all the same, rather surprising—if the Socialist party would substitute for the eternal cry of all victorious majorities—*toutes les places et tout de suite!*—the demand of *autogestionnaire* democracy—*Une place pour chacun! De la place pour tous!*[18]

But alongside the question "Will the parties give way?" one might well ask: What would Europe be like as a sea of islands of self-managing socialism?

IV

As new ideologies and movements grew up outside the arena of traditional politics, within the arena there was a long-term decay of the collective agents of representation that once would have channeled new forces into the system: the political parties. This failed connection—between the parties, on the one side, and the new political ideas and organizations, the intense and proliferating activity of citizens' groups sprung up around newly perceived political grievances, on the other—is the great missed opportunity of the last decade and the main cause of the weakness of political will and imagination.

Throughout Western Europe, in the "healthy" democracies as well as in the sick ones, the political capacity of government and opposition parties has been declining. The observation is one that few observers of the European scene fail to make. The evidence can be found in almost every sphere of party functioning. With respect to recruitment of members, for example, in Western Germa-

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ny there are estimated to be as many members of the citizens' movements as there are members of political parties. The slackening grip of the major parties on their electorates shows up in the success of new party entrants—the Radicals in Italy, ecologists in France and Germany, Glistrup in Denmark, the Scottish Nationalist party in Great Britain. In Britain there has been a marked decline in the strength of the two major parties: from 1951 to 1974, the proportion of the popular vote won by the Conservatives and Labour fell from 97 percent to 75 percent. The number of seats held by the small parties, while not increasing in proportion to their new votes, still went up from 13 to 39 (October, 1974).[19] The decreased weight of party within the legislative process, the weakness of party in negotiations with interest groups and with the bureaucracy, and growing intraparty conflicts that make it ever more difficult to formulate party policy—all these phenomena can be found in greater or lesser measure in all of Western Europe. Though the pattern varies from country to country, and some countries, notably France, and some parties, notably the Communists, stand out, still the general tendency is clear.

Most commentators on current European politics find the causes of party decay in "growing social complexity," in the increased level of social demands and entitlements that makes government less successful (see the crisis of governability arguments) and also, for the same reasons, makes the articulation and aggregation of interests by parties ever more difficult. It is striking that both conservatives and radicals offer variants of this explanation.[20] No one would deny that the load on government becomes heavier when the state takes on functions once performed by market or family or local communities and creates new expectations about the provision of security and welfare. And yet, this explanation of political decay that blames increasing levels of social demand and complexity hardly seems a sufficient account, particularly if one considers the United States or Japan, both societies with comparable social burdens but with few if any signs of the Western European patterns of political revival outside the parties; or if one remembers that Western Europe's political troubles predate the energy price hikes and the economic recession. Rather what is striking in Western Europe are the political causes of the current political crisis. Even after recognizing the importance of the increasing state burden—borne by all advanced industrial states—still there stands out as critical in Western Europe the relative autonomy of the political processes that have undermined the political institutions' capacity for movement.

It may seem excessive to define as crisis the political situation of a Europe in which most governments have good chances of being returned in the next election and have as their only mortal enemies some tiny terrorist groups with supporters that in no country number over a few thousands. And yet, the climate in France before the 1978 legislative elections and in Italy in the wake of the Moro kidnapping, the apocalyptic tone of British debate over the economy and the proposed breakup of the state, all suggest a widespread sense of the fragility of the old political system and a despair about the capacity of today's politicians and institutions to begin putting elements of a new order into place.

The main political processes that have undermined the old institutions, without building new ones to replace them, are three: the erosion of the "catch-all" parties of government, the failed transformation of the Left, and the pro-

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gressive decoupling of party and legislative power. While in this essay it will hardly be possible to do more than to sketch out in rough fashion the dimensions of each, the central fact is of their cumulative impact on the political system of the two postwar decades.

The End of the Catch-all Party

The first of these shifts has been the transformation and narrowing of the social bases of the principal parties of government. This phenomenon has been most marked in France and Italy, where the Gaullists and the Christian Democrats provided the classic examples of "catch-all people's parties," parties appealing to the whole population for votes, unlike class-based parties that mobilized particular segments of the electorate.[21] These parties presented themselves as "interclassist" and in fact, until the late sixties, both drew substantial support from all classes. The composition of their electorates closely matched the socioeconomic composition of the population. The most revealing measure of the interclassist nature of these Center-Right parties was their success in winning working-class votes. In France through the first decade of the Fifth Republic, one-third of the blue collar working class voted Gaullist.[22] And in Italy, Paolo Sylos-Labini has estimated that 35 percent of the working class voted Christian Democrat (DC) in 1968.[23]

The emergence of the catch-all people's party was interpreted as part of a larger phenomenon, the modernization of European politics, with the disappearance of ideological parties and the rise of parties with pragmatic, broad-based appeals to the electorate. Although the function of ideology in enlarging or limiting the electorate of the catch-all parties was not altogether neglected in the theory of the catch-all party, it was considered distinctly secondary.[24] In retrospect, however, the nationalism personified in General de Gaulle, the Catholicism represented in the organizations, traditions, and values of the DC, appear to have been far more important elements in the construction of catch-all party coalitions than was recognized. In France, after de Gaulle's departure from power, the electorate of the Union Démocratique Républicaine (UDR) began to narrow. Blue collar workers who had constituted 27 percent of the Gaullist electorate in 1965 were 22 percent of the majority electorate in 1973 and 17 percent in 1976.[25] Middle-strata cadres and employees who were 20 percent of the Union pour la Nouvelle République (UNR) electorate in 1965 were 16 percent of the majority electorate in 1973 and 14 percent in 1976. Over the same period, the traditional groups in society came to constitute a more significant part of the majority's electors: farmers who had been 13 percent of the UNR electorate in 1965 were 13 percent of the majority electorate in 1973 and 24 percent in 1976. Retired persons and those without profession, who had been 24 percent of the Gaullist electorate in 1965, were 30 percent of the majority's electorate in 1976.

In Italy the interclassist appeal of the DC was inextricably connected to the strength of Catholic values, traditions, and organizations, incorporated in a subculture whose members were loyal DC electors. With the erosion of the Catholic subculture, the spillover from religious practice to political choice has been reduced. Electors who once felt bound by religious conviction to vote for the

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DC are now free to shift their ballots.[26] The party's reduced leverage on practicing Catholics increases the probabilities not only of loss of the DC's working-class electors, but also of its women and youth.[27]

The effects of the weakening of the Catholic supports of the catch-all party have only begun to appear in electoral behavior. Until the seventies, the Italian electorate was remarkably stable, despite generational turnover and geographical mobility. Even in 1976, the Communists' great electoral leap forward did not so much draw on defectors from the Center-Right as on electors casting ballots for the first time and on transfers of votes from other Left parties.[28] The decline in the interclassist appeal of the DC is still in an early phase; nonetheless, with the withering away of the links that tied Catholic electors to the party, the same set of changes appear to be in progress in the DC as in the Gaullist party, with the same results: a decline in the working-class, white collar, and urban electorate. As Arturo Parisi and Gianfranco Pasquino commented on the 1976 legislative elections:

> Perhaps the most worrisome aspect of the June 20 election was the likely concentration of working class and lower class votes on the PCI and of the votes of the small and medium bourgeoisie on the DC, which creates the *bases* for the radicalization of Italian political life, especially since, with such a composition, the DC electorate seems prepared to do all to defend its material interests.[29]

In Britain, too, there has been a weakening of the ties that once committed a given segment of the electorate to a given party. Class has become a progressively less important determinant in voting. By 1964, 58 percent of the electorate identified with the party naturally associated with their class; by 1974, only 51 percent.[30] But far from working to expand the social base of the Conservative party, these shifts appear rather to have had the opposite effect, as in France and Italy. Working-class support for the Conservatives has not expanded with the decline of class politics, and there have been substantial middle-class defections to Labour.[31] While the fact of the narrowing of the Conservative party's base is a matter of great concern to the Conservatives—since their future hinges on being able to keep middle-class electors and expand their appeal among the working class—the government of the country has not been substantially affected by the changes. The shifts have worked to widen the base of the Labour party, which, now in government, is obliged to negotiate the trade-offs that the increasingly diverse interests of its electorate require.

In France and Italy, though, it is the parties of government that have had their bases narrowed, and the parties in seemingly permanent exile from government that are experiencing a widening of their appeal. The consequences for politics have been significant. The Center-Right parties increasingly resemble coalitions of the most advanced and the most backward groups in the country, and their incentives for reaching out to the working-class or to the middle strata of the electorate—indeed their possibilities for doing so—thereby decline. The more important it becomes to keep the traditional electorate, and the more necessary the old themes of conservative defense of their maintenance in power, the less able they are to respond to new currents of opinion in the country or to make the accommodations in organization and program that would be needed to win over new segments of the electorate. All this was

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played out in the debate between Chirac and Giscard d'Estaing over the strategy for the majority in the 1978 legislative elections. Chirac argued that the key to conservative success lay in mobilizing the faithful around the tried and true themes of anticommunism and the preservation of a bourgeois France in which small independent proprietors and big capital can both find a place. Giscard argued for a liberal policy of reforms, a certain leveling of privilege and of income differentials, and for an *ouverture* to the working and middle classes that would separate from the Left those groups that want reform but not revolution. The majority won: not because of the reforms it promised, but because of the dangers it conjured up of chaos in the wake of a Left victory. That the parties of government, in France and Italy at least, are less and less representative of the population at large—are less and less catch-all and, instead, catch the peculiar alliance of the traditional and the capitalist sectors of society—paralyzes the reformers within the Center-Right. It cripples initiative, imagination, and policy. As their electoral bases narrow, the parties of government become progressively less capable of channeling the ferment in ideas and interests in the country into the arena of policy-making. And the gap between *le pays politique* and *le pays réel* widens.

The Failed Transformation of the Left

The successes of the European Left parties in the postwar decades have come chiefly from jettisoning old ideologies and programs; the failures, from an inability to develop alternatives that would both satisfy the core groups in their old constituencies and respond to the interests of newly mobilized strata of the population. The British Labour party and the German Social Democrats are the best examples of Left parties that have come to power and are on the way to becoming the "natural" parties of government. Their triumph is the result of changes in party image, goals, program, and organization that made the prospect of the Left in power acceptable and even desirable to once-resistant electors. Under quite different circumstances, and starting from positions much further from power and from popular acceptance, the Communist parties of Italy and Spain, and to a lesser extent France, appear to have become more successful as they abandoned old tenets of belief and old organizational practices.[32] Shedding their unconditional support for the Soviet Union, the "*ouvrierisme*" and sectarianism of the fifties, and Stalinist organizational practices within the party, these parties are now increasingly regarded as legitimate contestants for power.

In moving away from their pasts, the Left parties have innovated not by a transformation in their vision of society, nor even by the incorporation of new elements into their programs, but rather by the selective discarding of some parts of the past and the development of other elements of their heritage. In the case of the Italian Communists, for example, the *compromesso storico*, the strategy of social alliance of the working class with middle-class, peasant, and petit bourgeois groups and of political alliances with the Christian Democratic party, draws on Gramsci's analyses of the twenties and Togliatti's of the immediate postwar period. The renunciations of further nationalization of industry, of opposition to NATO in Italy; of the dictatorship of the proletariat in France; of

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Leninism in Spain—are new: the so-called innovations build on other parts of the party inheritance. But the parties have not succeeded in latching on to the new social demands and the new alignments of interest in the country; there has been no major reworking of Left ideology, programs, or organizations to incorporate the new politics.

This incomplete transformation of the Left, both in the countries in which the Left parties are now legitimate alternative parties of government and in those in which they remain excluded from government, leaves two problems. First, in shucking their pasts, the parties of the Left have not gone far enough to satisfy large segments of the electorate. This is obvious in the case of the Communist parties. Even in Italy, where the Communists have been in power in various cities and regions for many years, where they have collaborated with the parties of government in passing most of the legislation of the last decade, where they now have moved into the penumbra of government, still the steps that would bring them into the government remain extremely problematic because of widespread and persistent concerns about the party's nature and long-term intentions. These doubts focus on the party's commitment to democratic centralism as a system of organizational practices and norms. In France, where the Communist party has executed a major about-face three times in as many years, the questions about the weight of the Stalinist legacy are now openly pressed not only by the Center-Right and by the disappointed Socialists but also within the party.

In the case of the French Socialist party, too, it is likely that the balancing within the party program of the old and new ideological strains—of the plans for more nationalization of industry and of projects for autogestion and for decentralization—gave more weight to the elements of the past than was consonant with the desires of the Socialists' actual and potential electorate. Although it is not possible on existing evidence to separate out the losses the Socialists suffered in March, 1978, because of uncertainties about the kind of government they could form with allies who had become their principal attackers, from the gains they failed to realize because of their own programmatic weaknesses, it does seem that the *programme commun*, with its heavy load of old ideological baggage, was more an albatross than an attraction.

It is perhaps not surprising that parties of the Left that call themselves Marxist still have to contend with the legacy of a past they have not entirely renounced and with the suspiciousness and hostility of large parts of the electorate that feel the parties have not gone far enough. What is more puzzling is that this same issue arises—and with ever more insistence—even for those Left parties that have become parties of government. If one considers the issue of nationalization in Britain, for example, support for further nationalization of industry fell from 30 percent in 1973 to 17 percent in 1977.[33] Even among the staunchest Labour party partisans—male, working-class trade unionists—this traditional plank of the Left lost favor. In 1964, 64 percent of this group were in favor of nationalizing more industries; by 1974, the proportion had dropped to 50 percent.[34] To put it too simply, the old appeals of the Left no longer appeal.

At the same time—and this is the second problem of the Left's incomplete transformation—the parties of the Left have failed to make the connection with the new interests and emergent values of the electorate. Here, there is one par-

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tial success story alongside a catalogue of missed opportunities. The partial success is that of the French Socialists, who established contact with the regionalist movements, with local government associations, with the advocates of autogestion and, to a certain extent, incorporated their demands into party programs. The missed opportunities were, however, numerous. In West Germany, the Social Democrats were so slow to sense and to respond to the mounting public concern over the construction of nuclear reactors that by the time they did move, citizens' groups had already organized the protesters outside, and against, the party. In France, the Left did not move quickly enough to take seriously the shift in the climate of opinion about women and family, with the result that the campaigns for divorce, for abortion, and for women's rights were largely organized outside the parties, with the parties coming in only at the last moment to try to pull the political advantages into their camp. The Left waited so long indeed that the majority was able to derive as much (or as little) political benefit from the eventual passage of new legislation. The story is the same for the ecology issues. Here the Left let issues slip by on which new ecology parties would be able to form. The nuclear reactor protest, too, was inadequately noted by the French Left. In Italy, the Left's failure to sense the popular support for divorce and abortion left unoccupied the space in which the new Radical party grew. On all these issues, the Left might have been able to integrate the specific objectives of the protesters into an overall social and political analysis and, in so doing, to have redefined what it means to be on the Left in an advanced industrial society. In the absence of this connection, the Left is still largely defined by reference to a heritage that party supporters and nonsupporters alike find less and less desirable and relevant.

The Parties in Parliament

Two essays in the 1964 *Daedalus* issue reflected on the decline of parliamentary institutions in Western Europe and both signaled, among the causes of this evolution, the role of parties. Karl Dietrich Bracher wrote of the withering of parliamentary power in the "party state";[35] Alfred Grosser, that "in Great Britain, Germany and Italy the parties have a tendency to displace the parliament as the intermediary between citizens and the government, whereas in France it is the pressure groups that do this."[36]

The decline of parliament as the locus of policy-making in contemporary European states has continued over the past fifteen years. The French pattern that Grosser observed of a transfer of power out of parliamentary arenas into bureaucratic ones, and of negotiations between pressure groups and bureaucrats replacing those once carried out by parties in legislative bodies, has now been generalized across Europe. This phenomenon has received considerable attention in the literature on the "new corporatism," and need only be noted here.

What matters for the present argument is that political parties, far from profiting from these tendencies, as Grosser and Bracher imagined in the sixties, seem to be among the principal victims of the displacement of power from parliamentary to bureaucratic decision.

When French agricultural policy is worked out in negotiations between the national farmers' union (Fédération Nationale des Syndicats d'Exploitants Agri-

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coles) and the Ministry of Agriculture, and no longer hammered out, as in the Fourth Republic, in parliamentary committees by deputies with an eye to preserving stability in their districts and their own seats; when the Labour party becomes merely one partner among three (the others being the Trades Union Congress and the government) in "social contract" negotiations that commit the government over the entire range of economic and social policy; then political parties become rubber stamps for deals they never made. However much the Gaullists or the Labourites may approve the outcome of the interest group-government negotiations, still the consequence is to make the parties and party politicians as such progressively less important in policy-making. The channels that once linked the interest groups to the parties dry up for lack of a flow of demands and communication. And the parties themselves are cut off from the pressures and sources of information that in the past nourished party debate, provoked change in party positions, and provided the party with leverage on decisions taken by the bureaucracy.

Italy is the one major exception to this trend in Western Europe. Here it is striking that both political parties and parliament are strong. In the years of unshaken Christian Democratic hegemony, Italian parliament suffered a certain decline in importance and, as in the other European countries, power shifted to the bureaucracy. The Communist victories of the 1976 elections and, even before that, Communist successes in regional and local elections, reversed the trend, and parliament has become the arena in which the Communists and the Christian Democrats negotiate government policy. The tendency toward direct negotiations between the unions and the government—which was marked in the late sixties—has largely halted; and the Communist party for the unions and the Christian Democrats for the industrialists have once again become the privileged agencies of political intermediation. To a lesser extent in other countries, parties and parliaments have both revived when there were major conflicts over policy within the governing party or when government was forced to strike deals with third parties in order to stay in power. Thus the British Parliament has played a large role in the decision-making on devolution; the German Bundestag on law and order, "antiterrorist" legislation. In sum, two contradictory tendencies are in progress: the first, which works to weaken parliaments relative to the executive and bureaucracy, also works to diminish the role of parties; the second, which leads to narrowing margins for the parties of government and to coalition, not single-party, governments, serves to restore both parties and parliaments as critical agencies of representation and decision. Over the postwar period, the outcome has been grossly disadvantageous to the parties, but there is reason to believe the balance may shift in the next decade.

V

"The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appears," wrote Antonio Gramsci, reflecting on Italy in the twenties.[37] This phrase is often quoted in commentary on Western Europe today,[38] for there is a pervasive sense of living through a period of transition in which the old forces that provided stability, governmental capacity, and legitimacy have been played

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out and new ones have not yet come to maturity. The antistatism and antiparty themes described in the first half of this essay form an integral part of this view. The parties' diminished ability to receive the signals of changing social values and interest, let alone to express these changes in new programs, or to translate them into policy, explains much of this disillusion. The weakening of party, in turn, must be accounted for by political shifts that have been long in the making and that no foreseeable set of decisions or constellation of circumstances would reverse. Although counter tendencies exist, they are weak and their future evolution unpredictable.

And yet, however difficult the task of reforming the parties, this seems the only route that might lead Western European politics out of the current dead end. The secularized political parties of the seventies can no longer generate among citizens the loyalties, discipline, and total commitment that Church and party molded through the first three-quarters of the century. What remains to be seen is whether they can build the links between the lively politics of the citizens' initiative groups, the feminists, the regional ethnic movements, the ecologists, the new *poujadistes*, on one side, and national politics on the other. Providing these channels between societies in political ferment and political institutions paralyzed by lack of will, imagination, and projects would give new life to the political parties. It would also be the essential condition for bringing to birth "the new" in European politics.

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[1]I have learned much from the comments on this essay of Walter Dean Burnham, Peter Gourevitch, Stanley Hoffmann, and Charles Sabel. To have met their objections and to have incorporated more of their ideas would have made a far better manuscript . . . but a book. Some of my colleagues in this *Daedalus* issue have commented on an earlier version that the analysis, however true for some countries, does not fit their own. While I have trimmed in response, I have not renounced the notion that the trends laid out are indeed general to Western Europe.

[2]Walter Dean Burnham, "Great Britain: The Death of the Collective Consensus?," unpublished paper (1977), p. 7.

[3]See, for example, Commissariat général du Plan, *1985: La France face au choc du futur* (Paris: Colin, 1972).

[4]James O'Connor, *The Fiscal Crisis of the State* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973).

[5]For an exposition of this argument see Samuel Brittan, "The Economic Constraints of Democracy," *British Journal of Political Science*, 5 (1975).

[6]Samuel P. Huntington, "The Democratic Distemper," *The Public Interest*, 41 (Fall, 1975): 37. See also the analyses of Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki in *The Crisis of Democracy*, Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission (New York: New York University Press, 1975).

[7]Huntington, "The Democratic Distemper," p. 37.

[8]John H. Goldthorpe, "The Current Inflation: Towards a Sociological Account," in Fred Hirsch and John H. Goldthorpe, eds., *The Political Economy of Inflation* (London: Martin Robertson, 1978).

[9]André Glucksmann, *Les Maîtres penseurs* (Paris: Grasset, 1977), p. 256.

[10]Or at least this is the explanation offered by the *nouveaux philosophes*. See Bernard-Henri Lévy, *La Barbarie à visage humain* (Paris: Grasset, 1977), p. 180.

[11]Blandine Barret-Kriegel, in a criticism of the *nouveaux philosophes*, "L'Intellectuel et l'état," *L'Arc:* "La Crise dans la Tête," 70: 58.

[12]Lévy argued at Harvard on April 27, 1978, that political conceptions of the world imply, first, that some elite possesses superior knowledge, from which vantage point the "progressive" or "reactionary" nature of all events and human demands can be judged in a priori fashion. Second, they are the basis of divisions between contemplative and manual activities, between the flock and the shep-

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herds: in sum, between the rulers and the ruled. And finally, that they support the illusion that the decentralization of power reduces its oppressiveness.

[13]Pierre Clastres, *La Société contre l'état* (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1974).

[14]Ibid., p. 169.

[15]Tom Nairn, "The Twilight of the British State," *New Left Review*, 101-102 (1977): 60.

[16]Ibid. See also the Marxist reply to Nairn, Eric Hobsbawm, "Some reflections on 'The Break-up of Britain,' " *New Left Review*, 105 (1977).

[17]Alain Touraine, "Crisis or Transformation," in Norman Birnbaum, *Beyond the Crisis* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 39. See also A. Touraine, "Intellectuels d'en haut et intellectuels d'en bas," *L'Arc:* "La Crise dans la Tête," 70.

[18]Jacques Julliard, *Contre la politique professionelle* (Paris: Seuil, 1977), p. 134, p. 151.

[19]Data from Ivor Crewe, Bo Särlvik, and James Alt, "Partisan Dealignment in Britain, 1964-74," *British Journal of Political Science*, 7 (1977), cited in *The Economist*, March 11, 1978. On this question see also W. D. Burnham, "Great Britain." Some analysts consider the 1974 election an exception and find in the losses of the smaller parties in subsequent by-elections a reversion to "normalcy." Since the trend was well established even before 1974, the two major parties would have to regain substantial ground to recover their old dominance.

[20]Daniel Bell in *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* (New York: Basic Books, 1976) notes the similarities between his argument and that of James O'Connor. See also Claus Offe, "The Attribution of Political Status to Interest Groups: Some Observations on the West German Case," unpublished paper (October, 1977).

[21]Otto Kirchheimer, "The Transformation of the Western European Party System," in J. La Palombara and M. Weiner, *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 184-192.

[22]On this, see Jean Charlot, *Le Phénomène Gaulliste* (Paris: Fayard, 1970), pp. 67-72.

[23]Paolo Sylos-Labini, *Saggio sulle classi sociali* (Bari: Laterza, 1975), table 7.4. See also Mattei Dogan's estimates for 1958 in his "Political Cleavage and Social Stratification in France and Italy," in S. M. Lipset and S. Rokkan, *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* (New York: Free Press, 1967).

[24]Kirchheimer, "The Transformation of the Western European Party System," p. 187.

[25]The figures on the composition of the Gaullist electorate in 1965 are for the UNR party alone; for 1973 and 1976 for the majority: the Gaullists plus the Independent Republicans and Centrists. The 1965 and 1973 statistics are from Institut Français d'Opinion Publique (IFOP) and Société Française d'Enquêtes par Sondage (SOFRES) surveys cited in Suzanne Berger, *The French Political System* (New York: Random House, 1974); 1976 statistics from a SOFRES survey after the 1976 cantonal elections, "Les français et les élections cantonales."

[26]On the widening gap between religious belief and political practice, it is significant that while 67 percent of respondents in a 1953 survey judged that one could not be a "good Communist and a good Catholic at the same time," by 1970 this figure had dropped to 44 percent and, by 1972, to 34 percent. Cited in Giacomo Sani, "Secular Trends and Party Realignments in Italy: The 1975 Elections," paper presented at the American Political Science Association (APSA) convention (September 1975), p. 25.

[27]See Arturo Parisi and Gianfranco Pasquino, "Relazioni e partiti-elettori tipi di voto," in A. Parisi and G. Pasquino, *Continuità e mutamento elettorale in Italia* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1977).

[28]Giacomo Sani, "The Italian Election of 1976: Continuity and Change" paper prepared for Conference Group on Italian Politics, APSA (September, 1976). Also, G. Sani, "Generations and Politics in Italy" paper presented at Fondazione Luigi Einaudi, Turin (March, 1977).

[29]Arturo Parisi and Gianfranco Pasquino, "20 giugno: struttura politica e comportamento elettorale," in Parisi and Pasquino (1977). Until more current surveys of the Italian electorate become available, it remains difficult to know to what extent the DC's interclassist base has been reduced, but the studies reported by Parisi and Pasquino and a variety of single-constituency studies suggest significant changes.

[30]Crewe, Särlvik, Alt, "Partisan Dealignment in Britain, 1964-74, pp. 23-24.

[31]Ibid. Since the 1974 elections, polls suggest that Conservatives have been gaining among workers. See Peter Kellner, "Election Season: Labour's Shifting Support," *New Statesman* (June 23, 1978).

[32]The point is debatable. Annie Kriegel argues the contrary for the French Communist party in *Un autre communisme?* (Paris: Hachette, 1977) and there is some evidence that suggests that recent changes in the Italian Communist party have lessened its appeal to the working class, in certain regions at least, without winning over other strata; see Marzio Barbagli and Piergiorgio Corbetta, "Partito e movimento: aspetti e rinnovamento del PCI," *Inchiesta* (January-February, 1978).

[33]Survey cited in *The Economist* (July 30-August 5, 1977).

[34]*The Economist* (March 11, 1978), p. 24.

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[35]Karl Dietrich Bracher, "Problems of Parliamentary Democracy in Europe," in S. Graubard, ed., *A New Europe?* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), p. 255.

[36]Alfred Grosser, "The Evolution of European Parliaments," in S. Graubard, ed., *A New Europe?*, p. 243.

[37]Antonio Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, ed. and trans. by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1975), p. 276.

[38]The quote is, for example, used by Burnham, to introduce his reflections on contemporary Britain.

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ALBERT BRESSAND

The New European Economies[1]

THERE WAS A TIME, long before superhighways and television games, when sphinxes and other supernatural creatures awaited the traveler at the crossroad on the way to Thebes and asked him to wager his life on a few riddles. Just imagine Oedipus's sphinx coming back with a Yale Ph.D. to sit by the newsstand in Harvard Square and propound the following riddle to MBTA riders: What is half the size of Africa, owns oil reserves that are less than one-twelfth as large as OPEC's, does not share in America's special monetary privileges, cannot grow half as fast as Japan, lags far behind the Soviet bloc in natural and military resources, looks almost unpopulated compared to China, cannot compete with Korea and Taiwan on the freighter and color-television markets, speaks with almost a dozen voices at the same time, and always loses the America Cup? What has, nevertheless, become the world's first exporter and biggest economy (at current exchange rates), has achieved—in some of its regions—the world's highest standards of living outside Kuwait, and may even have an economic future?

The answer of course is Europe. The present economic achievements and problems of the namesake of the nymph abducted by Zeus must be seen against the background of two major types of constraints and a set of economic policy issues.

The constraints, which are dealt with in the first and second part of this paper, concern, first, the broad and not very flexible framework imposed on present capacities by nature and history—in the form of demographic trends and natural resources, on one hand, and the technological bases of innovation and adaptation, on the other. The second type of constraint is the external one—the opportunities and challenges of international economic relations. Both sets of constraints have clearly gained in visibility and vigor since the issue of *Daedalus* entitled *A New Europe?* published in 1964. The end of cheap energy and the growing difficulties of competing in depressed world markets are even interpreted by many as signs, among others, that the period of rapid growth and full employment that began with postwar reconstruction efforts was an exceptional historical phase that will not be repeated, if ever, before fifty years have elapsed on the would-be Kondratieff-cycle calendar. Others find some grounds for optimism in the growth prospects of other continents.

But, as the third and last part of this article will show, Europeans will have a say in deciding how their economic future will be affected by these constraints.

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The crucial issues, in the views of this writer, are those usually referred to under the mysterious rubric "European economic integration." Only within an integrated framework can Europe have a significant voice in the monetary decisions that will, more and more, condition overall international relations. Only within this framework can European countries overcome the divergence of their individual economic evolutions, which reached dramatic proportions in the mid-1970s and which will, if continued, hurt all of them in the long run.

Today's Constraints on Tomorrow's Choices

DEMOGRAPHY: MAIS OÙ SONT LES BABY-BOOMS D'ANTAN?

The strong recovery of European population growth following the end of World War II was widely perceived as the symbol of the new European vitality. The laws passed to encourage large families were based on the premise, especially notable in France, that interwar protectionism, economic Malthusianism, and (some would even add) elite incompetence had their roots in—or were at least closely associated with—the more general apprehension of life and change expressed by low fertility rates.

Of course, the costs of this new vitality have been high: crowded schools, housing shortages, and higher taxes. But now that reproduction ratios are rapidly sinking below the magical 2.1 figure—and in Germany the population has already begun to shrink[2]—the lowering of these costs often turns out to be economically unsettling. Fewer children in school means fewer employment opportunities for the increasing numbers of university graduates now looking for teaching jobs. Housing slumps may be good for the environment and, as far as morality is concerned, they can hardly be much worse than the real-estate speculation that preceded them. Their bread and butter impact, however, is clearly negative.

Of course, certain industries, including those which benefit directly from weddings and the establishment of new households, have yet to feel the pressure. But the young Europeans who are today in increasing numbers reaching the work and marriage age often see distressing evidence that job opportunities are shrinking, and they wonder whether the new, smaller generation behind them will be able to pay for their pensions and to provide them with advantageous early retirement opportunities.

Demographic issues and their economic impact are more complex than a narrow focus on fertility rates might suggest. Because of built-in lags, the working-age population, for instance, will increase over the next decade in most European countries, which may attenuate some problems (e.g., by increasing the social security and income tax base) but may compound others (especially in a high unemployment context). In any case, the economic impact of demographic changes will be difficult to isolate from other factors. Qualitative changes in consumption and investment patterns will be at least as important as the quantitative changes in population growth. Broadly speaking, one should take note of the growing risk that the new demographic trends might reinforce a certain fear of demand saturation. What is worrisome is less the present reality of the threat than the possibility that, as a result of the subtle interplay of ap-

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pearances and realities that economists halfheartedly analyze under the name of anticipations, it might translate into a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Of course, these apprehensions appear premature, to say the least, in light of the present inequalities in the distribution of the fruits of affluence and inadequacies in the supply of collective goods and services. Furthermore, clever advertising and growing environmental concerns have certainly not reached the limit of their ability to create new demands. But hospitals are being built which, it is said, are the last ones of their size we will need for ten years, and highway building programs are being delayed without arousing the same concerns as before—or are even opposed by the future users for whom they were intended.

Hence, a certain pessimism about the future of consumption in Europe is probably one of the major differences between the underlying economic mood of the late 1970s and the one that prevailed at the time of the 1964 issue of *Daedalus* concerned with Europe. This pessimism could turn out to have been influenced by short-term problems, and the old, but presently fashionable, Kondratieff theories of fifty-year cycles may not have time to be taken seriously before they are abandoned again. The automobile industry has indeed displayed much greater resilience than several leading economists had expected in the wake of the 1960s challenges of previous growth and consumption models. A hopeful few have already made up their minds to wait firmly for the wave of technological invention they foresee for the mid-1980s (after all, the private flying-saucer boom may be just around the corner). For the time being, however, a growing number of Europeans, including investors, think that the markets of the future could well be on other continents and that their own economies will have to cope, at least for a while, with fewer babies, shorter meals, and tougher consumers.[3]

RESOURCES AND ENERGY: SERMONS ON THE BUTTER MOUNTAINS, LECTURES OVER THE OIL CONSERVATION GAP

In the last fifteen years, Europe has undergone not only a quantitative demographic transition but a qualitative one as well. Of course, services still do not represent as high a percentage of employment as they do in the self-proclaimed postindustrial United States, and the not-so-ancient agricultural structures of many regions can still be detected in, for example, the delicate imbalances of electoral representation. But the rural migrations are over as a major social phenomenon,[4] and it is mostly the advanced age of many farmers that will account for further reductions in the rural/urban population ratio. Indeed, the time has come when it often makes sense from an economic and ecological point of view to induce rural dwellers to remain where they are (especially as there are fewer and fewer industries to which they could go).

The tremendous increase in the efficiency of European agriculture has been greatly fostered by the EEC Common Agricultural Policy. The merits of the latter are often not clearly perceived on the other side of the Atlantic, in spite of its unsuspected similarities to various American agricultural intervention policies.[5] The cyclical accumulation of beef, butter, or powdered milk mountains—although a favorite target of economists trained in the Chicago flatlands—may be a small cost to pay for a secure food supply, decent standards of living in

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rural areas, and protection from the vagaries of world markets. After all, the American soybean embargo was a good reminder that life is not simply about Pareto optimality and maximum trade gains.

In any case, the future of the EEC Common Agricultural Policy is a controversial issue, and emotional stances are undoubtedly more frequent because the real costs and benefits are not only hard to measure but also changing rapidly. Because of the perpetuation of a special exchange-rate system (the "green currencies"), the British consumer and the German farmer are among the major beneficiaries of a policy that the government of France defends more vigorously than their own governments do.[6]

Whatever the seriousness of the growing debate on the Common Agricultural Policy, there is at least one problem worse than overabundant supplies—namely, nonexistent supplies. Europe's situation with respect to nonagricultural raw materials, especially in the field of energy, is a good illustration that even the wealthiest societies are not suffering only from rich man's burdens.

When *Limits to Growth* made it fashionable to talk once again about resource shortages, Europe's coal was on the way out, its natural gas was considered near its peak, and its oil was almost nonexistent. These facts were of little concern then, however, since the importation of raw materials was widely perceived as a status symbol (remember the superiority of those who pointed with contempt at Soviet dependence on raw-material exports). The steel industry was even undergoing a major geographical relocation in an effort to take better advantage of cheaper imported ore.

The energy crisis, however, did not strike Europe fully unprepared. Good old Scarcity was still a familiar figure, and there was even a secret satisfaction in discovering that previously mocked European traditions of economy could prove superior, in times of adversity, to the wasteful and triumphant American way of life. And, after all, carless weekends were fun.

Aside from humor, other resources could be mobilized. Suddenly North Sea oil became competitive, which led to the paradox in which the same energy planners simultaneously protested against OPEC oil prices and devised ways to prevent these politically controlled prices from falling below North Sea production costs. By the same token, costly nuclear reactors suddenly became a (relatively) cheap way of producing electricity, and ambitious (and overambitious) plans promising rapid decreases in energy dependency were quickly designed.

Five years later, Europe is in a position to lecture the United States on energy matters, and, from one summit meeting to another, it rarely hesitates to do so. But the superiority is rooted as much in the poor American performance as in the smaller than expected European achievements.

Energy conservation results were initially impressive, but they clearly leveled off after a couple of years. Coal mines still have to be closed, even if at a slower pace. Norway may someday become the Abu Dhabi of the North, but England has problems devising clever ways to spend whatever shares Scotland will agree to abandon of the remaining unmortgaged benefits from the oil bonanza.

But the most unexpected developments have taken place with regard to nuclear energy. Uranium ore remains plentiful and cheap, but Canada, Niger, Gabon, and Australia—not to mention the future independent Namibia—do

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not seem likely to behave like the eager-to-sell, no-questions-asked suppliers one would have expected. When it comes to purchasing enriched uranium, problems are even worse, except when dealing with the well-behaved, businesslike Russians. American policy-makers, rightly concerned about the military fallout of atoms meant for peace, have clearly shown a propensity to favor leverage over respect for previously negotiated commercial commitments. The development of Europe's enrichment capacities, through the competing Urenco and Eurodif groups, will reduce this dependency in the near future, however.[7]

TECHNOLOGY: CONTROVERSIAL BREEDERS, NOISY PLANES, AND THE POLITICAL PREREQUISITES OF DEPOLITICIZED ECONOMIC RELATIONS

The success of Europe in coping with the new energy conditions is closely dependent, therefore, on its capacity to foster and master technological progress. But in a world of "complex interdependence" and multiple linkages,[8] this requires more than technological capacity. It was assumed, for example, that the impressive European lead in the development of breeder reactors—which multiply fiftyfold the amount of energy obtainable in the long run from any given quantity of uranium ore—would provide an elegant way out of energy dependency. But construction of the 1200-megawatt "Super Phoenix," for which France, Germany, and Italy have joined forces, is now threatened less by technical difficulties than by public demonstrations against the "plutonium-and-police society" some foresee in it and by strongly voiced American sour grapes about fast breeders.

The situation on the energy front is not without analogies in other sectors of the technology frontier. Europe, which has never resigned herself to the role of brilliant follower, is discovering that catching up with America is not simply a matter of technical excellence—or, rather, that "excellence" is not a value-neutral concept.

After all, the beautiful and unsuccessful Concorde did meet all—and more—of the criteria for excellence as they were defined when its construction was launched and as they were still widely perceived in Europe. Yet, it was not always easy to convince American public opinion that international exchanges require a minimum of predictability and symmetry and that the world's largest economic power—for its own long-term best interests—has to show some restraint in the expression of its national preferences (not to mention its local ones) when they can have dramatic repercussions for hundreds of thousands of workers abroad. Interdependence is more easily proclaimed than put into practice. The point is not that Americans manipulated noise standards to their advantage, or more generally, that their power to define the rules of the game and what Nye and Keohane call "international norms," is used for the national rather than international good, but that there is an American tendency to treat domestic values as international moral imperatives—hence certain types of mutual incomprehension that could become the focus of future difficulties.

The growing number of conflicts in high-technology fields between a relatively less powerful America and an increasingly self-confident Europe tend to be looked down on by the former as European attempts to replace competitiveness with politics—witness, for example, the label "political plane" con-

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descendingly applied to Concorde and Airbus. This attitude often reflects a fundamental misperception of the new position of Europe vis-à-vis America.

If European challengers do cross the fuzzy border between economics and politics, they do so less as a resort to "political" tricks to make up for "economic" shortcomings than to call attention to the distortions that three decades of de facto American hegemony have created in the economic sphere. In a way, they are asking Americans to do away with the politically imposed asymmetries that had come to be perceived as natural components of "economic" relations. Europeans on all horizons have developed growing reservations about such things as thirty years of American failure to bring its domestic law in line with the rules embodied in the GATT or the failure of Congress to make good concessions—such as abolition of the protectionist "American Selling Price" system—that executive-branch negotiators agreed to in multilateral talks. Beyond the specifics of each point of contention, what is increasingly resisted is the general (and sincere, well-meaning) American feeling that the whole world should abide, whatever the costs and contradictions, by the American constitutional process, by the deadlines—and deadlocks—of American agendas, by unilateral American interpretation of jointly agreed-upon rules, and by the changes in these interpretations—including straightforward "renegotiation"—that American domestic politics sometimes call for.

In other words, Europe is beginning to ask for its fair share in the definition of the "rules of the game" and, to quote again Nye and Keohane, of the "international regimes" and the rights and duties associated with them. This attempt does not stem from any radically different conception of international economic relations Europe wants to oppose to the American one, but rather from an increasing desire to see more symmetry in the actual observance of the principles of international economic liberalism.

The Place of Europe in the New International Economic Disorder

Overcoming the constraints that confront the European economies is thus not simply a matter of incremental adjustments. The previous engines for growth have either exhausted themselves, like the demographic one, or are pushing toward uncharted paths, such as new consumption patterns oriented toward improved quality of life, or plans for investments in the Third World that are both desired for their short-term export impact and feared for their long-term boomerang effects—in the form of cheap imports.

The belief in the self-steering processes and automatic regulation once generated by the economic machine is gone. As it is clear from the new agendas of trade negotiations and from the difficulties encountered by European exporters in the advanced-technology fields, even relying on "depoliticized" economic expansion in the framework of international liberalism raises highly political questions related to the definition and enforcement of these liberal rules of the game.

A strategic vision of the role of Europe in the world economy of the 1980s and 1990s is, therefore, needed if Europe is to overcome its internal and external economic difficulties. Central to the latter is what could be described as the scissors dilemma: this results from the combination of (1) serious difficulties in

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cashing—in United States' dollars and Japanese yen—the commercial dividends of Europe's technological maturity and (2) the no-less-serious challenges of Third World newcomers on the standardized goods markets.

THE SUCCESSFUL CHALLENGER'S BLUES

As argued just above, competition with the United States is no longer dominated by technological-gap problems but by issues pertaining to the definition and implementation of international rules of conduct. It is indeed astonishing to see how rapidly the *défi américain*, as described by Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber in his seminal book published in 1967, has disappeared as a hot issue.

The fears that better-managed, more efficient, technologically more sophisticated American invaders were going to put European firms out of business or buy them out at substantial discounts, have not materialized. European firms have caught up with their American counterparts, even in managerial terms. A Harvard Business School MBA is no long a gold mine on the old continent, and Chrysler has sold its European subsidiaries to Peugeot. Indeed Europe has begun to invade its invaders. In 1977 German investments in the United States were greater than American investments in Germany (1.3 against 1.15 billion DM). Furthermore, the brilliant performances of firms like Volkswagen, Michelin, British Petroleum, and others can be seen in the broader perspective of macroeconomic data that indicate, for example, that the GNP of the enlarged European Community will be roughly equal to that of the United States, that standards of living in several European countries are now superior to those enjoyed in Howard Hughes's native country, that European firms and banks have made the *Fortune* top ten, and that Europe's share of world exports and world financial reserves are now, respectively, three and five times that of the United States.

This is not to say, as two British writers thought it appropriate to claim in 1975, that the American challenge has been superseded by "the European Revenge." The stronger growth achieved by the United States in 1976 and 1977 is a reminder of history's aversion for linearity; some even interpret it as an indication that the costly energy and floating-exchange-rate environment is more favorable to the new than to the old continent. Whatever the hesitations of the pendulum, it nevertheless remains true that the economic relationship between the two zones has undergone a qualitative change.[9]

Because they no longer suffer from their old inferiority complex, Europeans are no longer taking it for granted that the North American market should remain difficult for them to penetrate. They become, therefore, more and more critical of those obstacles that compensate for, rather than reflect, American competitivity. The *défi* is no longer what it was thought to be, but outward-looking Europeans are concerned today with a more subtle *mépris américain* that denigrates their planes as either too noisy, too expensive, or too cheap, that tends to substitute legal action (not infrequently on several counts at the same time) for Walrass's auctioning process, and that even commits the supreme offense of banning imports of fine Perigord foies gras if they cannot be proven to have been grilled like a hamburger.

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Hence the emphasis that European negotiators have put on nontariff barriers during the Tokyo Round of negotiations and their request for "codes of conduct" that would substitute international norms for unilateral American criteria.

By contrast, when it comes to the central issues of international economic relations and, notably, monetary matters, Europe still has problems behaving as the superpower it does not really want to be. Political divisions among Europeans, the various military and political sources of leverage enjoyed by America, and, of course, the usual lags in institutional adjustments to new power structures (well analyzed by Kindleberger) account for this now familar contrast.[10]

Yet, when international rules are built around the special duties and privileges of one country, and when that country seems to become both less powerful (in relative terms) and more parochial, it takes an exceptional faith to expect perpetual and unconditional acceptance of the rules.[11]

The plans for tighter European monetary cooperation presented by France and Germany at the Bremen summit in June, 1978, may be a tenuous signal that America's "benign neglect"—of the dollar's value, trade deficits, oil-import levels, and so on—may bring about important changes in Europeans' perceptions of their own responsibilities in the management of interdependence. Of course, a more active role for Europe in international monetary management would not be intended as an attack on American interests; and in practice it could foster them—international stability being a textbook example of a collective good. But the signal would nevertheless be clear.

A majority of Europeans, whatever the opposition of influential minorities, have, in the past, displayed readiness to accept American leadership. Today they might welcome the creative "leadership without hegemony"[12] that Stanley Hoffmann once called for in the name of an American world-order approach to international relations. But it would be ill-advised to expect them to bear the costs of a paradoxical "hegemony without leadership" of the special-privileges-cum-benign-neglect type.

EUROPE AND JAPAN: TOWARD AN ENCOUNTER OF THE THIRD KIND?

There are enough ambiguities, mutual experience, and shared sins in the economic relations of Europe with the United States for conflicts to be easily circumscribed. But Japanese exporters can seldom hope to benefit from the same tradition of prudence—the more so as their spectacular results are concentrated on a few highly visible and politically vocal sectors. Many of them, therefore, have come to prefer self-imposition of elements of voluntary restraint to the risk of becoming the scapegoat for all economic ills.

The word *trilateral* has become fashionable before the reality it is supposed to describe has in fact materialized. There may be three pillars in the Western club, but it is premature to talk of a triangle when what exists is much closer, geometrically speaking, to an open angle in which bilateral links between the United States and Europe on one hand and the United States and Japan on the other have hardly any equivalent between Europe and Japan. By considering the misconceptions that nevertheless exist in the United States about Japan—about salary levels, for instance—one can gain a fairly good idea of the potential for misunderstanding between Europe and Japan.

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There must be, therefore, some element of truth in the Japanese claim that European trade deficits ($5 billion in 1977) are indications of insufficient interest on the part of European exporters for Japanese markets. To which one can add that, even if interested, few European exporters are aware of the major learning efforts (from language to custom regulations) that would be required from them; this lack of in-depth preparation contrasts sharply with the patient and systematic work of Japanese industrial and trade-company representatives in Europe.

But the story does not end with Italian salesmen mispronouncing Japanese names or Bavarian farmers displaying ignorance of the subtleties of Japanese civility codes. To a far greater extent than is sometimes the case in some American markets, European exporters are confronted with an inward-looking society displaying the kind of unspoken organic solidarity that Europe as a whole has failed to exhibit. Treating importing as a residual activity that takes place only after all domestic possibilities have been exhausted is a natural attitude in the light not only of Japan's previous balance-of-payments problems but also of the intricate network of solidarity that exists among the large zaibatsus, their suppliers, the trading houses, the banking systems, and, of course, the Ministry for International Trade and Industry. The Japanese trade surpluses then reflect not only differences in competitivity but also a communication failure between very different social and economic systems.

Overcoming this lack of communication is, therefore, a major task for European economic and political leaders. This will probably require a more sophisticated and balanced approach on the part of the European Commission than the almost caricatural imitation of American arm-twisting practices (fairly unsuccessful) on which it embarked after the Strauss-Ushiba agreements.

What is needed is both a major psychological change on the part of Japan—now required to act and react as one of the wealthiest and strongest economies rather than as a developing country—and a substantial effort by the Europeans themselves. The emphasis should clearly be on expanding European exports rather than on limiting Japanese imports, a practice that is fairly widespread today. The so-called self-limitation agreements are indeed uneconomical, not only from the exporter's point of view but also—a fact often overlooked—from the point of view of the importer, who thereby renounces the potential price reductions the exporter might have had to implement at higher export levels. For this reason, such agreements have sometimes been lobbied for by the exporting firms on which they were supposed to be imposed. Although they may play a useful, but transitory, adjustment role, such agreements reflect a failure by two of the three economic giants to attain a more meaningful level of interaction.

EUROPE AND THE NEW INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES: CAN LORD KEYNES AND GENERAL MARSHALL BE DRAFTED AGAIN?

The importance for Europe of strengthening its position in the high-technology areas through more balanced relations with the United States and Japan is heightened by the rapid progress of major Third World countries in traditional European markets.

Of course there has been strong resistance to the entry of these new competitors, for hundreds of thousands of European jobs have already been lost in

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such industries as electronics, textiles, shipbuilding, steelmaking, and so on. The legitimacy of this competition is questioned from an economic point of view and, when economics are not convincing enough, from a moral one. Ironically, Europe, as well as other parts of what Third World radicals call the capitalist world, is showing some resistance to a historical process that might in fact amount to no less than the gradual integration of Third World economies into the capitalist system. It is an amusing paradox to see, for instance, the "basic-human-needs" approach to development once put forward by radical Third World thinkers eager to delink the South from the West, borrowed by much less radical Western circles concerned with what they summarily call "social dumping." Previously hard-hearted businessmen are suddenly displaying an extraordinary compassion for the standards of living of Taiwanese or Korean workers; but, oddly enough, they seldom wonder whether the situation of these workers might not actually improve as a result of their export successes.

European reluctance to accept a new world division of labor cannot be ignored. But it would be wrong to lose sight of the very significant role Europe is actually playing in bringing about this change. (The broader matter of the relations between Europe and the Third World is addressed in an article for a later issue of *Daedelus*.) Indeed, if any consensus develops over these difficult issues, it is likely to be on the desirability of Third World economic development for Europe—with the caveat that appropriate elements of adjustment and gradualism be preserved.

After weighing the costs and benefits associated with increased Third World competition, a major study by the French planning agency concluded in 1978 that France has more to gain by being actively engaged, as importer and exporter, in Third World industrialization than by trying to protect itself against it.[13] Moreover, it is increasingly recognized in France that German firms owe a part of their export successes to their capacity to reduce total product costs by importing numerous components from cheap-labor countries.

There are, therefore, mutual interests to be identified, as the Brandt Commission, for instance, has set out to do, between European economies—or, for that matter, between American and Japanese economies—and the Third World. The notion of a "Marshall Plan" (what about a "Schmidt Plan"? or a "Cheysson Plan"?) that would both stimulate the development of the latter and the recovery of the former begins to be widely discussed. In light of the benefits that have accrued to Germany from its greater-than-average openness to Third World products, simple-minded protectionist policies appear as clearly less effective in the medium term than systematic import and subcontracting policies.

This does not mean, however, that, as the liberal tenet implicitly reads, all good things go together. Marshall Plan concepts have failed when transposed to situations too different from the one for which they were originally devised. Similarly, one could wish for a higher degree of rationality in the large-scale implementation of industrial delocalization policies when they threaten to transform major industrial companies in Europe into trading firms and to eliminate many more jobs than can be created in other sectors, while having no impact on Third World development other than creation of what Commissioner Claude Cheysson likes to refer to as "multinational enclaves."

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Difficult issues are thus beginning to be raised, under the heading of "investment concertation" or "global recovery package"—for example, within the framework of renewal of the Lomé Convention or preparations for European and Western summits. More often than not, discussions of orderly management mechanisms arouse the opposition of traditional liberal economists, especially German ones, watchful for signs of protectionism in disguise. It may also be that the presently most successful countries see little benefit in institutionalizing economic-cooperation mechanisms that their private sectors can implement without governmental help. But the French "orderly growth of trade" motto—which has replaced the widely misread "organized free trade"—is not contradictory to efficient economic strategies, for it calls attention to the social, political, and dynamic dimensions of implementing these strategies.

On the whole, and barring a major British move in the protectionist direction along the lines suggested by prominent Cambridge economists, one would expect that the debate will be less on protectionism versus free trade than on the ways in which to manage a world economic system in which the role of Third World countries will be larger.

The Internal Preconditions of External Success

The definition of Europe's role in the new world economy raises, therefore, some complex questions about the types of relationship that should prevail on at least three different levels:

1. The level of what will perhaps someday be called the "quadrilateral world," the members of which (Europe, the United States, Japan, and the new industrial countries) are direct competitors for the same types of activities and are moved by basically the same considerations of economic efficiency and international specialization gains. At this level, the major issues have to do with regulation of competition in a series of markets—from standardized goods to advanced technology—in which the actors are unequally active. This regulation involves not only tariffs but also the increasingly important nontariff and monetary barriers.

2. The level of relations between members of the quadrilateral world and the four other major categories of world actors (the Soviet bloc, China, OPEC, and the nonindustrial, non-oil-exporting Third World). Rather than being in direct competition, these two broad groups are engaged in complementary activities (e.g., exports of raw materials and semiprocessed goods on one side and exports of industrial goods on the other). Issues to be resolved at this level include, therefore, not only regulatory ones but also the difficult search for common values, norms, and procedures to bring a mutually satisfactory coherence to the relation between these qualitatively different activities—in short, a new international economic order. Concretely, this second type of issue would include mechanisms and criteria for pricing commodities where and when the interests of their producers are not satisfactorily reflected in world markets organized for, and within, a world economic system they do not really belong to. They also include provision for concessional financing for countries not in-

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tegrated into the commercial banking system, recycling of petrodollars, and protection of financial "petroreserves" created and spent in a political rather than economic manner.

3. The level of intra-European relations, at which domestic and international issues are even more closely intertwined than at any of the preceding levels.

The third level may well be the crucial one if the new European economies are to overcome the constraints, both internal and external, that confront them today. Indeed, to write about Europe's chances of success in the new international division of labor is tantamount to writing about the future of the European Economic Community.

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: IS THERE LIFE AFTER THE TOKYO ROUND?

Contrary to once popular functionalist views, the EEC's creation and its preliminary successes have generated no irresistible momentum. Rather, internal and external factors have tended to lead toward gradual dilution. The existence of a customs union is less and less a sufficient engine for European integration, as its significance has been greatly eroded by several rounds of trade negotiations that have considerably lowered tariff levels worldwide. The Tokyo Round is likely to end with a 25 to 35 percent further reduction, which will translate into reduced European economic specificity, both internally and with respect to preferential agreements with Third World countries. Furthermore, it is not impossible that the United States will try to push this process to its logical outcome by suggesting the creation of an Office for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) free-trade zone as the next step in multilateral-trade diplomacy. If such an objective were reached, even fewer European firms than at present would look upon Europe as a privileged area in which to define their strategies, look for merger opportunities, and define industrial priorities.[14]

Of course, many economists would argue in favor of this evolution in the name of global economic efficiency. But their point would be well taken only if the numerous barriers associated with the existence of the two large, self-centered markets of Japan and the United States were also removed, and this condition is unlikely to be fulfilled. It is difficult to imagine European and American companies granted equal access to some of the world's largest indirect-subsidy sources—namely the highly stimulating United States Department of Defense or NASA contracts—or to the low-priced natural resources presently owned, processed, and transformed by integrated American companies, or even to some of the major American civilian markets.

As economists know, pursuing policies that would be optimal in a first-best world when one actually lives in a second- or third-best world can be highly inefficient.[15] Even simply accepting the present evolution toward an OECD free-trade zone without appropriate offsetting measures would be a very unequal deal; and it would probably lead to asymmetries that would further reduce equality of opportunity—and thus efficient competition—within the quadrilateral world.

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NEW DILEMMAS, NEW INSTRUMENTS, OLD RECIPES

Considering, then, that the lowering of tariffs is in itself a desirable objective, what offsetting policies could both preserve the benefits of an even more liberal trade system and create a favorable environment for further European integration?

Leaving aside the useful but limited harmonization policies, as well as the special case of agriculture, there are still two main roads that lead toward European economic integration.

The first road to economic integration has been described so many times by those who do not follow it that grass has grown between the cobbles, and it has come to be traveled by poets, idealists, and other federalists rather than by matter-of-fact politicians. Calling it the royal road to European union even became the well-behaved way to avoid going anywhere, especially toward European union. When in his 1977 Florence speech EEC Commission chairman Roy Jenkins called for all governments to resume the journey, his hearers initially wondered whether this was an exercise in politics or eloquence. A meeting between President Giscard d'Estaing and Chancellor Schmidt at Rambouillet took everyone by surprise, however, and generated intense speculation. A few months later, at the Bremen summit, it became clear that things had changed and that the road toward monetary union was really open again.

Of course, nobody is seriously talking yet about a common currency, which, besides, might have adverse effects on resource transfers, inflation rates, and various other matters. Still, what is officially proposed (namely a "monetary stability zone" based on joint interventions in the currency markets, sharing of 20 percent of national reserves, and creation—around 1981—of a European monetary fund) could go a long way toward providing better conditions—both for European economic recovery in general and for further progress toward integration. The scheme will not necessarily succeed; the United States could probably torpedo it if it preferred even monetary disorder to a less unilateral order.

But the idea offers an opportunity (which the most conservative and adamant German economists may not succeed in obscuring entirely) of avoiding the pitfalls of previous efforts that had aimed prematurely at stabilizing exchange rates in a European "snake." The focus of the present proposal is on countering the perverse and economically unjustified effects of floating exchange rates on intra-EEC exchange rates. Rather than a gradual—and highly reversible—convergence, the scheme, even if reformulated at the Aachen meeting in terms of a parity grid, still aims at the creation of a European monetary fund and relies on a qualitative jump toward a joint European monetary and economic policy. And it may succeed only if the need for this jump is clearly acknowledged during the implementation process.

The second road toward integration in a free-trade environment is less glorious and is even notorious among some schools of thought. The concept of industrial policy is indeed foreign to the neoclassical approach, and "sectoral policy" is almost a dirty word in German—as several recent "memoranda" have made clear. Nevertheless, under the pressure of excess capacities that could obviously be resorbed only under some form of collective discipline, it has been

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necessary for the first time (outside the Coal and Steel Community framework) to encourage coordination in sectors like chemicals and textiles. But this is the def sive aspect of industrial policy, which is accepted only as a lesser evil; and it exacerbates the offensive flavor of the overall concept. The type of positive industrial policy that can foster European progress and integration does not have to be an extrapolation of crisis cartels; its aim, as defined by its proponents, should be to promote joint industrial ventures in those sectors where a European dimension can be a major asset in international competition. The success of Airbus Industry shows that this scheme does not imply any departure from the usual rules of private enterprise and economic efficiency. One of its aims is to foster the emergence of firms that could be described as European in the same sense as Mitsubishi is Japanese. Only then would Europe become an economic entity rather than the simple juxtaposition of national economies that it still is today.[16]

Progress along this second road to economic integration has so far been limited: an EEC "wedding bureau" has facilitated a few dozen minor mergers. The most promising avenue seems to be cooperation based on the kind of well-defined commercial or industrial objectives among a few countries worked out for some aircraft programs and for fast-breeder development and enrichment plants.

Whether this road holds promise of progress in the post-Tokyo Round environment depends on whether a new concept of industrial policy emerges, both clearly rejecting any protectionist undertones and providing a framework for a deliberate and faster adaptation to the new economic environment. The problem is thus less one of economic technique than of achieving an overall trust and understanding, on the part of each country, of the policies and objectives of its European partners. It is obvious that such a harmony of objectives and doctrines within the EEC cannot exist if economic situations remain as divergent as they have been in recent years. Any success in overcoming the constraints they have in common will therefore depend on their success in coping with their differences.

THE STATE OF THE NONUNION: UNDERACHIEVERS, OVERACHIEVERS, AND ITALIANS

Without going into a detailed review of the achievements of the individual countries (which will be provided in a later issue by Michele Salvati and Giorgio Brosio), we need to take a look, after noting the similarities, at the diversity of European economic situations.

Durkheim, in one of his pioneering sociological studies, noted that "crime" or "sin" are relative rather than absolute concepts and that the more virtuous a society, the more demanding are its definitions. Today, remembering the various colloquia of the 1960s on European economic convergence, one is almost reminded of his example of the pure-hearted monks who found sin in imperceptible variations from rigorous norms. At that time experts expressed deep concern about the impact on European integration of the one- or two-percentage-point differentials that then existed between national performances. Those were happy days indeed. Since then, reactions to the oil and monetary

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crisis have been so divergent that they represent a qualitative rather than simply a quantitative change from the earlier period.

As the following table illustrates, a turn toward greater similarities in national economic behaviors—although it is far from constituting a return to the pre-1973 situation—was noticeable in 1977 with respect to inflation rates—the indicator that had demonstrated the widest divergences.

Countries	*Annual averages*		*12-month period ending Dec.*			
	1965-69	*1969-73*	*1974*	*1975*	*1976*	*1977*
Germany	2.2	5.3	5.9	5.4	3.9	3.5
France	4.0	6.1	15.2	9.6	9.9	9.0
Italy	2.1	3.6	25.3	11.1	21.8	14.9
UK	4.1	8.0	19.2	24.9	15.1	12.1
(USA)	(3.8)	(4.9)	(12.2)	(7.0)	(4.8)	(6.8)

Source: Banque des Règlements Internationaux (June, 1978).

In any case, the major problems, at least in terms of their political repercussions, have less to do with absolute differences in national indicators than with the different capacities of the national economic and, especially, industrial structures to adapt to a new international environment. The distinction is therefore less between wealthy central regions and a poorer periphery (in 1977, GNP per capita was $8,160 in Germany, compared to $3,920 in the United Kingdom, $2,860 in Greece, and $1,930 in Portugal) than between two ill-defined groupings of "weak" and "strong" economies, even if this contrast will be even more spectacular after the second enlargement. Poorer Ireland is doing well and growing fast, whereas outside of the EEC, richer Sweden, after several years of success in buying time to stay out of the crisis, has suddenly run short of "anticyclical" funds and is displaying growing signs of weakness.

However, one should use the increasingly popular distinction between weak and strong countries only with great caution. Today's strong may be tomorrow's weak, and the choice of the yardstick by which to assess strength is a more complex and value-loaded operation than is sometimes assumed.

Take Great Britain, for example. The present difficulties of the country that invented industrial revolution—and now seems close to inventing industrial stagnation—have led more than one economist to wonder, privately or publicly, whether economies do not go through the same kind of life-cycle as a biological organism. In that case, some would argue, the kingdom seems close to retirement age. Some have even carried the metaphor so far as to write about "the British illness" as if it were a communicable disease, and they try to identify its early manifestations in younger organisms in North America.[17] But who can really assess the impact that the forthcoming injections of petromoney will have on the vitality of the old lady? And who can imagine the future economic value—in the face of still-unknown types of future socioeconomic challenges—of the traditions and contemporary achievements of the British in the not-so-peripheral fields of political democracy, social consensus, and cultural in-

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novativeness? How should one integrate into an overall assessment and forecast the fact that, in spite of (or is it because of?) their disastrous industrial production-growth record, the British have been shown by various comparative surveys to be among the happiest and most optimistic people in Europe? This is not to mention, of course, the often impressive concrete British successes in the major fields of industry, commerce, and banking.

One should therefore beware of stereotypes and sweeping judgments, even when it comes to Italy. This country could easily be seen as the living symbol of a weak economy. Among the structural problems which the 1977 OECD economic study listed were, for instance, the need to renovate whole sectors of various industries, traditional weakness in productive investments, insufficient diversification of exports, archaic agricultural sectors, persistent regional imbalances, low-cost housing shortages, archaic fiscal behaviors, dramatic rigidities in the labor market, booming public-sector deficits, and so on.[18] Add to that picture flourishing urban terrorism and a governability crisis that had become the textbook example of the genre and you are quite close to an almost-Weberian "ideal type" of weak European country. Yet, doing away with normative preconceptions, one gets a confused feeling that the dialectic of strengths and weaknesses is more complex in the real world than abstract analysis and concepts reflect. After all, we should remember that the much admired "Italian miracle" of the 1960s was achieved on much the same economic base, and it is too easy to say that Italy is simply "paying now" for its earlier successes. As the present remarkable competitivity of the small-scale "Bresciani" steelmakers illustrates, some archaic economic features may suddenly be turned into ingredients of overall efficiency. The trade surpluses experienced in the first semester of 1978 are an encouraging sign. Of course, one may regret, from a normative point of view, that social security taxes are not always collected, but is this type of "economic irrationality" really qualitatively different from, for example, the access to low-priced oil that some countries have preserved for their industry when marginal cost pricing would, theoretically, be economically preferable? Economists will always, rightly, strive to bring reality in line with their models, and they resent departures from "cleanliness" as a personal offense. But, from a pragmatic point of view, technical perfection matters less than the overall capacity of a country to cope and make do. From that point of view, Italy has clearly displayed an astonishing resilience. Its capacities for social innovation (e.g., the *compremesso storico* and the endorsement of IMF-backed austerity measures by the Communist trade union leaders) have been so outstanding that, once everything is said about absenteeism and rigidities, one should not rule out too quickly the possibility of a new Italian miracle.

If miracles can be a way of life, the concept of structurally "weak" economies, although highly relevant in the short term, is of little use in forecasting the economic situation of Europe in ten or twenty years. But what use can be made, then, of the concept of "strong" economies? In other words, will Europe, by the 1990s, have become a Deutschmark zone?

The economic strength of Germany and its greater success in coping with the major crisis, in which most other Western economies are still more or less entangled, may well be the most significant political fact in today's West. Germany accounts for one-third of the total European Community GNP, which

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represents about one-fourth of the American GNP. For the first time, in 1978, it overtook the United States as the world's first trader; its share of world trade reached almost 10 percent. Although these quantitative successes owe much to the high value of the Deutschmark relative to other currencies, and coexist, therefore, with a real-growth record (6 percent, in 1970 prices and exchange rates, from 1973 to 1977) and an unemployment level (4.6 percent in 1977) that are not entirely satisfactory, there are at least four major dimensions beside which German achievements are especially impressive:

1. A remarkable capacity to overcome the shocks of 1973, bring bilateral trade balances back in the black even with OPEC, and maintain overall trade surpluses ($17.2 billion in 1977 or 4.3 percent of GNP) from 1951 to 1977 even with a greatly appreciated Deutschmark.
2. Success in keeping inflation (3.9 percent in 1977) at less than half of what it is in most other industrialized nations.
3. The strength of the Deutschmark, both in terms of its appreciation (69 percent against the dollar, 60 percent against the French franc, 19 percent against the yen—between 1969 and 1977 in nominal terms), and in terms of its growing international role as an emerging reserve currency and on the Euromarket: about 8 percent of central banks' currency reserves in mid-1978 was estimated to be in Deutschmarks, while the circulation of Euromarks has reached the 100 billion DM level.
4. Last but not least, the moral superiority that comes from believing firmly in a given set of theories and policies, sticking to them and, in so doing, achieving often-impressive results.[19]

There is little doubt that these economic successes are widely admired and envied. Much of the economic debate in France, for instance, centers around the desirability and possibility of going the German way. The choices made in the spring of 1978 to renew economic liberalism were to no negligible extent the result of this debate.

But, as the controversies among German economists indicate, these economic strengths should not blind us to certain weaknesses and limitations.

The weaknesses are the natural counterpart of the choices made by Germany to give priority (with a fervor that may not be unrelated to the still vivid memory of the hyperinflation of 1923) to the fight against inflation. It is true, of course, that a sound monetary policy is a highly laudable objective and that the high levels of federal budgetary deficits in 1977 and 1978 did not leave much room for additional stimulation. Yet, there may be something a little excessive in the vigor of German opposition, in practice at least, to international recovery schemes. Psychoanalysts and cartoonists would probably argue that the declining prestige of heavy industry and the emergence of postindustrial values are reflected in the negative reactions of Germany toward those who seek its favors and markets by comparing it to a locomotive. Similarly, the trust put in the present policies may be going a little too far when it leads the government to take advantage of the broad consensus that exists within the economic establishment (notably the five major research institutes) to minimize or preempt the collection and analysis of statistical and econometric data on which alternative policies might be based. Even the most respectable economic tenets—such as

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the central role of a higher profit/wages ratio in the determination of investments or the idea that direct government intervention to stimulate investments would be canceled out by perverse expectations of more such interventions by the private sector—need to be critically reassessed from time to time.

Besides the obvious economic and psychological benefits, there could be some dangers in too strict a reliance by German policy-makers on a single approach. One is that real economic life is not necessarily governed, in practice, in strict accordance with principles put forward so strongly and almost self-righteously in domestic and international arenas. Hence there is a risk of losing credibility if controversies develop over questions like the impact of the "greenmark" undervaluation of agricultural prices, industrial subsidies at the länder level, and the contrast between the behavior of private firms and the theory of perfect competition.

In addition to the weaknesses that are accepted as natural counterparts of its strengths and emphases, the German model may also have some built-in limitations that should call for some prudence in extrapolating from its past successes. Its remarkable capacity to maintain trade surpluses in spite of (or even—according to the "virtuous-cycle" theory—thanks to) the strong appreciation of the national currency, could turn out to be effective only within certain limits. After all, the whole process started with a greatly undervalued Deutschmark, from 1948 to the mid-1960s, a factor which, according to some, accounts for the exceptional importance of the industrial sector in the German GNP. Worries that were beginning to be expressed by the German business community about the impact of too strong a mark may have influenced Chancellor Schmidt's decision to accept a closer relationship with other, weaker EEC currencies. In any case, the "virtuous cycle," if it exists, requires an industrial structure well adapted to the prevailing patterns of international trade, so as to reduce price elasticity of demand. But, in today's rapidly changing environment, this supposes permanent adaption to the economic structure, which may prove difficult to maintain in a slow-growth context.

The debate about the need for a "structural policy" (*Strukturpolitik*) has been at the center of controversy in the mid-1970s.[20] Trade union calls for active sectoral policies more or less along the French model have been strongly resisted, and the decision to entrust the five institutes with periodic reports on sectoral structures has allowed the government to avoid any significant move toward the creation of new policy instruments. In the long term however, complete reliance on natural adjustment processes and market signals will not necessarily allow it to cope successfully with the unemployment issue. Such a failure would probably threaten the bases of the present compromises and the trust placed in purely "horizontal" and "global orientation" (*Globalsteurung*) policies. If it turned out that successful adaptation to a new international division of labor does not coincide with a successful employment policy, the question of what costs should be acceptable, and who should bear them, would come back to the forefront of the domestic debate.

So the economic landscape in the Europe of the late 1970s includes weak countries endowed with quite remarkable resilience and a strong country not without potential weaknesses. But what can be said of the countries that differ

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from these two polar opposites and tend to exhibit a combination of strengths and weaknesses?

The most important country in this category is probably France. Of the weaker countries, France has a certain propensity for inflation and an industrial structure in which important sectors remain quite vulnerable to Third World competition. The social and political bases for a domestic consensus on economic issues, although they seem to be slowly strengthening, are probably still more fragile than they are in many countries. Important currency fluctuations illustrate, from time to time, the existence of these potentially destabilizing factors.

On the other hand, French real growth has been one of the highest in Europe (an average of 4.2 percent per annum from 1960 to 1975, compared to 3.5 percent for Germany, 2.2 percent for the United Kingdom, and 2.5 percent for the United States). The rediscovery of the *impératif industriel* has translated into major industrialization and competitivity efforts, in which civil servants have not necessarily been the troublemakers and money-wasters that *liberalismus vulgaris* leads some to expect. The balance-of-payment problems associated with the 1973 crisis have been overcome faster than expected. The fragility of this achievement is, however, underlined by the slow-growth context in which it has taken place and by the importance of bilateral deficits with OPEC countries and with the most advanced economies, which are concealed by the overall balance. These deficits are compensated for by surpluses with less-developed and Eastern-bloc countries, which, in addition to implying a higher degree of potential political and economic vulnerability, could be interpreted as reflecting a hierarchization of international exchanges in which France occupies an intermediate position.[21]

Because it is by far the largest European economy that can at present be designated as neither clearly "strong" nor "weak"—bearing in mind the highly qualified nature of these concepts—much of the future configuration of economic forces in Europe, and between Europe and the rest of the world, will depend on whether France is able to overcome its economic weakness and join Germany as a strong world economic power.

VICIOUS CIRCLES AND VIRTUOUS CIRCLES: HAVE THEY BEEN SQUARED IN BREMEN?

In the booming days of old, a number of recipes were developed to cope with the divergence of economic situations, allowing each country to pursue its own specific mix of domestic objectives while preserving a satisfactory economic relationship with its European partners.

In the case of France, for instance, achieving a real growth superior to that of Germany—its first economic partner—was a major economic-policy objective, especially after de Gaulle's successors fully acknowledged the importance of a strong economy to the exercise of a significant world role. The successful mobilization of domestic resources toward that goal had its price, however. In particular, it reinforced inflationary tendencies which were already more important than in countries where the sharing of the national pie could be based on a stronger social and political consensus. The recipe, freely summarized here in

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its simplest form, was to compensate for this higher inflation rate through periodic devaluations (and later downward floating) that recreated the conditions for competitivity and growth.

One of the problems of today's Europe is that these venerable recipes and tricks (the French example being only one of many), which were pragmatically developed over the years, have lost much of their effectiveness, while new mechanisms, in which some had put so much hope, have failed to provide alternative regulation possibilities.

In particular, floating exchange rates have fulfilled their promises (King Milton's, that is) of automatic trade adjustment. The link between the relative value of currencies and the relative competitivity of economies that floating exchange rates were supposed to provide so painlessly has turned out to be incomplete, influenced by psychological and political factors and perturbed by unclear lag effects. But floating exchange rates, if they have not freed governments from the previous constraints, have, nevertheless, greatly reduced their capacity to use exchange rates as a tool for adjusting to the international context. At the same time, the quadrupling of oil prices (and the fact that the latter are still expressed in United States' dollars), combined with the low price elasticity of oil imports, has greatly increased the costs of currency devaluation as a policy for reestablishing balance-of-payments equilibrium.

Interdependence is a nice word, but, in the real world, its progress is only pleasant to the extent that ways to cope with its negative effects are also in progress. The danger for Europe is that the increasing difficulties each national economy is experiencing in trying to cope with external constraints could gradually give full relevance and political significance to the presently ambiguous distinction between "weak" and "strong" economies.

Indeed, some leading European policy-makers fear that economies will tend to exhibit one of two opposite types of behavior, with little possibility for individual countries to shift from one type to the other. Some would be trapped in a vicious circle: lack of adaptation to the international demand and competition patterns would create trade deficits, which depress exchange rates, which in turn increase the cost of the bill for oil and other inelastic imports and thereby exacerbate inflation, which eventually lowers international competitivity even further and touches off a new series of unpleasant events. The happy few, in the meanwhile—and Switzerland is an even better example than Germany—would be trapped in a "virtuous cycle," not without its own virtuous dangers (virtue may eventually price itself out of competition, but only after many pleasant adventures). In these countries a well-adapted and competitive industrial structure could lead to trade surpluses and appreciated national currency, which makes light Arabian crude a bargain and keeps inflation down, which allows competitiveness to remain high and exports to increase, if not in volume, at least in value. Well aware that perfection is a long way to go, the virtuous must, however, maintain a permanent adjustment process to keep the technological lead and industrial strength that allow their products to remain in great demand even as their prices, expressed in foreign currencies, keep on increasing. During this permanent redeployment process unemployment may remain high even if this does not show on financial sheets.

Of course, like any analysis phrased in terms of virtues and vices, this allegory has its limits. But it is not without its appeal, especially to worried sinners.

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This is probably one of the sources of the renewed interest, described above, in European monetary union: keeping the currencies closer together appears to some as a way to break up the cycles before their spiraling effects get even worse.

Unusual prudence in expressing reservations about the new monetary schemes put forward at the 1978 Bremen summit has been shown even by some countries that might be expected to oppose giving up the slightest bit of sovereignty over monetary matters (let us say, not to name any country, countries surrounded by sea and endowed with a buoyant financial center and a reserve currency of their own). This attitude certainly has something to do with the discovery, during the 1974-1977 period, that individual sovereignty, when the individual is trapped in the wrong type of circle, is of little practical help. At such times it appears that resisting currency devaluation (or at least keeping it to the minimum required by the so-called "fundamental" evolutions) is a better alternative than trying to float downward faster than one's trading partners. And resisting devaluation requires a minimum of international monetary cooperation for which Europe presently has the only feasible framework.

There are, of course, other policies "weak" countries can try in order to switch circles. One is simply to follow the "right" policies of the strong countries, as the latter keep on advising them to do. But the transition from vicious to virtuous policies must be very gradual and often cannot succeed (because of unemployment or balance-of-payment problems, which it would only exacerbate in the short term) in the absence of some form of international cooperation. Such a cooperation could take other than monetary forms, such as "concerted recovery efforts." Contrasting with previous semifailures, the July, 1978, Bonn summit may have represented a first significant step toward the implementation of an international strategy, although the real motivations may well have been less international than the language. This cooperation may also consist in financial transfers—the specific pretext chosen (be it regional or social European funds or compensatory monetary payments) mattering much less than the amount. Indeed, some countries, taking at face value Barbara Ward's calls for an evolution from welfare states to an international welfare society, are showing definite interest in setting up "intergovernmental welfare" policies along the same lines as those already popular within their borders.

But regardless of the mix of policy instruments devised, monetary questions seem certain to surface at one point or another. Failure to grapple with them creatively at the European level, if not at the world level, would probably condemn, sooner or later, any scheme for economic cooperation the European countries might invent. The French attempt to make, with German help, the qualitative jump from a chronically weak to a strong French franc and to do away with some of the rigidities that are seen as hampering adjustment can be seen as an explicit recognition of the new logic of international economic relations. Such a choice, however, is a difficult one, since a stronger currency will put marginal economic sectors in an even weaker position internationally.[22] A country that does not as yet enjoy an industrial structure as well adapted to international competition as the German one will need to achieve a faster rate of industrial redeployment. This restructuring—which should be conceived at the level of the firm and of the product to be perfected, rather than in sectoral terms—appears to be the necessary first step for a country hoping to find oppor-

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tunities, rather than constraints, in the new international division of labor.[23] Thus, the present French international economic policy, which some analyze in terms of alignment on Germany, can be seen, on the contrary, as based on the notion that a rapprochement between the franc and the mark, which will call for a stronger redeployment effort in France, is the only way to avoid a divergence of the two major European economies that would someday be a source of common difficulties, including difficulties at the political level.

Even those who think, "year of Europe" notwithstanding, that the old continent is at best a marginal actor on the world economic and political scenes, may realize that the ways in which Europe will overcome its common economic problems and manage to cope with and reduce the diversity of its national economic situations will have a major bearing on the evolution of the world economic and political scenes.

We have seen that European economies are confronted with constraints—both external and resulting from the long-term trends of their own evolution—that will require unprecedented innovations with regard to economic policies. No less is required than redeployment of industries and finding ways to distribute the costs of these adjustments, redefining the economic role of the state, and finding new relationships with both the advanced economies of the United States and Japan and the growing economies of the Third World.

Considering the ambiguity of the situation and the diversity of paths the new European economies may follow, one might well wonder whether there is not indeed a sphinx at the crossroads. As always, it will take an uncommon mixture of ingenuity and sophistication to answer its questions. Some may even go so far as to wonder whether the answers can be found at all in the complete works of the great Europeans—from John Maynard Keynes to Jean Monnet—who defeated the sphinxes of the past.

References

[1]I am greatly indebted to Thierry de Montbrial, Olivier Gaussot, and my colleagues at the Centre d'Analyse et de Prévision for permanent intellectual stimulation and advice, as well as to Christophe Riboud for patient and detailed comments on the manuscript. My gratitude also goes to Marie-Claude de Saint-Hilaire and Laure Hantzberg. But, as always, the views expressed and the shortcomings are those of the writer only.

[2]Total EEC population in 1975 was 258 million and is expected to be 265 million in 1985. But the German population (61 million in 1975) is expected to decline to 59 million in 1985 and 55 million in 2000 (G. Buttler and B. Hof, *Bevölkerung und Arbeitsmarkt bis zum Jahr 2000*, Köln: Deutscher Instituts-Verlag, 1977). Forecasts, however, should always be taken with a grain of salt, as illustrated by the contrast between pre-war demographic forecasts for the 1950s and actual demographic evolution.

[3]Among those writing about new consumption patterns that they foresaw or called for, were, for instance, Jacques Attali, *La Nouvelle Economie Française* (Paris: PUF, 1977). On the new technological wave see, for instance, G. Mensch, *Das technologische Patt, Innovationen Überwinden die Depression* (Frankfurt: Umschau Verlag, 1925).

[4]François Houiller "La paysannerie une 'peau de chagrin,' " *Etudes* (February, 1978). Population employed in the agricultural sector represented 16 percent of total working population in Italy, 11 percent in France, 7.3 percent in Germany, and 2.7 percent in England in 1978 (*Eurostat*, 1977).

[5]Whereas the European Common Agricultural Policy is built around highly visible price support mechanisms, backed with almost avowedly protectionist measures (such as import levies and export subsidies), it would be wrong to assume that the United States (not to mention Japan, in which the small peasant constituency is one of the politically most influencial lobbies) has the clean free-trader's hands that it claims to. The barrage of restrictions on dairy imports, "voluntary" restrictions on beef imports, grain reserves, a mixture of deficiency payments and cropland "set-aside"

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incentives are among the features that allow the United States Department of Agriculture and Congress to protect farm income and to influence prices to an extent comparable, if not in the same ways, with that of the EEC. See, for instance, Christophe Riboud, "L'influence du Gouvernement Américain sur les échanges agricoles," mimeo., Centre d'Analyse et de Précision, Paris 1978.

[6]In October, 1978, compensatory monetary duties were still a full 25 percent in favor of British food importers.

[7]In 1977, total EEC nuclear power net production was 100 billion kilowatt hours (+20.9 percent in one year) of which 35 billion kilowatt hours were produced by Great Britain, 34 by Germany, 17 by France, 11 by Belgium, 3 by Italy. Total installed capacity at the end of the year was 20,000 megawatts (*Enerpresse*, 2141, August 24, 1978). As for enriched uranium production, Eurodif (which regroups France, Belgium, Italy, Spain and Iran around the gaseous diffusion enrichment process) will produce a little over 10 million isotopic enrichment units per year in the 1980s, a capacity which may be doubled by a second venture of the same type (Coredif). Urenco, which regroups Germany, Great Britain, and the Netherlands around the ultracentrifugation enrichment process, is expected to produce between 1 and 3 million isotopic enrichment units. Total European capacity will be only slightly smaller than the American commercial production in the late 1980s.

[8]On the complex interdependence model, see Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1977).

[9]Robert Heller and Norris Willatt, *The European Revenge* (New York: Scribner's, 1975). Growth rates in 1976 were 6 percent in the United States, against 4.5 percent in the EEC, a trend confirmed in 1977 (4.9 percent against 2.2 percent) and probably in 1978 (3.5 percent expected, against 2.4 percent).

[10]Charles Kindleberger, *The World in Depression 1929-39* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), especially pp. 302, 303.

[11]See Thierry de Montbrial, *Le désordre économique mondial* (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1974).

[12]Stanley Hoffmann, *Primacy or World Order: American Foreign Policy since the Cold War* (McGraw Hill, 1978).

[13]Commissariat Général du Plan, *Rapport du Groupe Chargé d'Etudier l'Evolution des Economies du Tiers-Monde et l'Appareil Productif Français*, "Rapport Berthelot" (Paris, January, 1978).

[14]The best description of the difficulties and limits of European integration is probably to be found in Jean-François Deniau, *L'Europe Interdite* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1977).

[15]On optimality in a second-best world, see, for instance, Roger Guennery, "A General Framework for Second Best Analysis," *American Economic Review*.

[16]See, for instance, Robert Toulemon and Jean Flory, *Une Politique industrielle pour l'Europe* (Paris: PUF, 1974).

[17]Robert Bacon and Walter Elbis, *Britain's Economic Problems—Too Few Producers*, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1978). The British industrial production index rose by only 6 percent from 1970 to 1977 (against 16 percent in Germany, 26 percent in France, and 27 percent in the United States), according to the OECD Main Economic Indicators (August, 1978).

[18]OECD, Economic Studies: Italy (Paris, March, 1977).

[19]On the German economy, see, for instance, Hans-Hinrich Glismann and Ernst-Jürgen Horn "Problèmes de conjoncture et de croissance dans une économie ouverte, la RFA," *Economie & Statistiques*, 97 (February, 1978), the French translation of a study by the Kiel Institute, as well as the answer, by Bernard Keizer, to this article (Bernard Keizer, "Les choix de la République Fédérale d'Allemagne," *Economie & Statistiques*, 102). Also Alphonse Losser, "Transformations de la structure sectorielle et renouvellement de la politique économique en RFA," mimeographed paper.

[20]Cahlen (B), "Strukturpolitik in der Marktwirtschaft," *Wirshaftspolitische Monatsschrift*, 58(1) (1978). Lamberts (W), "Strukturpolitik als 'Politik des Datenkranzes,' " *Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut fur Wirtschaftforschung/Essen*, Mitteilungen, 24 (1973).

[21]In 1978, France experienced bilateral trade deficits of FF 10.7 billion with Germany, FF 8.1 with the United States, FF 4.5 with Japan, and FF 28.9 with OPEC countries. By contrast, it experienced trade surpluses of FF 2.4 billion with Socialist countries, FF 4.2 billion with the franc zone, and FF 7.8 billion with the other non-oil-developing countries. The overall trade deficit was FF 34.2 billion. (*Source:* Banque Française du commerce extérieur, February, 1978.)

[22]Jean-Pierre Dubarry, "Commerce extérieur et croissance," *Chroniques d'Actualité de la SEDEIS*, 19(15) (August 1, 1978).

[23]On the issue of industrial redeployment, see, for instance, Alain Cotta, *La France et l'Impératif mondial* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1978); Christian Stoffaes, *La Grande Menace Industrielle* (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1978); Alain Boublil, *Le Socialisme Industriel* (Paris: PUF, 1977); Christian Sautter, "L'Economie Française dans la crise mondiale," *Défense Nationale*, 34 (July, 1978).

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The Community: Performance and Prospects

LET US GO BACK TO THE BEGINNING—the logical beginning and also the historical beginning. What are the European Communities *for*? Those who take a strictly organic view of human institutions may find this an improper question. But the EEC, the Coal and Steel Community, and Euratom have not been ordinary institutions. From their inception they were unusually artificial constructions put up by highly idiosyncratic architects. They did not, like the American Union, emerge by an inevitable logic from the facts of a given situation; it is extremely doubtful whether the Communities would have been founded had not Robert Schuman and Konrad Adenauer been exactly where they were in 1950. The founding fathers happened to have a vision that reflected the federalism fashionable, both on the Continent and in the British Empire, in the decade before the First World War; and they were fortunate to be in the right place at the right time to persuade others to try it out forty years later. Admittedly, in spite of the artificiality of their construction, the Communities have acquired an independent life—as such institutions do. An established bureaucracy now has a vested interest in their continuation, and the worlds of the Commission, the Council, and the Parliament have evolved their own traditions and conventions. But the process has been slow and uncertain, and the world of the Community as a whole has never managed to spin under its own momentum. It has been more like a top whose gyrations and perilous stability can be maintained only by being whipped along from time to time by a vigorous political hand.

The strategy of the originators of the enterprise was set out clearly in Robert Schuman's declaration of May 19, 1950:

> The contribution which an organised and active Europe can make to civilisation is indispensable for the maintenance of peaceful relations. . . . Because Europe was not united we have had war. . . . The uniting of the European nations requires that the age-old opposition between France and Germany be eliminated: the action to be taken must first of all concern France and Germany.[1]

In other words, the paramount objective was political, but a political aim that was to be achieved in the first instance by quite limited economic means.

> The pooling of coal and steel production will immediately ensure the establishment of common bases for economic development which is the first step for a European federation, and will change the destiny of these regions which have long

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been devoted to the production of arms to which they themselves were the first to fall constantly victim.

A benign circle of logic is envisaged. If France and Germany are united in the fundamental elements of industrial production, they cannot go to war; if France and Germany are at peace, Europe will be prosperous; if Europe is prosperous, it is likely to be peaceful as well.

At first sight this logic has not served so badly in practice. Whatever else has not been achieved in Europe in the last thirty years, the historic breach between France and Germany has certainly been healed. In Western Europe at least there has been a period of peace and prosperity longer—so far as prosperity is concerned—than at any time since the Napoleonic wars and longer—so far as peace is concerned—than any other this century. It is possible to argue that both these phenomena might have occurred without the intervention of Messrs. Schuman and Monnet. Franco-German rapprochement was to some extent ordained by the external circumstances of the cold war, while economic prosperity was assured by the generous imagination and enlightened self-interest of General Marshall and other American leaders. But even the most revisionist historian would find it hard to deny that the Communities have played an important part in these processes. Business confidence and cooperation on the political level did reinforce each other, much as the founding fathers planned, and for the first decade of the Communities' existence the activity of reducing barriers to business activity and competition over a vast industrial market area was invigorating as well as useful.

Moreover, invigoration bred self-confidence, as Monnet hoped it would. In spite of the setbacks of the mid-1950s (notably the failure of the European Defense Community), the federalist objectives the Schuman declaration had dared to express only in a rather cautious and instrumental form ("the first step for a European federation") came to be more and more explicitly espoused by many European politicians as well as by the first EEC Commission, headed by the highly ideological Walter Hallstein. To some extent this was part of the defensive reaction of the smaller members of the Six to the threat of excessive Franco-German domination—which seemed to require a forthright counter. But mainly, one suspects, it was the simple result of the ease with which the first achievements of the European Coal and Steel Community and the EEC were accomplished. The creation of the common external tariff and the setting up of the institutions of the Community were brought off with a lack of argument that astounded the most optimistic "Europeans of the first hour." The establishment of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was a more difficult and dangerous affair, but it too was accomplished, suggesting to many that the inner dynamism of the Community was now as unstoppable as the most enthusiastic theorists of federation had predicted. Even General de Gaulle's presence on the scene had the paradoxical result of heartening, in some sense, the federalist forces he wished to eliminate. Gaullist nationalism appeared to be so destructive and self-interested that for many of his political opponents in Europe it became a sacred duty to espouse the two causes—federalism and the entry of Britain into the EEC—that he had turned his back on.

The display of federalist resolve was not the only feature of this phase. At this time another aim of the EEC was discovered—namely the notion that the

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EEC as such should acquire a strong "third power" identity in the geopolitical balance. This was a possibility that had made virtually no appearance among the purposes of the founding fathers in 1950 and very little in the Treaty of Rome. It came to the fore as a result of the tensions between the United States and her allies, caused, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, by the changing balance of economic and military power between America and a now revitalized Europe. The mid-Atlantic jargon of those years—support costs, the *défi américain*, the twin-pillar theory, the multilateral force—marks the wavering course of an argument about how under these new circumstances Europe should define itself in relation to the most powerful active force in its field of vision. At the same time, the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations and the negotiations of British entry threw up problems of even broader scope, including the adumbration of a North-South dialogue that went far beyond the narrow colonial visions of the founding fathers. The Schuman declaration had identified one of Europe's essential tasks as "the development of the African continent"; but by 1962 Monnet was putting the matter in a far more grandiose perspective: "The natural attitude of a European Community based on the exercise by nations of common responsibilities will be to make these nations also aware of their responsibilities, as a community, to the world."[2]

Yet these "second-period" objectives of state-building at home and abroad proved infinitely more difficult to achieve than those of the first phase. To be sure, General de Gaulle eventually retreated into history, and with him many of the more extreme manifestations of Gaullist nationalism. The stumbling, onward march of economic integration was resumed. By the end of the 1960s the Community had achieved a Common Market, a Common Agricultural Policy, the framework at least of a Common Commercial Policy, and appeared to be ready to move on to the creation of an economic and monetary union. On the other hand there were growing difficulties. The chief instrument of integration, the Commission, was being elbowed aside by the Council of Ministers and the Committee of Permanent Representatives. The Community was finally about to be enlarged; but to anyone who could read the writing on the wall there were plenty of signs that in the brave new Europe *à neuf*, Britain at least would emphatically not be in the federalist camp. The achievement of an identity vis-à-vis the outside world was certainly enhanced by the successful completion of the Common External Tariff in July, 1968. But the problem of European relations with the United States was not really solved. This was partly, no doubt, because President Johnson was basically ill at ease with European questions—particularly those with an economic cast—and both he and his successor were deeply preoccupied with the Vietnam War; but it was mainly because the countries of the Community were torn in varying degrees between their desire to keep on the right side of their most powerful ally and their wish to demonstrate their independent identities.

Whether the Community was ready, in 1970, to resume its projected progress after absorbing Britain, Denmark, and Ireland—fostering the convergence of the nine economies and finally achieving economic and monetary union within and a common foreign policy without—is hard to say. Perhaps if all other things had been equal it might have been done; but things seldom are equal, and in the early 1970s they were certainly more unequal than otherwise. The breakdown in the Bretton Woods system precipitated by the economic strains of the

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Vietnam War, followed by the introduction of floating exchange rates, ruled out any further progress on economic and monetary union for the time being. The violent dislocation caused within the Community countries by the oil price rise of 1973 and the ensuing recession and inflation completed the transformation of the psychological climate. The governments of the Nine, commendably, did not rush toward individual protectionism on the whole, but they certainly mislaid, if they did not lose, their enthusiasm for further harmonization. The objectives of the Community became, in this third phase, predominantly defensive and palliative: externally, the protection of Community industry from competition from America, Japan, and, latterly, the Third World; internally, the prevention of excessive divergence in the distribution of growth and employment and the protection, so far as possible, of Western European open, democratic systems from the social strains that economic crisis imposes. In 1978 there have been signs of a new flicker of political initiative and a realization that minimalist aims clearly have failed to prevent the deterioration of the situation and have, even more certainly, failed to improve it. But it is still very far from clear what can now be achieved.

This brief history of the teleology of the Communities is grossly oversimplified; but it is enough to shed some necessary light on the present predicament of the Nine. What emerges most clearly is that while the ultimate aims of the Community—namely, the peace and prosperity of Europe—have within limits been successfully fulfilled up to the present, the proximate, political ends (which in a certain light can also be regarded as means) have never been achieved or even accepted universally as appropriate and realistic. The chief casualty of the process, we can now see, has been the notion of automaticity—the idea that one thing would lead ineluctably to another. Monnet was not so naïve as to suppose that it would all be plain sailing; but the basic theory was that once the initial action of political will was taken the gears would gradually enmesh more and more of the machinery of economic harmonization until finally the whole vast construction would pulsate with the same life. What has prevented this development from taking place? The answer suggested by the history of the last thirty years is that there were two major miscalculations in the Community's original conception—one political and the other economic.

The political flaw was really a matter of scope. The Community's structures were designed, basically, to accommodate the Franco-German rapprochement. But it rapidly became apparent that although the relationship of France and Germany was indeed at the core of the European problem, Europe itself spread much wider; and if peace in Europe was the ultimate aim, the competence of the Paris and Rome treaties was not sufficient, perhaps not even appropriate, to bring it about. The enlargement of the Community from six to nine came about in part because the smaller members found themselves stifled by the concentration of Franco-German power but also, more generally, because the developing geopolitical situation and the unexpected political complications of an interdependent world obliged even President Pompidou to come to terms with the idea.

Yet enlargement meant dilution, both political and economic, which enabled the French to impose the Gaullist vision of a *Europe des patries* to a considerable extent upon the European partnership. As a quid pro quo for the enlargement they obliged the other members to go along with the setting up of

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the parallel system of "Political Cooperation" on foreign policy; but more generally they were able to reduce the power of the supranational Commission and place the locus of power within the Community even more firmly in the Council of Ministers. As a British commentator I argued strongly throughout the 1960s for Britain's membership, but had I been a member of the Six, even an anti-Gaullist, I would have been tempted to argue against Britain's admission. The adherence of three new members—one of them large, powerful, and self-opinionated, demanding all sorts of special derogations (not to say arrangements) for a vast group of camp followers in the underdeveloped world—was bound to cause drastic dilution of the coherence of the Community. Yet the logic of letting in Britain was, of course, in another sense, unanswerable. It was not simply that it was nice for the Six to have access to the British market for industrial goods. The basic problem was that the peace and security of Europe in the context of the 1960s appeared to depend very heavily on the inclusion of the British. The sense of vulnerability and powerlessness in the face of the United States' economic strength and the USSR's military strength—to say nothing of the growing challenge from Japan—pointed relentlessly toward enlargement. Indeed it was because they had been thinking in these broad political terms that the founding fathers had framed the Community treaties in such a way as to make permanent rejection of applicant European nations a virtual impossibility.

This discussion brings us abruptly to the present day. For the problems raised by the Mediterranean enlargement, though very different in detail from those attached to British entry, are strategically very similar. The political arguments for admitting Greece, Spain, and Portugal to the EEC are very strong, and the majority of the senior politicians in the Nine are now publicly committed to the notion. Democracy, it is said, must be preserved along the southern flank of NATO, and it is generally accepted that democracy will be endangered if the economic and political benefits of membership are denied to the countries concerned. Now that the matter has got this far, nothing on earth is going to prevent its completion, although no doubt it will be well into the 1980s before their applications have been fully processed. Yet there is equally no power on earth that can prevent the enlargement of the Community from shaking it to its foundations. What is to happen, then? The reasons for alarm about the outcome have been extensively discussed and analyzed in the last year, but they are worth rehearsing here briefly, since the future of the Community turns largely on its willingness and ability to cope with them.

1. There is little complementarity between the production of the three applicant countries and the Community. Not only do they have a lower per capita income than the existing members, but their exports are concentrated in particularly sensitive areas of "old" industry—textiles, clothing, steel, shipbuilding, and oil refining.

2. This export pattern is much the same as that of a number of developing countries to whom the Community has existing obligations. In some cases, notably Turkey, the political repercussions of protectionist favoritism toward the new applicants might well be very unpleasant.

3. In all three countries the majority of industry is organized into small firms. If the pressure of competition with the rest of the Community is too

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great, there will be a vast increase in unemployment (without, incidentally, the safety valve that existed ten or twenty years ago of exporting labor to France and Germany). If, on the other hand, competition is excessively tempered during the transitional period there will be trouble with the present members.

4. The new enlargement will certainly precipitate a crisis, which may come in any case, over the basic economic purposes of the Community. In general the pressure for greater protectionism vis-à-vis the outside world and greater state intervention inside the tariff wall will tend to increase slightly under the new strains. The question will therefore arise whether the free-market philosophy, which was that of the founding fathers and which is still for the most part that of the West Germans, or the more interventionist philosophy of France and Britain is to become the prevailing rule of the Community.

This list of dilemmas (which, incidentally, leaves out the vexing question of agriculture on the grounds that the CAP will have to be altered in any case) is not just a collection of unfortunate accidents. It highlights, in fact, the second major defect in the strategy of the founding fathers—that is, their assumption about the future of the European economies. Here, they thought, was a group of supposedly similar countries at roughly the same stage of advanced industrial development. A single strong economic and, with any luck, political group, could be forged out of them; and, in the process of forging, such discrepanices as actually existed would disappear. It was assumed that not only the economies of the Six, and later the Nine, would tend to converge, but that the existence of the Customs Union, constituting a single large market, would help the process in the long run. The long run is not yet complete, of course, and to that extent we must exercise a little caution. But it must be said that so far the Community has not had much success in promoting convergence among the existing members and has even, according to its detractors, aggravated divergence. Moreover, everyone reckoned without the industry and efficiency of the German people, which has put Germany in an economic class by itself within the Community. Equally, they reckoned without the political and institutional difficulties that have beset Italy and, to a lesser degree, Britain, causing growth rates and inflation figures that were bound to reduce their competitivity vis-à-vis the stronger members of the club.

Economists may argue as to what extent the existence of the club has strengthened these effects, but the absence of an internal tariff has certainly provided no protection against them. Compensatory mechanisms such as the Regional and Social Funds and the European Investment Bank are supposed to take care of the effects of the Customs Union and bring convergence back on course; but the amounts allotted to these purposes have been so meager for most of the Community's life—and indeed they are meager still—that it has been hard to take them seriously. It would be wrong to blame the founding fathers too much for excessive optimism on this score; they had no choice but to pull the Community up by its own bootstraps. But the fact remains that economic divergence has frustrated the progress of the Community throughout its history and continues to impose severe strains upon it. It has hopelessly distorted the Common Agricultural Policy. It has disfigured the industrial market and caused the erection of such nontariff barriers as the Italian import deposit scheme. It

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caused the first steps toward monetary union to be retraced by countries like Britain—which discovered that it could not stand the pace—and it threatens the success of even the more modest monetary scheme adumbrated at the Bonn summit in July, 1978. The truth is that governments will take steps one way or another to protect themselves from any competition they believe will seriously affect economic activity in their countries and the employment of their own voters. They may be prepared to undertake integration in the less important fields of development aid, environment, or even transport policy, but they will resist any system that leaves them without an economic and political safety net.

Seen in this perspective, the idea of further enlargement, to include the Mediterranean countries, looks foolhardy in the extreme. Unless a staggering amount of money is devoted to the task of diversifying and rationalizing the economics of these nations and, in the transitional period, to tempering the wind to the shorn lambs in the old industries of the Six and the Nine, there are bound to be defensive operations on a grand scale to undermine the widened Customs Union. Once this piece of knitting starts to unravel there is no knowing where the psychology of defensive panic may lead; and there is a very real chance that there would be nothing left of the EEC but a loose association of a cooperative kind on the lines of the OECD, with a few bits and pieces stuck on—the remnants of a Common Market, some very minor regional distribution of income, and a protectionist defensive attitude toward the rest of the world.

There is, of course, a school of thought on both sides of the Atlantic which says that these dangers, political and economic, are really not dangers at all; the founding fathers may have miscalculated, but perhaps it is all for the best. A Common Market stripped to the bare bones is, in this view, an organization much more appropriate to modern conditions than the conception of Monnet or even than the actual Community of Roy Jenkins, with its hypocrisy, its bent rules, and its neurotic obsession with its own identity and past dreams. A minimalist Community, according to this thesis, could easily combine on an intergovernmental basis to produce a workmanlike external policy; indeed, some of its existing successes are put forward as evidence of this proposition. In the trade field the Community has successfully weathered the Kennedy and Tokyo rounds. The framework of the Common Commercial Policy embraces a large range of free-trade agreements and commercial-cooperation agreements with all sorts of industrial countries, to say nothing of the Lomé Convention, which governs aid and trade relations with fifty-three African, Caribbean, and Pacific states. Leaving aside the question of whether the Community has been particularly successful in protecting its interests against Japan and the United States or in showing generosity toward the less developed countries, its record of solidarity in this field has been rather impressive.

Just the same, it is doubtful whether the boast of the Tindemans Report (December, 1975) has been justified: "The increasing political weight of the Nine when they are united, and their common interest in lessening potential sources of conflict in their immediate surroundings, tend to induce our countries to act together, and will do so increasingly."[3] It is true that at the Helsinki and Belgrade conferences on European security the Nine put forward a more-or-less common view, especially on the economic questions in Basket II. They have also succeeded in taking a collective view on a number of questions in the

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United Nations General Assembly: on the Middle East, Cyprus, and Portugal, for example. The EEC as such was also represented collectively at the Conference on International Economic Cooperation, and it has been struggling in that context to evolve a united voice in the North-South dialogue. But, as many people (including those on the Commission) have commented, the issues on which either the Nine or the Community shows a solid front are usually of a relatively minor or defensive nature. Positive initiatives on major issues in which the interests of some or all of the Nine have been deeply engaged have been almost entirely lacking.

It is not easy to pin down exactly why this should be so. But a clue is contained in the fact that the Community's most effective external coordination has been in the trade field, where the Commission has an undoubted competence to negotiate on behalf of the Nine. It is hard to resist the conclusion that no very great progress will be made until the Political Cooperation machinery is brought back within the ambit of the Community and some body, presumably the Commission, is given the task of injecting a more *communautaire* dynamic into external policy discussions. It seems equally doubtful that this can be brought about without the existence of a quite different political climate in the Community as a whole.

The internal defects of a minimalist Community are more difficult to be sure about. What, after all, *is* the minimum? Opponents of the whole conception of the EEC, such as the left wing of the British Labour party, are quite clear in their minds about the external factor: the enlargement of the Community will be its downfall—which is why they are in favor of it. They are not nearly so certain about what has to be chipped away from the inside walls of the existing Community to induce the edifice to collapse. By the same token, pro-Marketeers who are trying desperately to keep the building standing in a very unfavorable economic and political climate find it hard to decide what can be left to the demolition gangs and what is structurally essential. On the one hand critics can fairly ask whether it is really necessary for the Commission to force the consumer onto the Procrustean bed of pure competition theory at every point, however trivial, instead of allowing standards to reflect widely differing national tastes. Yet the reply is equally valid: attempts to abandon harmonization in order to meet the political difficulties of particular members have produced distortions that are sometimes so glaring that they undermine the whole fabric of the Community.

We are back, then, to the central question to which Monnet addressed himself—whether it is possible to sweep away barriers to economic cooperation between states without ultimately having to sweep away sovereignty itself. Minimalists such as the theologians of free-trade areas maintain that there is little need for policy harmonization over and above what is required of countries that already engage in international trade on a large scale; and they cite the case of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA). But the trouble with this argument is that almost none of the EFTA countries plays a really major role in the trade of the others—which is why they cling like barnacles to the periphery of the EEC. By contrast, the major countries of the EEC, whose economic activities under free trade are capable of causing great disturbance to their partners, are rapidly forced up against a difficult choice: either free trade is not worthy of the name because so many protective exemptions have to be made by individual

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governments or else some attempts to harmonize competition must be undertaken. The governments of the Six and, subsequently, of the Nine have been for many years struggling with the painful political and economic problems involved in a radical attempt to harmonize their policies. They now find themselves coming to the point at which they are obliged to say that, given a common working market framework, the results of not harmonizing their economies in the most fundamental way are almost equally painful—hence the tentative return in recent months to the notion of a monetary union as a means of reducing the present exchange-rate risks and the inflation uncertainties inherent in an unharmonized market.

In case of another enlargement, there can be no doubt that this dilemma will have to be faced; but it can hardly be avoided even if the Community stays at its present size—as one can readily see by looking at even the most sophisticated semiminimalist strategy. The most attractive—outlined in the MacDougall Report (April, 1977)—is a kind of *reculer-pour-mieux-sauter* strategy of cutting down the activities of the Community; indeed it would restrict them to those fields in which it can be clearly shown that there are economies of scale to be derived from a national approach or else policies that are so transnational in their effects that it is impossible to control them on a national level. This line of thought is a potentially fruitful one as far as it goes; but it is no use pretending that the strategy will take the heat off the Community. For one thing, the direct management of "the various functions of West European activity where there is an international spill-over or where there are economies of scale to be found" (to quote MacDougall)[4] is a definition that would bring the Council of Ministers and the Commission into a vast number of extremely tricky fields where they are at present only just beginning to venture—notably such problem areas as steel, textiles, and shipbuilding, where the "orderly reduction of capacity" by cartelization is the fashionable, if controversial, formula. In any case, the MacDougall approach implies a degree of integration over the things that really matter politically and economically that makes evasion of the crucial harmonization issues impossible.

To summarize this argument, I would say that the idea of a minimal Community is extremely hard to define satisfactorily. The nations of the Nine naturally partake of the problems, economic and political, of the whole Western developed world, and their relations with each other could, in theory, proceed on the same ad hoc basis as any other bilateral relations within that framework—for example, those between Germany and the United States. But the attempt to avoid the difficulties that beset such bilateral relations beckons those who embark on it into deeper waters. To that extent the founding fathers of the EEC were correct; it is not at all easy to maintain a stationary position in the shallows. They were wrong, however, in supposing that movement can be only in one direction—there is, alas, no automaticity about going forward. Political will is required at each step, and it is always open to the participants, either singly or collectively, to scuttle back up the beach.

Which is it to be today? It must be said that the outlook is not exactly fair. The fact is that the spinning top is wobbling badly and needs a new touch of the political whip. Yet that is precisely what is most difficult to provide under present circumstances. For the balance of world economic power is tilting away

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from the countries of northwest Europe. Moreover, although this process is gradual and comparative, it is happening at a time when electorates have particularly high expectations and when even marginal changes in comparative living standards cause very troublesome political shock waves. It is a period of conservatism and inward-lookingness, when men tend to cling to ancient crosses and hoard gold. Cooperative ventures of all sorts are examined with a jaundiced and cynical eye (in July, 1978, the Commission's Community-wide opinion poll showed the lowest support of the EEC in six years); new initiatives and new ideas either are greeted with deadening skepticism or do not materialize at all. So it is a tribute to the persistence of both the politicians of the Community and the idea of the Community itself that three fresh—or relatively fresh—notions still stand on the agenda; each one is capable of reviving the political impetus of the Community, and yet each is pregnant with possible disaster if it cannot be carried through with some conviction and élan by the national governments.

The most immediate of these is the plan for another attempt at monetary union. The advantages of such a step from the European federalist point of view were well described by Roy Jenkins in his Jean Monnet Lecture in Florence in October, 1977: quite apart from any practical advantages, it would take the Community over a new political threshold. But the question is whether national politicians are prepared to take the domestic political risks involved in the crossing. Any British government, for instance, would be extremely reluctant to join a genuine monetary union that it believes would increase unemployment in the short run and result, in the longer term, in the subordination of the British economy to a Deutschmark bloc. Conversely, any German government would be extremely reluctant to risk the inflation entailed in paying the expansionist price a British government might accept as the trade-off for its acquiescence in the union. It will require vision and some willingness to take a gamble on the part of both participants in this dialogue if anything is to be done. And not only that. A deal that cannot be sold to the electorates of Britain and Germany will in the end be self-defeating, since it will undermine still further the credibility and acceptability of the Community.

The second horse on which a lot of bets have been placed is the directly elected European parliament. The fact that the Nine have succeeded in agreeing to direct elections in spite of all the difficulties and political opposition (particularly in Britain) is indeed a sign that there remains a groundswell of political opinion (particularly on the Continent) with some feeling for the supranational approach. It is also true that a European assembly, directly elected, could have a legitimacy that would turn it from its present role of mildly useful shoptalking into something with real power—in particular the power to compel the Council of Ministers to take "European" initiatives they might not otherwise take. But here again there is no automaticity. The legitimacy of the parliament will depend on how many people turn out to vote for it, the quality of the people who find it worth joining, and the effect its activities have on the fortunes of individual politicians at the national level. At the best it will take time—perhaps a decade—for this credibility to be built up, but it will have no chance at all of growing unless national leaders are prepared to promote the experiment positively. In particular, they must increase the Community budget from its present minute 0.7 percent of the national product of the whole Community to an amount that it is worthwhile for the parliament actually to "control."

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Finally, there is the question of the enlargement. We have already seen that this move presents the Community with the most gigantic and probably most unanswerable challenge. If the Community of the Nine cannot take drastic measures to equalize its economic disparities—both internally and in relation to its peripheral applicants for membership—it is hard to see it surviving in any meaningful form. No doubt some kind of decision-making organs and even corporate identity would live on, but the Community would almost certainly proceed by way of a two-tier structure to a loose association of more-or-less protectionist nation-states. War and famine might not immediately break out again; but their banishment would depend to a greater extent on external factors—the superpower balance, the state of the world economy, the strength of the less-developed world—than it does even at present.

The alternative, of course, is a massive redistribution of resources and purchasing power on the scale of the Marshall Plan. This has probably become the price of the continuance of the ideal of a European economic community; whether the people in the richer parts of Western Europe are willing to pay it is ultimately a psychological and indeed a cultural question. If we are brutally realistic we recognize that the sense of consanguinity and mutual interest Europeans feel for each other does not fall easily into the mold of the European Economic Community. It either fails to fill it or it bursts its boundaries. The cultures of the western countries are converging in many ways under the influence of mass production and easy communications, but this convergence covers North America as well as Western Europe and even, to some extent, Eastern Europe as well. At the other end of the scale people are falling back on smaller groupings to support their sense of identity and are tending to define themselves in regional enclaves. And in the midst of these changes the nation-state, with all its panoply of institutions, is fighting, and not without success, for its life. In this melee a new cooperative venture, neither nation-state nor cultural grouping, is indeed hard put to survive. The stage direction to Part I of Thomas Hardy's *Dynasts* sets the scene:

> The nether sky opens, and Europe is disclosed as a prone and emaciated figure, the Alps shaping like a backbone, and the branching mountain chains like ribs, the peninsula plateau of Spain forming a head. Broad and lengthy lowlands stretch from the north of France across Russia like a grey-green garment hemmed by the Ural mountains and the glistening Arctic Ocean. The point of view then sinks downwards through space, and draws near to the surface of the perturbed countries, where the peoples, distressed by events which they did not cause, are seen writhing, crawling, heaving, and vibrating in their various cities and nationalities.

It is amid these long vistas and teeming crowds that the European Common Market is still struggling for its existence.

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UWE NERLICH

Western Europe's Relations with the United States

The Old World Restored: The American Condition

THE UNITED STATES: AGENT OF HISTORY

THE RECONSTRUCTION OF WESTERN EUROPE some thirty years ago resulted from American improvisation rather than grand design. It displayed, however, not imperial style but the genius of architecture. After decades of European self-destruction, the new Alliance with the United States provided a common framework for Europe from Norway to Turkey—though at the price of even more painful divisions between Western Europe and those countries that had fallen under Soviet control. Under most unfavorable circumstances—with the political fabric of many countries shattered, with vast enforced migrations, with a potential for the expansion of Soviet influence—the Alliance created conditions conducive to unprecedented economic prosperity (along with losses of colonial empires), unprecedented political unity under conditions of dependency, a defense coalition among former enemies, and stability.

No revisionism will undo the fact that this reconstruction of the old continent was a historic achievement of American foreign policy. Soviet leverage was diminished for many years to come. Hostilities among new partners were muted to the point of genuine cooperation. Economic growth produced the new European welfare states. And a "permissive consensus" spread throughout the Alliance which reduced the impact of nonsystemic shocks as it enabled the Alliance to manage many of its built-in structural deficiencies—the nuclear-sharing problem, the German issue, or the fear of selective deals with the Soviet Union.

The Alliance, indeed, seemed to extend to Western Europe that "cushion of insulated space" (Daniel Bell) that had protected America from its own vitality throughout most of its history. Moreover, Western Europe was caught up by the American sense of pragmatic utopianism that so inspired community building until well into the sixties. As one of Europe's great social thinkers of the century, Ernst Troeltsch, had observed some decades before, for Europeanism to survive it would have to merge in a cultural synthesis that would allow for the boost of that tremendous American vitality. After decades of European self-destruction there was no other alternative.

Throughout its ascendance to global power the United States had protected itself by staying out of European conflicts. Yet, in its maturing stages, the

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United States was dragged into Europe's wars of agony and determined their outcome. But the result was a secular reversal of roles: the United States now became both the pacifier and the protector of those parts of Europe that had not fallen under Soviet dominance. The American engagement was caused by Soviet actions and policies; indeed the very simplicity of the bipolar confrontation was presumably a prerequisite for this departure from American traditions. In a more complex and diffused competitive environment internal American pressures to stay out might have been decisive.

To maintain this condition of Western Europe the United States had to acquire European responsibilities that would last indefinitely. While she did so with painful reluctance, this was the essential ingredient of America's global power. Europe became the principal stake in the unfolding and secular competition with the Soviet Union—the other global power emerging from Europe's agonies. Moreover, the United States exercised its new hegemonical role in Europe by dragging Western European nations into a system of economic cooperation that provided prosperity as well as American dominance and by building a system of military cooperation that provided protection as well as severe constraints on Western Europe (mostly in the nuclear field). The American condition of Western Europe's fortunes thus became ever more essential. Yet by the same token America's commitment to Western Europe—with all its risks and its burdens—became ever more inescapable.[1]

This new relationship was shaped by accidental circumstances, even though the realities of the East-West competition endowed it with a sense of historic necessity. Western governments perennially played with integrative choices, even though these were open to no one. Their interrelations soon became crucial, both for the nations of Western Europe and for the American republic; in fact, common heritage and shared values provided a natural basis for them. And yet, the Atlantic Alliance as it emerged after World War II was strangely at odds with the basic political traditions of the United States as well of Western Europe: neither American continentalism nor the kind of Europeanism that had been dominant for more than three centuries was preserved in this system. Thus, in spite of its functional necessity, the Alliance was forced, in order to remain viable under less demanding circumstances, to develop a new political culture. These imperatives, along with the structural limitations of United States-Western European cooperation and the changing political interface between the United States and Western Europe, will eventually determine the fate of Western societies on both sides of the Atlantic.

POSTWAR EUROPE REVISITED: AMERICAN INSTITUTIONALISM WRIT LARGE

The Atlantic Alliance never quite fit the classical dichotomy of isolationism versus interventionism. The mood of the war and early postwar years was understandably conducive to a solidarity that led in turn to a kind of extended isolationism—embracing Western Europe as a possible province of American exceptionalism. It is true that the United States only reluctantly committed itself to permanently deploying major forces in Europe. Nonetheless, institution-building in Western Europe was pursued in a manner to which one could apply a kind of Turner thesis writ large. In a context of unfolding Soviet-American

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rivalry, the division of Europe provided a kind of new frontier; and as "the problem of the United States is not to create democracy, but to conserve democratic institutions and ideals" in a steadily enlarged sphere of action,[2] new Western European institutions were seen by Americans primarily in terms of their commensurability with the American system.

This institutionalism in the reconstructionist American approach to Europe merged with the new conditions of nuclear deterrence to create a strangely artificial, though inescapable, political structure to which there was no obvious alternative at the time. But, as Irving Kristol so aptly put it, with "the advent of the nuclear age, and with the natural growth of the United States into the status of a world power, the ideological polarity behind American foreign policy has less and less connection with actuality. . . . The very existence of world power creates conditions of dependency and interdependency—and also engenders the obligations (moral, political, and economic) which flow from such conditions."[3]

The very belief in American exceptionalism itself might have signaled the need for caution. In the words of another American historian, "institutions are not and should not be the grand creations of men toward large ends and outspoken values; rather they are organisms which grow out of the soil in which they are rooted and out of the tradition from which they have sprung."[4] It may have been the latest European tragedy that the Atlanticist reconstruction of Western Europe after 1945 was a brighter opportunity to create unity than any Europe had experienced in the past, but that the condition of dependence imposed an element of unreality on this grand endeavor to which de Gaulle, in his obstinate way, was only responding prematurely. What is worse, the primacy of military integration that was bound to develop in the shadow of the unfolding competition of the two new world powers reduced further the chances of a lasting consensus within an Atlanticist framework. Indeed, the case has been made that the imperatives of nuclear deterrence and the resulting "atmosphere of unreality in the White House" have impaired even the American presidency to a degree that may eventually threaten the American democratic system itself.[5]

EUROPEANISM AND THE PENALTIES OF HISTORIC DISCONTINUITY

It was Troeltsch, again, who observed that in European history it was the unique multitude of inner tensions, cultural interferences, divergent origins, competitive ideas, and seemingly unlimited opportunities for expansion that produced that genuinely European idea of development—the derivation of designs of the future from past compulsive experience—which always transcended the ancient concept of expediency, the Christian notion of chiliastic ends, and, even, the modern idea of progress. Without visible authority, it regulated this European drama of conflicting forces and fragmenting ideas in a way that, over the centuries, steadily enlarged the measure of catastrophy. At the same time, by releasing and absorbing new resources as well as spiritual forces, this European dynamism perennially left the imprints of a European identity, even though time and again it fell short of averting tragedy.[6]

After the breakdown of the old European state system between 1914 and 1945, for those who were "present at the creation" the unprecedented task was to reconstruct Western Europe without releasing, once again, the destructive

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forces that Europeanism had never been able to mute fully. Welfare and common institutions blossomed as never before in European history. But, while the new distribution of power after 1945 ruled out another step toward European self-destruction, the "unmaking" of history and the novel conditions of the postwar system—both with regard to the nature of Western institutions and the new realities of military technology—tended to confine Western Europe's recovery to economic progress—along with, however, an unprecedented growth of civil liberties.

It is a measure of European self-destruction that historical continuity was least disrupted in Western European states that either kept out of the unification process altogether or had only marginal influence; whereas West Germany, for example, became in many ways a stabilizing force in the new community—though unrooted and almost totally deprived of its historic continuity. Indeed, when de Gaulle tried to invoke the soul of European nations again, this was a kind of heroic effort; but it was Hitler before him who had appealed to the soul of nations on his way to doomsday.

In order to reduce friction, West Germany, as a principal stabilizer, would have to continue to function as the ahistorical artifact it became in the postwar world. However, the European Community failed to provide the more embracing identity, which was seen as the raison d'être of the new West German state, and—after three decades of existence as a provisional state whose earlier history has been wiped out—the political and social fabric of this entity is increasingly suffering from its inherent lack of identity.[7] But, while a rediscovery of German history could hardly be a boost to the rebuilding of German identity, recent efforts to internalize the Third Reich were instantly denounced as a "Hitler wave" and released old enmities that are obviously being used by those who would prefer to reduce Germany's role as a stabilizer. There are still many who do not accept Robert Musil's definition of history as what the living would not do.

Revisionism of the orthodox views on postwar history hardly ever goes back beyond the origins of the cold war. Yet it was the loss of European identity, along with the loss of European empires, that carried the seeds of disintegration that were to emerge several decades later. If Europeanism was, above all, defined by the inner necessity of a political evolution spilling over from past experience, the reconstruction of Europe *ex nihilo* was bound eventually to fall short of its grandiose ends. Common institutions did not revive and absorb loyalties and deep commitments; and to the extent Europeanism had survived, it turned out to be strongest in erratic ways that were decidedly noncommensurate with the postwar community-building.

WESTERN EUROPE'S UNITY: A POSTHUMOUS VENTURE?

The vigor of economic recovery and the resulting degree of political stability tended to blur the fact that within the framework of postwar reconstruction there was no way to revive Europeanism. As one ardent student of European history observed in 1945: "national cultures with intellectually free sovereignty, but not freely competing nation states any more, and a hierarchy of 'gremiums' or judiciary syndicates into which their economic and general policy is built—

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such is the new historic world-type" in Europe.[8] Community structures developed with a remarkable degree of stability; indeed they were needed because "small and medium sized nations cannot rely on a free-floating power game; they need institutions and international organizations."[9] Some, like François Duchene, even claimed that Western Europe as a civilian power was an "area vital to the world balance, without being itself a great power, [which] is brought under control not as a victim of rival masters but as a field of cooperation sought keenly by the weaker states."[10]

In a sense such a Western European posture indeed "looks almost tailor-made for the condition of the future."[11] But external circumstances, as well as the inner fabric of Western Europe, were hardly ever conducive to its viability. Given the boost of early recovery and subsequent economic growth, the staged process built into the treaties of Rome and to a lesser extent into subsequent ventures—the Fouchet Plans or the Werner Plan—seemed to reflect a political reality. But while institutional ends had played a role in European dynamism since the seventeenth century as a means to channel conflict, they were now perceived rather as a means to generate loyalties in a pacified environment. Moreover, notwithstanding its usefulness, institutionalized cooperation in Western Europe was confined to levels that were admittedly essential for political and social stability but provided few instruments with which to shape positively social and political conditions in individual member-states. Community structures thus conformed, by and large, to the description Alfred Weber had anticipated many years earlier.

But as common institutions were the only avenue left at the time for what had once been European dynamism, failures to achieve scheduled advances took on an unusually symbolic quality. Anything but increasing institutional conformity within community frameworks was considered a setback on a priori grounds. Eventually this was even rationalized in terms of an "endless crisis," a kind of permanent condition.

These frustrations over phased institutionalism still reflect the inner necessity of political evolution that had defined Europeanism in the past. Moreover, they not only provide a measure of Western European failures on the way to integration, they also relate to the very nature of fears of Finlandization. For, although the Marxist-Leninist notion of "progress" almost caricatures the genuinely European idea of evolution, its implied determinism—however backed by military power—tends to be recognized in Western Europe whenever the impression prevails that Western efforts toward greater political unity have failed.

Even major Communist parties in Western Europe seem committed to retaining and refining the instrumentalities of the Community, although the latter's functional utilities are limited insofar as solutions have to be sought in a larger context. But community-building has more or less run its course in terms of a closed regional entity with integration confined to some levels and dependence on external powers being perceived on others. It was prudent advice when Heinz Gollwitzer, years before the treaties of Rome, recommended that "in view of an increasingly obvious and unavoidably global nature of international affairs Europeanism gets into an intermediate position between individual nations and global organization. Already today many urgent problems can no longer be solved within a European framework. Moreover, Europeans must

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not forget that current efforts to achieve European unity in many ways are a posthumous venture, something which in the past an independent Europe was unable to achieve."[12]

BETWEEN THE NEW MASTERS: THE PRIMACY OF MILITARY INTEGRATION

Indeed, this basic condition of "posthumous" unity at no time disappeared from the European scene. Unlike the American government, Western Europeans have never been, since the end of World War II, in a position even to consider "a policy which we would probably pursue if there were no Soviet threat."[13] When Soviet and American soldiers met at the Elbe River in 1945, this meant, above all, that the emergence of the two new global powers, which had appeared irrestible since the mid-nineteenth century, had come to a conclusion that could not have been more symbolically symmetrical. While neither was a genuine world power in 1945, their presence in the heart of Europe—tragically entangled as it was—finalized Europe's abdication—leaving ever more vacua the new masters were compelled to fill.[14]

Notwithstanding its continued, and habitual, fears and hostilities, Europe had learned a lesson about the political disutility of military force; and yet it faced the uncertainties of expanding Soviet power backed by nothing but military force. It had no choice but to protect itself by entangling the other emerging world power, which had no tradition of military force as an instrument of imperial foreign policy. As Stanley Hoffmann has observed, the United States "has made of modern Western and Japanese society an international open-zone in which there is an increasing similarity of behaviour and complementarity of interests, which make the use of force within it quite inconceivable."[15] But, though the unfolding realities of nuclear deterrence were meant to reduce the usefulness of military force even further, the structure of Western Europe's dependence on the United States came to be characterized, above all, by the primacy of military integration.

Thus the basic condition of Western European dependence was inherently alien to both American political culture and postwar Western European preferences. The Soviet combination of tailored military buildup and persistent efforts at détente aimed precisely at this "unnatural" condition of the Western alliance, which otherwise, from a Soviet vantage point, must have looked politically impenetrable. Even NSC-68 had stated the need "to leave open the possibility of negotiation with the U.S.S.R."[16] It was thus only a matter of time before Western societies would instinctively favor détente over confrontation. At the same time, an increasingly affirmative Soviet military posture combined with Soviet pursuit of détente, would predictably have a double effect—encouraging increased defense efforts by the West and, simultaneously, delegitimizing them in the eyes of societies that had a propensity to see their stakes in détente.

Thus a regional community Western Europe, embedded in an Atlantic security system, was unlikely to be durable as a dominant pattern of Western cooperation. In particular, this condition was further weakening whatever political vitality Europe had left in 1945. Within Western European societies utilitarianism was succeeding to such a point that the modern welfare state began to make the combination of privileges and dependence an almost universal condition of life. And, while the United States had vital stakes both in the security of

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these states and in preventing their access to ultimate military power, Western Europe's military dependence on the United States strangely resembled the easy acceptance of invisible paternalism that was pervading Western European societies. The modern welfare state tends to immunize societies against militant socialism; but it also tends to reduce the political will to resist.

DISJUNCTION OF REALMS: THE AMERICAN "TWO-TRACK SYSTEM"

Given the dominant role of the United States, the primacy of military cooperation further deprived Western Europe of opportunities in which to translate economic prosperity into political identity. This emphasis, however, was not originally in the cards, for the hegemony of the United States after 1945 was based on both its military and its economic strength. The Marshall Plan and the Point Four Program even gave a slight priority to economic efforts in the foreign policy of the late forties. In the early fifties this orientation changed profoundly, and by 1955 a prominent American commission was already deploring that "much of the recent decline of morale and failure of nerve in the West can be charged to an excessive preoccupation since 1950 with short-run military objectives and with the day-to-day tactics of the cold war."[17]

The resulting system was aptly described by Richard Cooper as a "two-track system" that allowed economic disturbances to be decoupled from issues of international security. While this had obvious advantages, it also narrowed the scope for building a Western European identity. Within this system military power—above all, control of nuclear weapons—was politicized so as to become a vehicle for structuring the Alliance, whereas international economic relations were depoliticized; that is, the regulations of Bretton Woods and GATT became a framework for treating trade and monetary issues as technical matters that rarely entered the agenda of high diplomacy—and whenever they did, it was for political reasons only.

American dominance within this system was overwhelming. Most Western industrialized nations were members of military alliances with the United States. Moreover, for varying reasons, a primacy of military cooperation was most ardently endorsed by allies with strong economies. Not before the mid-sixties did other Western nations begin to pursue their own national economic interests more vigorously, at a risk of alienating the United States. The strength of the system was also derived from the opportunities it offered to subdue or to neutralize particular economic interests and to reduce the range of claimants in the name of military security.

This system thus served economic purposes. Yet it confined major efforts to structure political relations with the United States to the realm in which Western Europe was weakest and most dependent—military cooperation. This "two-track system," however, was increasingly jeopardized by the failure to achieve multilateral nuclear control, the successes in normalizing relations with Eastern European nations, and the shattering impact of the Yom Kippur War.

THE EUROPE THAT IS

These, then, are the six conditions that have shaped Western Europe's inner development since World War II: Its dependence on the United States was the

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price for its very survival. Its structure was predominantly seen as an extension of the American institutional system. Traditional Europeanism survived only in noncentral factions. Political evolution came to be identified with phased institution-building. The perceived limits of military force, combined with a primacy of military cooperation, created political vulnerabilities domestically as well as toward the Soviet Union. Increasing economic power was deprived of much of its political potential as a result of the constraints of military cooperation. Under these conditions, many failures that are often ascribed to lack of will or good intentions in fact had their roots deep in recent history: in complex situations political will is always a result of fortunate historical and structural conditions.

Yet, under the circumstances, Western Europe has fared better than professional pessimism would suggest. Most recent history—so full of turbulence—provides encouraging evidence. Even though only a few years ago American and Western European foreign policies seemed to be in much greater harmony than they are today, for President Nixon to meet collectively with the heads of allied governments in Europe seemed to require the presence of Leonid Brezhnev. Today Western summitry has become a routine instrument of Alliance cooperation. A few years back Western Europeans were distressed over the mistake of American involvement in southeast Asia and its possibly lasting effects on American commitments abroad. Today Western Europeans are almost embarrassed at the renewed priority given to NATO by American foreign policy. With the cynicisms of Vietnam and Watergate still almost fresh in European minds, current misgivings now concern the way the human rights campaign is being used to reinvigorate a sense of American destiny. Finally, after the "disgusting"[18] disarray the Yom Kippur War created within the Alliance, there has since emerged a fairly consolidated common Western position on the Middle East.

In fact, never since the disappearance of Jobert's obstinacies have there been straightforward confrontations across the Atlantic. Potential American blunders have been averted or at least reduced to manageable proportions—in Portugal by building up social democratism in time, in Turkey by Western European efforts to retain relations that congressional inaction threatened to put in jeopardy, at the CSCE Follow-on Conference in Belgrade by dedramatizing the human rights issue, and in Italy by inducing the Americans to display more flexibility toward that country's domestic affairs. Moreover, against the background of the pipe embargo in the mid-sixties, increasing American restraint was evident after West Germany, despite massive American pressures, insisted on going ahead with the nuclear technology deal with Brazil. It also suggests a changed context for the *défi Américain*.

In Western Europe itself authoritarian regimes have disappeared in Portugal, Spain, Greece, and Turkey. There is not one such government left. The current Spanish-Scandinavian rapprochement was inconceivable a few years back. In Iceland and Portugal Communist access to power has been undone without damaging democratic credentials, while Communist aspirations in Greece, Spain, and France have turned sour at the polls. Some near civil wars—above all in Northern Ireland—are slowing down. And the open conflict between Greece and Turkey has again become a matter of direct and possibly genuine negotiation.

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Indirect French intervention in Zaire and the West German rescue operation in Mogadishu indicate a mature self-reliance. Serious terrorist efforts to destabilize the political structures of West Germany and Italy—with their presumed potential for reviving authoritarianism and subsequent polarization—have been met with a strengthening of democratic forces.

Most important, however, Western industrial nations have managed collectively to dampen the worst postwar economic crisis, although alarming problems still prevail. Inflation rates have been reduced almost everywhere; in some nations they are almost back to normal. Britain has passed the bottom of its disruptive economic troubles. Italy would have recovered even further than it actually has, if political interests had not militated against it.

Managing United States-Western European Relations

All these are encouraging outcomes, and they display a residual capacity to adapt to demanding circumstances. Even though the basic conditions of Western Europe preclude a revival of Europeanism and a sustainable Western European power between the two new masters, outcomes of Western European political processes can make big differences in many areas. Relations between the United States and Western Europe are no exception. In fact, although these relations have become more crucial than they were in the sixties or even the fifties, they appear to be less central in current foreign policies. Without the leverage of the postwar system—primacy of military cooperation and two-track system—the management of United States-Western European relations has become vastly more difficult in recent years. Some structural limitations have always operated so as to strain these relations, and they still prevail, yet reinforced by new political trends and circumstances. We shall discuss some of these strains and limitations in the following sections.

INTERNATIONALISM IN RETREAT

Until the mid-sixties, political expectations in Western coalition affairs followed the neofunctionalist creed that achievements would spill over into other areas and thus serve common ends. In NATO, nuclear sharing was thought to lend itself to the legitimization of the political structure of the Alliance; in the EEC, incentives for political integration were hoped for as a result of an increasingly institutionalized economic cooperation. It never quite worked that way—certainly not in recent years. Instead, achievements today at best maintain steady states, and most of the time they skillfully avoid worse outcomes. They seldom result in new structures of cooperation, and, where they do, such outcomes are likely to be canceled out elsewhere. The early belief in pooling energies and commitments toward common ends has degenerated into an economic device with a poor record. Today's orthodoxy, as expounded canonically by Keohane and Nye, reduces interdependence to sensitivity and vulnerability. In other words, cooperation among Western nations through common institutions has become an extension of domestic politics.

While intergovernmental cooperation increases steadily, internationalism is in retreat on both sides of the Atlantic. Instead of yielding sovereignties, it is imperative to solve pressing domestic problems through intergovernmental

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coordination. On major issues like monetary stability it presently cannot be otherwise. Skills and instrumentalities have improved remarkably. Moreover, such efforts do require international solidarity, even though it is based on true self-interest. But they also reduce common ends to crisis management and they deinternationalize Western affairs. They put the nation-state back in the center at a time when it "has become too small for the big problems in life, and too big for the small problems."[19]

This trend may be inescapable, but it tends to further increase fragmentation and hence unlock hitherto surbordinated veto powers and claimants that will in turn intrude into international affairs—with predictably paralyzing effects. Illustrating cases are legion. Two will suffice. Obviously the military services are the principal clients of NATO's current long-term force-improvement program; and yet service interest in maintaining endowments will be a major impediment to the program. Similarily, the United States should welcome enlargement of the European Community by Greek membership and closer Turkish association as an offset to the impact of continuing American failures in the eastern Mediterranean; yet the American agricultural community, with its potential to threaten free trade, may prevent favorable outcomes. Thus the most crucial issue "at this juncture is how the separate national positions of individual Western societies can be merged within one operational framework."[20]

It is the crux of current Western internationalism that, in order to deliver in common endeavors, governments have to retain—if not regenerate—state loyalties up to a point where subnational claimants and veto powers lose some of their impact. Yet the more governments try, the more they focus on the nation-state; and while this tends to reinforce particularism, it also tends to diminish further the chances for nation-states to perform as "actors" on the international stage—a euphemism modern social science jargon has borrowed from histrionics.

BEYOND ATLANTICISM

This paradox pervades Western common efforts in all areas. In fact, it governs the foreign relations of all member-states of the Western Alliance. But while this is a serious impediment to cooperation in Community affairs in general, it is most precarious in relations with the United States; for ties with the United States are not only the single most important element in the foreign relations of any Western European member-state, they also determine the kind of European "identity" that may or may not develop. Thus nothing could be more obstructive than dependency without common policy, and in recent years this condition has not seemed so unlikely.

There are a number of explanations of why "Atlantic partnership, as that kind of reliant dependence of the fifties and sixties, is irreversibly passé."[21] Some point to changing elites. The diffusion of leadership in both major parties in West Germany is one case in point: in both parties the strong factions with close connections in the American body politic have almost disappeared. The disappearance of a northeastern establishment embracing makers of foreign pol-

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icy, as well as a whole generation of bankers and newsmen who determined both effective reconstruction in Europe and supportive public opinion in the United States, is another. Some blame specific watershed events—such as the announcement of Nixon's New Economic Policy on August 15, 1971, the climax of the Vietnam War, or the oil embargo and its aftermath. A legion of observers claim that the United States has failed painfully to provide leadership commensurate with its responsibilities—with Eisenhower ailing well before his second term ended, Kennedy assassinated, Johnson running as a peace candidate and then giving up over Vietnam, Nixon committing himself to law and order, yet almost impeached over Watergate, Ford lacking a public mandate in a climate of low confidence in American institutions, and, finally, Carter campaigning against "Washington" and then trying, somewhat in vain, to get accepted. Indeed, some analysts point out, even with a functioning imperial presidency, systemic restraints are released only under extreme circumstances.

Given these conditions, it has become a truism that the traditional choices behind which political support used to rally—preferential cooperation with the United States versus a more self-reliant "European" Western Europe—have run their course as dominant philosophies in the Western political universe of discourse. Neither choice provides a means of reducing today's complexities. Nor have they been replaced by similarly simplistic organizing principles. We even seem to lack the language to deal with these realities; consequently, continued political discussion about relations between the United States and Western Europe "in general" may be bound to fail.

THE TRANS-ATLANTIC INTERPLAY: INDIFFERENCE TOWARD DOMESTIC STRUCTURES

At the same time, the interplay between the American republic and Western Europe has constantly suffered, as Nicholas Wahl has stated, from a vast deficit in communications. The American body politic simply found few incentives to respond to the domestic structures of Western Europe's policies toward the United States, and once normal processes of domestic competition and social conflicts in Western Europe—where electoral participation is usually substantially higher than in the United States—led to outcomes that required more discriminating evaluations, a "rather patronizing attitude toward Western Europe"[22] tended to change abruptly to American alarmism. On the other hand, Western Europe's vulnerability painfully revealed the difference American politics can make in Alliance affairs—the more so as competitive factions within the United States became instrumental in relations with the Western European governments. Moreover, Western European responses tended to be out of context—with Mansfield or protectionism taking on an almost symbolic quality. Indeed, Western European political elites seldom even tried to play on the keyboard of American politics. The Russians, let alone the Israelis, eventually learned to do so much more impressively; even the ominous grain deal of 1972 "outclassed" the Western Europeans.

This communication problem is doubtless aggravated by stereotypes on both sides, which invite disappointment as easily as hostility. Indeed, it seems

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conducive to a kind of duality in Western European perceptions of the United States' role, which oscillates from hegemonical aspiration to lack of imperial style, from ambitious moralism to cynical and indiscriminate destructiveness, from excessive interventionism to irresponsible isolationism, from superpower chauvinism to obstinate provincialism, from condominium-prone bilaterlaism with the other world power to cold-war-type confrontational stances. As George Kennan wisely counseled: "there is little we can do about all this, other than to try not to play up to it more than we have to. And we need not worry us beyond a point. For all this edginess and for all their criticism of us, these people are aware of their stake in the existence and the prospering of our society."[23] Yet it is obvious that American perceptions too suffer from such stereotyping.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMUNICATION: CHANNELS BETWEEN WHOM?

Even intergovernmental interactions suffer from severe lack of communication. Bureaucratic policy studies suggest that there is every reason to recognize the presence of often-deplored inertia in the processes of policy initiation among fifteen nations. As Raymond Aron has observed, common Western institutions, especially in NATO, are necessarily routinized to the degree they are limited to their original function; and yet, unlike political cooperation among the Nine, multilateral dealings across the Atlantic are mostly channeled through standing delegations in Brussels and elsewhere, which leaves only diminished opportunities for both sides to influence policy formation before some internal consensus has been achieved. Moreover, although international organizations continue to grow and national bureaucracies are more and more absorbed by the demands of international bodies (in some areas the increase is more than 450 percent over the last fifteen or so years), Western Europe's means to influence decisions on the spot (that is, in Washington) have actually declined—the move of NATO's Military Committee headquarters from Washington to Brussels in 1967 is but one step in the wrong direction.

The sheer size of the national bureaucracies often matters too. Given the potential of the American administration, it is always difficult for Western Europeans to know who is the most appropriate bureaucratic counterpart in Washington and where the operations of NATO and other international bodies are plugged into the American system. The Western European bureaucracies also tend to be overwhelmed by the paper output of the American bureaucracy, which hampers communication in two ways—by producing either despondent acceptance or stiffened defensiveness.

To some extent, Western European relations with the United States can be seen as those between fairly closed systems, leaving only modest chances for common policy formation in early stages. While Western Europe has faced this difficulty from the outset, especially in the realm of security, without really trying to find more direct methods of consultation, American experience of this problem is more recent; as policy formation among the Nine improves, the United States does not always recognize that fuller penetration would jeopardize what little consensus might emerge from the process. The one major gain of this decline of communications has been improved direct exchange between

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heads of governments, ranging from phone calls to multilateral summitry, which has shown the United States as increasingly susceptible to occasional advice from Western Europeans.

The proliferation of international regimes and levels of international negotiation in which Alliance members are involved defines still another barrier—a condition that is bound to diffuse leaderhip and grand objectives even further. At the same time, national restraints such as national budgets limit the scope for common action much more severely than they did in the fifties and sixties. Similarly, the penalties of common action with regard to the interests of third parties, notably the Soviet Union, weigh more precariously in the balance than they did in previous decades.

THE UNITED STATES IN WESTERN EUROPEAN POLITICS

Unlike the fifties, and to some extent the sixties, there is today almost an absence of distinctly pro-American political parties in Western Europe. While even some Communist parties like the CPI pledge not to disrupt ties with the United States, a positive stand on preferential cooperation with the United States is not currently seen to pay political dividends. *Mutatis mutandis*, the same is true in the United States. If there was a political rationale behind Senator Mansfield's drive to cut troop deployments in Western Europe in the face of Western European claims that such a move threatens the hard core of the American commitment, it was that if the government is under pressure to cut defense expenditures, it should do so where it hurts least in terms of domestic penalties.

At the same time, anti-Americanism in Western Europe operates in more differentiated ways than it used to. Like the earlier semipatriotic pro-Americanism, the more vulgar anti-Americanisms have by and large gone with the Vietnam War—with the noticeable exception of Greece. In a number of countries like West Germany it changed into encapsulated, yet violent, terrorism. Across the spectrum of politics there are some amazing variations. In Greece, some degree of anti-Americanism has been a necessary instrument in Prime Minister Karamanlis's efforts to prevent more hostile outcomes. In a number of countries, pro-Americanism could endanger political majorities or stalemates. In a country like France, where a kind of chauvinist anti-Americanism has been a platform for the Gaullists as well as the Communists for many years, the United States hardly figured at all in the 1978 election campaign; instead, the Federal Republic became the center of controversy.

The most complex case is that of Italy. On the one hand there is a large and mostly conservative Italian population in the United States, and Italy is heavily dependent on the IMF, which the United States dominates. On the other hand, polls in Italy show the most favorable attitudes toward the United States of all major Western Europeans. At the same time, the *compremesso storico* has almost been attained—a situation in which American interference could weigh heavily in Italy and yet requires considerable restraint on the part of the United States. The easiest case to understand is Turkey, where, under conditions of political instability, national pride is time and again seen as violated by American actions and inactions—as the case may be. The result is simply loss of confidence in the United States.

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Yet whatever the shades and instrumentalities of anti-Americanism, the Vietnamese drama also, in a sense, helped bring the United States closer to the European orbit, for to some degree it ended American exceptionalism. In Flora Lewis's words, America is no longer "so uniquely beyond and outside the troubled world of Western Europe."[24]

Perhaps the most crucial impediment to US-Western European relations, however, is the fact that in almost all Western European states, elections in recent years have tended to produce stalemates—some perpetuating immobilism, some being rather near escapes from disruptive changes. At no time in Western European postwar history have domestic structures been more central: "The fact is that the same factors that limit progress toward European unity also limit the margins within which European governments can change their attitudes toward the United States and its Atlantic policies."[25]

THE EUROPEANIZATION OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THEREAFTER

The Vietnam War destroyed the basic beliefs upon which the American effort to reconstruct Western Europe—and with it the whole idea of extended isolationism—had rested. Moreover, the domestic repercussions of that war demonstrated that the United States was no longer "the city on the hill." These repercussions were not confined to responsive ethnic minorities or particular influence groups. They exploded into movements, and they badly ruined the American economy. It was this traumatic phase of "European" experience that virtually called into being what became the Kissinger era. Against this background of dismay and incoherence Kissinger was "the first American Secretary of State to have to operate without either a consensus in foreign policy or a polarization over foreign policy, a polarization which, whatever its difficulties at least provided basic points of reference and a field of maneuver for the statesman. He [was] in the process of constructing a foreign policy for the United States ex nihilo; or, to be more precise, he [was] in the process of constructing a foreign policy for an imperial republic which is reluctant to confront the fact that it is an imperial republic and whose foreign policy traditions are not really appropriate to its new conditions."[26]

It was, indeed, a Europeanization of American foreign policy that, not accidentally, restored American influence in unprecedented ways by skillfully following Talleyrand's counsel that, in order to be great again, the overcommitted and entangled country would have to cease to be colossal. It also began to create a framework for the cooperation of Western industrial nations that combined American imperial style with more scope for independent yet congenial action on the part of partners. American policy toward the Alliance ceased to confirm the Turner thesis. To quote Irving Kristol's wise comment again, Kissinger symbolized "the end of the idea of 'American exceptionalism.' " While superpower chauvinism was painfully present in the new foreign policy, the concurrence of American and Western European détente policies in the early seventies was a rare example of synchronized, yet sui generis efforts, that had not been seen in almost thirty years of Alliance history.

One of the big "ifs" in recent events is whether, without the ordeal of Watergate, a new consensus behind a Europeanized foreign policy commensurate

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with the global power of an imperial American republic would have developed in the United States. Notwithstanding the continued rise of Soviet military power, the "correlation of forces," as Soviet jargon puts it, would have continued to shift in favor of the West. The Soviet pullback in the Middle East since 1972 is but one striking example. Amazingly, this new foreign policy outlasted Watergate to some extent. It did not, however, survive the change in administration in 1977. And, while for Western Europeans it was astonishing and, indeed, reassuring to observe how profoundly "Americans seem to be absoring their difficulties without feeling a menace of grave social and political trouble,"[27] they also recognized that this continuity signaled a recurrence of moralism and a decline of imperial style in American foreign policy, which shattered in no time what had remained of the Kissinger design after the Watergate ordeals.

Indeed, few Western Europeans were aware that, along with the ordeals of Vietnam and Watergate, the United States had undergone a profound social and political evolution that was conducive to more than the rapid recovery of American society. It released again energies that McGovern's romantic call to "bring America home" had failed to bring into play, but which were harnessed by Jimmy Carter to carry him into the White House—even though, once there, they deprived him of the instrumentalities needed to reshape the international environment so as to be safe for American exceptionalism.

As, even without de Gaulle's obstinacies, Western Europe would eventually have turned out not to be commensurate with the traditions of American foreign policy, so the American body politic might have resisted the Europeanization of American foreign policy before long—even without the impact of the Watergate crisis. As a student of Bismarck, Kissinger was painfully aware of the fragility of an imperial foreign policy in the hands of his successor.

But Kissinger's foreign policy had set in motion political processes in Europe that—in the absence of the momentum and the instrumentalities of this policy—then turned out to be difficult to control. What had seemed to merge into a new framework of common policy was rapidly diffused. The return of American foreign policy to more traditional patterns in turn not only withdrew American leadership, it left Western Europe in a vacuum: on the one hand, NATO was once again declared an American high priority (though there was no common policy within the Alliance); on the other, the more genuine elements of the post-Kissinger foreign policy strangely counteracted certain European interests. While the new moralism, notably the human-rights policy, was painfully at odds with subtle Western European efforts in Eastern Europe or Southern Africa, the old, recurrent arms-control policy—deprived of the political instrumentalities it had acquired during the Kissinger years—interacted in rather bizarre ways with a Western European leftism in search of a focus, as was evident during the controversy over the so-called neutron bomb.

WESTERN EUROPE IN A DISINTEGRATING AMERICAN EMPIRE

Where does this leave Western Europe? In an often quoted preview of the year 2000, Samuel Huntington observed that "the struggles accompanying the disintegration of the American world order will have profoundly stimulating effects on political development in the participating states. These struggles are, indeed, likely to play a major role in generating national cohesion and institu-

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tional development."[28] In essence this may well describe the future course of trans-Atlantic relations. Yet Western Europe's dependence on the United States is presently increasing, while the scope for common policy, as well as the American political instrumentalities available to control processes, seem to be diminishing. A profound mutuality of interests is more obvious than ever it was in the "golden days" of the Alliance—when the American role often was seen simply as that of a generous protector. At the same time, national interests on both sides of the Atlantic are increasingly perceived in narrow and competitive terms.

Western European community-building within an Atlantic system and, in fact, common efforts in wider frameworks—toward détente as well as toward more viable relations with the nonindustrialized world—will continue and, indeed, remain imperative. But they no longer catch the imagination of elites nor, indeed, of the public. They can thus no longer provide Europe with a sense of direction—the sense of direciton that has always been the very essence of Europeanism.

Carter's effort to revive American feelings of destiny have made Western Europe all the more aware of its own lack of inner direction. American society still does not seem capable of combining restored stability at home with a foreign policy appropriate to its global role or, indeed, to its vulnerability. Given its dependency on the United States, Western Europe's stake in a functioning American social fabric is vital; but, as this fabric seems to threaten to deprive Western European states of a common framework again, they may be the first to experience the basic dilemma the American republic is facing.

NEW INSTRUMENTS AND GROWING COMPLEXITY IN UNITED STATES-WESTERN EUROPEAN COOPERATION

Although creative initiatives, of both a political and an economic kind, have become less obvious in Western European affairs, it is as if these countries presented themselves in a stable steady state as long as three conditions prevailed: (1) an American economy capable of supporting the postwar economic order of the Western industrialized nations; (2) an American capacity to stabilize the military situation so as to deny forced changes in the power balance; and (3) a basic political consensus in both the United States and Western Europe. Vietnam and the oil embargo that followed the Yom Kippur War shattered all three conditions.

This situation is widely recognized. It has also become obvious that both economic stability and the neutralization of Soviet military power have to be achieved within wider frameworks than the old economic order and the Atlantic Alliance, respectively. On the economic plane, practice has already changed, and both the United States and Western Europe face new challenges on the economic summit level as well as in the broader dialogue on a new economic order. In the past, economic policy-making was a much less developed area of US-Western European relations than the security realm. In recent years intergovernmental instruments for policy coordination among Western industrialized nations have indeed improved; yet such cooperation can no longer be confined to international trade or monetary matters. It concerns, above all, domestic economic policies, whereas governmental instruments to control eco-

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nomic trends tend to lose their effectiveness. While this increases the need for coordination, governments are also more vulnerable to domestic penalties. (West German responses to recent American pressures to increase economic growth are a telling case.) Moreover, while such new instruments as economic summits have undisputed usefulness, they have inherent procedural limitations as well, for here too actions "recommended must be taken in other forums."[29]

Concerning security, NATO has a hard time matching the direct Soviet threat against Western Europe—NATO's classical contingency. Nevertheless it becomes increasingly obvious that Soviet military power poses more imminent threats in a variety of non-NATO areas ranging from Yugoslavia to the Horn of Africa to Iran. Moreover, for NATO to consider any multilateral response requires more political cohesion than it had in the past; yet an effort to prepare for such contingencies may well destroy whatever cohesion is left within the Alliance. This novel situation in a sense revivifies the classical dichotomy of American foreign policy—interventionism versus nonentanglement—and Western Europeans tend to be equally worried about the implications for the Alliance and the prospects of either American unilateralism or inaction. Although it is difficult to predict whether a severe crisis—like Soviet intervention in Yugoslavia or a threat to oil supplies for Western Europe and the United States—would paralyze the West or produce firm responses which cannot be preplanned during times of complacency, it is certain that such novel challenges strain the already "unnatural" condition of US-Western European relations even further.

The New Political Interface

In the fifties, and to some extent in the sixties, the Alliance between North America and most of Western Europe provided a degree of political homogeneity that was conducive to its own perpetuation. De Gaulle's subtle distinction between NATO and the Atlantic Alliance was then characteristically seen as an earth-shaking event. This homogeneity turned political factions that were either less committed or directly opposed to the Alliance into fringes without a chance to win a domestic base. Although there was in fact more awareness of shared values on both sides of the Atlantic, and even a notion that American society could serve as a model for Western Europe, this was not seen as inconsistent with continuing diversity in political culture. Instead, the situation conformed to Henry Kissinger's description: "The domestic structure is taken as a given; foreign policy begins where domestic policy ends. But this approach is appropriate only to stable periods because then the various components of the internaitonal system generally have similar conceptions of the 'rules of the game.' "[30] The Alliance then was the prism through which the United States and Western Europe perceived each other, and, given the functional commonality of purposes within the Alliance, they appeared to be similar.

Today this homogeneity is gone. The Alliance provides little leverage to check divergent domestic forces anywhere, and political heterogeneity—in terms of how political actors generate legitimacy and set priorities—has in fact grown. At the same time, common institutions—above all the Alliance—display an astounding formal stratifcation, while their functional limits become ever more precarious. It is not simply a quesiton of North America and Western Europe drifting apart, but rather of whether competitive domestic forces on the

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two sides will allow foreign policies conducive to some degree of reciprocal commitment, so as to make commonality of purpose manifest and cooperative relations manageable. These are some of the structures which will shape what undoubtedly is a secular process.

POLITICAL HETEROGENEITY: SOME TRENDS

Since the mid-sixties a transformation of political systems and, indeed, cultures has been under way, and it tends to make the task of maintaining commonality of purpose in US-Western European relations even more difficult. Trends are abundant, but there are three with more obvious consequences.

First, the American party system is increasingly governed by the issue- rather than party-oriented behavior of the electorate and by the disappearance of a persistent congressional leadership; the latter change is a result of both the declining seniority system and the change of political culture in the South. In Western Europe—with significant regional variations—political parties are increasingly tightly bottom-up controlled grassroots organizations that as a rule cannot expect to govern alone, and increasingly tend to question the legitimacy of their opponents. The situation on both sides thus not only limits governance, makes policy outcomes dependent on fluid situations, and condemns even major initiatives to short lives; it also deepens precariously a divergence between the temper of American politics and European parties, which may crucially affect the scope for common policies. It is a traditional belief that "American politics is nonideological when compared with the politics of Western European nations. These latter achieve stability by effecting an equilibrium among competing ideological parties; the United States achieves stability by searching for a consensus which each competing party then tries to represent."[31] But while in the past foreign policy was the one major exception with reversed roles of ideologies on either side, current trends suggest that, notwithstanding the new moralism, ideology is losing its impact on American foreign policy, whereas Western European parties increasingly seem to be letting ideology intrude into foreign policy, notably into the most sensitive area, matters of security.

Second, after years of "greening" unrest, American society has turned conservative again; the list of major presidential candidates in 1976 (Udall being the only exception) is a good indication of the trend. The prevailing mood is moderate but, being issue-related rather than programmatic, it could easily stiffen. In Western Europe the trend is rather in the opposite direction, with the moderate Left constrained by slow economic growth and the more radical Left less at odds with societal realities than it was a few years back.

These countervailing trends have not yet appeared in access to government.[32] In fact, electorates in Portugal, France, Italy, and West Germany have allowed no dramatic changes, and in the United States the conservative tide has not given substantial advantage to the GOP, the most genuine conservative party. Instead the result has been a diffusion and transformation of established party systems. But the trends can be seen to shape foreign policy outcomes rather differently on both sides of the Atlantic, which in turn reinforces the growing awareness of the distinction between superpower détente and normalization of East-West relations in Europe.

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At this stage, therefore, radical socialism has not had its way anywhere. But, given the constraints on social democratism as the major integrating force vis-à-vis the radical Left, the potential for radicalism—the prospect that ten million people will be unemployed in EEC countries by the end of the decade—and the structural reasons for this potential, there may well be a further shift to the Left and subsequent polarization—to the detriment of most moderate parties.

In this context, Eurocommunism can be seen as a symptom rather than a cause. In fact, in some countries it is "less part of the problem than of the solution."[33] The most crucial process within Western Europe, notably along the southern belt, is integration of the Left by more moderate forces. Moreover, Soviet behavior in Yugoslavia is likely to affect outcomes quite as much as American behavior in Italy. The odds are, however, that American responses to this process will be indiscriminate. Even major liberal congressional leaders have already turned away sharply from the idea of dealing with Communist parties inside the Alliance.[34]

Third, the essential role of American political institutions is to provide for self-regulation in a mobile and heterogeneous society; and, at least for the time being, this system has been restabilized.[35] In Western Europe the disintegration of less flexible institutional frameworks is imminent, and new kinds of political forces are developing outside the established systems. The latter either openly challenge existing institutions or resurrect premodern positions—there are neo-Luddites and environmentalists as well as national, ethnic, religious, and linguistic factions—that at times play progressive roles. Moreover, precisely because most European nations have less adaptable institutions than the United States, they are more vulnerable to political terrorism, the declared strategy of which, in countries like West Germany, has been to abolish American influence.

Although these processes of disintegration may have direct consequences, Huntington's prediction could allow more positive expectations with regard to institutional development. George Kennan's assessment of some of these changes may have put too much blame on the welfare state, but he rightly observed that

> these and other phenomena reflect the search for a more meaningful collective identity than any the modern welfare states has been able to provide. They must be presumed to be an expression of a pathetic desire to escape from the very blandness of the materialistic and secular welfare society of the modern age, and to tap, from earlier and more local roots, something of the faith and the vitality of their ancestors. They are a reaction against the meaningless "larger" of the present, and a retreat into the idealized "smaller" of the past, and in that sense, a mute, irrational, not even fully conscious revolt against the welfare society. It will not, we must expect, be the last of such struggles of emancipation. What forms the further ones will take, we cannot know.[36]

INCREASED DEPENDENCE VERSUS INCREASED AUTONOMY

Primacy of military integration was an unnatural condition of Atlantic relations under more stable circumstances, and it is all the more precarious in a

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situation where challenges and demands grow as steadily as strains in the consensual structure of these relations. In fact, the US-Western European interface is about to change profoundly. While Western Europe's dependence on the United States is growing—along with its vulnerability to American failures, unilateralism, and inaction and its uncertainty over what promises the American government will be able to keep—the political and social changes in Western Europe are mostly of a genuinely European nature: either indifferent to American interests or beyond the reach of American influence, except in the case of disruptive changes in economic or military boundary conditions.

In past decades this dependency meant essentially military protection and avoidance of economic protectionism. Today military protection is more ambivalent. An American and Allied capacity to deny uses and payoffs of Soviet military power has become a much more specific requirement than it was in the fifties and sixties; at the same time a condition of détente is in many ways much more crucial for Western Europe than for the United States—it is needed to continue normalization of relations with Eastern European states (notably between the two halves of Germany), to dampen anti-Americanism in Western Europe, to integrate the radical Left, to maintain consensus for the Alliance (and indeed for continued defense efforts), and, last but not least, to avoid confrontations in the Middle East and elsewhere—which would increase Soviet leverage and present Western Europe with painful choices. This ambivalence of Western European interests is most evident in regard to SALT, in which negotiations have turned increasingly against Western Europe's military and security interests; yet serious friction in the negotiating process is viewed with genuine alarm—in London and Paris and Bonn alike.

Similarly, economic relations have become more ambivalent. The American negotiating position vis-à-vis Western Europe is less hegemonical than it used to be, except for the United States' potential for disruption. This is evident with regard to energy regulations as well as monetary matters; and the futile American effort to pressure West Germany into a policy of more rapid growth demonstrates the sensitive nature of interdependent domestic economic processes. But there also is a growing conjunction of economic stability and military security that reinforces Western European dependence tremendously. The oil embargo was a painful lesson. And there is still an American potential for unilateral action and lack of restraint, to which Western Europe could respond only in disruptive ways and which, if unchecked, could have disruptive consequences for Western European economies—and, thus, for the fabric of Atlantic relations. The possible combined impact of continued decline of the dollar and continued lack of restraint in American energy consumption is certainly on the horizon for all Western European governments.

At the same time, the nature of autonomous Western European processes has changed. In the past the Alliance was by and large homogenous, to an extent that enabled the United States to remain largely indifferent to European domestic processes. Such processes either existed within a framework that provided sufficient American leverage or were one element in a unification process whose outcomes differed only in degree of political responsiveness to the Alliance—or else they were dismissed as parochial matters. The nature as well as the failure of de Gaulle's effort to unite Western Europe in his way provides a measure of what the important autonomous processes have been in the past.

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Today the politics of Western European countries are dominated by radical discontent and disintegration as well as by unification processes that require both American tolerance and indigenously European solutions. This is particularly true for a wide variety of unification processes, most of which take place outside the institutional framework of the European Community. Some—for example, the accommodation of Lutheran and Reformed churches in the Leuenburger Concord—which, after 300 years, united most of the eighty European Protestant churches—may have significant consequences for the cohesion of the Western social fabric as well as for specific policies. Some have a more direct impact on Western European affairs—for example, the evolving interparty organizations of Social Democrats and Socialists, of Christian Democrats and of Liberals, which are likely to gain in importance in a directly elected European parliament. Some are intergovernmental processes and require specific arrangements to coordinate outcomes with the United States. The European Political Cooperation (EPC) of the Nine is the most visible example of this type; it is outside the Community framework, and, unlike the Alliance, operates through meetings of policy-makers on various levels rather than through permanent delegations. Only after several years of irritation was a procedure—the so-called Gymnich Agreement of June 11, 1974—developed for consultations with other nations, above all the United States. Yet there is good potential for streamlining US-Western European cooperation, especially during crises, by utilizing the EPC machinery.[37]

The novel situation is that nongovernmental unification processes increase in importance, and some of them lead to broader accommodations that could include the United States,[38] while intergovernmental cooperation no longer offers serious hope for Western Europe to speak conveniently with one voice. As within the American government, Western European consensus will emerge from a complex process of policy formation that may often be invisible from an American vantage point.

WESTERN EUROPEAN REGIONALISM AND BEYOND

Given this novel combination of increased dependence on the United States and increased autonomy of intra-European political processes—together with Western Europe's ever more obvious vulnerabilities to and vital stakes in other areas of the world—these nations are likely to respond in an improvised manner at best to events occurring beyond the jurisdiction of the common US-Western European institutions.

To be sure, Western Europe never could really afford the kind of parochial regionalism to which it became so committed in recent decades. Throughout its history the political fabric of the Atlantic Alliance has been shaped by external events rather than genuine Alliance affairs: the Communist seizure of power in Prague, the Korean War, the Suez intervention, the Cuban missile crisis, the Vietnam War, and the Yom Kippur War. Except for such crucial domestic events as West Germany's recovery or de Gaulle's return to power or the economic decline of Great Britain, developments inside Western Europe, for the most part, have had less impact. Moreover, de Gaulle's return was caused by the Algerian crisis, while Britain's decline cannot be dissociated from the breakdown of the commonwealth.

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Yet, although Western Europeans could never afford to entertain the notion of being "islandized" in world affairs, this was essentially the way they tended to see themselves. There are manifold reasons for this postwar regionalism in Western Europe: the task of reconstruction after the breakdown of the European system in two world wars, the emergence of Soviet military preponderence and American economic hegemony, along with the painful process of decolonialization and ambivalent American efforts to strengthen Western Europe militarily without jeopardizing the objective of nuclear control. Most Western institutions reflected this regionalism in the postwar decades, and NATO was certainly no exception.

In fact, in a sense this Western European regionalism is a derivative of its Alliance with the United States and the kind of institutionalism that governed it throughout the postwar period. It is not certain that NATO is equal to even the limited task of deterring a direct Soviet attack on NATO territory. Yet there is no other system of military cooperation in Western Europe, and political constituencies are at best expected to back the existing Alliance commitments. What used to be claimed as global interests on the part of France and Great Britain more or less lost their strategic dimension in the course of the sixties.[39] Although Western Europeans resented the regional-interest formula Kissinger presented in his Year of Europe speech, their behavior during the Yom Kippur War provided painful evidence of its existence.

This outlook in Western Europe is strangely at odds with the recurrence of geopolitics. As James Schlesinger has stated, "we have tended to compartmentalize different theaters—Europe, the Middle East, Southeast Asia—but the improvement of communications has resulted in a condition in which we can no longer talk about separate strategic theaters as one could talk about China, Burma, India during the Second World War. We have a single strategic theater."[40] Yet, until quite recently, the scope of Western European policies was even more narrowly confined to NATO than it was in the fifties. In fact, preoccupations have developed rather in terms of subregions—that is, as Central Europe and the flanks.

But today Western Europe's vital interests can no longer be perceived within the framework of common US-Western European institutions. In recent years new crucial relations have developed with actors on the international scene—the Soviet Union, the Arab OPEC countries, and major Latin American nations. As a result, Western European governments face a twofold problem. On the one hand, they have to balance their pursuance of vital interests outside the Atlantic area against the maintenance of the Alliance that remains, after all, the cornerstone of Western European viability. On the other hand, many of the novel challenges are best met by a common US-Western European approach, even though conflicting interests and, above all, the diffuse impact of interest groups on both sides of the Atlantic severely restrict the chances for success in such intergovernmental cooperation.

The problem is rendered particularly difficult by the fact that the American factions most committed to common US-Western European institutions are least prepared to tolerate the choices these governments are contemplating outside these common frameworks: integrating the more radical Left, normalizing relations with the Soviet Union, establishing close ties with Arab oil-producing

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countries, or competing with the United States in high-technology markets such as Latin America. The attitude of American supporters of NATO vis-à-vis Eurocommunism or détente provides ample illustration. Moreover, the real saliency of this problem is that on many issues these potentially congenial American factions have to defend an embattled position at home. Given the way US-Western European relations have been institutionalized in the past, there is also the reverse impediment of Western European elites who, because of their preoccupations with areas and issues outside the Atlantic institutions, tend almost mechanically to downplay the importance of relations with the United States.

Yet it is in relations with crucial third parties that US-Western European relations will eventually fail or be strengthened. Given the reduced utility of common institutions, as well as their traditional role as the dominant framework for relations with the United States, the task ahead is to design policies to minimize US-Western European cleavages vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, the Middle East, and other crucial areas. In their absence, common institutions will deteriorate further. On the other hand, if new policies do result, they will not only reduce policy conflicts between Americans and Europeans—along with the potential for third parties to exploit those—but also will display a common cause. They will thus be conducive to continued awareness and support of electorates on both sides of the Atlantic of the crucial importance of relations between North American and Western European nations.

Since societal interactions across the Atlantic are modest, it is through common action in international affairs that ties are being reinforced. Paradoxically this would tend also to strengthen existing institutions like the Atlantic Alliance, which, in turn, would broaden the domestic base on which the Alliance rests on both sides of the water. This was the basis of American détente policy in the early seventies.

Obviously it requires strong political leadership to escape the vicious circle that dictates that in order to shape favorable domestic outcomes one has to design appropriate foreign policies, whereas the task is rendered tantalizingly difficult by domestic claimants and veto powers. Thus it may be that human limitations will eventually determine whether or not the American condition of Western European well-being will prevail. Leadership has become a scarce commodity.

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[8]Alfred Weber, *Farewell to European History or the Conquest of Nihilism* (London, 1947), p. 179f.

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[11]Dahrendorf, "International Power," p. 85.

[12]Heinz Gollwitzer, *Europabild und Europagedanke: Beiträge zur deutschen Geistesgeschichte des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts* (Munich, 1951), p. 413.

[13]*NSC-68: A Report to the National Security Council*, April 14, 1950, reprinted in *Naval War College Review* (May-June 1975): 68.

[14]As Paul Dukes put it, "before the Second World War neither the U.S.A. nor the U.S.S.R. was ready to exert super-power on a world scale. At the end of the war both had no choice; super-power was almost as much thrust on them as sought after" (*The Emergence of the Superpowers* (London, 1970), p. 121). Contrary to what both cold war history and revisionism assume, historical insights exist in the works of Erwin Hölzle and others to the effect that 1945 was not the beginning, but rather the final breakthrough toward dominant roles for the United States and the Soviet Union in world affairs.

[15]Stanley Hoffmann, "The Acceptability of Military Force," *Force in Modern Societies: Its Place in International Politics*, Adelphi Papers, no. 102 (London, 1973), p. 5.

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[19]Daniel Bell, "The Future of World Disorder: The Structural Context of Crises," *Foreign Policy*, 27 (Summer 1977): 132.

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[30]Henry A. Kissinger, *American Foreign Policy* (New York, 1969), p. 11.

[31]Kristol, "Consensus and Dissent," p. 80.

[32]For a fuller discussion of counterveiling societal trends in the United States and West European societies, see Werner Link, "Evolution of Western Societies: Divergent and Common Solutions," in Ernst-Otto Czempiel and Dankwart Rustow, eds., *The Euro-American System* (Boulder, Colo., 1976), pp. 167-193.

[33]Stephen S. Rosenfeld, in *The Washington Post* (January 27, 1978): A23.

[34]Cf. James Reston's report, "European Communism and the U.S. Congress," *International Herald Tribune* (June 27, 1977).

[35]Prudent observers of American society like Irving Kristol, however, have never ceased to warn that this stability may be fragile: "We shall simply stagger on until some kind of social explosion takes place. It is really a curious phenomenon we are witnessing: a nation preferring to live under a perpetual, self-inflicted indictment of 'social injustice,' and amidst an ever-swelling and ever more demoralized population on the dole, rather than revise its utterly fanciful and utopian idea of human nature. There cannot have been many instances in history of such high-minded masochism. We may even be the first" (*On the Democratic Idea in America* (New York, 1972), p. 144).

[36]Kennan, *Cloud of Danger*, pp. 128-129.

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[37]On the EPC, see Heinz Kramer/Reinhardt Rümmel, *Gemeinschaftsbildung Westeüropas in der Aussenpolitik. Internationale Politik und Sicherheit 4* (Baden-Baden, 1978).

[38]E.g., there is every reason to hope that trade unionist relationships across the Atlantic will improve over time or that other means of cooperation on social matters can be mapped out. Similarly, given the obvious importance of the churches in Third World affairs, cooperation with the American churches could be more direct and less confined to the wider body of the World Council of Churches. An encouraging example of bifocal transnational cooperation across the Atlantic is the EC-US Businessmen's Council, which was founded in 1973. See Werner Link, *Deutsche und amerikanische Gewerkschaften und Geschäftsleute 1945-1975* (Düsseldorf, 1978), p. 181f.

[39]Even the only major initiative to reestablish Western European responsibilities in security matters on a global scale—de Gaulle's call for a directoire à trois—had essentially intra-European motivations. It went almost unnoticed anyway. Cf. John Newhouse, *De Gaulle and the Anglo-Saxons* (New York, 1970), pp. 54ff.

[40]Press conference (January 10, 1974).

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Western European Perceptions of the USSR

On an evening in June, 1977, President Giscard d'Estaing was hosting Chairman Brezhnev in great pomp with a state dinner at the palace of Rambouillet. Many important figures of the Paris social, cultural, and political scene had been invited, and quite a few were present; however, none of the leading intellectuals were there. For, at the same time, in a small Parisian theater, they were all—from Jean-Paul Sartre to Eugene Ionesco, from Michel Foucault to the *nouveaux philosophes*—offering a counterreception to the Soviet dissidents.

Obviously, the "in" place to be on that evening was with Leonid Pliusch (whom Jacques Chirac, when he was prime minister, had criticized for abusing French hospitality by attacking his native country from France) and with Andrei Amalrik (whom President Giscard d'Estaing had refused to receive), *not* with the two French statesmen (who had been competing with each other for Brezhnev's time) and the Soviet ruler.

To understand the full extent of the psychological revolution underway, one must turn back to 1952. At that time, while the French government was arresting Communist leader Jacques Duclos on charges of conspiracy, and the French Communist party was propagating the slogan "Never will the French people go to war against the Soviet Union," Jean-Paul Sartre—the author of a play on Soviet defectors and their reception by the Western establishment—was writing in *Les Communistes et la Paix* that "an anti-communist is a dog" and that the truth about the Soviet Union should not be spread about too loudly lest it "désespérer Billancourt," that is, draw the French workers into despair. An issue of the magazine *La Nef* on "The Soviet Union Seen from France" was published at the beginning of the fateful year 1956, which, coming to grips with the Khrushchev report and the invasion of Hungary, was to mark the first serious change in the attitude of the French intellectuals. Early in the year, however, Raymond Aron could still write an article entitled "Fascinated by the Soviet Union" and point out that, for French intellectuals, "when the master is Russian, the words change their meaning and enslavement becomes liberation."

Of course, one should not fall into the typically Parisian trap of mistaking the evolution of French intellectual fashions for that of world history, or even of Europe. While both phenomena—the improvement of relations between Western European governments and the Soviet Union through détente and the parallel disillusionment of the revolutionary Left with the Soviet regime (because of a

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series of revelations from Khrushchev's to Solzhenitsyn's)—are real and widespread, one should not forget two other factors that complicate the picture.

First, because of de Gaulle and the diplomatic tradition of counterbalancing Germany and the United States with as good relations as possible with Russia, France is the country which, for reasons of pure Realpolitik, has consciously sought for the last ten years to occupy a privileged position in East-West relations. On the other hand, France is the country whose intellectuals, after having gone the farthest in their commitment to revolution, have also been the most shaken by Solzhenitsyn and the most enthusiastic about the Eastern dissidents.

Secondly, while it may be that both phenomena—faith in détente and the cult of the dissidents—are already declining, they are only part of two broader and more complex realities that retain all their validity: (1) the perception by Western governments of the need for accommodation with the Soviet Union and (2) the decline of the latter as an ideological model.

Here, a shift from France to Italy may be useful. The Italian statesman Ugo La Malfa is fond of pointing to the paradox that "the Eurocommunists are getting more distant from Moscow at the same time as Moscow is getting closer to Europe." The context of this oft-repeated remark shows that he is not referring to the paradox (verified after the deaths of both Stalin and Mao) that many Western leftists who had no objections to the most monstrous tyrannies started to detach themselves from the respective regimes just as the latter began to moderate their excesses. Rather, La Malfa's comment that Moscow is getting closer to Europe refers to its military shadow, which is looming larger and larger on the European horizon. He reminds us, then, of two facts: first, that the disaffection toward Moscow is general not only among romantic intellectuals but also (with many more hesitations and qualifications) among the most important Western Communist parties; and, second, that the détente policy of Western governments may have been based, not only on an increased confidence in Soviet peaceful intentions but also on a growing uneasiness about either Soviet military power or American protection.

Although increasing Soviet repression at home or activism in Africa may have begun, as far back as 1973, to sour the euphoric or hopeful aspects of détente, the future effect of the increase in Soviet military power and political assertiveness on Western European attitudes is much harder to predict. From case to case, governments and opposition parties (including Communist ones) with a prospect of reaching power may be driven either to a harder stance vis-à-vis the Soviet Union or to a greater concern to avoid its displeasure. The latter attitude, of course, can be more cheerfully rationalized. After all, one of the least unsatisfactory definitions of "Finlandization" is the constant need to adopt the most reassuring interpretation of Soviet behavior because one cannot face a more disquietening one or cannot afford to take the actions that would follow from it. The apparent or conscious optimism is based, in that case, on a deeper or less conscious pessimism.

This diversity of motivations—from intellectuals to Communist parties and to governments—illustrates how impossible it is to examine Western European attitudes toward the Soviet Union without first acknowledging the almost-impossible complexity of the task. There is a two-way, and often unconscious relationship between perceptions of (and behavior toward) the Soviet Union,

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and interaction with it, which raises an inevitable question. Why have Western European perceptions of the Soviet Union changed? Because the Soviet Union has changed or because our knowledge of it has changed? Or because, perhaps, our countries have themselves changed—in their domestic priorities, in their relations with each other, or with other powers? This raises, in turn, the even more obvious question: whose perceptions are we discussing? (Or, to paraphrase a traditional American question: who perceives for Europe?) As our example shows, one must, at the least, distinguish between governments and left-wing opposition parties and between intellectuals and the general public.

Things become even more complex if one introduces a time perspective. The evolution includes at least three periods: the cold war, détente in its first, optimistic phase, and the present phase—which this writer likes to call "the hot peace" and in which Western European perceptions may be both more ambiguous and more realistic than they were in the preceding two.

Finally, the differences among Western European countries are hardly less important than those among social forces or political groups within a given country. One can identify at least four groups: first, countries that, like France and Italy, have mass Communist parties and a left-wing cultural predominance; second, Germany, which is a case in itself because of its direct experiences with the Soviet Union and the interests associated with its division; third, countries like Britain and the Benelux or Scandinavia, which have no such direct links or conflicts but where other considerations (attachment to human rights, concerns with Finland, and so forth) may play a specific role; and fourth, countries that have only recently escaped right-wing dictatorships, or that nourish a special resentment toward the United States or other Western powers. The latter are the only countries in which the Soviet image seems not to have darkened in recent years and where Moscow is fashionable—not only diplomatically, as in Greece, but culturally as well, as apparently is the case in Spain. While certain general common trends may be discerned, obviously both the speed and the crucial turning points are not identical for the various countries and groups.

Looking at the process of detachment from the Soviet Union, we can see that it started for Western left-wing intellectuals in 1956 and has been accelerated by the Sino-Soviet split, by the events of 1968, and finally by the influence of Solzhenitsyn since the publication of *The Gulag Archipelago*.

For the Eurocommunist parties, 1968—with the invasion of Czechoslovakia—is definitely the most important date, although the process of detachment began in 1956 for the Italian Communist party (PCI), and did not become explicit until 1976 for the French party.

The opposite process on the part of governments—détente, entente, and cooperation with the Soviet Union—has had its great signposts too: 1953, with Stalin's death; 1962, after Cuba and the end of Khrushchev's Berlin offensive; 1969, after Prague and the beginning of the new Soviet peace offensive; and 1973-1974, with the changes introduced by the energy crisis and the Yom Kippur war.

But for the two countries most involved in détente, other dates are at least as important. For France, the crucial factor was, of course, the return to power of General de Gaulle, and his campaign from 1964 to 1968 for a "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals"—which he undertook once the Algerian war was

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ended and the Adenauer card had failed. For Germany, the crucial factor was the accession of the German Social Democratic party (SPD) to power—first with the Grand Coalition in 1966, then with the Brandt government—the negotiation of the treaties with the East between 1969 and 1972, and the succession of Helmut Schmidt to Willy Brandt.

These gaps and lags, these "parallel convergences" (to use the late President Moro's immortal expression), and these divergent parallelisms sometimes give an impression of chaos and cacophony, sometimes that of a well-regulated minuet or a game of musical chairs. But it is precisely these movements of coming together and separating again that constitute the theme of this essay. They could be summed up under the heading of "convergence and differentiation" or, more precisely, of convergence into differentiation and renewed divergence through conflicting priorities.

If one considers the two main gaps—the one between countries and within them, and the other between the more or less centrist governments in office and the Left, particularly the Communists their fellow travelers—a certain convergence has indeed taken place.

Between countries, France and Germany have always been at the two ends of the spectrum in their attitudes toward the Soviet Union. In 1954-1955, the German attitude (calculated by subtracting unfavorable opinions about the USSR from favorable ones) was the most negative in Europe (−56); the French attitude was the least negative (−24). Ten years later, in 1964-1965, the gap had widened; public opinion in all of Western Europe had moved spectacularly toward the Soviet Union (+16 for Great Britain, +12 for Italy), but nowhere more dramatically than in France (which, with a score of +27, had become favorable). The one exception was Germany, which had moved only from −56 to −54; thus the gap with France had almost doubled in ten years.[1]

In the seventies, the gap was largely, if not entirely bridged. Although no directly comparable figures for the fifties and the seventies are available, the comparison between two German polls taken on the occasion of Brezhnev's visits to Bonn in 1973 and 1978, and between two French ones taken in 1974 and 1977, give strikingly parallel results. In 1973 (and already in 1971), a majority of the German (as well as the French) public believed in the genuineness of the Soviet desire for détente. By 1978, on the other hand, 53 percent believed that the Soviet Union was abusing German goodwill.[2] In France too, where in 1974 49 percent (versus 26 percent) believed in the sincerity of the Soviet Union's détente policy, the proportions had been inverted by 1977—to 28 percent believing against 54 percent disbelieving.[3]

In neither country, however, has skepticism toward Soviet intentions detracted from the desire for good relations. In France, an overwhelming majority (88 percent against 3 percent) think good relations with the Soviet Union are a good thing. In Germany, in response to a narrower question about the desirability of improving economic relations, 52 percent answered favorably, citing the fact that exports increase employment.

This conversion to a prosaic or realistic viewpoint is particularly striking in Germany, considering the very short time that has elapsed since Ostpolitik first favored positive expectations toward the East over absolute distrust. Not much later, the public's disappointments with the meager effects of détente on rela-

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tions between the two Germanys produced a return to a new, more discriminating skepticism. But the same succession seems to be prevalent in most of Western Europe. (It reminds one of Auguste Comte's law of the three stages—progressing from a theological divinization or demonization of the Soviet Union, through a metaphysical belief in abstract notions like détente, convergence, rapprochement, and liberalization, Europe has moved to a more "positivistic" or relativistic attitude.) The evolution implies the bridging of a more important gap than that between the Federal Republic and its neighbors—the gap that, to different degrees and in different fashions, runs through the various countries of Western Europe.

The trend of the evolution has been to bring about a convergence between the perspective of governments (including, with some time lag, the German government) and that of the Left. In the eyes of the former, détente has made the Soviet Union appear less and less as all-black. For the latter, because of the revelations of the Khrushchev report, the invasion of Hungary, the Sino-Soviet split, and the invasion of Czechoslovakia, it has appeared less and less as all-white. Indeed, the episode with which we began this essay vividly illustrates the reversal of positions that has occurred, to some extent and in certain instances: some conservative governments and businessmen are more favorable to the Soviet Union (in the name of *Realpolitik*, economic interdependence, or of the "holy alliance" of law and order) than some former or present revolutionaries (in the name of their Maoism or, in the case of the French *nouveaux philosophes*, their belated discovery of the evils of totalitarianism).

What has taken place is a kind of banalization of the Soviet Union. Except for a few extremists (who, interestingly enough, are to be found nowadays on the Left as well as on the Right), it is seen less as a terrifying threat or a shining hope than as a massive, cumbersome, rather embarrassing, disquieting bore. Nobody quite knows how to live with it, but nobody really imagines any longer that it will fade away or fundamentally change its character in the foreseeable future—either through conversion to democracy or through disintegration.

This predominance of a more balanced and, to this writer, more realistic view has been made possible thanks to a process of differentiation. This process, I would argue, has taken place on two levels and concerns the association of the Soviet Union with certain abstract notions or global trends, as well as the reality of the Soviet Union itself.

In the 1950s, revolution, communism, and the Soviet Union were intimately linked in the minds both of those who were for them and those who were against them. At least three phenomena—the Sino-Soviet split, the emergence of the New Left in Western Europe (symbolized by the events of 1968), and Eurocommunism—have separated them. Right and Left converge in seeing the Soviet Union as a conservative power, at least in the sense of not being a revolutionary model. (Indeed the French semiheretic Communist historian, Jean Elleinstein, has called it an "antimodel," and a young Italian Communist historian, Professor Sergio Corduas, at a conference on the Prague Spring organized by the PCI, similarly stated that what the Soviets call "real socialism" is as opposed to socialism as such as capitalism is.)

Of course there may be much hypocrisy in all this: many authoritarian parties, movements, or governments would, like, for example, to imitate the Soviet

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treatment of its dissidents or hijackers; others, including perhaps the Eurocommunist parties and certainly their terrorist enemies on the Left, would indeed be likely to do so under certain circumstances. But the important point is that none of them—from right-wing dictators to nostalgic Stalinists and to half-de-Stalinized Communists—would in broad daylight pay allegiance to the model of today's Soviet Union. By now, there can only be an uneasy or unavowed pro-Sovietism, what Cornelius Castoriadis speaks of, in the case of the French Communist party, as a "totalitarisme honteux."[4]

Other processes of differentiation have worked in the same direction of separating the Soviet Union and aspirations to world revolution; among them is the support given by Moscow to the repression of national liberation movements—as in Ogaden or Eritrea—and to the perpetuation of monstrous autocracies like Idi Amin's regime in Uganda. And the very notions of a world revolution or liberation movement have been dealt a blow by the hostility between Vietnam and Cambodia and between Ethiopia and Somalia.

But the most common perception today goes even further. Beyond the separation of the Soviet Union from the notion of socialism or the process of world revolution, it distinguishes, within the Soviet reality itself, between the ideological, cultural, social, and economic dimensions—which are generally seen as failures and as unable to generate influence or support abroad—and the military dimension, which is seen as successful and impressive on all three relevant levels: strategic balance, European balance, and worldwide projection of Soviet power over faraway seas and distant lands.

On the basis of this more prosaic and differentiated common perception, however, differences of assessment and reaction are beginning to reappear, particularly along the Right-versus-Left axis and sometimes along American-versus-European lines. These differences are contrary to those who emphasize the Soviet Union's military strength and expansion and those who emphasize either its weaknesses in other areas or its domestic crises. Probably the real debate is between those who see in this combination of strength and weaknesses a reason for reassurance and those who see it as a reason for additional worry. Does the combination make the Soviets more adventurous or less? If, according to Richard Löwenthal's expression, "we are watching the successful external expansion of an internally declining regime,"[5] does the internal decline make the external expansion too costly to pursue or too tempting to resist for the Soviet leaders? Conversely, should the Western response emphasize meeting the military threat, building on the Soviet Union's economic needs to influence its long-range domestic evolution or immediate foreign behavior, or should it play upon its ideological and cultural vulnerabilities to defeat it in the battle for the minds of men?

These dilemmas are likely to become more acute if a period of international "hot peace," which maximizes the mutual effects of domestic and international conflicts, coincides with domestic polarization in Western European countries. Any prediction depends upon a threefold judgment about the evolution of the international environment (including the United States, China, and the Third World) and the evolution of Western European politics. It may well be that, after the polarized opinion blocs of the cold war and the loose but fairly general

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consensus of détente, an era of "hot peace" will see a contest in several key Western European countries between two views of international relations and, in particular, of policies toward the Soviet Union. The opposition would be between, on the one hand, a conservative, defense-oriented, more anti-Soviet, verbally more offensive and actually more defensive Right, and, on the other hand, a socialist or Eurocommunist, more détente-oriented, less anti-Soviet Left, which would promote a militarily weaker but ideologically more offensive stance toward the Soviet Union.

"Who perceives for Europe?" we have asked. The answer is certainly not "the academic community"—as it would be in an ideal world where perceptions were based on objective realities and these realities were measured, again objectively, by political scientists. Nor is it "Western European governments"—as it would be in other times or regions where governments enjoy a monopoly of communication and expression. Certainly the most relevant, as well as the most difficult part of the answer, concerns those elusive entities, the public opinions of the various countries, and those only slightly less elusive ones, their political forces. But the perceptions and attitudes of citizens and governments are bound to be influenced, to some degree at least, by the reality of Soviet evolution and Moscow's relations with their respective countries. It follows that, although we shall focus essentially on domestic factors and trends, we need to preface their examination with a brief look at Soviet evolution itself—as it is perceived by the prevailing consensus of competent Western observers—and at the evolution of diplomatic and economic relations between Western European countries and the Soviet Union.

Images of the Soviet Union: A New Consensus?

Several good surveys have recently reviewed the Soviet image in contemporary western literature. The trends they indicate can be conveniently summarized by the titles of two papers, one by W. Taubmann, "The Change to Change in Communist Systems: Modernization, Postmodernization and Soviet Politics"[6] and the other by Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Soviet Politics: From the Future to the Past."[7] The first paper indicates the trend toward relativism and the successive discard, in the post-World War II world, of the totalitarian scheme based on the unity of Soviet regimes and the adoption of the modernization scheme, which is based on analogies with other "mobilization regimes," particularly in the Third World, and relies on an ever shakier theory of political modernization or development.

The second paper indicates, however, that beyond any unilinear theory of progress one can discern a substantive evolution of Soviet reality that is, according to the author, paradoxically reproducing more and more the essential features of the czarist regime. But the formula: "from the future to the past" is essentially ambiguous: it may mean that the Soviet regime is less and less oriented toward the transformation of society and more and more toward its own conservation; it may mean that it is actually evolving backwards and recreating forgotten features of the past; or finally, it may mean, from the point of view of

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the Western observer, that instead of presenting a model of the future, the Soviet Union more and more represents a premodern stage that more dynamic societies have left behind.

This ambiguity raises the ever-recurring question of the relation between changes in the fashions and attitudes of the West and changes in the Soviet Union itself. Moreover, once one asks this question, one must pursue it by wondering whether the consensus of most analysts about Soviet reality is a Western or an American one and to what extent it is shared by Western European governments and public opinion.

In a recent review article, Daniel Tarschys indicates the way toward an answer. He distinguishes three causes that have contributed to renewing the Western image of Soviet politics and the successive devaluation of the Soviet archetype in Western political debates: (1) détente; (2) de-Stalinization and the differentiation of the Eastern bloc; and finally (3), new currents within the social sciences.[8] The first cause has to do with Western politics or at least with East-West relations, the second with the evolution of the East, and the third with an intra-Western and, more specifically, essentially intra-academic and intra-American phenomenon.

The question, then, is to what extent the rise and fall of American intellectual fashions—broad concepts influenced by the cold war, such as totalitarianism or theories of modernization or of the behavioral revolution—happen to influence, reflect, or coincide, on the one hand, with the evolution of Western and particularly Western European public opinion and, on the other, with the evolution of the Soviet world.

By and large, surprisingly enough, it would seem that the three evolutions, allowing for some time lags and marginal variations, have more or less gone hand in hand. Some idiosyncrasies—particularly the more extreme applications of nonpolitical behavioral categories and methods—have remained American; others, like the more pervasive hypertrophy of ideology from Trotsky to the *nouveaux philosophes*, from Bettelheim to Besançon, are typically French. But in general—if only because of the contributions of a number of transnational, often Polish, authors—sovietology has been a broadly Western enterprise which, while maintaining at all times a radically anti-Communist and a neo-Marxist radical wing, has usually gathered a fairly consistent consensus around a dominant position. And this dominant position has tended to evolve along with the reality it was supposed to study.

Perhaps the best guide for this parallel evolution is still the admirable final chapter, written in 1953, of Barrington Moore's *Terror and Progress USSR* about images of the future. Apparently taking his bearings from Weber's three types of legitimacy, Moore distinguishes three keys to Soviet evolution: power (whose ultimate logic is totalitarianism), rationality (which can have a technocratic version and a democratic one), and tradition (which can lead to a neofeudal society). He warns that Soviet society will almost inevitably be based on a combination of the three dimensions, but that their relative proportions and combinations will be critically important. In opposition to the views prevalent at that time, which emphasized the constant aggravation of totalitarianism (e.g., Hannah Arendt) or the irreversible march of democratization via economic rationalization (e.g., Isaac Deutscher), he stresses the likely mutual limitation of

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the three dimensions and the neglected but probably increasing importance of the third element.[9]

It is not an exaggeration to say that of Moore's three images, each has become fashionable successively, and precisely in the order he presented them. In the fifties and early sixties the prevalent image of the USSR was that of a totalitarian state complete with permanent purges and limitless expansion. In fact, although inspired in particular by H. Arendt's work of 1950,[10] the concept was popularized mostly after Stalin's death, just as it began to be less useful. Hence, a series of adaptations ("totalitarianism without terror," "administered society," and the like) emerged, along with alternative models corresponding at the same time to de-Stalinization, the emergence of détente, and the attempt to integrate sovietology into the social sciences. Incipient or institutionalized pluralism, interest-group politics, modernization, mobilization, and, ultimately, convergence, were the order of the day. As in Moore's concept of rationality, one could distinguish between approaches which insisted on pluralist features borrowed by analogy from Western societies[11] and those which insisted on the prevalence of development over utopia or of "experts" over "reds."[12]

In the late sixties and early seventies it was again a convergence between relatively separate developments occurring in Soviet reality—the fall of Khrushchev, followed by increased ideological retrenchment and conservatism at home, the invasion of Czechoslovakia (showing the imperial limits to the development of pluralism in Eastern Europe)—and in American social sciences (the loss of faith in theories of modernization and political development)[13]—which led to the prevalence of the more static models: oligarchic petrification, conservative authoritarianism, and big-power chauvinism. This prevalence has been gathering ever more strength and credence during the seventies, as, again, both Soviet immobilism within the empire and the revival of cultural history have given it empirical confirmation and intellectual respectability.

Three qualifications must be made, however, regarding this new consensus, for, to use Tarschys's expression, there are cracks in sovietology as well as in the Soviet monolith itself.

First, there are two versions of the present "third-image" consensus, which are united in going beyond the alternatives of totalitarianism and pluralism and in stressing oligarchic petrification. But the more sociological version presented by Tarschys himself insists on the bureaucratic model of competition between vertical organizations, while the more historical or cultural version is presented by Brzezinski—and, in a recent survey, by Richard V. Burks—in terms of the "Russification of modern civilization instead of the modernization of a backward country," and in terms of the re-creation of a "solidary society"—with emphasis on power, control, and autarky rather than on conflict, innovation, and interdependence.[14]

Secondly, for both versions of the consensus, the question of their consequences for the Soviet Union's foreign policy and, more generally, for its relations with the world is far from settled. Again, once one has gone beyond the two images of the world revolutionary conspiracy and of convergence breeding détente and vice versa, the question remains whether a Soviet Union seen as ideologically more retrenched and socially more conservative is externally more defensive or more offensive, more isolationist or more expansionist. The total-

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itarian image was tied, perhaps incorrectly, to economic autarky and military expansion; the democratic one to economic interdependence and the downgrading of military competition. The bureaucratic image is more open: it can accommodate increasing influence for both the military-industrial complex and economic planners concerned with the expansion of trade and technological cooperation with the West. The party bureaucracy may seek to accommodate both of them, as it seems to have done, by combining dynamic policies in both areas. But if, as also seems likely, the two collide because of Western reactions and endanger the domestic choice for immobilism and cultural autarky, the decision could be either a defensive, isolationist semiwithdrawal within the empire or an attempt to acquire prestige and, possibly, economic benefits (in oil-rich areas, for instance) through an adventurist foreign policy.

Similarly, a return to a more national or traditional pattern does not necessarily mean a status-quo foreign policy. Becoming "less of a cause and more of a state" does not necessarily mean becoming less imperialistic. On the contrary, becoming less revolutionary may mean becoming more Victorian, and becoming more Victorian may mean living in the age of Victorian expansion, or the rise of the German empire, or, simply, pursuing the traditional aims of Russian expansionism.

Hence there is a debate among specialists, which parallels the perplexities of the public, about the great efforts of the Soviet Union to expand its military power and global role. This would entail an increasing acceptance of the risk of confrontation in third countries—while it continues to plead for economic interdependence and cooperation. Moreover, a common ground among the participants in the consensus on the third image is that to some extent the trend it reflects is based, on the part of the Soviet leaders, on awareness of some degree of weakness and inability to implement either the totalitarian or the pluralistic model. The question then arises whether Moscow can live with these contradictions, or whether the neotraditionalist solution is so inherently fragile that it will have to bow, in the coming years or the next generation, to a resurgence of full-fledged totalitarianism or a genuine attempt at pluralistic reform.

Some of the most competent Western analysts or advisers, like Marshall Shulman and Richard Löwenthal, put great stress on the inevitable generational turnover at the upper levels of the Soviet power structure; they point to evidence that there is even more polarization between Slavophiles and westernizers and traditionalists and modernizers—within this new generation than among the present rulers or the dissidents.[15] If these speculations are correct, a certain polarization within the Soviet elite could encourage a certain polarization among Western observers. Some of the "dissidents" among the latter have views one is tempted to ascribe more to time lag, due to cognitive consonance, or to belated recognition, but which may be reinforced by reality.

The more conspicuous exceptions to the consensus apparent at the present, besides the permanent doctrinaires on the extreme Right and Left, belong to two groups. There is, first, a tendency, particularly among certain ruling statesmen and politicians or among some left-wing parties, to maintain a lingering belief in the inevitability of democratization through economic progress and trade. One finds such an assumption in statements from figures ranging from Andrew Young to Egon Bahr, and to Samuel Pisar and his preface-writer Valéry Giscard d'Estaing.

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On the other hand, the new generation of French sovietologists is rediscovering the totalitarian model and the role of ideology, partly under the influence of Solzhenitsyn and Alexander Zinoviev. They emphasize the invincible logic of the system, as in the writing of Alain Besançon, or its weakness and decline, as in the work of Emmanuel Todd.[16] The recent Moscow trials and Soviet actions in Africa would seem to confirm their views just as new attempts at reform may comfort believers in the long-run primacy of economic interdependence. But, for the time being, the exceptions to the consensus are best understood in terms of the political and economic interests of Western governments and the spiritual adventures of Western intellectuals.

Relations with the Soviet Union: New Vested Interests?

It is remarkable that, compared to their American counterparts, most Western European governments display a greater reluctance to change their assessment of the present stage of Soviet policies to a point which might jeopardize the assumption of continuing détente; at the same time, most Western European intellectuals are rather more eager than their American colleagues to shift positions radically.

In the case of the intellectuals, this is probably due to their greater propensity to embrace absolute positions and switch from one extreme to the other. This is especially so insofar as their favorable attitude toward the Soviet Union, based on their Marxist faith and disillusionment with "the God that failed," led them to reject Him altogether and look for other idols. In the United States, on the other hand, the positions of intellectuals toward the Soviet Union—except for some prewar communists or Trotskytes turned liberal or conservative—are based less on Marxism or anti-Marxism than on dovishness or hawkishness or on optimistic or pessimistic attitudes that are more resistant to change.

With governments it is the other way round. Being more immediately engaged in direct contact with their powerful Soviet neighbor, Western European governments are less prone to sudden switches than the US, which, short of jeopardizing the common interest in avoiding nuclear war, can better afford acrobatic moves or positions based on the ethics of conviction. The Europeans are forever afraid that American-Soviet relations are either too close to collision or too close to collusion. John Foster Dulles's brinksmanship and President Carter's human rights crusade generated European fears of confrontation, while the Kennedy and the Nixon-Kissinger varieties of détente brought fears of condominium—sometimes from the same governments.

Some—as is often the case in Germany—are simply afraid of any basic changes (certainly in matters of military security and sometimes in political arrangements as well). Having painfully adjusted to détente under the prodding of their allies, they find it difficult to change their stance again, especially under the fire of the "I-told-you-so" cries of the opposition. In Gaullist France, on the other hand, the objection was less to change per se—for instance in the direction of negotiations with the Soviet Union—than to the fact that it was not French-originated. There too the French initiatives are both encouraged and limited by dimensions other than their rivalry with Germany and the United States—namely, colonial and neocolonial interests in Africa and the existence of a strong Communist party at home.

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All governments, then, cannot avoid having their perceptions of Moscow influenced by their actual relations; and these—beyond immediate bilateral fears or interests that are often compelling enough—also have to be seen within a multilateral framework involving intra-European, intra-Western, and North-South relations, as well as domestic politics.

The particular proportion and combination of these factors varies, of course, according to the national situation. A useful way of differentiating them would distinguish between countries that have direct bilateral interests in their relations with the East (what A. Wolfers has called "possession goals") and those that have primarily "milieu goals," that is, those interested either in just maintaining peace and prosperity or in changing the structure or nature of the European or global system.[17] Norway and Belgium would be examples of pure types; one having both direct economic (the Spitzberg, the continental shelf) and security interests in its relations with the Soviet Union, and the other only indirect concerns as a member of NATO and the European Community.

But the complexity and diversity of European reality force us to complicate the picture still further. If one considers the triangle of the three leading powers of the European Community, one finds not two models but three. Germany, like Norway, is a perfect example of an inescapable direct, special, and ambivalent relationship with the Soviet Union. A vaguer general commitment to détente and defense, to trade and freedom, commands the attitude of Britain, as of Belgium. But France offers still a third model. Though it has no territorial goals and no border or population conflicts with the East, it carries on a traditionally active Ostpolitik, which culminated in de Gaulle's pathbreaking initiatives of the middle sixties. The reasons for the policy are to be found, essentially, in France's triangular games with Germany and the United States. The Soviet Union is seen, above all, as a counterweight to one or both of them; alternatively, France's role can be seen as that of a mediator or balance between the USSR and these countries. When a direct Soviet-German or Soviet-American dialogue takes place, France's role diminishes; and she is faced with the task of trying to beat the Germans or Americans to Moscow. In the case of an American-Soviet dialogue, she can also try to constitute, in association with Germany, a Western pole of resistance and strength (which is what de Gaulle attempted to do with Adenauer, in reaction to the Kennedy initiative). In the case of German-Soviet talks, she can take the same course in association with Britain (which is what Pompidou, with Heath, tried to do in reaction to Brandt's negotiations).

Under Giscard d'Estaing, this diplomatic aspect of French relations with the Soviet Union has diminished, partly because, already under de Gaulle, the dreams of a fundamental change in the European system had vanished with the invasion of Prague, and partly because the more common Western motivations (the advantages of economic relations with the East, the dangers of Soviet penetration in Africa), have been given increased weight. But the dilemma of choosing between belief in the positive evolution of the Soviet Union through trade and détente and in the necessity of standing up to it in Africa have never completely superseded the specifically French dilemma (visible in particular during the Belgrade and Helsinki conferences) of giving priority to other concerns: the encouragement of smaller states looking for a greater autonomy, the unity of the nine Community members, or the preservation of a special relationship with the

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Soviet Union—believed to be necessary both because of Germany and because of the French Communist party.

France, as a result, has the additional difficulty of choosing between, on the one hand, a view of international relations which is strongly predicated on raison d'Etat (hence on Realpolitik) and on paying more attention to Russia as a state than to communism as a regime and, on the other, the domestic need both to fight and placate the Communist party and to respond to the public's new interest in human rights.

In the German case, the perception of the Soviet Union is no less complex but much more concrete. The historical relationship between the two peoples, with its alternations and combinations of hatred and attraction, wars and coalitions, and the recent experience of military occupation and territorial annexation, of refugee and minority problems, give both security and détente a much deeper and more genuine meaning for Germany than they have for any other Western country.

The most crucial consideration is, of course, the division of the country. It was the absolute priority of German reunification that caused the Federal Republic, in the pre-Ostpolitik days, to oppose any steps toward détente and arms control that would not be accompanied by corresponding progress on this issue. And it is both the acceptance of the division as an inescapable reality for today and the necessity of keeping communications open with the GDR that are the basis of Ostpolitik. Willy Brandt and Egon Bahr have repeatedly said that to them détente meant, above all, the four-power agreement on Berlin and the treaty with the GDR, which has allowed greater security for West Berlin and opens up more possibility for travel to, and to some extent from, East Germany.

Thus, to West Germany, the Soviet Union is not only seen as a potential and (to a great degree) actual military threat, and as an economic partner; it is also seen, at least as importantly, as a decisive influence on the GDR—in regard to the future status of Germany as well as the daily, crucial issues of access to West Berlin, the buying-off of political prisoners, and similar problems. This influence is the decisive leverage Moscow can use against West Germany any time it yields to the temptation to react too loudly against Soviet domestic repression or foreign expansion.

The intensity of the direct issues does not detract, however, from the importance of the indirect ones relating to intra-Western and intra-West German politics. Willy Brandt has said that the immediate origin of his policy of "little steps" and "change through rapprochement" with the East was the Western inability to do anything about the Berlin Wall (interestingly enough, both Adenauer and F. J. Strauss were afraid that the United States might overreact to it). Chancellor Schmidt has repeatedly measured German or Western European relations with the Soviet Union by the standard of US-Soviet relations: at times of great superpower intimacy he has warned that Europe must not stay behind; at times of tension at the top he has insisted that Western Europe must assume the task of maintaining détente. Concerning strategy he believes that superpower parity makes local balances more important, so that both strengthening the NATO posture and achieving success in such arms control negotiations as the Mutually Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) are crucial. He has described his dialogue with Mr. Brezhnev by using the analogy of Bismarck's "reinsur-

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ance" treaty. To a great extent then, German-Soviet relations are based on a change in the German perception of the United States rather than a change in its view of the Soviet Union itself.

On the other hand, much of West Germany's Soviet policy results from domestic factors—in the double sense that the necessity of maintaining a certain stable consensus of opposition to coexistence with the East is balanced against the necessity for the government, at a time of domestic difficulties, not to minimize its foreign policy achievements, among which a certain reconciliation with the East stands out, if only by lack of a serious competitor.

Finally, the relation between the national situation and domestic politics acts as a unique constraint on German foreign policy. The national situation makes certain domestic developments, such as a strong Communist party, unthinkable; on the other hand, it was the staleness of public opinion, particularly among the younger generation, with the official assumptions about the Oder-Neisse line, reunification, and the cold war, that pushed the government into Ostpolitik. Officially, and probably in the intentions of its architects, Ostpolitik meant adjustment to realities, including that of the détente policies of other Western powers, and carried no expectations either of national reunification or ideological convergence with the East. In fact, the government had to oversell the change in the Soviet Union, just as in an earlier period, in order to achieve integration in the West and rearmament, its predecessors—along with the rest of the West—had to oversell the Soviet Union's military strength and aggressive intentions. In turn, public opinion (particularly in the Federal Republic, and there particularly among the young) seems first to have gone far beyond the official pronouncements and later to have become disillusioned with them. We noted early in this paper the parallelism that is evident between German and French evolution in the periods 1973-1974 and 1977-1978. But already in the preceding period, a switch just as spectacular had taken place in German public opinion—from hope in Ostpolitik and trust in the Soviet Union to disillusionment with the former and distrust of the latter.

While the number of Germans satisfied with the success of the Federal Republic's foreign policy jumped from 9 percent in 1966 to 53 percent in 1970, and the number of dissatisfied had dropped from 38 to 13 percent, by 1973 the proportion of the satisfied had decreased to 33 percent while the number of dissatisfied Germans rose to 26 percent. In 1974, the dissatisfied, with 35 percent, again outnumbered those who thought German foreign policy was successful—who numbered only 30 percent.

More striking still is the finding that in 1971, 53 percent of the Germans, against 37 percent, thought neutrality was preferable to the American alliance. In 1973 that proportion declined to 40 percent, against 39 percent; and in 1974, the 38 percent in favor of neutrality were vastly overtaken by a proalliance 51 percent.

A question asked about the good intentions of the Soviet Union shows a similar evolution: in 1971, 46 percent of those less than 30 years old answered positively, whereas in 1974 only 37 percent did so. Among respondents over 45 years old, the respective percentages were 23 and 22 percent. What is remarkable here is that the younger generation, which, at the beginning of the Ostpolitik, was enthusiastic and optimistic about the Soviet Union, changed its attitude

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and drew closer to the position of the older population, which had changed very little. What is even more remarkable is that the changes back and forth in the outlook of the younger generation were accompanied by corresponding switches in attitudes on such ideological and domestic themes as the class struggle. In 1971, to the question, "Do you consider the class struggle as damaging or necessary?" 40 percent of those under 30 answered that it was necessary; only 34 percent thought so in 1974. Twenty-four percent considered it damaging in 1971 and 37 percent in 1974. In the over-45 group the proportion that considered the class struggle necessary was almost identical in 1971 (20 percent) and in 1974 (21 percent); but in this age group too, the proportion who considered it damaging grew from 36 percent in 1971 to 46 percent in 1974.[18]

The paradox, then, is that national and international constraints have brought periods of national consensus on foreign policy in the Federal Republic more than elsewhere: the SPD's rallying to Adenauer's policies, the CDU's de facto acceptance of the Eastern treaties, and the general consensus of the need for American protection (curiously interrupted, according to the one poll we have quoted, by the Ostpolitik-intoxicated year of 1971). Yet East-West relations and domestic politics remain inextricably linked, and the state of détente has more direct consequences on domestic politics in Germany than in any other country. A new cold war would bring a highly dangerous polarization, which would apparently favor the CDU—two good reasons for a SPD government to avoid it, at all costs, even though it might need to interpret international trends in a slightly distorted way in order to do so.

In an attenuated form and in various combinations, one finds some of the same interactions in the other countries involved, more or less directly, in relations with the Soviet Union. In Scandinavia, one can say in a nutshell that traditional perceptions and policies, linked to the delicately shaded nordic balance and to pacifist traditions, are under attack because of increasing concern with the spectacular growth of the Soviet navy and the corresponding growth in the assertiveness and arrogance of Soviet policy on disputed issues. The reaction of "northern flank" countries is to increase their military preparedness and their cooperation with NATO; but concern both with Finland and with domestic consensus forbids abandonment of accepted rules (such as "no nuclear weapons," "no foreign troops on Norwegian and Danish soil"). The same public opinion which still pushes for détente also calls for an activist stance on human rights issues and on the Helsinki Third Basket, and is affronted by Soviet repression.[19]

In Mediterranean Europe, which in NATO parlance is identified as "the southern flank," the situation regarding relations with the Soviet Union could not be more different. True, the increasing presence of the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean parallels, without matching it, its growth in the North. The projection of Soviet power in the Adriatic is certainly of growing concern to Mediterranean countries, particularly to Italy and particularly in light of a possible Soviet-Albanian rapprochement or of growing Soviet influence in Yugoslavia after Tito's death. Yet in this area more than anywhere else, certainly more than in the North, relations with, and even perceptions of, the Soviet Union are determined above all by relations with the United States and by intraregional and domestic politics.

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This is true even for Turkey, although it shares a border with the Soviet Union and in the past has been subjected to its demands and its pressures. Certainly the awareness of these geopolitical and historical realities must set severe limits to any rapprochement between Turkey and the United States. But the deterioration of relations with the latter after the arms embargo, the unpredictable course of the conflict with Greece over Cyprus and over Aegean oil and, even more, the deep disillusionment with the West and the trend (mainly among neotraditionalist forces but also in part on the Left) toward a more Islamic, more Middle Eastern, or more nonaligned role—all these factors seem to take precedence over the traditional perception of the Soviet threat and to make for an at least instrumentally positive answer to Soviet overtures. The opposition to this new game may come not only from the awareness of strategic constraints but also from the commitment of conservative forces to the Western connection and their fear that changes in international orientation would produce unwanted domestic consequences.

In Greece, both the anti-American and the regional (in this case anti-Turkish) or domestic dimension are even more pronounced; nor are they balanced by any comparable geostrategical counterweight. The legacy of the Nixon administration's links with the colonels seems to make Greek public opinion infinitely more anti-American than anti-Soviet, and Eastern realities seem to be regarded almost exclusively in an instrumental way.

At the other end of Mediterranean Europe, in Portugal, the image of the Soviet Union is almost entirely dominated by ideological and domestic considerations. After forty years of hostility during the Salazar regime, a new, favorable image was dominant at the beginning of the 1975 revolution. But Moscow's support of Alvaro Cunhal and the polarization brought about by the power struggles of 1975 have made for continued attachment on the part of Portuguese Communists and renewed or increased distrust on the part of everyone else. At the governmental level, African issues, particularly those connected with Angola, are likely to be as important in determining attitudes toward the Soviet Union as European ones.

In Spain, the same kind of historical and ideological experiences are decisive, but there are obvious differences, such as the direct role of the Soviet Union in the Spanish Civil War and the attempt of the Communist party to gain new legitimacy by emphasizing its differences, or even its break with Moscow. But just as important is the fact that, unlike Portugal, Spain is a potentially important power with an active foreign policy inspired, to some degree, by Realpolitik. Both in the East-West and in the North-South context, Spain has tried, particularly during the last years of the Franco regime, to find a unique role—keeping good relations with the Arab countries, improving commercial relations with the Soviet bloc (to the point that, under Franco, a miners' strike was broken by extra shipments of coal from the Soviet bloc), and playing a certain nonaligned role in East-West negotiations. Interestingly, the return to democracy has led, to some extent, to a return to the West; for Spain's potential entry into the Common Market and NATO has drawn heavy Soviet criticism, and her quarrels with Algeria over the western Sahara have soured her relations with the Arab world. Ironically, it is the main opposition party, the Spanish Socialist Workers party (PSOE), that continues the search for an autonomous

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international role and has signed warm communiqués with Mr. Brezhnev as well as Mr. Boumedienne.

Finally, Italy is perhaps the European country where the primacy of domestic politics over foreign policy is the most pronounced. By the same token, however, Italy is one of those countries where international considerations and interventions (often solicited by Italian political forces) play the greatest role in domestic politics. The crucial consideration is, of course, the strength of the Communist party. Ever since the 1948 elections, Italy's choice of the Christian Democrats and choice of the West, including NATO and the European Community, have been presented as elements of one and the same "choice of civilization."

For both Italian ruling circles and their American allies, the main point seems to be Italy's domestic regime and its geopolitical position (hence its military bases), rather than any active political and military contributions. Italians see themselves as security consumers rather than producers.

On the other hand, precisely because of this passive role, a certain implicit or rampant neutralism has been a component of Italy's stance and has led to a kind of "pacifist atlanticism," which, in turn, has made it easier for the Communisty party, in recent years, to accept membership in NATO. A certain urge to be on good terms with everyone, East and West, North and South, while, according to polls, not trusting anyone including themselves[20] has led Italians, though among the most faithful members of the Alliance and the Community, also to cultivate good relations with both the Soviet Union and the Arab world. (Italian industry, for example, has many links and vested interests in the Soviet bloc. Both the nature of Italy's foreign relations and the nature of her domestic alignments are likely to be heavily influenced by the future climate of East-West relations and the state of the East-West balance. Just as the earlier polarization was made possible by the cold war, the present collaboration between Christian Democrats and Communists is made possible by détente and may have trouble surviving it. Similarly, what today is a healthy diversification of friendships (corresponding to the PCI's slogan of "a Europe which should be neither anti-Soviet nor anti-American") could turn tomorrow, if Western influence declines, into a kind of "maltification"—that is, a neutralism submitted to strong influences from the East and from Qaddafi's Libya.

The evolution of Yugoslavia—where geographical and ideological situations come together—is likely to have an important bearing on the way Italian political forces and the national foreign policy of the Italian government (which is little more than an expression of the compromises between the political forces) calculate the balance of influences that will determine the subtle nuances of their attitudes toward the outside world, including the Soviet Union.

Uses of the Soviet Union: Convenient Threat and Embarrassing Friend

Our inquiry seems, so far, to have led us in directions opposite to those I announced at the beginning. I began by stating a general convergence of views about the Soviet Union in Western Europe, and we have discovered a multiplicity of different national outlooks. I contrasted the objective judgments of the experts and the objective interests of governments, and both directions have led

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us to the subjective views of ideological intellectuals and the parochial calculations of political forces.

Perhaps the same dialectical paradox will obtain if we proceed in reverse order. By looking directly at the domestic politics and debates of Western Europe, a certain unity may emerge out of diversity, and a certain Soviet reality may emerge out of the conflicting and successive Western myths.

Among the forces of the political Right, the image of the Soviet Union has remained relatively stable (just as the West German public opinion poll we quoted shows how the views of the more skeptical older generation have varied much less than those of the more easily enthusiastic and more easily disappointed young). After all, not the invasion of Budapest, nor of Prague, Solzhenitsyn's books, nor Soviet actions in Ethiopia challenged the views of Western conservatives. Rather, these events were welcome confirmations of views they already held and which proved to be even more true than they thought. They enabled the conservatives to wage campaigns against the illusions of the Left and the dangers of détente, an exercise in which Franz-Josef Strauss in Germany and Mrs. Thatcher in Britain are the most distinguished experts.

There are three qualifications, however, to the permanence of the conservative vision. First, unlike the Fascist extreme-Right, Center-Right parties are government parties; and their leaders are former, present, or future ministers. While, as a rule, these parties are more anti-Soviet, particularly when in opposition, than the governments they support when they are in power, they cannot remain isolated from the evolution of governments whose awareness of the necessity of nuclear peace and the utility of East-West trade almost universally leads them to a less manichaean view of the Soviet Union. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Mr. Brezhnev's visit to Bonn, in the spring of 1978, was his long and cordial dialogue with Franz-Josef Strauss.

Secondly, conservatives in Europe, at least as much as in the United States, not only have a de facto anti-Soviet convergence with China, but are actively courted by the latter and respond to this courtship favorably. The very fact that they are allied with one Communist power against another must give their anti-Sovietism a less ideological and more pragmatic character.

Finally, in some cases conservative parties may be more hostile to some other power, for example the United States or Germany, than to the Soviet Union—or to some other figure, such as President Giscard d'Estaing, than to Mr. Brezhnev. In the Gaullist tradition, belief in the prevalence of nations over regimes and in the role of Russia as a counterweight, leads to avoiding too strong a stress on Soviet military growth or expansionist policies, for fear of justifying Atlantic integration. Hence the paradox that a party like Jacques Chirac's Rassemblement pour la Republique (RPR), whose main domestic appeal is its claim to save France from the danger of Communist totalitarianism, is courting the sympathy of Russia out of raison d'Etat; in addition, it displays a certain sympathy for the Soviets' use of state machinery against leftist anarchism or against crusades for human rights encouraged by American liberalism and moralism.

But the locus of change and paradox in attitudes toward the Soviet Union is the Left. Here transnational differences between ultra-leftists, Communists, and Socialists, national differences within each of the groups, and ambiguity or

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"false consciousness" everywhere, combine to make the Soviet question a fascinating test case for the more general evolution of the Western European Left itself.

The most clear-cut phenomenon is the decline of the old fellow travelers and the emergence of the New Left. These developments are due partly to Soviet evolution and behavior, as well, paradoxically, as to the amelioration of the international climate. The first massive postwar divorce of Western intellectuals from the Soviet Union occurred in 1956 after the invasion of Hungary; whereas the decline of the World Peace Movement or the "Ban the Bomb" campaign (except for the largely British movements for unilateral disarmament) was connected to the decline of the cold war and the fear of a preventive war launched by the United States. But perhaps the main cause of the emergence of an autonomous New Left has to do less with a change in the perception of the Soviet Union and its relation to the United States than with the emergence of alternative objects of devotion or symbols of revolution.

If one takes Jean-Paul Sartre as an example, it is clear that for him what has changed is less the image of the Soviet Union than his attitude toward the French Communist party and, ultimately, the French working class. The chain of the equation, "to be against the bourgeoisie = to be for the oppressed = to be for the workers = to be for the Communists = to be for the Soviet Union," has been broken less at the beginning or at the end than in the middle. First the Chinese and Cuban revolutions, then the "peasant masses of the three continents," the colonized "wretched of the earth" whose interpreter was Frantz Fanon; then, after 1968, the young, particularly those involved in the events in France and more recently in the Italian "movimento," were substitute causes which made it possible to oppose the existing Western order without identifying with the Communist parties and the Soviet Union. In turn, these new attachments, by their more romantic and activist character—symbolized by the figure of Che Guevara—contrasted sharply with the prudent, rigid, authoritarian, and conservative behavior of orthodox Communist parties and states, whether in their strategy within the capitalist world or in the character of the Soviet Union itself.

From this general trend, three different directions have branched out in recent years. For one wing of the New Left—which until recently was preeminent and which still is, in, for instance, Italy and the Federal Republic—the notions of revolution, of violent insurrection and, more generally, of a global struggle between imperialism and reaction, are being maintained and even reaffirmed with renewed energy and commitment. According to one part of this group—the Maoists—the Soviet Union and the Western Communist parties have joined the ranks of the capitalist enemy. Another part believes that, although they are hopelessly bureaucratic, authoritarian, and "embourgeoisés," the Western parties, and particularly the Soviet Union, still have a fundamentally positive role in the world scene—as supporters of national liberation movements and revolutionary causes against the main enemies, capitalism and colonialism, the United States and the multinational corporations.

One finds this view beyond the ultra-Left groups themselves, among "Third-Worldist" individuals like the pro-Arab, pro-Baader-Meinhof, and formerly pro-Fascist writer Jean Genêt, or Régis Debray, who combines Cas-

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troism and Mitterrandism. Indeed, this outlook is also common within the Italian and the French Communist parties and, even more perhaps, in the self-proclaimed left-wing of the French Socialist party, the Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Socialistes (CERES) and in Papandreou's Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK).

At the other extreme, a number of young intellectuals, particularly in France, have carried their critique of past illusions to its ultimate consequences by discarding the very notions of revolution, conquest of power, and socialism. For most of them, disillusionment with Maoism, particulary after the end of the Cultural Revolution and the death of Mao, coincided with the discovery of Solzhenitsyn and the Soviet dissidents and, in some cases, with the views of authors who espouse what may be broadly termed an antipsychiatric critique of society. This has led—on the one hand—to the generalization of their critique to include not only any socialist state but any state, any power, any institution, any left-wing movement, any belief in progress and rationality as such, and—on the other hand—to the adoption of the "Gulag Archipelago" as the archetype of the state and of the Soviet dissidents as the model of the only stance possible for intellectuals: resistance from below.

Instead of a model, what they found in the Soviet Union, seen in the light of the Gulag, was a countermodel representing the ultimate logic of the West; and in the Soviet dissidents they found the combination of a new oppressed population and a new heroic and enlightened elite. I have described, of course, the French *nouveaux philosophes*. They are far from holding a common position (some, for instance, are reappraising the liberal state and citing the United States as the least bad society because it is the most tolerant of dissent, while others are not); but they all have in common this need, carried over from their past, to find both new heroes and an Absolute Villain. This leads them sometimes, out of anti-Sovietism or anti-Communism, to become unexpected allies of the establishment (as in France) or of pseudorevolutionary, violent minorities (as in Italy).

Finally, perhaps the most numerous and the most interesting, but also the most inarticulate part of the New Left, is composed of those who, while sharing most of the criticisms of existing revolutions made by the *nouveaux philosophes*, are equally skeptical of existing violent movements and of existing conservative institutions. They have not, however, abandoned the hope for a fundamental transformation of society.[21] For the first time, they have no foreign models and no total blueprint, but their disillusionment with utopias is combined with as strong a desire for liberation as ever. Their energies are aimed in less global directions, at the local level or at that of the various movements or communities (women's rights, ecology, etc.). To them, the Soviet Union is neither an ally nor the main enemy: it has simply become irrelevant.

If the Western Communist parties, Eurocommunist or not, and their Socialist and Social Democratic rivals have something in common, it is their inability to afford this kind of luxury. For them, the Soviet Union cannot help being relevant and in a way that gets ever more complicated and embarrassing, since their attitude can no longer be one of either flat acceptance or outright rejection. The relevance of the Soviet Union is intimately linked both to their ideological and organizational past (since the split in the worker's movement originated

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precisely over issues having to do with the Bolshevik leadership and model) and to their political future as potential government parties on a continent where the Soviet presence looms larger and larger.

The problem is particularly acute for the Eurocommunist parties: first because their rank and file members often have a view of the Soviet Union which is inherited from past indoctrination; but, second, because their voters and potential allies make their accession to power conditional on a break with Moscow; and, finally, because the likely conditions of their experience in government would make it desirable to be both protected from the Soviet Union and protected by it. It is difficult, therefore, to decide at what level to look for their perception of the Soviet Union. One must distinguish at least four levels among the perceivers—the electorate, the members, the intellectuals, and the leaders themselves—and at least four dimensions in the external relations of the Communist parties (and particularly in their relations with the Soviet Union) which influence their perceptions of the latter—interparty relations, interstate relations, and alliance politics at both the domestic and the transnational, European, or global level.

The classical Communist perception of the Soviet Union, which Moscow would like to preserve, is (in the sequence of these dimensions) that of the center or the leader of the world Communist movement, ideological model of socialism, promoter of European security, and protector of the forces of peace in the European system and of the forces of liberation struggling against imperialism on the world scene. We cannot here engage in a systematic comparison of the extent to which the acceptance of this traditional view has declined in the various parties and has been replaced by its opposite. We can, however, single out the three parties which have given rise to the notion of Eurocommunism (the Italian, the Spanish, and the French) and point out the differences in their attitudes and evolution, which make the very notion of Eurocommunism a highly ambiguous and doubtful one, and which nonetheless define the common limits within which these differences are found.

Today none of the three parties recognizes the Soviet claim to leadership of the world Communist movement; they all proclaim that it should have no leader or center laying down the law or the general line. On the other hand, none of them is denouncing the notion of a world Communist movement itself, although most speak of a new internationalism which, from the point of view of the Italians, should not be limited to the Communist parties and, according to all, should no longer have pro-Sovietism as its touchstone. Similarly, none of the three parties recognizes the Soviet Union as its model for socialism; all claim to want to build a different kind of socialism based on the pluralist tradition and social structure of advanced Western societies. But none has, as a party, taken the step of declaring that the Soviet Union is not socialist, although the PCE as a party and several leading French and Italian communist intellectuals have come close to saying so. All have criticized the lack of political democracy in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (ranging from the denunciation of specific acts of repression to a recognition of the structurally antidemocratic character of the regime itself), but none has proclaimed that economic exploitation is continuing under "real socialism" or that the working class has had fewer social rights than it does in the capitalist world.

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Similarly, regarding the Soviet Union's relations with Eastern Europe, all condemn the invasion of Czechoslovakia but continue to justify that of Hungary. All recognize implicitly, and some explicitly, that the Soviet Union dominates the area at the expense of the independence of its allies, but none have called the Soviet bloc an imperial system. All accept, more or less, the Western structures (NATO, the European Community) which the Soviet Union criticizes as aggressive; but in actual debates or negotiations on East-West relations in Europe (from the neutron bomb to East-West trade), they usually see the Soviet Union on the side of the angels. In the Third World as well, they criticize the spirit of superpower confrontation and extoll the independent development of formerly colonialized peoples. Yet they maintain the need for a class analysis of the world revolutionary process and see American imperialism and the multinational corporations (at least as far as the PCI and the PCF are concerned) as the main enemy in this struggle for world liberation and the Soviet Union as a powerful ally of the process. Again, regarding China or Cambodia, they refuse to participate in Moscow's campaigns of denunciation or excommunication, but they are more favorable to the Soviet and the Vietnamese side.

The important point to be made about all these positions is that while they do correspond to a common logic—that of differentiation, both within the Communist movement and in their judgment about Soviet reality (that is, the refusal to make a stark choice between obedience and separation or between imitation and rejection)—they do not add up to a coherent and tenable position. The variations in the ways the three parties have reached these positions and the different emphases they place on one element or the other, bear instead the mark of an essentially fluid series of compromises in response to contradictory pulls and pressures.

The party which has gone the farthest in distancing itself from the Soviet Union is the Spanish one. The essential break occurred after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, although there have been several halfhearted reconciliations. Santiago Carrillo certainly sees the Soviet connection as compromising and Soviet attacks aginst him as essentially legitimizing in the eyes of the Spanish people. He has pushed the logic of this position so far that today the PCE is probably, of all Spanish political forces, the one on the worst terms with Moscow—certainly much worse, for instance, than either the Socialist party (PSOE) or the government.

It is difficult to know to what extent the "David versus Goliath" image which Carrillo is evidently trying to evoke is actually accepted by the Spanish public and the party activists. Within the leadership itself, some, like Marcelino Camacho, have expressed more favorable judgments about the Soviet Union, and many, among the older leaders, although they share Carrillo's line of total independence from Moscow, apparently believe that he is going too far in applying it. The Soviet delegate to the 1978 party congress of the PCE was apparently among those most warmly applauded; but like the rumblings about the abandonment of the Leninist label, this may be as much an indirect way of teasing Carrillo or indicating dissatisfaction with his style of leadership as a positive expression of support for the Soviet Union and its principles.

At the level of public expression, at any rate, there is no duality between more adventurous party intellectuals and a more restrained party leadership, for

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it is Carrillo himself (particularly in his book *Socialism and the State*, which triggered a furious response from Moscow), and his right-hand man, Manuel Azcarate, who have been most vocal and daring in criticizing both the nature of the Soviet regime and its role in the world. And they are clearly, on practically all these issues, at one end of the consensus described above, and are held within it only by the fear of being too far detached from the other Eurocommunist parties. They are the most explicit about their refusal to consider the Communist movement as a church and Moscow as its Rome. They have called the Soviet regime a primitive form of socialism based not on the power of the proletariat but on that of a small elite. Of Soviet intervention and rule in Eastern Europe, they have expressed the harshest criticism, the clearest justification for resisting it through armed force, and the warmest solidarity with its victims.

Finally, on the question of the international role of the Soviet Union—both from the point of view of the interstate, particularly European balance, and from that of the "international class struggle"—their position is, in some ways, closer to that of the Chinese, or at least of the Yugoslavs, than to that of their fellow Eurocommunists: they stress, above all, the dangers of the two hegemonies and of great power politics. Hence they treat both superpowers the same way. In Western Europe, according to Carrillo, both superpowers would be hostile to a victory of the Left and socialism; Europe must, therefore, be independent, including militarily, in order to resist their blackmail. In the world at large, it should seek the alliance of all anti-imperialist forces, not to align with the Soviet Union in fighting American imperialism but to bring about a multipolar world.

There is none of this boldness and clarity in the case of the Italian Communists, though there is not necessarily any less credibility. Their process of estrangement from the Soviet model and world view, precisely because it has been much slower (having started at least in 1956, although based on experiences as old as Togliatti's reticence in the face of the sectarian turn of the Third International in 1929 or his direct contact with Stalin's purges), much more discrete, and more subject to slowdowns and reversals, may be seen either as more halfhearted or, with at least equal justification, more genuine and less instrumental. While for the Spanish (and even more for the French) the change in the way of perceiving the Soviet Union may either be superficial or have come about as a consequence of a conflict with Moscow and the tactical need to assert independence, the Italians seem rather bent on avoiding or minimizing conflict with the Soviet Union as well as with any one else. Their evolution may be prompted by the same tactical domestic considerations that require a certain separation from the Soviet Union as a ticket of entry to the political game. But the main phenomenon is probably a third one, which exists much less in the other countries—namely, mutual contamination or interpenetration between the Communist party (which had not been Stalinized in the first place, because of fascism) and Italian society. The effect upon the latter has been a certain Marxist cultural hegemony which makes for a weaker right-wing culture and a more Stalinist ultra-Left one than, for instance, exists in France. But the effect upon the PCI has been a steady "westernization" or "Italianization," which seems to have given to a whole generation of Communist local administrators, economists, historians, and politicians an outlook on civic life, on European

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integration, or on the international economic crisis that—whatever their abstract attachment to the Soviet Union—seems to belong to another cultural universe than the "real socialism" or "the general laws of social development."

Of course, at every level, besides old leaders who have lived through Stalinism and want never to see it again—men like Amendola or Terracini—there are others, such as Longo and Pajetta, who may have maintained more of their attachment to their past education. Among the younger leaders, some look essentially like Western Social Democrats, others seem to show a taste for order and control that makes them less different from traditional Leninist apparatchiks. Among the party members, the Soviet Union is for all practical purposes an unknown quantity or a matter of indifference for the vast majority of the new young cadres of middle-class origin who are at the base of the PCI's growth in the sixties and seventies. But this is not so for many of the older, working-class members who constitute the party's core. Among the party intellectuals, while most are deeply influenced by the dominant trends of Western, particularly American, culture, some are trying to preserve the philosophical basis for a Communist identity by maintaining a link with notions like the world revolutionary process or the hegemony of the working class. Finally, even among the voters, the vast majority of whom vote Communist for non-Communist and, certainly, non-Soviet reasons, a strong minority (30 percent according to one poll) has a more positive view of the Soviet Union than of any Western country.

What, then, is the real attitude of the PCI toward the Soviet Union? Paradoxically, because the party is still ruled by democratic centralism, the last word lies with Enrico Berlinguer and his tight little group, but the movement they lead is so diverse and the reality they must take into account so complex that one never knows whether their hesitations and contradictions mean that they play upon this diversity and complexity or that they are its prisoners. Whether the voices of the PCI are fully orchestrated or not, the fact is that their nuances vary with the spokesmen, the context, and the issues.

On party-to-party relationships, the PCI was, along with the Spanish, Yugoslav, and Romanian parties, one of the "autonomists" who refused the Soviet-East German attempt to impose a common line at the Berlin Conference of European Communist parties in 1976. But ever since, it has, together with the Hungarian party, assumed more the role of mediator, indicating that it sincerely wishes to cling to the formula of "unity and diversity." This attempt is also apparent in the very qualified support given to Carrillo in his confrontation with the Soviets. On the other hand, the PCI does try to promote a new concept of internationalism, which blurs the distinction (essential in the eyes of the Soviets) between Communist parties and their allies.

Ideologically, the judgment about the socialist or nonsocialist character of the Soviet Union has become a central theme in the dialogue between the PCI and the non-Communist Left. Communist statements have varied, from Berlinguer's very restrained comment, in January, 1977, about "some illiberal features" of Soviet-type societies, to complaints by leading party theoreticians, sometimes in editorials of the party journal *L'Unità*, about the continuing Stalinist character of the Soviet Union, the structural defects of the system that make repression possible, or the presence of a socialist economic infrastructure and the absence of the democratic superstructure that should be an inseparable component of socialism. The PCI declares that it refuses to give a "yes or no"

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answer to the question of the socialist character of the Soviet Union because this would mean a return to the logic of labels and excommunications but, above all, because one cannot abstract from the historical role of the October Revolution and from the present international role of the Soviet Union. PCI leaders insist that further studies, conducted in a spirit devoid of polemics as well as apologetics, are necessary to understand the evolution of the Soviet system since 1917 and its interaction with the general evolution of the world.

In fact, the PCI's specialized institutes and intellectuals have indeed been pursuing rather remarkable work in this direction: they held a seminar on the Soviet Union in January, 1978, one on the Prague Spring in July, 1978, produced several books on Stalinism and the history of the Soviet Union, and, last but not least, prepared a campaign of articles in favor of the rehabilitation of Bukharin—with the implication that a campagn on Trotsky would follow.

At the same time, it is remarkable that all these initiatives are explicitly initiated and approved by the party leaders but that their interventions within their framework are always a step or two behind those of the specialists. Clearly the latter are being used, in a pedagogic and exploratory way, to say what the leadership thinks but does not want to be committed to officially. Berlinguer feels that he has to take into account the PCI's present and future relations with the Soviet Union, more or less as a head of state does.

Relations between the PCI and the Soviet Union have indeed acquired something of the character of interstate relations. The Soviet Union regards the PCI, and, to some extent, the other Eurocommunist parties, on the one hand, as bad pupils or dangerous ideological heretics whose influence, particularly on Eastern Europe, has to be checked, but on the other hand, as powerful political forces whose role in government could be favorable to Soviet foreign policy goals. And the parties, particularly the PCI, respond in kind. Moscow and Carrillo can afford to express their true feelings toward each other because the PCE is not approaching power; but in the case of the PCI, and to some extent, the PCF, the potential state-to-state relations of governments with Communist participation are beginning to project their shadow over present party-to-party relations, particularly with the Communist party of the Soviet Union.

The Italian Communists, even more than the Yugoslavs themselves, seem to apply the formula of a Yugoslav foreign minister: "As Yugoslavs, we need the Americans to protect us from the Russians. As Communists, we need the Russians to protect us from the Americans." Again, their diplomatic concern and skill makes it difficult to disentangle the real attitude of the PCI to Soviet policies in the international arena. One thing is clear: they support Soviet policy to the extent that it is a factor of balance and détente; and they are worried, without saying so explicitly, by some of its militaristic or expansionist aspects. They express their nostalgia for Khrushchev and their support for the presumed doves against the presumed hawks in the Kremlin.

In Europe, they support Soviet initiatives, but, at the same time, they support Italian participation in the European Community and in NATO with arguments that imply a belief in strengthening the West as a measure of safety against Soviet interference. They also indicate their concern for the independence of Yugoslavia; several Italian Communist leaders have suggested to Western interlocutors that if Yugoslavia were to slide back into the Soviet orbit, Italy, and in particular the Communist party, would be under strong pressure

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to slide toward nonalignment. This does not throw a very favorable light upon their moral steadfastness or the depth of their attachment to the West, but it can be taken as a message to the latter warning it against the consequences of letting Yugoslavia drift, and it certainly indicates a distrust of Soviet action after Tito.

When it comes to the Third World, the predominant judgment of the PCI seems to be expressed less in terms of stable balances and more in terms of a world revolutionary process helped by the Soviet Union. There is a contradiction there with their attitudes on European problems, just as their ecumenical search for alliances with all progressive or peaceful forces leads them to embrace Social Democratic parties in Europe and military dictatorships in the Third World. The contradiction is somewhat alleviated by the fact that the Soviets, too, have been courting the Socialist International. Authoritative Communist sources have criticized the Soviet Union for following the logic of confrontation in Africa; but again these criticisms, prompted in particular by the danger of Soviet support to the Ethiopian offensive against Eritrea, are mitigated by the fact that the Soviets themselves seem to refuse their all-out support to Colonel Mengistu and that the PCI qualifies its criticism by pointing out the importance of class criteria in judging Soviet action.[22]

To the decisive question of the extent to which the party members follow the leadership in this complex balancing act, the only answer one can find is fragmentary: a poll published in the weekly *l'Espresso* on October 30, 1977. The gist of it seems to indicate strong support for the PCI in its controversies with the Soviet party within the world Communist movement (73.6 percent) and for the Eurocommunist line (82 percent). It is interesting, however, that when it comes to interstate relations, while only 13.4 percent were in favor of closer ties with the Soviet Union (compared to 9.1 percent favorable to "rapprochment" with China), no more than 27.4 percent were for maintaing NATO ties: an impressive 51.6 percent preferred a policy of neutrality.[23]

Our discussion of the French Communist party can be much shorter, if only because, within the limits of the minimum consensus we have described, it suffices to say that its attitudes are just the opposite of those of the PCI. We can begin with the question just mentioned—the relation between the perceptions of the various party levels. In the French case, contrary to the Italian one, the real attitude of the leadership seems harder to determine than that of the followers. A number of polls seem to indicate a relatively coherent evolution among the latter, whereas the public stance of the former is comprised of frequent and brutal changes of line.

According to the answers received by the party weekly *l'Humanité-Dimanche* to a questionnaire published in 1973, less than 1 percent of the respondents base their definition of socialism on the Soviet Union or other socialist countries. No more than 6 percent define it either by the collective appropriation of means of production and exchange or by the overthrow of capitalism.[24] This does not mean that French Communist voters feel no attachment to the Soviet Union; their view of that country is consistently more favorable than the national average. But the results do coincide with the downward trend of the general attitude, and are coming increasingly close to it.

This evolution is not true in every respect, however. In 1974, 63 percent of Communist respondents believed the Soviet experience was a success in the area

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of economic development, compared with 5 percent who believed it a failure. The national average was 47 to 19 percent. While in 1977 the national percentages for this same question had declined slightly (to 40 versus 22 percent), the Communist public had not budged. Similarly, regarding the improvement of living standards in the USSR, the judgment was only slightly less favorable among Communists in 1977 (52 percent; 16 percent against) than in 1974 (53 to 13 percent), whereas the national average had dropped from 45 percent (versus 20 percent) to an evenly balanced 31 percent. On the sincerity of the Soviet Union's attachment to détente, the answer of the general public changed from positive in 1974 (49 percent versus 26 percent) to negative in 1977 (28 percent versus 34 percent); whereas the Communist answers remained positive in 1977 (52 percent versus 16 percent), though they were less so than they had been in 1974 (70 percent versus 10 percent).

On the issue of public freedom, however, the trend among Communist respondents from favorable to unfavorable is strong enough to make them join the general public, which was already negative in 1974 (55 percent believed the Soviet experience was a failure in respect to public and individual freedom) and became even more so in 1977 (61 versus 6 percent). Among Communists in 1974, 33 percent thought it was a success and 23 percent thought it a failure; in 1977 only 17 percent thought it a success and 39 percent believed it a failure.[25]

The theme of infringements of human rights is the one on which the PCF has, in 1976 to 1978, clashed with the Soviet Union most directly (to the point of protesting against the trials of Orlov and Scharanski much more quickly and more energetically than the PCI). It seems natural to think that the chain reaction goes from increased perception of Soviet repression in French society at large and contamination of the Communist electorate by this general trend, through a changed perception or a tactical adaptation on the part of the Communist leadership, to conflict with the Soviet Union. There are, of course, elements of truth in this view. Whether to give the "union of the Left" a chance, or to win back from the Socialists the primacy within the Left, the PCF desperately needs to improve its image on the point where it is most vulnerable. But when it tries to prove its independence from Moscow, it looks much more convincing in affirming its nationalism than its devotion to freedom.

It is also true that on the subject of the Soviet Union and the judgment to be made of Stalinism, there are genuinely held and violently contrasting views within the PCF, ranging from the unconditional support professed by Maurice Thorez's widow, Jeannette Vermeersch, to the historical explanations and moral condemnations of Jean Elleinstein (whose views are not very different from those of Carrillo or Italian specialists like G. Boffa), and to the abstruse ruminations of Louis Althusser, who sees in Stalinism the product of an economistic and humanistic deviation. But it is even more true that the abrupt changes of line which characterize the recent history of the PCF seem to correspond much more to the unclear and unpredictable episodes of a personal power game between its leaders and those of the Kremlin than (as in the case of PCI) to the logical, if prudent, development of a social and ideological evolution.

The reaction of the French Communists to the Khrushchev report and the other events of 1956 was the opposite of the Italian one. Until the death of Maurice Thorez in 1964, the PCF was the most rigid opponent of de-Staliniza-

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tion and Khrushchevism. Between 1965 and 1969, under Waldeck-Rochet, it began a cautious evolution toward the Italian position. But Georges Marchais's ascent and control represented a step backwards, toward closer links with Moscow; this trend was illustrated by the French attitude (contrasting with that of the Italians) at the world conference of Communist parties in 1969, by their acceptance of Czechoslovakia's "normalization," and by their hostile attitude toward such diverse victims or adversaries of the Soviet Union as Dubček, Solzhenitsyn, and Carrillo.

Even though, during the Common Program of the Left and the campaign for the presidential elections of 1974 some criticisms of Soviet behavior in the area of civil liberties were voiced, this was the period, as late as 1973, that Marchais was proclaiming the superiority of Soviet over Western democracy and, as late as 1974, the official Communist press was publishing apologetic books about the Communist countries under such titles as *Le Socialisme se porte bien*.[26]

In 1975 in particular, in the confrontation about the Portuguese events, the PCF was clearly siding with Cunhal and Brezhnev against Berlinguer and Carrillo. If anything, the French party seemed to be tacitly reproaching Moscow for not supporting the Portuguese Communists strongly enough. In the preparation for the Berlin conference of European Communist parties, it sided with the Soviets and the East Germans and against the autonomists in favor of a common document laying down a mandatory common strategy. While the Italians wanted this document to stress détente and to avoid anti-American attacks, the French wanted an even more strongly "anti-imperialistic" line than the Soviets proposed. Again, the PCF harbored the suspicion that the Soviets might be sacrificing revolutionary advances in the name of détente and the status quo.

Then, in the months of October and November, 1975, came the big switch. As their maximalist line was not accepted at the conference, the French turned from being more centralist than the centralists to being more autonomist than the autonomists—from apostles of "proletarian internationalism" they changed into apostles of the absolute priority of national strategies.[27] From then on, their line and their relations with Moscow become even more difficult to understand. On the one hand, they embrace the Italians (whom they were attacking two months earlier), the Spanish, and the whole notion of Eurocommunism, and they seem to take steps toward the acceptance of European and Atlantic institutions. On the other hand, they distinguish themselves from the Italians by much sharper and more open clashes with the Soviets and by a more nationalistic line. Marchais was present neither at the Twenty-fifth Party Congress of the CPSU nor at the celebration for the anniversary of the Revolution, whereas Berlinguer was received with great deference at both occasions; and Marchais did not see Brezhnev during his Paris visit.

The turn toward a nationalistic emphasis becomes spectacular with the breakup of the left-wing union. Since the summer of 1977 the French have engaged in a violent antisocialist campaign whose international aspect is an ever more strident campaign against the Socialist International, the Federal Republic, the European Community and its enlargement, the United States, and the capitalist world, and whose theoretical aspect consists of a nationalistic or autarchic version of the Soviet theory of state monopoly capitalism.

All this activity reflects an attitude exactly opposite to that of the PCI and PCE, which is essentially favorable to Europe and tries to seduce the SPD.

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Much of it, particularly the breakup of the unity of the Left, should be pleasing to the Soviet Union. The opposition to supranationality and the sharp demarcation between Communists and Socialists or Social Democrats belong to the Moscow orthodoxy, which was being threatened by Eurocommunism. Yet the PCF campaign on these issues is currently much more strident than Moscow's. Indeed, the Soviets' frequent praise of Willy Brandt and their courting of the Socialist International are more consonant with the tactics of the PCI. Regarding both the Federal Republic and social democracy, and perhaps even regarding European integration, the Soviet Union seems to want to keep its options open rather than to come down too hard on the negative side.

There may be a lesson to be learned from this. Perhaps too much attention has been paid to the evolution of the Western Communist parties and not enough to that of the Socialist and Social Democratic parties whose future may be even less predictable and much more relevant to Europe's future. After all, not only in the North, where Scandinavian Social Democrats, the British Labour party, and the German SPD are obviously more important than their Communist opposite numbers, but everywhere else as well, with Italy as the only exception, the future of Europe's relations with the Soviet Union may well be determined by the orientation of parties like the French PS, the Spanish PSOE, the Portuguese PSP, and the Greek PASOK.

Now, most of these parties, precisely because of their recent creation, transformation, spectacular growth, and use of strategic position on the political spectrum, are particularly fluctuating and unpredictable on East-West issues. Some of them, particularly those in the Mediterranean area, have revived the ambition of the "Second-and-a-half International" which originated in the twenties from the impulse of the Austro-Marxists to provide a bridge or a third way between the Second and the Third Internationals—between social democracy and Bolshevism. One aspect of this position is an attitude of critical sympathy toward the Soviet Union, which is similar to that of the Eurocommunists' effort to avoid both unconditional support and total rejection.

The refusal to be assimilated into social democracy and the ambition to constitute a bridge between East and West are part of the historical tradition of the Italian Socialist party. With the spectacular ascent of the French Socialist party and the apparent prospects for revolutionary transformations in Southern Europe in 1975-1976, the idea of a bridge between North and South and of a more general ideological and political unity of "Mediterranean" or "latin" socialism—more or less under French hegemony and opposing or balancing the northern Social Democratic parties led by the SPD and the Labour party—was fashionable for a time. It was used by François Mitterrand and promoted on the theoretical and strategic level by the CERES wing of the French Socialist party.

Soon, however, first the Portuguese and then the Italian Socialists turned their backs on the idea, as the domestic politics of their countries led them to oppose the Communists and court the support of northern Social Democrats. Conversely, it is among the latter and, more specifically, within SPD that one notices new trends toward unconditional détente and toward giving priority to a dialogue with the Soviet Union intended to improve prospects not only for the national reunification of Germany, but also for the ideological reunification of the international workers' movement. Another way of seeing the present ambiguities and paradoxes within the Socialist International would be to remark

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that, while among some Mediterranean Socialists the trend is back toward the center, among some northern Social Democrats (partially as a compensation for the moderate policies their parties have to follow in governments headed by H. Schmidt in the FRG and J. Callaghan in Britain), it is toward the search for a left-wing foreign policy. The question is whether, contrary to the trend of the extraparliamentary New Left, this means a policy more accommodating to the Soviet Union.

Nowhere are these ambiguities and paradoxes more apparent than with the French Socialist party. This should come as no surprise, since ambiguity has been at the basis of this party's paradoxical adventure from 1974 to 1978. The source of this ambiguity is the paradox of the French Left—namely, that it can win power neither without the Communists nor with them. The particular form of this paradox for the Socialist party is that in order for the Left to win, the Socialists have to become visibly stronger than the Communists; but in order to do so, and, in addition, in order not to lose thereby the Communist alliance, they have to pursue a leftist strategy, that is, a strategy of unity with the Communists in which the Socialists constantly have to show their leftist credentials and defend themselves against the suspicion of planning to betray their allies and join the Center.

Precisely because in domestic politics their interests and those of the Communists are as much competing as they are convergent, ideology and foreign policy are relatively low-cost areas—at least in the short run—in which to show that the PS is closer to the PCF than to the centrists. This fact explains the form the Socialist paradox has taken in regard to our subject: for just when the intellectual prestige of Marxism and the moral and political prestige of the Soviet Union have been going down in French public opinion, they have been increasing among one sector, namely the rapidly expanding Socialist party.

It is not that the PS has become officially commited to Marxism or to being an apologist for the Soviet Union. But, first, it has become considerably more critical of the United States, the multinational corporations, and even European integration and German social democracy in their present forms. In doing so in the name of fighting imperialism, and in putting its domestic strategy in the context of a break with capitalism, it has implicitly adopted a vision in which, imperialism being a fundamental economic battle between capitalism and socialism, the Soviet Union is on the side of the angels, and the criticisms it deserves essentially concern matters of detail and are made within a basically common camp. This vision is reflected in the answers of Socialist voters to the polls we have quoted above: most of the time, particularly regarding the success of the Soviet Union in developing the standard of living and workers' participation, the Socialist respondents are closer to the Communist than to the non-Communist ones.[28]

Secondly, when the Socialists criticize Soviet behavior—particularly on issues like human rights or Portugal—they do so with hesitation and great moderation, for fear of alienating their Communist allies, of awakening their suspicions, or of provoking their attacks. This was particularly true, for instance, at the time of Solzhenitsyn's expulsion.

Thirdly, when the Communists are on the warpath against them, the reaction of the French Socialists is often the same as that of conservative govern-

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ments: to try to enlist the support of Moscow (thought to be a more reasonable and peaceful influence) to moderate them. In recent years a number of contacts, visits, and meetings have taken place between the French Socialist party and, not only Eastern European governments but also Soviet party and governmental authorities, as well as experts from specialized institutions. Very often the language used in communiqués is inspired by Soviet conceptions and couched in Soviet terms.

On the other hand, on interstate matters, the French Socialists, who are in favor of a rather vague and indiscriminate conception of disarmament and collective security, can, in the present phase, find some common ground with the Soviet campaign for "military détente." The problem is that in ideological as well as in security matters, the French Socialists may be content with an approach combining a vague, sentimental orientation with a short-run domestic calculation, whereas the Soviets have more precise ideas about the symbolic meaning and the substantive uses of these meetings and communiqués. It may be, however, that the breakdown of the Union of the Left, coinciding as it did with the emergence of the human rights theme, is beginning to modify the attitude of the French Socialists toward the Soviet Union. As the Socialist party no longer sees itself on the threshold of governmental power or of reconciliation with the PCF, it has less need for diplomacy toward the Soviet Union. It must reassert its identity, which will lead it to maintain its Marxist and more or less revolutionary rhetoric but also to be less afraid of displeasing the Communists and to be more interested in finding themes that may be embarrassing to them. Cultivating its relations with the New Left and embracing the theme of human rights can be useful in that perspective. A certain change of tone in this direction was noticeable in the summer of 1978.[29]

Among the Mediterranean parties, some of the same contradictions and evolutions are taking place without any coherent pattern seeming to emerge. For two of them, the Spanish PSOE and the Greek PASOK, the problem seems to be to make themselves the expression of the prevailing national mood. In the Spanish case, this is being sought by trying to be on good terms with everybody; indeed Felipe Gonzales does succeed in being on better terms than Santiago Carrillo with both Moscow and Washington. In 1978, the PSOE seems to be moving closer to the West, but not to acceptance of membership in NATO. It justifies its position, interestingly enough, by the bad consequences this move would have for Yugoslavia's independence from Moscow.

For Mr. Papandreou, the key attitudes are anti-Americanism and Third Worldism. They make him feel ideologically closer to Moscow as an anti-imperialist force, even though questions of national interest (for instance, too-close relations between the Soviet Union and Turkey) could easily make him anti-Soviet too.

For two other parties, the PSP and the PSI, the evolution has been different. The Portuguese Socialists have moved, in a matter of weeks, through direct experience of traditional Communist methods, from the Mediterranean blend of Marxism, anti-Americanism, and Third Worldism to a staunch defense of Western values, the European Community, and NATO. The same primacy of domestic politics, however, may yet produce a certain evolution back in the other direction, which may be foreshadowed by Soares's position on Africa, and par-

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ticularly on Angola. If the main challenge is seen to come less from the Communists and revolutionary captains backed by the Soviet Union than from the Right, backed by the West, the anti-Soviet attitude of the Portuguese Socialists, genuine as it undoubtedly is, could be subject to partial reconsideration.

The case of the Italian Socialists is, if anything, even more illustrative of the way in which attitudes toward the Soviet Union can be subordinated to the vagaries of domestic politics. Alone among the major Socialist parties of the West, the PSI had stuck to the policy of a united front with the Communists after 1948; the policy provoked several breaks (the most important one being the creation of the Social Democratic party led by G. Saragat) but led it, essentially, to support Soviet policies during the cold war, and earned its leader, Pietro Nenni, a Stalin prize.

After 1956, the Italian Socialists began to move away from the Communists and toward an understanding with the PSDI and the Christian Democrats; this was to lead to the "socialist reunification" and the formation of the "Center-Left" governments. In foreign policy the party changed accordingly into acceptance of Western institutions (including NATO), with the proviso that they have only a defensive meaning and lead ultimately to the dismantling of the blocs. In successive government majorities, the Socialists represented the most "dovish" element, just as domestically, after their disappointment with the Center-Left, they claimed that the Communists were ripe for participation in government and that the country was ready for a left-wing alternative.

To the extent, however, that the Christian Democrats and the Communists did start a dialogue and that Italy was drifting toward a de facto "historical compromise," the Socialists began to feel left out. And the way they found to regain an identity and a role was to become the most severe critics of the inadequacies of the Communist conversion to Western democracy. While the "creeping historical compromise" has led the Christian Democrats to be less and less critical of the Soviet Union, it has led the Socialists to be more and more so. Just as they are the most vigorous and polemical critics of the Gramscian tradition and of the PCI's attachment to it, they castigate the Communists for their lack of clarity on the Soviet Union and their insufficient support of Eastern European dissent. In this way, the Socialists have become the most energetic students and defenders of the dissidents (on, for example, the occasion of the Venice Biennale dedicated to the dissidents and practically organized by the PSI).

These initiatives are part of Secretary General Craxi's broader plan to "Westernize" the Italian Socialist party and to regain, at the European level—particularly in relations with the Labour party and, even more, with the SPD—the ground lost through the latter's interest in Eurocommunism. The paradox is that, precisely at this time, those impeccably Northern and Western Social Democratic parties seem more interested in détente than in dissent, in reassuring the Soviet Union than in attacking it.

This is nothing new for one wing of the Labour party, in which the Webbs' discovery that the future lay with the Soviet Union was never completely forgotten, and in which the most important union leader of the country, Jack Jones, could declare at the time of Mr. Shelepin's visit to London that "people ought to be greeting him in the streets. Have they forgotten about 1939?" Of

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course, this rather naïve idealism about the Soviet Union has few consequences in actual practice.

With the SPD it is the other way round. There are few, if any, more intriguing recent developments in Europe than the new accents of its Ostpolitik. We have already mentioned the reasons, both in terms of national interest and domestic politics, that give the West German government a stake in the pursuit of détente, and lead it to fear a general hardening and polarization and to look for a mediating role. But let us put together some events and attitudes: Chancellor Schmidt's declarations on arms control negotiations and his attitudes to President Carter's campaign on human rights; Minister Wishniewski's visits to East Berlin and the West German government's disappointed hopes of East German moderation on Berlin during Brezhnev's visit to Bonn; Egon Bahr's declarations against the neutron bomb and his attitudes on Eurocommunism; Horst Ehmke's declarations (and, in a more cautious style, those of Chancellor Schmidt himself) minimizing the Soviet danger in Africa; Willy Brandt's appeals against endangering détente and his refusal to meet Polish dissidents in Warsaw; Boris Ponomarev's presence at the Spring, 1978, meeting of the Socialist International and his invitation to its chairman, Willy Brandt, for joint studies and actions on disarmament in Europe; and, finally, the declarations of several young SPD leaders on the need to overcome the division between Social Democrats and Communists (as well as between West and East), thereby echoing a theme more and more voiced by the Italian Communists as "what Eurocommunism is all about." A pattern begins to emerge from that semiobscure region of politics where ideology and realism, long-range dreams and short-range calculations meet.

One should avoid taking too conspiratorial a view of this foment, and reviving the ghosts of past mysteries and controversies: the "Bahr plan" of the late sixties, revealed in the early seventies as proof of its author's neutralistic designs, and Herbert Wehner's Communist past and secret visits to East Berlin. But we cannot avoid being reminded of the essential ambiguity of the SPD's Ostpolitik expressed in famous formulas like Egon Bahr's "change through rapprochement" or Willy Brandt's "in order to change the status quo one has to accept it." The essential assumption is that in order to bring about improvements in the relations of Communist regimes with other societies, and with their own, one has to reassure them, and that in order to reassure them one has to help them stabilize their rule.

What is not clear is whether this increased self-confidence is supposed to bring the elites to lower their guard and promote an unwitting and unconscious structural change, thereby working against their own real interests, or whether what was meant was a real stabilization which would allow them to keep their domination but dispense with the more pathological measures born out of insecurity. There was nothing to prove, in the first case, that Communist leaders would not see through the game and turn it to their own advantage; nor, in the second, that the regimes were not structurally unstable and that the conciliatory gestures of the West toward them, and their own toward their populations, could prevent a cycle of explosion and repression.

At any rate, the experience of the seventies does show a certain success for the Bahr-Brandt formula, for it did produce more concrete results in terms of

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human improvements than any other policy; but it also shows its fragility and dangers: it is highly vulnerable both to general tension and to specific blackmail. It leads the SPD leaders to be highly reticent toward any changes that risk destabilizing the Soviet regime. According to a highly informative article by Barbara Spinelli, not only is much of the West German attitude motivated by the fear of losing or upsetting Brezhnev and having to face his more hawkish successors, but it also involves a negative retrospective judgment on the Prague Spring, reticence toward East German dissidents and even toward Eurocommunists—not like that of the conservatives, who fear that they may be Moscow's tools, but for the very reason that Zbigniew Brzezinski is interested in them: because they may create trouble for the Soviet Union and hence have a destabilizing effect.[30]

While some concern for avoiding false hopes or unnecessary irritations is a healthy mode of European reaction in the face of certain manifestations of irresponsible American exuberance, such extreme empathy with, and care for, Soviet reactions does of course raise a number of objections. It leads the SPD to bank desperately on the existing situation, even when it is obviously very shaky (if only for biological reasons, such as Brezhnev's personal rule); it leads it to discourage and disappoint forces which are morally respectable, like Eastern European dissent, or historically significant, like Western European Eurocommunism; and it even leads it to use a double language—giving maximum publicity to its concern about President Carter's blunders and minimum publicity to its concern over Soviet Military efforts and political expansionism. All this is done in order to reassure (some would say to appease) Moscow and it all does seem to justify Brzezinski's quips about the "self-Finlandization" of Germany.

As always with "Finlandization," however, there is another side to the coin. The same Horst Ehmke is the politician who coined the term "Sozialdemokratismus" to express the hope of a convergence of the European Left, from Palme to Dubček, around the combination of socialism and freedom, across the Iron Curtain and the Wall. The same Willy Brandt showed, at the time of his trip to Erfurt and Kassen, what an explosive effect his popularity could have in East Germany, and one of his apologists, Peter Bender, was not far off the mark when he spoke of "offensive détente." If one looks at the interaction in this perspective, one may well ask "who is Finlandizing whom?" Certainly from the perspective of a Soviet military planner or negotiator, the position which emerges from the left wing of the SPD is a great advantage—especially since the German Social Democrats seem, for the first time in many years to be letting their moral pacifism and political concern for détente influence their more hardheaded positions on NATO strategy and arms control negotiations. But from the perspective of an East German ruler, a threatening, "revanchist" West German is certainly preferable to a smiling Social Democrat whose embrace carries the greatest risk of all—that of "ideological contamination" or "creeping subversion."

Competitive Decadence with the Soviet Union: Beyond Cold War and Détente

The dialogue between the Soviet military planner and the Soviet, or even East German, ideologist does not necessarily lead to conflict. Both probably

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agree that the god of history is with the bigger battalions and that ideas are weapons, that the Soviet empire should be both militarily more powerful than Western Europe and ideologically more protected. Yet conflicts of priorities will exist between them, especially when they involve a third man, the economic planner. Similarly, on the Western side, there is no stark alternative between a militaristic Right ready to return to a total cold war, if there is such a thing, and a capitulationist or idealistic Left ready to bank everything on unconditional détente and historical evolution. Indeed, the emphasis of this essay has been on showing that the Right has learned that it has to live with the Soviet Union (without giving up the political advantages of its threat) and that the Left has learned that it has to detach itself from it (without being able to afford a complete break). But conflicts of priority do exist, and, here too, they are being sharpened by the intervention of a third dimension—domestic, socioeconomic demands or constraints.

Conflicts of priorities are in the nature of politics and economics, but they are particularly encouraged and made particularly hard to solve by the present phase of East-West relations in Europe. Precisely because it is a phase of greater realism, it is a phase of greater uncertainty. Or, as Stanley Hoffmann would put it, the crisis or perplexity is a crisis of complexity. The heart of the matter is that we may have entered the post-détente age without going back into the cold war. Détente and cold war were, in a way, more manageable because they were more simple or, at least, because they relied upon a certain illusion of simplicity.

During the cold war, Western Europe lived under the shadow of the Soviet threat, and the military character and gravity of this threat were grossly exaggerated; subsequent studies have shown that the military posture of the Red Army was essentially defensive and that Stalin did not really back the bid for power of the Greek Communists. After 1962 and the end of the Cuba and Berlin crises, the common assumption was that the military threat was becoming irrelevant and that Europe was entering a period in which domestic problems and, at the international level, negotiation, competition, and indirect influence through contacts and cooperation were the order of the day. Again, there was some truth in this assumption. But it was hiding another, no less important reality: it was precisely during this period of détente or, some would say, behind its screen, that the Soviet army changed to an offensive posture and that the Soviet military buildup took on the character of a crash program.

Today, perhaps for the first time, both aspects of the problem are penetrating the consciousness of the general public. There is a resurgence of worry about Soviet regional superiority and global expansionism. Western Europeans realize that their security was based on a balance of imbalances between Soviet regional and American global superiority. Now the latter has disappeared in favor of parity but the former has increased yet further. Meanwhile, on the world scene, the Soviet Union, which used to run a rigid, but regionally restricted empire, is becoming global, while the United States, which used to intervene (most often to the dismay or disapproval of Europeans) in various parts of the globe, is becoming much more restricted geographically, even as far as the threat of force for protective purposes is concerned.

All those worries are both justified and widespread. Yet they are not necessarily the last word, as they would have been during the cold war. In our period

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of "hot peace" the domestic, national, or regional genies which détente has let out, and who have created a proliferation of dispersed conflicts, will not return to the bottle in the name of the renewed primacy of the external threat. Hence the characteristic of the period will be the increase in conflicts of priorities and resource allocation in defense budgets, arms control proposals, and technological transfers to the East—all implying different attitudes toward the Soviet Union. European-Soviet relations will depend essentially upon the outcome of these intra-European struggles, as well as on the intra-Soviet struggles at the top after Brezhnev.

A left-wing Europe, where civilian priorities would gain the upper hand, could emerge out of an alliance between social democratism and Eurocommunism. It would imply a maximum of vulnerability for both sides, as it would present the Soviet Union both with ideological dangers and military opportunities. A right-wing Europe, along Chinese lines, would be united in resistance to the Soviet military threat. It would for the first time give a real chance to European defense, but it would run into trouble both at the global level—with both superpowers—and at the domestic levels—for it would produce great social and political tension in several countries.

Neither of these two Europes is very likely, for two reasons. First, each of them is less than adequate for the problems of the present phase. As several authors, from Ugo La Malfa and Richard Löwenthal to Uwe Nerlich, Johann Holst, and the present writer, have often emphasized, restoring the military balance which has tilted dangerously in favor of the Soviet Union and integrating the social and political forces of the Left should be seen not as mutually exclusive alternatives but as two sides of a coin.[31]

But this argument is not the decisive one, since the complex policy it suggests is even less likely to be implemented. Rather, what makes both a left-wing, a right-wing, and a discriminating and flexible Western European policy unlikely is the likelihood that Western Europe will not be sufficiently united and that the evolutions of several countries are likely to be sufficiently divergent to make even effective coordination difficult. The more realistic prospect, then, is that of a relatively fragmented Europe, where several countries or groups of countries will continue to entertain competing and contradictory bilateral relations with the Soviet Union. The latter is likely to retain the initiative and to use both its increased military weight and stepped-up peace campaigns to influence domestic evolution and foreign attitudes.

But these Soviet efforts hold no guarantee of success either: they may be paralyzed by Moscow's domestic troubles in a period of succession crises or national rebellions; or the Soviet Union may overreach itself in other parts of the world and either lose prestige by becoming hopelessly entangled or provoke a counterreaction by being brutally aggressive.

Franco-Soviet relations are an example: both countries, particularly France, have a stake in maintaining the image of détente and of a special relationship. If the relations are in trouble, it is neither for bilateral nor for ideological reasons but because of China and Africa. It is not likely that President Giscard d'Estaing or his successor will be able to maintain indefinitely the two roles of being second to none in the defense of détente in Europe, but also second to none in the defense of Africa against Soviet and Cuban intervention. Con-

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versely, Chancellor Schmidt or his successor will not be able to maintain forever the special arrangements between the Federal Republic and its neighbors, which are based on an assumption of détente, by simply pretending not to take notice of Soviet actions in other areas, especially if these areas get closer to home.

Ultimately, relations between Western Europe and the Soviet Union are likely to be determined less by what they do to each other directly, militarily or diplomatically, than by the way they respond to the challenges of their respective and their common problems and to their respective involvement in third areas. If one may hazard a final guess, the regions which may be most decisive in this respect, in the coming years, are those areas like Albania and Yugoslavia which share an immediately regional and symbolically global importance and the not very stable situation of being both gray and red—and hence the potential to influence both the military security of Western Europe, the ideological security of the Soviet Empire, and the political evolution of the continent.

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ARCHIE BROWN

Eastern Europe: 1968, 1978, 1998

NINETEEN SIXTY-EIGHT was potentially the great turning point in the history of postwar Eastern Europe, but history (in the shape of the Soviet Union) refused to turn. While in Western Europe groups of students were captivated by the idea of "revolution," in Czechoslovakia, Communists, who from the depths of their personal experience had grown profoundly skeptical of "revolution" as a means of bringing about a worthwhile new political and social order, were in the process of producing such fundamental change within a political system modeled on the Soviet prototype that their actions were, paradoxically, in an important sense more "revolutionary" than anything that had happened in Europe for over a decade.

Though many Czech reformers felt it imprudent to suggest that they were producing a new model of socialism for others to follow and emphasized instead their right and duty to work out a form of socialism compatible with distinctively Czechoslovak traditions and social conditions, the significance—on a European scale—of the "Prague Spring" was quickly evident. As early as March, 1968, demonstrating students and other intellectual critics in Gomułka's Poland were making explicit reference to the changes underway in Czechoslovakia. This helped to ensure that Gomułka would become one of the sternest critics of developments in the neighboring country and a strong supporter of military action. He was joined by Ulbricht, who was only too conscious that Germany was well endowed with a "revisionist" Marxist heritage of its own and was fearful of the stimulus the Czech example might provide. Within the Soviet Union the most virulent opposition to the Czechoslovak reformers came from Shelest, a Politburo member and first secretary of the Ukrainian party organization. Radio programs from Slovakia—broadcast in Ukrainian for the benefit of the Ukrainian minority there—were eagerly picked up by listeners in Soviet Ukraine, and the Prešov radio not only described developments within Czechoslovakia but also permitted critical comments on aspects of life within the Soviet Union.[1]

In 1968 a unique opportunity was offered to the Soviet Union and other Eastern European Communist states to learn what might be achieved by a radical political and economic reform in a country which had no intention of leaving either Comecon or the Warsaw Pact and in which the overwhelming majority of the people (they were not afraid at the time to reply honestly to public-opinion

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polls) professed loyalty to socialism. The Czechoslovak reform movement was not anti-Soviet and antisocialist in the sense in which developments in Hungary and Poland in 1956 had been anti-Soviet and, to an extent, antisocialist. Public ownership of Czechoslovak industry was not in question (though reform of its structure and improvement of its accountability were). Even the collectivization of agriculture (which had come under strong and successful attack in Poland and Hungary twelve years earlier) was in no danger of being reversed, for collectivized agriculture in Czechoslovakia actually delivers the farm produce and provides quite a comfortable standard of living for those employed in it.

Yet, in retrospect, it is not surprising that the Soviet leadership resorted—after political, economic, and psychological pressures had failed—to military intervention. It may be argued in principle that the maintenance of at least a benevolent neutrality to developments in Czechoslovakia was in the enlightened self-interest of Communists (not merely in the interests of the citizenry as a whole) in the Soviet Union and elsewhere in Eastern Europe.[2] But to concede that Czechoslovakia might be producing a model of socialism that would be more attractive in both Western and Eastern Europe than the Soviet model itself (though to the outside observer that seems incontestably true) would have called for a degree of enlightenment, humility, flexibility, and courage on the part of the Soviet leadership which is rarely found in the leadership of any powerful state and which it would be unrealistic to seek among those who had risen slowly through the Soviet party and state apparatus, where political caution and ideological reliability are the rocks upon which a career is built.

Since socialism, as understood in the Kremlin, is synonymous with the essential features of the Soviet political and economic system, it is not really surprising that developments in Czechoslovakia, far from being welcomed as offering a new socialist path, were perceived as counterrevolutionary. Even from a perspective more detached than members of the Soviet Politburo could afford to adopt, it is possible to see that within a Communist state there are certain pillars of the system which, if removed, turn it into something different in kind. These pillars are: (1) the supreme authority and unchallengeable hegemony ("leading role") of the Communist party; (2) a high degree of centralization within that party, with strictly enforced discipline and narrowly interpreted rights of debate (which is what the term "democratic centralism" has come chiefly to connote); and (3) political censorship of the media of communication.

In 1968 the "leading role" of the party in Czechoslovakia was less immediately threatened than it had been in Poland in 1956 and it was in incomparably less danger than in Hungary that same year, but the Czechoslovak Communist party maintained political control, and indeed enhanced its popularity, only by going more than half way to meet the beliefs and hopes of a majority of Czechs and Slovaks. The process, moreover, was one of accelerating change, for the demands of the public in May were no more than dreams in February; and a number of Communist leaders (including Dubček himself) found themselves first resisting, and then acquiescing in, proposals more radical than they had previously contemplated. A society in which public opinion is decisively calling the tune is not one which accords with the Soviet conception of the leading role of the party. Within the party itself, horizontal (not only the permitted vertical)

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links among different party organizations—as well as open criticism and discussion—had transformed the substance of "democratic centralism" to such an extent that Brezhnev complained in one of his meetings with Czechoslovak leaders that the party was being turned into a debating society. As for censorship, it had already rapidly withered away de facto before it was abolished de jure in a series of amendments, adopted by the National Assembly in June, 1968, to the existing law regulating the mass media.

These institutional constraints upon spontaneous political activity are, at one and the same time, the essential elements of the existing Soviet-type political system and a necessary defense against further deviation from the path of political orthodoxy. It might be supposed that within Eastern Europe by 1968, and a fortiori within the Soviet Union itself, the process of political socialization would have been sufficiently successful—in terms of educating people into acceptance of the officially sponsored values, beliefs, and aspirations—to permit a reduction in the reliance upon such constraining doctrines and structures. In fact, although values and beliefs have changed, many of them have changed in ways neither foreseen nor desired by the party leaderships. In view of the control exercised by the holders of institutional power over practically all instruments of political socialization (from the school curriculum to the content of the mass media and the policies of publishing houses), it is remarkable how far from being "new socialist men" (in the Soviet sense of citizens who eagerly accept the values of official Marxism-Leninism) Eastern Europeans remain. Nothing is more important in the present context than an understanding of the gulf between the values and beliefs which are widespread throughout Eastern European societies and the party-state ideology. The dissonance between the officially promoted values and beliefs and those which are actually widely held is, at one and the same time, a seedbed for possible radical change and a source of the determination of the Soviet leadership and their orthodox supporters within the Eastern European parties to hold the line firmly in defense of the vital pillars of the system.

Before examining the most important developments in Eastern Europe in the realm of political behavior, it is appropriate to cite some of the empirical evidence that not only points to the existence of value conflict but also indicates the degree to which the leaderships' political socialization efforts have failed. The evidence, in the form of survey data, is much richer than many observers have assumed, though it varies in quantity and quality from one country to another. The data we shall consider here relate to Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and the German Democratic Republic.

Yugoslavia is something of a special case, in this respect as in others, inasmuch as the official values and official ideology have been modified over the years, to a greater extent than elsewhere in Eastern Europe, to bring them into closer alignment with the values and beliefs of a majority of the population. Even so, there is some tension between the beliefs into which the leadership of the Yugoslav League of Communists wishes to socialize the citizens and those widely held within the society. The persistence of a very strong sense of national consciousness and national rivalries among the different ethnic groups and the prevalence of religious belief are important cases in point. An investigation in

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Slovenia (the most economically developed part of Yugoslavia) in 1969 showed an incidence of religious belief of 25-30 percent among white collar workers, 50-60 percent among manual workers, and 92 percent among the peasants. Political knowledge is also far removed from what the Yugoslav political leadership would desire: a survey published in 1972 showed that a remarkable 70 percent of Belgrade's secondary school children could not name the founders of Marxism![3]

In Czechoslovakia the survey data of the late 1960s show an attachment to socialism; although "socialism" is usually undefined in the questionnaires, it is almost certainly taken to mean public ownership of the means of production, together with welfare statism and job security, which the people associate with socialism as a socioeconomic system. In the competitive elections of 1946 only one antisocialist party was allowed to stand—the People's party—and it attracted approximately 20 percent of the votes in the Czech Lands. (The Communist party, in the 1946 elections, received 40 percent support in the Czech Lands and 30 percent in Slovakia.) If a fifth of the Czech population voted for an explicitly procapitalist candidate in 1946, by 1968 hardly anyone favored a return to large-scale capitalism (even though there was widespread support for the legalization of small private shops and craft private businesses). Such a reorientation of political belief may be regarded simply as an adaptation to a new reality, which had clearly come to stay, or as a successful instance of political socialization on the part of the institutional powerholders. Whichever interpretation is favored, it is of even greater interest to find a large body of data on attitudinal change between 1946 and 1968 clearly pointing to a strengthening of beliefs about the political system which, in orthodox Soviet terms, could only be regarded as "bourgeois democratic" or "social democratic," although to the Czechs themselves they were simply "democratic."

Thus, in 1968, only 9 percent of Czechs regarded the period from 1945 to 1948, when the Communist party was the dominant force within a still-pluralistic polity, as the most glorious time in the history of the nation, "a time of advance and development." (In a survey of 1946 it had been widely regarded as one of the three greatest periods of Czech history.) Even fewer in 1968 (a mere 3 percent) viewed the period after February, 1948 (i.e., after the Communists had seized full power), as the most glorious. The most popular period—according to a large-scale survey conducted after twenty years of Communist rule—was the First Republic (1918-1938), when Czechoslovakia was a social democracy ruled by a series of coalitions (under the presidency, for almost the entire period, of Thomas Masaryk). The 39 percent of Czechs who in 1968 identified most of all with the First Republic may be contrasted with the 8 percent who in 1946 considered the First Republic the most glorious period in the history of the nation. Not only a longer perspective, but also the specific intervening experience of a political system based on the Soviet model (initially the Stalinist model) had lent enchantment to the view of the prewar republic. Similarly, Thomas Masaryk, who in 1946 was the historical figure Czechs esteemed most highly (74 percent of the population so regarded him) not only retained his first place in the eyes of Czechs in 1968, but—after almost twenty years of mass-media, official denigration of his views and historic role—had increased his hold on the imagination of Czechs: 81 percent of respondents named him as the personality in their nation's history they most respected.[4]

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In Hungary as well, a relative failure of the official political socialization emerges from the more limited survey data available for that country. An investigation of Hungarian youth in 1968 found that 32 percent of the young people believed in God and 66 percent considered themselves to be "primarily materialists." But of that 66 percent, "only 14 percent professed Marxist and socialist values."[5] Knowledge of the political structure of the state, as described in the constitution and political textbooks, appears to be scanty. A survey conducted by two American political scientists of Hungarian origin found that only 12 percent of their representative sample of respondents in Hungary gave the correct answer (the Presidential Council) to the question, "What is the highest organ of state power in Hungary?" Only 17 percent knew who was the president of Hungary. (The correct answer was Pal Losonczi, but close upon half of the respondents named party leader János Kádár.) More than three-quarters of those surveyed in the same inquiry did not know the name of their parliamentary representative. Interviews conducted by the Mass Communication Research Centre of the Hungarian radio and television networks in 1966 produced results equally depressing to political educationists in Hungary. From three names given, 25 percent of those surveyed identified Charles de Gaulle as the general secretary of the French Communist Party, and over 50 percent were unable to name the Hungarian prime minister.[6]

In Poland—as elsewhere in Eastern Europe—there is evidence of support for socialism (in the sense of state ownership of industry as well as job security and welfare provision), but survey results have indicated a "general lack of popularity of Marxism as an imposed theoretical discourse." In a survey of the political attitudes of students taken in 1958, only two years after pressure from below had produced a change in the Polish political leadership, twice as many students answered that they were not Marxists as claimed they were. So far as religion is concerned, surveys of 1966 and 1973 indicated that a clear majority of Poles are religious believers. On the prospects of Poland's decollectivized agriculture, it is true that far fewer peasants saw the future of agriculture lying in individual smallholdings in 1969 than in 1959; but even at the later date only 27 percent saw the future in terms of either collective or state farms.[7]

Though fewer sociological survey data are available for the German Democratic Republic, evidence of this type is not entirely lacking, and it too is suggestive of failures on the part of political educators. An investigation was carried out in the district of Magdeburg to discover to what extent schoolchildren had absorbed the "correct" idea of freedom. The response they had been taught in school is that "freedom is understanding the necessary." The results of the survey from two different age groups of children (in percents) were as follows:[8]

	12-year-olds	*14-year-olds*
Freedom is understanding the necessary	0	0
Analogous response	58	40
Freedom is personal freedom	28	50
Unclear, indefinite responses	14	10

While it is of interest that none of the children could find the right form of words, it is of greater significance that, in contrast with the younger group, a majority of whom accepted something approximating to the official formula,

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only a minority of children in the older age group viewed freedom in the way deemed appropriate by the authorities.

The great advantages institutional power gives to authoritarian rulers in their desire to control the process of political socialization and (it is assumed) the acquisition of values and beliefs have often been cited as explanations of the durability and relative stability of quasifascist and Communist states alike. Yet the sudden changes which took place first in Portugal and then in Spain in the mid-1970s appear to indicate that years of authoritarian control over the mass media and the educational curricula do not necessarily produce the changes intended in popular values. With a much more welfare-oriented and more egalitarian social policy, with more comprehensive controls and a more all-embracing ideology, Communist states might be expected to have succeeded where the Portuguese and Spanish regimes of Salazar and Franco failed. On the basis, however, of survey evidence collected by social scientists in these countries (some of which has been cited above), it would appear that in a number of Eastern European Communist states the most that has been won is the acceptance of some of the policies (especially social) that have been pursued, while the Marxist-Leninist ideological foundation on which these policies are supposed to rest has still to win any comparable degree of acceptance.[9]

Before going on to look at what has happened in recent years in several of these societies in terms of actual political behavior and to examine both the factors making for political stability and the pressures for radical change, it is worthwhile considering the extent to which Marxist-Leninist beliefs and values have won acceptance within the Soviet Union itself. Not everything that happens within the Eastern European Communist states—even at a governmental level and, still more, at a societal level—is in accord with Soviet preferences; but it is beyond dispute that changes within the Soviet Union (in whatever direction) are of such importance for the peoples of Eastern Europe that it would be an incomplete, and even barren, exercise to examine the political present and possible future of these countries without consideration of social and political tendencies within the USSR.

Though great importance is attached by the Soviet Communist party in general, and its departments of propaganda at the various levels of the party hierarchy in particular, to the inculcation of Marxism-Leninism in its official form, there is an interesting body of evidence which suggests that even in the Soviet Union many of the most widely held beliefs are remote from, and even contradictory to, those deemed appropriate for the new Soviet man. When asked why they attend political education classes, Soviet citizens may well feel it prudent to tell pollsters what they think the authorities would like to hear; nonetheless, as many as 39 percent of respondents in the industrial town of Kamensk in the Sverdlovsk region said that they attended such classes "because they were obliged to do so," and a remarkable 75 percent of respondents in a Leningrad factory stated that they went to political education classes because they were "obliged to do so by Party or administrative pressure," while a further 5 percent of the same sample owned to attending because they "did not wish to offend the lecturer."[10] For some years there has been abundant evidence of an anecdotal nature to suggest that political lectures are frequently delivered to very inattentive audiences, and such personal accounts are corroborated by a

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number of recent empirical investigations of the absorption of political knowledge. Few points in Soviet propaganda are more frequently reiterated than the view that détente does not, and must not, lead to a slackening of the ideological struggle. Yet more than half the students of a school of the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism who were questioned about this turned out to be unaware that détente and ideological relaxation did not go together.[11] This is consistent with the findings of a survey of recent Soviet immigrants to Israel, in which it was discovered that there was "uncertainty and even confusion on some of the concepts which one would assume would be very familiar and clearly defined to any Soviet citizen."[12]

The same survey, however, illustrates very well the point that if the official ideology has a much weaker impact, even within the Soviet Union, than might plausibly be assumed, a process of political socialization is, needless to say, taking place—both in the course of everyday life experiences and in the transmission of values and beliefs (from one generation to the next) within the family.[13] A comparison was made of two sets of immigrants to Israel—American immigrants and Soviet immigrants. (Socioeconomic background and status were, so far as possible, held constant, and the large majority of respondents in both samples had some form of higher education.) Asked whether they agreed with the statement, "Every person should have faith in some power whose decisions he obeys without question," only 21.2 percent of the immigrants from the United States agreed with this view in 1972; 24.1 percent of the same group agreed with it in 1975. In contrast, 52.4 percent of the immigrants from the Soviet Union expressed agreement with the statement in 1972; and the figure had risen to 61.5 percent by 1975. Similarly, in 1975 four times as many Israeli immigrants from the Soviet Union as immigrants from the United States thought that there should be "less freedom" in Israel than currently existed, and more than twice as many Soviet as American immigrants held that it was the job of "the government or its bodies" to decide "how much freedom there should be."[14] It would be difficult to deny that such distinctive views of the two sets of immigrants are historically conditioned; traditional American and traditional Russian beliefs are much in evidence.

When we turn to the way people behave in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and the response of the authorities, in day-to-day policy terms, to the citizens' behavior and beliefs, the nonemergence of the "new man" is underlined. The strength of the "second" or "parallel" market within the economy—in reality an entire spectrum of legal, semilegal, and illegal markets[15]—which profoundly modifies the way in which the Soviet and Eastern European economies function, is an enormously important case in point. The scale of illegal economic activity is indicated sufficiently by the estimate published in *Izvestiya*[16] that in the early seventies more than a third of Soviet private car owners were driving on petrol illegally sold to them by drivers of state-owned vehicles (who had, of course, obtained the petrol for nothing).

"Consumerist" values are extremely widespread, within both the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The gulf between these values and those of official Marxism-Leninism does not mean that the existence of, for instance, gray and black markets and a popular desire for more and better consumer goods are necessarily factors making for political instability within Communist states.

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Many, though by no means all, unofficial economic activities actually help the economies to work more smoothly than they otherwise would, and an individual's concern with personal standards of living can be an anodyne alternative to dangerous political activity (dangerous for the systems as well as for the individuals). The practical response of Communist political leaders to this reality has been eloquently challenged by the Czech playwright, Václav Havel:

> What has happened to the idea that a man should live in full enjoyment of social and legal justice, have a creative share in economic and political power, be raised on high in his human dignity and become truly himself? Instead of free economic decision-sharing, free participation in political life and free intellectual advancement, all he is actually offered is a chance freely to choose which washing-machine or refrigerator he wants to buy.
>
> In the foreground, then, stands the imposing façade of great humanistic ideals—and behind it crouches the modest family house of a socialist bourgeois: on the one side, bombastic slogans about the unprecedented increase in every sort of freedom and the unique structural variety of life; on the other side, unprecedented drabness and the squalor of life reduced to a hunt for consumer goods.[17]

Havel is writing in the context of Czechoslovakia of the 1970s, but his argument has a more general application. It is clear that the attitude of Communist leaderships within Eastern Europe to "consumerism" has become, at worst, one of ambivalence and, at times, of tacit approval. Following political crises (in post-1956 Hungary, post-1968 Czechoslovakia, and post-1970 Poland) consumer booms have not only been officially tolerated but deliberately created.

The failure thus far of the long-term effort to create a "new man" with distinctively socialist values does mean, as the examples cited immediately above indicate, that the party leaderships within the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have had to respond to political and social pressures with more than slogans and talk of "moral incentives." One form the response can take (and has taken) is to seek legitimacy in national terms and to lay an increased stress on national symbols. The problems of this course for the authorities are least great in nationally homogeneous states such as Hungary and Poland.

In Hungary the present leadership have largely succeeded in persuading the population that they are following as distinctively "Hungarian" a policy as the geopolitical environment within which they operate allows. Lord (formerly Mr. R. A.) Butler, during the prime ministership of Anthony Eden, described Eden (with memorable ambiguity) as "the best Prime Minister we've got." Hungarians, with rather more enthusiasm, have come to agree that János Kádár is "the best first secretary we've got." The characteristic view of Hungarians, in the words of the authors of a recent book on Hungarian politics, is that "that which is aimed at preserving Hungarian culture is 'good,' that which is opposed to its preservation is 'bad.' " The same authors add: "Citizens will grudgingly accord a qualified legitimacy to their leaders as long as those leaders protect Hungary and Hungarians from being swallowed up by forces from the East; Hungarians will accept the existence of Communist rule as long as that rule does not conflict too seriously with their basic sense of national pride."[18]

Apart from paying attention to symbols of Hungarian nationhood, the Hungarian leadership have responded to social pressures by presiding over the most radical economic reform and the most relaxed cultural policy to be found any-

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where in Eastern Europe in the decade after the "Prague Spring." The economic decentralization, and the rights it, inter alia, afforded to peasants to sell their produce freely, so improved agricultural incomes relative to those of industrial workers that discontent grew among the latter. Again, however, the Kádár leadership showed its characteristic responsiveness to widely held grievances and instituted an across-the-board wage rise for state employees. In terms of the availability of goods and growth of the economy—in a country particularly hard hit by the energy and raw materials crisis of the seventies (heavily dependent as Hungary is upon imports)—the economic reform has had a fair measure of success.

In Poland, in the wake of the violence and demonstrations of December, 1970 (protests against the sharp rise in food prices), which brought down Gomułka, the Gierek leadership responded by paying attention to both national sentiments and economic grievances. They have tried to appeal to the Polish sense of history by authorizing the expensive rebuilding of the Warsaw Royal Castle (destroyed during the Second World War). More important, they have made a number of overtures to the Catholic church, whose social significance as an institution in Poland is as much national as religious. These have ranged from the important concession of granting permission to build churches (in new housing areas in urban industrial districts) to the symbolic gesture of Gierek's well-publicized meeting with the Pope in the Vatican in 1977.

The extent to which the Polish leadership, in the absence of a fuller legitimacy, is dependent upon providing material rewards, was, however, brought home in the summer of 1976 by the strikes that followed another price rise; these occurred in spite of the fact that (unlike 1970) the increases followed a five-year period in which real incomes had risen faster and further than at any time in Polish history. In response to the manifest discontent, more modest price increases were introduced, though even the original rises had by no means erased all of the gains of the preceding period. Since the rise in the standard of living in the first half of the seventies was produced by an import-led boom (financed by Western hard-currency credits), and since the debts had, in due course, to be paid, the leadership was (and is) in something of a cleft stick. With a third of the revenue they obtain for Polish exports going to service their hard-currency debts, their scope for "buying off" a discontented populace has become more limited.

In Czechoslovakia the "national" appeal of the present leadership was limited from the outset. This is not only because the Slovak Gustáv Husák, who combines the offices of general secretary of the party and president of the republic (a pluralism—in its old sense—for which he condemned Novotný), is a member of the smaller of the two major nationalities. Still more important is the fact that, as every Czech schoolboy knows, the present leadership is only there pursuing its present policies as a result of the military intervention of almost half a million foreign troops in August, 1968. Any claim to popular acceptance of the present leadership must therefore lie, perhaps to an even greater extent in Czechoslovakia than elsewhere, in its ability to deliver the economic goods. In this they have been moderately successful. With the initial help of a Soviet hard-currency loan, Czechoslovakia in the 1970s has enjoyed a substantial improvement in the standard of living, though economic growth has been accom-

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panied—as the enthusiasm of 1968 gave way to a more cynical materialism—by a rapid growth of economic corruption. (In this last respect Czechoslovak experience is in keeping with general trend throughout Eastern Europe.)

In order to secure political behavior that is in accord with the norms of their counterreformation, the present Czechoslovak leadership have not relied upon economic incentives alone. Just as in the last years of Stalin's rule oppression in Czechoslovakia was more severe than in other Eastern European states (as an unpleasant tribute to the very strength of Czech democracy), so in the 1970s Czechoslovakia has again distinguished itself from its neighbors by the degree of its political persecution. Tens of thousands of citizens, whose definition of socialism differs from that currently accepted in Prague Castle and the Kremlin, have been thrown out of the jobs for which they are qualified, and their children have been denied access to higher education.

In spite of the fact that an organized opposition has maintained a muted existence throughout the Husák period and has enjoyed a recrudescence since 1977 and the publication of Charter 77,[19] it has been less overt and, it would appear, less widespread than the opposition in Poland in recent years. Unlike the purged party reformists, who are subjected to various types of deprivation, a majority of Czechs and Slovaks are living lives that have all the outward appearance of normality. It is not, after all, abnormal for most people in most countries to live nonpolitical lives and to focus most of their attention on the material well-being of themselves and their families. For middle-class Western Marxists who take the patronizing view that workers are only interested in economic issues and who believe that the stress on political pluralism and press freedom in Czechoslovakia in 1968 reflected mainly the sectional interests of intellectuals, it may be tempting to conclude that most Czechs have indeed been "normalized."

Such a judgment would be unwise. Though in some Communist states it may be true that workers do not miss fruits they have never tasted, Czech workers—in common with other Czechoslovak citizens—have both historic and recent experience of autonomous political activity. Their memories—of days only a decade ago when there was such a free flow of information and comment in their newspapers, television, and radio that it was difficult to resist the temptation to read, watch, and listen at the same time—are of continuing significance. There is a great difference between the apoliticality of citizens in societies in which legitimate and autonomous political action remains an option—should grievances become sufficiently strong—and political passivity in societies in which the alternatives are to endorse the current line or invite persecution.

Only a little more than ten years ago the majority of people in Czechoslovakia seemed almost as politically passive as the majority are today. Yet within a matter of months they were to become miraculously, as it appeared, "repoliticized." The present "depoliticization" (the charterists and others excepted) should not, therefore, be misread. Since the present Communist party leadership enjoys less legitimacy and popular support than even the Novotný leadership, it remains peculiarly vulnerable to any deterioration in economic conditions at home or political changes in the external environment (in the Soviet Union above all, but not excluding changes in the position and influence of the "Eurocommunists").

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If the two main ways in which Eastern European leaders can supplement a purely Marxist-Leninist appeal for support within their societies are to play upon national sentiments and to satisfy the material demands of the consumer, the efforts in this respect of the Romanian and East German regimes make for an interesting contrast. Unable to deliver the economic goods, the Romanian leadership have played the national card for as much as, if not more than, it is worth. Though, as was suggested earlier, the national emphasis poses fewer problems in an ethnically homogeneous society, the Romanians have not allowed the presence of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania to deter them from beating the nationalist drum very loudly indeed. While Ceauşescu presides over one of the most politically repressive and economically backward states in Europe, he has been consistently vigorous in his defense of the rights of Communist parties to conduct their affairs without outside interference—from his opposition to the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 to his support for the rights of "Eurocommunist" parties in the most recent period. For the Romanian leadership, "Eurocommunist" policies do not represent an example to be followed but rather a further source of support in their constant struggle for national autonomy.[20] While Ceauşescu no doubt genuinely believes in running his own country in his own way, the Romanian leadership is clearly well aware of the benefits, in terms of popular support, which accrue from being seen to possess an element of national autonomy and from "standing up" to pressure from the Soviet Union. That there are limits to the efficacy of such a policy was, however, demonstrated by the serious miners' strike of 1977, which was calculated to dispel complacency in Bucharest.

In contrast with their Romanian counterparts, the leadership of the GDR have to be cautious, and more highly selective, in the use they make of appeal to national sentiment. Since the heroic and overwhelmingly important Soviet contribution in the struggle against Hitler's Germany and a continuing fear of Germany were practically the only factors legitimizing Soviet power in Eastern Europe in the eyes of most Slavs during the first two postwar decades, the East German leadership has had to take pains to avoid evoking the wrong kind of memories. Even so, in the words of Richard Davy,

> East Germany really is German, and the government tries hard to develop a sense of national identity by claiming descent from the revolutionary strands in the German tradition. People who knew Germany before the war find it more recognizable than its brasher and more Americanized brother next door. The houses are often older, the streets quieter, the pace of life is slower, and the social values are more traditional. Some people are also unkind enough to notice the goose-stepping soldiers, the strident propaganda, the Prussian bureaucracy and the harnessing of sport to politics.[21]

Western recognition of the GDR and vastly improved relations with the Federal Republic have enhanced the political standing of East Germany within the Soviet bloc; but the parallel improvement in the relations of the Federal Republic with Comecon countries, dating from Willy Brandt's chancellorship, has removed some of the propagandist appeal of the GDR as the sole peace-loving German state.

Though the GDR leadership for long remained acutely conscious of their legitimacy problem and anxiously sought the recognition they eventually se-

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cured on a bilateral basis from Western states, their main efforts have been concentrated on building up the economic strength of their country and attempting to satisfy the material aspirations of a people conscious of the high standard of living enjoyed by their fellow nationals across the border. In general, the progress of the economy of the GDR has been as conspicuously successful within the Eastern European context as that of the Federal German Republic has been within Western Europe. The only snag from the standpoint of the GDR's rulers is that East German citizens make their comparisons with West Germany rather than with the rest of East Europe. A political price is also being paid for certain aspects of the GDR's economic progress. In the Soviet Union and in the other Eastern European Communist states, there are shops where goods can be bought for western currency; but in an effort simultaneously to satisfy consumer aspirations and to import hard currency, the GDR leadership have not merely permitted an expansion of such shops, but have, since December, 1973, allowed citizens to receive gifts of foreign currency from Western visitors of up to 500 West German marks, which they can spend in the "Intershops."[22] This has led not only to some working-class discontent but to dissatisfaction on the part of members of the establishment, who have sometimes found it harder to obtain West German marks than citizens in less politically exposed positions. The leadership have thus, in turn, been forced to open an increasing number of luxury shops in which Western goods can be bought (at high prices) for East German marks, dissipating, to some extent, the hard currency the "Intershops" earn. The greater emphasis on meeting the West German challenge in consumerist terms may also have helped stimulate criticism of the leadership from a Marxist perspective, which has been one of the interesting features of intellectual life in the GDR in recent years.

Yugoslavia continues to resist the generalizations applied to the rest of Eastern Europe. Its internal and external policies remain distinctive. Over the last two decades in particular, the value conflicts and political tensions which exist within all Eastern European societies have been allowed to come into the open in Yugoslavia more freely and more regularly than elsewhere. Since the crisis of the early seventies, the degree of political pluralism previously attained has been reduced, though not by as much as Tito's speeches at the time seemed to presage. The besetting danger to Yugoslavia's socialist market economy, to its substantial decentralization and de facto institutional pluralism, has been that these very deviations from the orthodox Communist model would lead, given the country's historic background of ethnic conflict and mistrust, to national particularism. When, however, the top leadership of the League of Communists in Croatia was removed at the end of 1971—accused by Tito of pandering to "rotten liberalism" and nationalism—it looked as if the pendulum might swing in the opposite direction.[23] For Tito did not confine himself to attacking a divisive ethnic nationalism, but in speeches in 1972 revived phrases (full of meaning for the initiated) that had fallen out of fashion in Yugoslavia—"the leading role of the party," "democratic centralism," and even "the dictatorship of the proletariat."[24]

How far Tito himself really wished to turn back the clock is unclear, but the institutional changes which have gradually taken place over a quarter of a century have not been reversed, even though tighter discipline and a measure of

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recentralization within the party have made themselves felt throughout Yugoslav society. That this more conservative tendency within the party has not met with any widespread challenge owes much to Tito's unique personal authority, an authority much in evidence at the Eleventh Congress of the League of Communists in June, 1978, where the 86-year-old president was accorded fervent support and emotional ovations. That same congress underlined the party's continuing adherence to one of the policies on which Tito's genuine popularity is, in no small measure, founded—the commitment to nonalignment and Yugoslav independence and rejection of the idea of the universal validity (in the sense of an example to be followed) of the Soviet experience.

Where, then, does Eastern Europe stand today and where is it going? As already indicated, economic progress and satisfaction of consumers' wants vary considerably from one state to another. The degree of popular legitimacy accorded the status quo also varies greatly—from Tito's Yugoslavia at the popular end of the spectrum to Husák's Czechoslovakia at the other. In every country except, possibly, Bulgaria, Soviet overlordship is widely resented. But Soviet military, political, and economic power, though a necessary condition of the continuance of the Eastern European systems in their present form, is not a sufficient condition.

It is one of the great paradoxes of both Soviet and Eastern European societies that—proclaimed collectivist, revolutionary goals notwithstanding—it is the possibility of living tranquil private lives that makes the systems tolerable for a majority. It has been said of the GDR that "if you want to live a quiet life with your mind switched off, it is more relaxing than West Germany."[25] In countries where basic foodstuffs and everyday household amenities are in much shorter supply than in the GDR, life is less relaxing (especially for women); but provided they do not openly challenge the system, people can live their private and family lives without undue anxiety or fear. Political executions and torture are rare, in comparison not only with the past but with contemporary Latin America. Fear of criminal attack in city streets is almost nonexistent and is seen as a remote, American nightmare. Unemployment (outside Yugoslavia) is negligible, and the rate of inflation, by Western European standards, is low. Moreover, the system has provided at least a basic minimum of welfare services, a gradually rising standard of living, and relatively accessible educational opportunities.

To these sources of political stability should be added a qualification to the remark about people with their minds "switched off." It is no longer strictly true to say that such a sacrifice is demanded, even in the Soviet Union itself—in sharp contrast with Stalin's time. The distinction which matters is between private and public life. People do not have less adventurous intellects in Prague than in Paris, nor are they less inclined to analyze their affairs critically in Warsaw than in Washington. Soviet and Eastern European intellectuals now enjoy many privileges, not the least of which is the freedom to say anything they want in the circle of their family and friends and (depending partly on occupational position and partly on knowledge of foreign languages and assiduity) to read practically anything they wish. But should they cross the border between private criticism and public protest, they will embark on a descending spiral that

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begins with reduced access to information and the forfeit of promotion prospects and ends with the loss of the social and personal security extended to all who observe the rules of the game.

The extent of the free discussion which goes on has both positive and negative aspects from the standpoint of the party leaderships. On the one hand, it is a useful safety valve; on the other, it helps to make sure that Marxism-Leninism comes under critical scrutiny and that many elements in the official ideology are rejected. This gulf between private thought and speech and public political behavior exists, as has been noted, within the Soviet Union as well as in Eastern Europe. While the benefits to the individual and his family of maintaining such a dual mode of conduct are far from negligible within the USSR, as within Eastern Europe, in itself this duality is a somewhat shaky foundation for the long-term stability of these societies. There are, however, other factors to be considered, and these serve to distinguish the prospects for political stability within Eastern Europe over the next two decades from those in the Soviet Union, notwithstanding (indeed, closely related to) the degree of Soviet surveillance of political life in the other countries.

The Soviet citizen—at least the Soviet Russian citizen—takes pride in Soviet national strength and superpower status. If the family remains the primary object of loyalty, the nation, throughout the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as well, retains its traditional emotive force as the focus of political identification. For many, though not all, Russians, Russian nationalism and Soviet patriotism are mutually reinforcing. Elsewhere in the Soviet Union, and a fortiori beyond the Soviet borders, there is no such felicitous conjunction. Georgians, Kazakhs, and Estonians, and, still more, Poles, Romanians, Hungarians, Czechs, and Slovaks identify with their "nation" rather than with the Soviet Union or "proletarian internationalism."

The same political structures and imposition of the same norms of political behavior can be perceived in quite different ways in societies with diverse political traditions. While Czechoslovakia is unique within Eastern Europe in terms of its experience of democratic government, it shares with other east-central European countries—Poland, Hungary, and the GDR—a very strong sense of belonging to a Western intellectual tradition and sharing in its cultural heritage. The historically conditioned beliefs and values of Eastern Europeans (to a greater degree than those of Russians) impose limits on what their rulers can normally do and, insofar as these limits are transgressed, deprive the leadership of such modest funds of goodwill as they need to draw upon in time of crisis. Thus, Khrushchev was able to close down three-quarters of the Christian churches in the Soviet Union during the last six years of his leadership of the Soviet Communist party; but his Polish counterpart, Gomułka, knew very well (and Gierek knows still better) that to pursue an identical policy in Poland would lead, quite simply, to revolution. Violent uprising plays a less prominent part in the Czech political tradition; yet, as the first eight months of 1968 demonstrated, a shift in the balance of political forces that seems to open up realistic possibilities of radical change may evoke a dramatic response. The values and political beliefs openly expressed in 1968 were dormant, rather than destroyed, during the previous twenty years. Reinvigorated as these beliefs and values were in 1968, it is unlikely that the present leadership have had any more success than the late

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Antonín Novotný and his colleagues in undermining their remarkable resilience.

It is true that the Soviet Union has, for over a generation, been able to circumscribe effectively the scope for political innovation within the various Eastern European states. In the immediate future, it will no doubt continue to do so. But if we look somewhat further ahead—let us say, to 1998 (since the "eights" have an uncanny resonance in East European history: 1918, 1938, 1948, 1968, not to mention 1848)—significant, even fairly radical, change in the existing order appears to be a more likely prospect than its petrification. If, moreover, the strong, and growing, pressures from within these societies are to influence developments, the change will be of a pluralistic and democratizing nature. (The precise direction of the change depends, of course, on many variables—above all, on the outcome of the struggle between the forces for political change and the forces favoring inertia within the Soviet Union[26]—not excluding, however, the pattern of developments in Western Europe.[27]) In the Soviet Union, by contrast (*pace* Andrei Amalrik[28]) radical political change seems somewhat less likely, and the prospects for democratizing and pluralistic change, in particular, are more slender.

The differences between the historical experiences of most Eastern European countries on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other remain very great. This is true not only of their pre-Communist experiences but also of the events of more recent times. Poles, and especially Polish workers, have the confidence which comes from having challenged the party-state authorities—in 1956, 1970, and 1976—and from having forced the latter into making significant changes of policy and personnel. Hungarians not only have the experience of a suppressed revolution in 1956 but also of a more gradual process of accommodation between rulers and ruled, in which many concessions have been made to Hungarian public opinion as the political system has come to function in a way that owes as much to the example of moderated authoritarianism of the prewar Hungarian order as to the Soviet prototype.[29] Czechs have the knowledge that only a decade ago they surmounted the domestic forces and the powerful institutional obstacles which stood between them and the pluralistic political system which, in overwhelming numbers, they desired. The very fact that intervention on a massive scale by the Soviet Union took place was an indicator of the profundity of the change they had brought about through their own intellectual and political resources.

In addition to the influence of these recent experiences in particular countries (knowledge of which is not, of course, confined to the countries in which they occurred), there are five more general factors that should make for political change: (1) the slowdown in social mobility; (2) higher educational levels; (3) cross-national cultural and political influences; (4) internal problems of informational feedback; and (5) national consciousness. Only the briefest elaboration of these points is possible here.

1. The slowdown in social mobility has two major aspects. The rapid increase in size of the industrial labor force and the broad expansion of further educational institutions and white-collar jobs led to large-scale recruitment of workers of peasant origin and, simultaneously, a first-generation intelligentsia of worker origin. It has been pertinently observed by Walter D. Connor that

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"the 'Warsaw intellectual' was indeed poorer in the early 1950s than in 1938—but 'he' was not the same person." As the same author notes, both the new intelligentsia and the new workers "were conscious of being 'upwardly mobile.' "[30] If the rapid social mobility produced a measure of support for the system from people who were grateful for the enhancement of their status and life-style, the slowdown—whereby proportionately fewer peasants are joining the industrial labor force and the intelligentsia is being largely replenished by the scions of the postwar intelligentsia—produces intellectuals and workers whose expectations and standards of comparison are very different from those of the previous generation. It provides, indeed, one of the major social preconditions for the growth of class consciousness.[31]

2. Urbanization and the expansion of the higher-educational system have undoubtedly raised general educational levels, in spite of the fairly rigid ideological constraints upon the curriculum. Though an attempt has been made to compartmentalize knowledge (always excepting the ubiquitous teaching of official Marxism-Leninism), it has been far from successful, and the cultural level of the Eastern European scientific and technical intelligentsia compares not unfavorably with that of their Western counterparts. The raising of educational levels is important for two reasons: on the one hand, it means that people are less easily duped, and, on the other, that they are likely to demand an effective voice (not merely token representation) in the policy-making process. The former point is alluded to by Roy Medvedev when he observes that "Stalin was supported by the majority of the Soviet people, not only because he was clever enough to deceive them but also because they were backward enough to be deceived."[32] The second point is illustrated by the prominent part played by the new intelligentsia in the Czechoslovak reform movement that culminated in 1968.

3. Greater cross-national cultural and political influences are in large measure a product of economic and technological advance. Rising living standards have led to a rapid growth in the acquisition of television sets and short-wave radios. Improved technology has made Western radio broadcasts (which are widely listened to in Eastern Europe) an effective alternative source of information to the local mass media, and hundreds of thousands of citizens tune in to Western television (most notably in the GDR, but also, for example, in Czechoslovakia). Tourism, as well as broadcasting, has been of growing importance as an informal source of information. The vast increase in the number of Western tourists reflects the need of the Eastern European states for hard currency, and the growth in the number of tourists from East to West is a response to the growth of money income of the new "middle class" in Eastern Europe and their desire to find something interesting to spend it on.[33] If radio is, above all, a vital source of information about developments in Eastern Europe itself (it was not from the indigenous mass media that Polish and Hungarian intellectuals followed developments within Czechoslovakia in 1968), then tourism between East and West makes it impossible to propagate myths, of the type put about in Stalin's time, that Western European workers enjoy a lower standard of living than their counterparts in the East.

4. The fact that informational feedback within these societies is a serious problem may seem paradoxical, in view not only of the increased flow of infor-

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mation between countries (to which reference has just been made) but also of the emphasis on cybernetics and electronic information systems found in contemporary Eastern Europe. The problem, however, is not technical but political. In the absence of competitive politics, autonomous interest groups, and freedom for political protest, and in the presence of political censorship of the mass media, there is no reliable way of telling the party leadership "what the public will not stand." The practical relevance of this kind of informational problem has been noted by a particularly well-informed observer, Włodzimierz Brus:

> It is difficult . . . to accuse the Polish statistical service in 1970 of being professionally incompetent and technically badly equipped, yet it supplied both the decision centre and public opinion with false information, not by means of inventing figures but through one-sided material which, in the existing political conditions, could not be countered. The well-known decision to raise food prices in December 1970 was thus to a great extent an effect of the negative feedback between the political system and the information system.[34]

5. The question of the focus of national identification has been touched on at various points throughout this article. A strong sense of national consciousness and identification with national traditions and symbols—especially symbols of national independence—have been, and continue to be, vital features of the Eastern European societies, features that are a constant threat to Soviet-type systems. Since national consciousness, in the nature of things, feeds upon reaction against whichever foreign power appears to be imposing limits upon national sovereignty and the expression of national culture, the force of nationalism in Eastern Europe tends to be directed (with varying intensity from one country to another) against Russia and that Soviet model which appears as an alien imposition. If in Czechoslovakia prior to 1968 Communists, at least, had a sense of having made their "own revolution," and if in the society as a whole anti-Russian and anti-Soviet feeling was mild by comparison with the attitudes toward the Soviet Union of Poles and Hungarians, such sentiments, not surprisingly, did not survive the experience of August 21, 1968. With Czech nationalism taking a more anti-Soviet shape, Bulgaria is left as the only society within Eastern Europe that might plausibly claim to be relatively free of popular resentment of the Soviet Union (though even that qualified statement may owe something to Western ignorance of Bulgarian society).

It is true, as noted earlier, that all the Eastern European party leaderships have tried to harness the powerful emotive force of nationalism for their own ends, but they have enjoyed only partial success. In the Soviet Union the problem is still more complicated. On the one hand, as we have observed, there is the source of national pride which stems from its superpower status. On the other, the problem of the national minorities is as great a threat as any to the stability of the Soviet Union. It is still an important fact that there are as many Russians within the state as there are all other nationalities (over a hundred of them) put together. But since Soviet demographic trends show the Asian republics of the USSR "to be in the classical phase of population explosion"[35] and Russians to be barely maintaining their present numbers, the sentiments of the non-Russian nationalities assume an increasing importance.

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All five of the outlined general factors making for political change in Eastern Europe apply, to a greater or lesser degree, to the Soviet Union as well. It would be foolish, therefore, to rule out the possibility of significant change even there. It would be even more unwise, however, to ignore the distinctively Russian sources of stability of the Soviet system. There is in the USSR a greater consonance between the political system and popular political beliefs than in most of Eastern Europe. As should be clear from an earlier section of this article, that is not to suggest that the "new man" is alive and well and living in Moscow. Insofar as this consonance exists, it is between what Russians expect a government to be—a remote but powerful authority—and political reality. It does not mean that every new pronouncement of the leadership meets with approval or that there is widespread acceptance of Marxist-Leninist ideas. It is rather that the relations between rulers and ruled are not terribly at odds with what Russians, who have a realistically low estimate of their political efficacy as citizens, have come to expect.

"Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose" is a view which to generations of observers of Russia has seemed peculiarly appropriate to that country. Shortly before he changed from being the Soviet bête noire among American academics to the Soviet bête noire among American politicians, Zbigniew Brzezinski embraced the doctrine in a radical form when he wrote that

> the Bolshevik revolution not only was not a break from the predominant political tradition, but was, in historical perspective, an act of revitalized Restoration. The late Romanov period was a period of decay, of the gradual weakening of the hold of the state over society. This was produced by the combined influence of social change . . . and of internal loss of vitality within the top elite, not to speak of the autocrat's own personal weaknesses. The overthrow of that ruling elite brought to power a new group, much more vital, much more assertive, and imbued with a new sense of historical mission. The political result of the Bolshevik revolution was thus revitalized restoration of long dominant patterns.[36]

Much of the legacy of the past, in Russia as elsewhere, is an inheritance which is assimilated at a barely conscious level or taken for granted, rather than one which is consciously understood and built upon. It is, however, important to note that in the Soviet Union there are also many aspects of tradition which are carefully analyzed and deliberately used in the process of political socialization. Such an analysis, complete with policy recommendations, was undertaken, for example, in a book published in Siberia in 1977, *The Role of Progressive Traditions in Communist Education*. The author, N. V. Solntsev, defined his subject as follows:

> Traditions are only those ideas and feelings which have a normative, evaluative character. Traditional ideas, views, activities, feelings etc. appear as the bearers of social experience, of an ideological heritage, and of spiritual riches and manifest themselves in all spheres of social life, often in the form of ceremonies and rituals.[37]

The Second World War, to a much greater extent in the USSR (where it is known as the Great Patriotic War) than in Eastern Europe, is a source of national pride and a rich repository of symbols of social cohesion, of heroism and

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industriousness under the most adverse conditions, and of Russian and Soviet patriotism. It is, therefore, part of the Soviet (as distinct from prerevolutionary) past which is widely used in political education and a vital element in a heroic tradition that strikes a much deeper response than the more ideological components of Soviet propaganda. According to Solntsev, however, still more use needs to be made of this source—for promotion of an all-Soviet unity—by the wider diffusion, especially in the armed forces, of rituals and ceremonies based upon the experience and traditions of the Great Patriotic War.[38]

Both rulers and ruled are well aware of the tensions that lie not far below the surface of Soviet society—the national tensions and the frustrations of various occupational groups. But the very fear of what an unleashing of these pent-up emotions might lead to is a bond between the leadership and the majority of the people. Russians' dread of chaos, of disorder, has often been remarked upon, and it is a feeling which even the most critical section of the intelligentsia shares with the party leadership. It is very clearly illuminated (together with the mutual distrust which existed, and to a large extent still exists, between the intelligentsia and the mass of the people) by Nadezhda Mandel'shtam when she writes:

> There had been a time when, terrified of chaos, we had all prayed for a strong system, for a powerful hand that would stem the angry human river overflowing its banks. This fear of chaos is perhaps the most permanent of our feelings—we have still not recovered from it and it is passed on from one generation to another. There is not one of us—either among the old who saw the Revolution or the young and innocent—who does not believe that he would be the first victim if ever the mob got out of hand. "We should be the first to be hanged from a lamppost"—whenever I hear this constantly repeated phrase, I remember Herzen's words about the intelligentsia which so much fears its own people that it prefers to go in chains itself, provided the people, too, remain fettered.[39]

It is not surprising, then, that the Communist party of the Soviet Union has taken to claiming, among other things, that it is the guarantor of order, tranquillity, and "social progress in conditions of *political stability*. . . ."[40] If the day should ever come when the party is forced to fight a competitive election, it could find no better platform on which to contest it.

Such basic beliefs as these militate strongly against either a pluralization or democratization of Soviet political life. Changes of a kind must, of course, take place. At the time of writing (August, 1978) the average age of the thirteen full members of the Politburo is almost sixty-eight, and the most powerful individuals within that body are all over seventy. One does not, therefore, need to be a futurologist to predict an almost total change in the party's top leadership within the next decade. The assumption that the next political generation of Soviet leaders will, however, be more liberal than the present elderly incumbents by virtue of being younger is altogether too simple. Though it is possible to imagine more apocalyptic alternatives, the four most probable alternative trends within the Soviet leadership (in order of likelihood) between now and 1998 appear to me to be:

1. The accession of people whose experience as regional party secretaries has made them anxious to impose a tighter discipline within Soviet society but who understand the need for compromise in domestic politics (and by extension

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in international relations). They would continue to govern in the style of Brezhnev and his colleagues.

2. The gradual acquisition of a preponderant influence within the leadership of technocratic reformers, people more concerned with economic and social progress than with ideological rectitude. They would take more domestic political risks than leaders in the first category but would have no wish to undermine the three pillars of the system discussed early in this article.

3. The coming to power of Russian nationalists, probably within the party framework but possibly on the basis of a dramatic shift of power to the military,[41] leading to a reduction of the existing rights of non-Russian nationalities within the USSR and to a harder line in international politics.

4. The coming to power within the Soviet Communist party of leaders prepared to reopen the whole issue of Stalinism and what they see as its still-significant imprint on existing institutions. While appealing to Lenin and accepting the basic legitimacy of the system, they would attempt liberalization from above. This may, for convenience, be termed the Medvedev tendency, though Roy Medvedev himself was expelled from the party in 1969. In terms of the three pillars, these neo-Leninists generally accept the concepts of "leading role of the party" and "democratic centralism" but wish to modify the way they are put into practice; and they are prepared to go a very long way toward removing the third pillar: political censorship.

Which of these four tendencies will become uppermost within the Soviet party leadership is clearly of great relevance for developments in Eastern Europe. Representatives of the fourth tendency (that least likely to succeed) would be willing to go farthest in granting independence of action to Eastern European parties and governments. Alternative two would offer the next most scope to Eastern European innovation; its representatives would almost certainly tolerate a "Kadarization" of Eastern Europe (cultural relaxation combined with carefully monitored economic and, to some extent, political decentralization), though they would try to prevent anything so radical as a "Prague Spring." The most likely alternative (the first one) would involve a continuation and intensification of existing Soviet attempts to achieve an increased degree of economic, political, ideological, and military integration among the Communist states of Eastern Europe and the USSR. The ultimate aim would be to produce the kind of rigid orthodoxy presently found in the Czechoslovak and Bulgarian systems. If representatives of the third tendency acquired a predominant position within the Soviet leadership, they would wish to go still further—all the way back to the kind of relations which obtained between the Soviet Union and the Eastern European states during the last years of Stalin.

However, the general factors making for change in Eastern Europe, which were outlined earlier, are producing societies with strong pulls in the opposite direction—away from the Soviet model and toward a measure of democratization of the political system and a more pluralistic socialism. The social bases for reformist tendencies within the party and governmental power structures in Eastern Europe are becoming increasingly powerful; and, as the case of Czechoslovakia demonstrated, the party intelligentsia may be a vital link between pressures from below and political decision-makers. Though the memory of the military intervention which ended the Czech experiment will in time become a

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less vivid deterrent to Eastern Europeans bent on change, Communist reformers within the next two decades are likely to be more inclined to concede a Soviet interest in their political arrangements than were the Czechs. The more cautious among them regard the "Kádár model" as the optimal one within the present geopolitical environment; and, since the USSR has tolerated the Hungarian precedent, the odds are against its being able to prevent the spread, well before 1998, of at least that degree of internal relaxation in other Eastern European societies. But the pressures for a more thoroughgoing democratic socialism will be intense. The outcome will not amount to democracy or, indeed, democratic socialism in a Western sense. As Vladimir Kusin has put it:

> The main difference between the kind of democratic socialism which it is hoped may arise from the reformed communist societies of Eastern Europe and the one advocated by the Social Democratic parties in the West lies in the preservation of a substantial, possibly even decisive, though not necessarily monopolistic, role of the Communist Party, in the projected retention of a special partnership with the Soviet Union, and in the decisive predominance of public ownership.[42]

Such a system would be a compromise between Eastern Europeans' desire for a more thoroughgoing pluralism and their worldly-wise acceptance that the best may be the enemy of the good.[43] But how realistic is even this goal, given the likely composition of the Soviet leadership? One answer is that it does not depend on the Soviet Union alone. What happens in Western Europe during the next two decades could tip the balance. Nothing that occurs in the West is likely to remove the countries of Eastern Europe from the Soviet sphere of influence, but that is not the point at issue. A reluctant Soviet acceptance of a degree of pluralism somewhat greater than that pertaining in Hungary in 1978 (though less than what was being achieved in Czechoslovakia in 1968) could come about if there are intense (and, especially, simultaneous cross-national) pressures for it from within Eastern Europe. The citizens, in high places and low, who are likely to exert these pressures will not be indifferent to the political and economic performance of Western Europe. If Western European states combine, as a number of them have in recent years, high rates of inflation with high rates of unemployment, they will make life easier for conservative Communists. If, however, revitalization of social democracy within Western Europe takes place or if, indeed, a "Eurocommunist" party (the most serious candidate, clearly, being the PCI) comes to power and actually practices what it currently preaches, the impact in Eastern Europe could be great. If in recent years Soviet leaders have not had to face particularly determined efforts by their Eastern European counterparts to win a greater scope for adaptation of the Soviet model, this is partly because, while the Soviet system has grown no more attractive, the Western example has, in important respects, become less attractive and has thus partially removed one source of popular discontent.

What Eastern Europe will be like in 1998 will, then, depend in part on what happens within the West during the next two decades. It will depend still more on the intensity and extent of the pressures (their direction is fairly clear) from within the Eastern European societies themselves. But it remains a fact, to which Eastern Europeans have accustomed themselves, that it will depend most of all on the domestic pressures and problems—and subterranean politics—within the Soviet Union itself.

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[2]For these reasons I began my article by describing 1968 as "the" great potential turning point in the postwar history of Eastern Europe, for by no stretch of the imagination could events in Hungary, or even in Poland, in 1956 be held to be in the enlightened self-interest of Soviet Communists. Soviet determination to reverse the tendencies manifested in the Hungary of Imre Nagy was much more of a foregone conclusion.

[3]These and many other survey data from Yugoslav sources are cited by David A. Dyker in his chapter, "Yugoslavia: Unity out of Diversity?" in Archie Brown and Jack Gray, eds., *Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States* (London and New York: Macmillan and Holmes and Meier, 1977).

[4]The source of survey data cited in this paragraph is an investigation by the Institute of Public Opinion of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences into "the relation of Czechs and Slovaks to their history": *Vztah Čechů a Slováků k dějinám* (Prague: Ústav pro výzkum veřejného mínění ČSAV, 1968).

[5]Peter A. Toma and Ivan Volgyes, *Politics in Hungary* (San Francisco: Freeman, 1977), p. 46.

[6]Ibid., pp. 143-144, 171.

[7]The survey results cited in this paragraph are drawn from the chapter by George Kolankiewicz and Ray Taras, "Poland: Socialism for Everyman?" in Brown and Gray, eds., *Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States*, pp. 107, 108, 109, 111.

[8]The survey is cited by Arthur M. Hanhardt, Jr., in "Political Socialization in the German Democratic Republic," *Societas* 1 (Spring 1971): 116.

[9]I am aware that public opinion surveys in various Eastern European countries have to be interpreted with even greater caution than those from Western Europe, since the extent to which citizens feel free to answer frankly is not only less than in many Western societies but also varies from one Communist state to another and from time to time within the same country. In Yugoslavia at most times since the mid-sixties and in Czechoslovakia from the middle to the late sixties—especially during the year from March, 1968, to March, 1969—many of the surveys are comparable with the best Western ones. Even in Yugoslavia, however, respondents apparently indulge in self-censorship of views which are not politically respectable. Much evidence from the realm of political action in Yugoslavia suggests, for example, that the nationalism of particular ethnic groups is a more serious problem than Yugoslav survey data on ethnicity would indicate. Empirical sociology made headway earliest in Poland, and interesting surveys from that country date from the late fifties. Much of this material has been published in Polish academic journals, though the frankness of respondents is likely to have varied in accordance with some of the radical changes of political climate (the cycles of thaw and freeze) the Poles have experienced. So far as Hungary is concerned, the results of a number of potentially useful surveys have remained unpublished, but certain interesting data are available. In general (and this applies to the Soviet Union, too) when the results are *not* those the party leaders would like to hear—and frequently they are not—there would seem to be no basis, other than a somewhat perverse fastidiousness, for withholding all credence from them.

[10]Stephen White, "Political Socialization in the U.S.S.R.: A Study in Failure?," *Studies in Comparative Communism* 10 (Autumn 1977): 334.

[11]Ibid., p. 336.

[12]Zvi Gitelman, "Soviet Political Culture: Insights from Jewish Emigrés," *Soviet Studies* 29 (October, 1977): 564.

[13]While peer groups and experience at work are obviously important agents, my own study of political socialization and political culture (in a Czechoslovak context in particular but also on a comparative basis) leads me to believe that the family remains the most important social institution of all in terms of influence on the acquisition of values and political beliefs. There is some force, however, in the view of Joseph R. Fiszman that "the family and the political system meet in mutual accommodation owing to a common recognition of 'reality,' the family acknowledging the fact of power and the system leadership recognizing that one of the conditions of continuing in power is to recognize traditional values and norms (*and prejudices*), official rhetoric notwithstanding" ("Child Socialization: Comments from a Polish Perspective," *Studies in Comparative Communism*, X [Autumn 1977]: 267). Parents, concerned for their children's careers, tend to encourage their offspring to accommodate their political behavior to the "operational code" of the powerholders, while at the same time they effectively contradict and undermine much official writing and teaching about the political system and the way it works.

[14]Gitelman, "Soviet Political Culture," pp. 559-560.

[15]See Dimitri K. Simes, "The Soviet Parallel Market," *Survey* 21 (Summer 1975); and A. Katsenelinboigen, "Coloured Markets in the Soviet Union," *Soviet Studies* 29 (January, 1977).

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[16]Cited by Hedrick Smith in *The Russians* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1976), p. 108.

[17]Václav Havel, "Letter to Dr Gustáv Husák, General Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party," *Survey* 21 (Summer 1975): 174.

[18]Toma and Volgyes, *Politics in Hungary*, p. 152.

[19]On Charter 77, see H. Gordon Skilling, "Socialism and Human Rights: Charter 77 and the Prague Spring," in Hannelore Horn, Alexander Schwan, and Thomas Weingartner, eds., *Sozialismus in Theorie und Praxis: Festschrift für Richard Löwenthal* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1978); see also the same author's "Czechoslovakia and Helsinki," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 18 (September, 1976).

[20]For extended discussion of "Eurocommunism" and consideration of Soviet and Eastern European reactions to it, see Rudolf L. Tőkés, ed., *Eurocommunism and Detente* (New York: New York University Press [for the Council on Foreign Relations], 1978); and Paulo Filo della Torre, Edward Mortimer, and Jonathan Story, eds., *Eurocommunism: Myth or Reality?* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, forthcoming).

[21]Richard Davy, "East Germany: View from Both Sides of the Wall," *The Times* (London) (September 20, 1977).

[22]On this, and other aspects of East German life in recent years, see the interesting article by Hartmut Zimmermann, "The GDR in the 1970's," *Problems of Communism* 27 (March-April 1978).

[23]The best account of the crisis of the early seventies, and indeed of Yugoslav politics since the break with Stalin, is to be found in Dennison Rusinow, *The Yugoslav Experiment, 1948-1974* (London: Hurst [for the Royal Institute of International Affairs], 1977).

[24]Ibid., esp. pp. 308-326.

[25]Davy, "East Germany: View from Both Sides of the Wall."

[26]Elsewhere I have discussed at greater length some of the sources of stability and sources of tension within the USSR. See Archie Brown and Michael Kaser, eds., *The Soviet Union Since the Fall of Khrushchev* (London: Macmillan, 2nd ed., 1978), chap. 10, esp. pp. 255-268, and chap. 12, esp. pp. 323-326. For a variety of other views on trends within the Soviet Union, see the symposium, "Où va le régime soviétique?" *Esprit* 41 (November 1973); the 100th issue of *Survey* 22 (Summer/Autumn 1976) devoted to 'The Future of East-West relations'; Smith, *The Russians;* Robert G. Kaiser, *Russia: The People and the Power* (New York: Atheneum, 1976); Paul Cocks, Robert V. Daniels, and Nancy Whittier Heer, eds., *The Dynamics of Soviet Politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976); and Mary McAuley, *Politics and the Soviet Union* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1977), esp. chap. 11.

[27]There are also other factors of enormous potential importance, which can only be noted in passing here—since it is not possible to discuss them in the detail that would do justice to their significance and complexity. They include the future of Soviet-United States relations and Soviet-Chinese relations—rivalries that are, in both cases, simultaneously economic, political, and military—as well as the problem of future trends within the world economy. More specifically, much may hinge on whether the United States has more success in coping with its long-term energy problem than the Soviet Union has in overcoming its technological lag.

[28]Andrei Amalrik, "Will the USSR Survive until 1984?" *Survey* 15 (Autumn 1969).

[29]George Schöpflin, "Hungary: An Uneasy Stability," in Brown and Gray, eds., *Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States*, esp. pp. 153-154.

[30]Walter D. Connor, "Social Change and Stability in Eastern Europe," *Problems of Communism* 26 (November-December 1977): 24.

[31]The point is made in ibid., pp. 27-29.

[32]Roy A. Medvedev, *Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism* (London: Macmillan, 1972), p. 428.

[33]When Eastern Europeans make self-financed visits to the West, they must buy foreign currency from the state at a very expensive rate of exchange.

[34]Włodzimierz Brus, *Socialist Ownership and Political Systems* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), p. 193.

[35]J. A. Newth, "Demographic Developments," in Brown and Kaser, eds., *The Soviet Union Since the Fall of Khrushchev*, p. 83.

[36]Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Soviet Politics: From the Future to the Past?" in Cocks, Daniels, and Heer, eds., *The Dynamics of Soviet Politics*, p. 340.

[37]N. V. Solntsev, *Rol' progressivnykh traditsiy v kommunisticheskom vospitanii* (Novosibirsk: Nauka [Siberian section], 1977), p. 106.

[38]Ibid. , pp. 110-111.

[39]Nadezhda Mandelstam, *Hope Against Hope: A Memoir,* Max Hayward, trans. (London: Collins and Harvill, 1971), p. 96.

[40]*Pravda* (June 9, 1974), cited by Mary McAuley in *Politics and the Soviet Union*, p. 327 (McAuley's italics).

[41]A number of writers, including some recent Soviet émigrés, have noted the growing strength of Russian nationalism within the Soviet Union. There are many different strands to this movement, some of which coexist quite happily with a technocratic reformism. Among those who have

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linked Russian nationalism with a possible shift of power to the military is Brzezinski, "Soviet Politics: From the Future to the Past?" p. 351.

[42]Vladimir V. Kusin, "An Overview of East European Reformism," *Soviet Studies* 28 (July, 1976): 361.

[43]It should be clear, in other words, that the kind of goal outlined by Kusin is not generally seen as an ideal solution but as the optimal one, given the constraints likely to be imposed by the Soviet Union in the forseeable future. It is also worth noting, however, that in the years since the Soviet armed intervention in Czechoslovakia there has been evidence of a growing body of intellectual opinion apparently disillusioned by the possibility of "within system" reforms and interested neither in a "Dubček model" nor a "Kádár model." In the words of *The Times* leader on the eve of the tenth anniversary of the invasion of Czechoslovakia: " A new kind of opposition has arisen which no longer seeks allies within the apparatus but tries instead to press it from outside to obey its own laws and grant the liberties to which it is, in theory, pledged. Writers now spend less time trying to outwit the censor and more time writing for an unofficial culture which simply ignores the authorities altogether. Official power is being bypassed as much as it is being challenged" ("The Continuing Occupation of Czechoslovakia," *The Times* (London), August 19, 1978).

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JUAN LINZ

Europe's Southern Frontier: Evolving Trends Toward What?[1]

SOUTHERN EUROPE, or the northern Mediterranean, particularly the Iberian peninsula, has occupied a marginal position in the development of the New Europe. The fact that Spain and Portugal, and intermittently Greece, were authoritarian regimes, and that the Iberian countries did not participate in World War II on the side of the victors, in addition to other historical, economic, and social factors, accounts for that marginality and margination. Now in rapid succession, in Portugal, Greece, and Spain, democratic institutions have been reestablished and are struggling for consolidation, while in the fourth major Mediterranean country, Italy, after thirty years of democracy, democracy is surviving without governing. Both the hope and the fear for democratic political stability in Mediterranean Europe have turned the attention of the world to this strategic area.

Southern Europe: Changing Societies

To provide a context for our analysis of Mediterranean politics, it seems useful to highlight some demographic, economic, and social characteristics of the four main countries in the area.[2] The first to be stressed is their populations, which represent a large proportion of the total European population outside the Soviet Union. Italy is the fourth largest and (when extra-European Turkey is counted) Spain is seventh, immediately after France. Even smaller Portugal and Greece have a larger population than countries like Sweden, Austria, and Switzerland, and each has almost twice the population of Denmark, Finland, or Norway. The population of the four in 1975 added up to almost 110 million people, while the Benelux countries, Sweden, Austria, and Switzerland—the largest of the smaller European democracies—only contained 45.9 million people. The GNP of Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece in 1975, at market prices in United States dollars, was $290,110 million, an average per capita income of $2,641. The absolute GNP of the smaller European countries just mentioned was almost the same, $299,490 million; but the difference in population means that the per capita income in the latter was $6,776. Southern Europe thus is the home of a large number of people—one of every five Europeans outside the Soviet Union and one of every four in non-Communist Europe—but it is also a relatively underdeveloped area economically compared to other parts of the Continent.

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This should not lead us to the conclusion, however, that even the poorest countries in the area should be classified with the Third World. The GNP per capita of Italy and Spain is above that of all major Latin American countries, including oil-rich Venezuela; and even Portugal, the least developed of the four, has a per capita income close to that of Argentina and more than $500 higher than that of Brazil or Mexico. In terms of economic development, they are part of the Second or Second-and-a-half World. They are also countries that have had a low population growth rate for the last fifteen years—the highest being that of Spain at 1.1 percent. During the period between 1960 and 1975 they all experienced considerable growth in their GNP per capita, with average annual growth rates ranging from 3.9 percent in Italy to 6.9 percent in Portugal; but between 1970 and 1975 they could not sustain these growth rates and rates ranged from 1.7 percent for Italy to 5.1 percent for Spain. They are thus characterized by relative underdevelopment, rapid growth—first in Italy, later in Spain, Greece, and Portugal—and then an abrupt slowdown of that growth. This problem was particularly acute in Italy in the seventies. In Latin America between 1960 and 1975 only Brazil, with a GNP per capita growth rate of 4.3, grew faster than the lowest of the Mediterranean countries, Italy, which recorded a 3.9 percent rate.

This economic change has largely been the result of a gigantic shift in the composition of the labor force.[3] While in 1950 about half the active population of Spain, Portugal, and Greece was engaged in farming, in Western Europe the proportion was about 27 percent. By 1970 only in Greece was the proportion above that figure, and in Spain it was already below 21 percent; during the same period it was 44 percent in Yugoslavia and 65 percent in Turkey. To realize the scope of that change, we can note that it took the United States from 1880 to 1940 (and Canada from 1901 to 1951) to go from the levels of 1950 to those of 1970 in Southern Europe. These changes have affected peasants and farm laborers differently and have had different ramifications for various regions within the countries. They have created new problems in the countryside as the remaining rural population has aged. Everywhere there have been dramatic changes in the way of life. For example, the 3 million unskilled farm laborers of Spain in 1950 were reduced, by 1970, to 986,000; in the same period, the industrial work force grew from 2.5 to 4 million—that is, from 23.5 percent of the active population to 30 percent—and the nonmanual force from 2.8 to 4.7 million—that is, from 26.5 to 41.0 percent.

These economic and social changes have been accompanied by rapid urbanization, so that in 1972, 9.6 percent of the Spaniards were living in Madrid, 19.2 percent of the Portuguese in metropolitan Lisbon, and 29.7 percent of the Greeks in the Athens area. Madrid was already the third largest city in Western Europe and Rome was fourth. The Mediterranean, the world of the polis, is today largely that of the metropolis—rather than of middle- and small-sized cities—and suffers from all the problems of such overurbanization.

In all these countries there are great inequalities in the economic development of the various regions. In Greece in 1962, the GNP per capita for Attica was 156 with respect to the national average, while that of the Ionian islands was 58. In Spain in 1975, that of the Basque Country, Madrid, and Barcelona was between 139 and 132, whereas that of a large number of provinces in the

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south and the west was around 60.[4] To those inequalities in the regional distribution of income, we have to add the relatively great differences in income distribution among classes, which is sometimes compounded by the regional differences. The Gini indices are 0.398 for Italy and 0.425 for Spain, according to one estimation (0.355 according to another), compared to 0.318 for the United Kingdom and 0.381 for France.[5] The share of wages and salaries has been rising, however, and in some cases it has dangerously reduced the share of profits after taxes in relation to national income; in Spain, for example, from 5.05 in 1973 to 3.31 percent in 1975. But even when unequally distributed, the growth in wealth has meant radical changes in styles of life; Southern Europeans have come to share in the consumption society. In Spain in 1960 only 4 percent of the households had a car; by 1966 the figure was 12 percent; by 1969, 27 percent; and by 1977, 51 percent. The ownership of television sets went from 32 percent in 1966 to 90 percent in 1977.[6]

With changes in the composition of the rural labor force, internal and external migration, urbanization, acquisition of new skills, and a new style of life, social relations also experienced a gigantic change. The old patterns of dependency, client relations with local notables, have been largely superseded by more impersonal and objective contractual relations. The disadvantages of low status and the privileges associated with social position—for example, in relations with the authorities—have been drastically reduced in the new context. It therefore seems likely that some of the forms of social conflict that manifested themselves during the civil war in Spain will not reappear, although new, more institutionalized conflicts are taking their place. From a subsistence economy and a labor market dominated by personalistic relations, people have moved into a market economy. As a consequence, Mediterranean peasants today are more likely to be concerned with the relation between agricultural and other prices, with government subsidies for their crops, and even with external markets, than with rents, which are generally frozen, or the acquisition of land through redistribution of large estates. There are still, obviously, areas with landless farm laborers and poor peasants, particularly in south-central Portugal; and in these areas the Communists have obtained a large vote. Even so, the economically marginal groups in southern Europe increasingly resemble those in other countries—they are pensioners, old people, the handicapped, marginal farmers, and similar others.

A number of common factors have contributed to these changes: the preexistence of modern sectors susceptible of expansion, particularly financial institutions and entrepreneurs in some of the societies; the capitalization made possible by the gigantic influx of tourists, which in 1970 contributed 5.2 percent of the GNP in Spain and a lower share, 2.1 percent, in Greece; the remittances of large numbers of migrants working in the wealthier countries of Europe; and foreign investment, which played a particularly important role in Greece. The proximity of the rich countries of Europe was an opportunity that is also one of the sources of tension in the area, for the economies of the southern countries are closely linked with those of the EEC and, therefore, highly dependent on European prosperity. While the share of agriculture in the national product has gone down (in Spain today it is 12.7 percent compared to 5.2 percent among the Nine), the share of agricultural exports is still important and is as high as 30.7

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percent in Greece. In this context, the entry into the Common Market and the Common Agricultural Policy acquires special meaning.[7] While in 1971 the EEC absorbed between 45 and 50 percent of their exports, the share of the United States ranged between 6 percent in Italy and 16 percent in Spain. The technological gap and the resultant dependency adds another heavy burden to the balance of payments.

The political changes that came with the end of authoritarian rule have allowed the working class to press for a larger share in the national income. In Spain, wages, salaries, and the contributions of businesses to social security in 1974 represented 61.85 percent of the net national income; the figure rose to 63.96 percent in 1975 and in 1976 to 66.67 percent—a redistribution about equal to that of the entire previous decade. At the same time the net excess of exploitation of the enterprises has decreased—from 9.59 percent in 1974 to 8.11 percent in 1975, and 5.85 percent in 1976.[8] In Portugal, the share of wages, salaries, and social security contributions rose from 49.1 percent in 1973 to 53.5 in 1974, and to around 62 percent in 1975; in 1976 it dropped back to the 1974 level.[9]

While the inflation rate in the European OECD countries in 1976 was 11.2 percent, the Spanish rate was 19.8 percent and the Italian 21.3 percent; Spain and Italy were the only two OECD countries in which the rate had risen since the previous year. In Portugal during the summer of 1974, inflation reached 25 percent. In Spain unemployment also increased, from 3.22 percent of the salaried population in 1974 to 5.5 percent in 1976. In Portugal it rose from 2.5 percent of the active labor force in 1970 to 13.6 percent in 1975. In that country the return of emigrants to Europe—the *retornados* from the colonies (estimated to be between 5 and 9 percent of the population)—added to the effects of economic recession to swell the ranks of the unemployed in 1977 to an official 18 percent. (According to some estimates, it was 25 percent of the labor force.)

Internationally, the Mediterranean countries have only been partially integrated into the Western political, economic, and military system. Only Italy is a member of both the European Community and NATO. While Portugal and Greece aspire to enter the EEC—and they are both members of NATO—Spain, another aspirant to Community membership, is not a member of NATO; moreover, its entry into the defense alliance is far from assured, although it has a special relation through a military agreement with the United States. Spain and Greece have conflicts with their neighbors that do not fit into the scheme of East-West relations and that, though central to them, are only marginal and disturbing to their European friends. Specifically, these are Spain's conflict with the United Kingdom about Gibraltar, the more immediate problem caused by the turnover of its former colony in the Sahara to Morocco and Mauritania, and—at the other end of the Mediterranean—the Greek-Turkish tensions over Cyprus and the Aegean. Those conflicts create defense needs and alliance problems that do not fit easily into the Western defense system. The presence of Eurocommunist parties in Italy and Spain (with their strong aspirations to become *Koalitionsfahig*) and of Socialist parties with a neutralist bent, sympathy for the Third World, and some connections with the Socialist parties of Arab states make integration into the Western political military system more questionable on both sides. Spain, a neutral of sorts in the two last

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world wars, has been isolated from the continental system of alliances since the time of the Napoleonic wars. Its distance from Eastern Europe, the fact that it was not liberated by the allied powers after World War II, and its tendency to blame the survival of the Franco regime, to some extent, on the willingness of the United States to reach agreements that served its interests, differentiate its foreign policy outlook from that of countries closer to Soviet power.

Capitalism in any of its variants—from liberal market economies to so-called *Soziale Marktwirtschaft* and to the welfare state's mixed economic systems of Northern Europe—has not gained full legitimacy in any Southern European country, as it has not in France.[10] It could be debated whether the lack of legitimacy is a result of the presence of strong Communist parties, as well as that of maximalist Socialist parties, or whether their presence is a result of the lack of legitimacy. Capitalism was not successfully established in any of these countries before, or at the same time as, liberal democracy. Precapitalist elites and a strong Catholic church never accepted the ethos of capitalism, and a dwarfed capitalist industrial development could not provide the masses of workers with a satisfactory standard of living. In Spain, and to a lesser extent in Portugal, capitalist economic development took place largely under an authoritarian regime that did not allow the emergence of a trade union movement that would have institutionalized economic class conflicts and forced, in the moments of prosperity, a more equitable redistribution of national income. To a greater or lesser degree—certainly less than ideologists of the Left would claim—that development has taken the form of dependent capitalism with the presence of multinational corporations, which can become the focus of a nationalistic Left-Socialist hostility. The important role played by financial institutions in the economic development of these countries—easily perceived as oligarchical and privileged, in contrast to their role under a more entrepreneurial capitalism in other European countries and the United States—makes the banks a traditional target. In Portugal this perception has facilitated large-scale socialization, since the banks controlled much of the economy—as, to a lesser extent, they also do in Spain.

Anticapitalism was condoned at the verbal and the ideological level by the authoritarian regimes, and incorporated Catholic corporatist, antiliberal traditions as well as the Fascist ideological heritage. This background—the lack of empathy with business values among large sectors of the middle classes that emerged from the early development of the modern state (bureaucrats and a large professional and educated sector) and the tensions between the more bureaucratic and political/national capitals such as Madrid and Rome and their industrial commercial counterparts, Barcelona and Milan—accounts for the lack of legitimacy accorded the industrial commercial bourgeoisie among the otherwise conservative middle classes. This latent and not-so-latent anticapitalism colors the image of the United States, and even of the European democracies in which Social Democratic parties have given up the utopia of a fully socialist economy. The intellectual success of Marxism among the generations that grew up during the student protests of the late sixties and early seventies, and the affinity of the intellectual styles in these countries with rationalistic global and ethical systems of thought (perhaps a Catholic heritage), helps to account for the present intellectual hegemony of Marxist thought.

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With the exception of Greece, a Greek Orthodox country, the two Mediterranean peninsulas are Catholic. But, in the course of the nineteenth century, and perhaps even before, they underwent a serious religious crisis provoked initially by anticlericalism and later by the indirect consequences of the changed economic position of the Church after the sale of mortmain by the liberal revolutionaries. It made the Church dependent on the bourgeoisie and contributed to the anticlerical and even antireligious moral indignation of the Socialist, and particularly Anarchist, labor movements. The institutionally powerful position of the Church and the hostility it encountered in the liberal-reformist and later the labor movement, turned it, in many parts of those countries, toward ultraconservative positions that further accelerated the alienation of important sectors of the lower middle class and, particularly, the urban and rural working classes. Today the old conflicts, particularly the issue of public support for private education, simmer on. The Left, and more specifically the Eurocommunists, have opted for an open hand to Catholics willing to accept their role in society and join them in particular pursuits. That policy, the Church's awareness of its own weakness—particularly of the lay organizations it sponsors—and, above all, the ideological heterogeneity and the internal crisis that was initiated, crystallized, or accelerated by the Second Vatican Council, have resulted in a radical change in the position of the Church in these societies. In the case of Spain, its identification with the Franco regime—a result of the anticlerical policies of the Republic and the religious persecution that occurred at the onset of the civil war—has been questioned by new generations of Catholic lay leaders and clergy; critical of the costs of that collaboration with the regime, they reflect a new social consciousness. Catholic laymen identify with the Communist party, and well-known priests even appear at Communist rallies. But the presence of leftist Catholicism, however vocal and intellectually articulate, should not hide the fact that religion continues to be, in all the countries of the Catholic Mediterranean, the decisive variable in accounting for the moderate and conservative electoral choices of the voters. In fact, it is a more important factor than social class. In the case of a real conflict between Church and state, the Catholic church could still mobilize large segments of the electorate. Religious leaders can help delegitimize the existing social and economic system—particularly capitalism. But at the same time, the Catholic subculture is one of the obstacles the Left encounters constantly in its drive toward hegemony.[11]

In summary, while structural and, particularly, economic problems are central to the future of Southern Europe—in fact they are the immediate source of some of its disquiet; in this area of the world *politique d'abord* is still prominent. The technocratic values that dominate so many of the councils of the New Europe, the skillful bargaining between corporatively organized interests—particularly trade unions and employers—the prominent role played by civil servants and experts in serving or imposing their choices on political leaders in Northern or a large part of Western Europe, is not the dominant, or at least the most visible, and certainly not the legitimate pattern of politics in Southern Europe. Grand political questions will be endlessly debated and alternative models of the social and economic order advocated; symbolic issues will flare up, foreign policy dilemmas will be formulated in ideological terms, and, in

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Spain, even the unity of the state created more than four centuries ago is being questioned by a small minority of the Basque population (an even tinier proportion is ready to use violence to achieve its goal). The youthfulness, and, to some extent, inexperience of the new political class of the new democracies,[12] the weak institutionalization of newly organized interest groups in Spain and Portugal, and the presence of parties like the Communist—which are perceived as antisystem in Portugal and of dubious legitimacy by large segments of the population in Spain and even Italy—make political debate salient and potentially dangerous. (In Greece, the memory of the Communist uprising and the subsequent civil war is even more damaging.) Political debate leads to a relative neglect and intractability of some of the more mundane and immediate economic problems and their social consequences, even while it fails to resolve the political questions. Some of them really are unsolvable—like the status of the Basques—or difficult to solve—like the integration of the Communist parties into the democratic political system (in spite of the almost heroic efforts of some Eurocommunists). Yet, their solution is in many ways a precondition for the continuous economic progress to which the populations of these countries have so quickly become accustomed. The incertitude about the economic system of the future, despite moderate conservative electoral victories and disclaimers of their ideological rhetoric by leaders on the Left, is likely to make continuous capitalist economic development more difficult; meanwhile the strength of conservative interests and the integration of these countries into the Western economic system makes a rapid transition to socialism difficult or unlikely, except at an extremely high cost. This fundamental ambivalence is not too different from the one noted by the Social Democratic leader Treves in March of 1920: "This is the tragedy of the present crisis. You can no longer impose your order on us and we cannot yet impose ours on you."[13]

If there is one word that characterizes the situation in Southern Europe more clearly than in other parts of Europe, it is *ambivalence*—ambivalence about the present and the future, in politics, the economy, and the international position. That profound ambivalence makes the situation ambiguous. Paradoxically, the great economic and social changes of the last decade and a half, and the even more dramatic change toward democracy—which was long awaited by large segments of the population, is welcomed by most of those willing to adjust in the past to authoritarian rule, and is actively opposed by only a few—have not created confidence in the future and in shared hopes. Hope in the new political field on the left, the disappointment of its supporters on economic matters, and fears that are more or less openly expressed in the political and economic realm by those who have most to lose by some of the advocated changes account for the fundamental ambiguity of the situation. There are alternative speculative scenarios for the area and for each of the countries, and some of them are quite disturbing. On the other hand, there are many indications of a strong desire on the part of large segments of the population in these countries for stability, liberty within a democratic order, continuing economic growth, and some degree of social change. Contrary to the impression one might derive from reading certain sources or listening to the rhetoric and the fearful rumors of others, neither a revolutionary nor an authoritarian reaction generates widespread support today. Those alternatives are likely to become successful only if

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the responsible leadership of the democratic political system fails, if it creates unnecessarily unsolvable problems, if it is unable to keep things under control in the face of violent active minorities ready to produce a disarray among the system-supporting forces, or if it does not adequately manage, alone or with outside help, immediately pressing economic problems. If the democratic leadership, to use Ortega y Gasset's phrase, is "at the height of its times," the problems might well be solvable—with some exceptions—and will allow the Southern European democracies to consolidate or reequilibrate.

Spain, Portugal, and Greece: New Democracies in Difficult Times

In Italy democratic institutions, in spite of their failings, have taken root within a well-entrenched party system based on highly integrated subcultures. But in Spain democracy has just been instituted. There the party system is still largely inchoate, and the dominant government party is without membership and not based, like Christian Democracy in Italy, on a subcultural community. In Italy the questions are the following. How far can the crisis, the survival without governing go on? Is there room for reequilibration of a democratic system or at least for survival without a breakdown? In Greece, Portugal, and Spain, the question is: Will democracy be consolidated? There are fundamental similarities between Spain and Portugal, both of which came late to democracy after, respectively, forty-seven and thirty-six years of authoritarian rule.[14]

There are also some differences that deserve a brief analysis. In Spain, the rule of Franco was established after a bloody civil war that lasted three years and divided a whole generation of Spaniards (fortunately, it is by now an aging generation). In Portugal, the Salazar regime came to power without such a dramatic break with the past. Rather it evolved out of the disintegration and crisis of a democracy that had not politically mobilized large parts of the country, and as a result of a military coup and a slow process of consolidation of a civilian dictatorship that also made no effort to mobilize large parts of the population. Although the regime, particularly in its latest phases, left some scars, it has engendered nothing comparable to the bitter memories of the Spanish Civil War. In addition, the regime of Caetano, after an unsuccessful effort at internal transformation, was overthrown by a quick and successful military coup, accompanied by the enthusiasm of the revolution of the flowers.[15] The change of regime was the result of an unsolvable problem generated by the leaders' unwillingness to face decolonization, the frustrations of a colonial army, and the cost of a war that went far beyond the resources of a small and internationally isolated country engaged in a hopeless conflict. The new regime could claim credit for ending that problem, even though the way in which it was solved—the sudden and unplanned decolonization—left the bitter legacy of the returnees from Angola; in the present economic situation, these ex-colonials cannot—unlike the *pied noirs* in France and even the *Heimatvertriebene* in Germany and Finland after the war—be effectively incorporated into the economy and society.

In contrast, the Franco regime—though it was decaying rapidly in the last few years, encountering increasing opposition, and facing an unsolvable problem in the Basque Country—died only with the death of its founder and the decision of his more enlightened supporters to move, first slowly and then expe-

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ditiously, to democracy.[16] The change in Portugal involved the army, the Movimento das Forças Armadas (MFA), in the decision making, and gave the young *capitanes* power to undertake a revolutionary change in society. Even though the MFA has since become the Forças Armadas Portuguesas (FAP) and the more colorful leaders of the military revolution have been displaced, the army retains a very special position; the candidates to the presidency of the Republic were military men, and no one thought a civilian should claim the post. Political parties that initially played a secondary role, and whose ascendancy depended on the links they were able to establish with the young officers, have slowly regained ground they had given up in the agreement with the MFA before the constituent assembly elections; these elections really established a diarchy between the MFA and the parties to a pact that gave veto powers and constitutional influence in all major decision-making areas to the council of the armed forces. It could even be asked whether such a diarchy really fits the definition of a democracy.

In Spain, the transition has been smoother, and was carried out according to the formal constitutional provisions of the Franco Fundamental Laws; the decisive step of calling for a directly elected assembly to make a new constitution was taken by the old Cortes, largely appointed by Franco, in November, 1976. The transition has been a clear example of constitutional change contrary to the spirit of the constitution but constitutionally made—what the Germans would call *verfassungwidrige Verfassungsänderung*—and in this aspect it is not too different from the transition to a Nazi dictatorship within the formal framework of the Weimar constitution. This transition has its advantages, but also its costs. Democracy enjoys the formal legitimacy derived from legality, even for many who are not happy with the change, and this formula, called in Spanish political language *reforma*, has made it easy for an army whose political outlook is quite different from that of the Portuguese to accept democracy. The Portuguese military coup and the internal transformation of the armed forces by the MFA —which allowed the military to play a political role—led to a very different internal change in the armed forces; in Spain, the army is the outsider standing by a process carried out by civilians. Another element of continuity with the past, with all the ambivalences connected with that fact, is Juan Carlos I. The young king confronts the difficult task of combining in his instauration the contradictions derived from its planning by Franco (intended to give continuity to the dictator's system) and his own decision to opt for a constitutional monarchy, which contributed decisively to the installation of democratic institutions. Juan Carlos gained popular support for himself, and thereby for the monarchical institution which no longer enjoyed the traditional legitimacy accorded it in some other European democracies. Southern European democracies offer an interesting opportunity to compare the role of elected presidents, with all the complexities that go into presidential politics, with the relative continuity and stability of a monarchy.[17]

Both the Spanish and the Portuguese are multiparty systems, but there are some fundamental differences between them.[18] No Spanish party has been able (until now) to obtain the 37.9 percent vote the Portuguese Socialists obtained in 1975. The Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD), the party of Suárez, had only 34.85 percent of the vote in 1977—even though they earned 47.1 percent of the

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seats.[19] In Spain, there are regional parties that poll around 7 percent of the vote and hold 19 of the 350 seats in the lower house. There are no such parties in Portugal, which is one of the oldest and most culturally homogeneous nation-states in Europe. The Communist party of Portugal, the PCP, obtained 12.5 percent of the vote in 1975, to which one might add the 4.1 percent of the MDP, a fellow-traveling party; in 1976, after disintegration of the MDP, it obtained 14.6 percent. The Spanish Communists were less successful, obtaining only 9.3 percent of the vote. Those electoral returns tell very little about the role the Communist parties play in their respective societies, however. The semi-revolutionary period that preceded the elections allowed the PCP to assume a controlling position in the Intersindical, the trade union federation, while their Spanish brethren have to compete openly with other trade union organizations. The initial period of Portuguese democracy allowed the PCP to consolidate what is called in Portugal *poder social*, a somewhat stronger influence than the Italian Communist *presenza*. There are extensive areas of Portugal in which the PCP gained the largest plurality—the industrial province of Setubal, south of Lisbon, and two agricultural provinces, Evora and Beja, where they obtained over 40 percent of the vote and made considerable gains between the two elections. There are no comparable Communist strongholds in the Spanish provinces. On the other hand, the Portuguese PCP finds itself much more isolated than the Spanish PCE. Its implication in a military coup in November, 1975, from which it backed away just in time, and its bid for hegemony during 1975, created widespread distrust, not only right of center, but within the Portuguese Socialist party. And it seems doubtful that they would be Koalitionsfähig in the near future.

The Spanish PCE is under the adroit leadership of an old political hand who even before the civil war was the head of the Spanish Socialist Youth Organization; he has made his extreme Eurocommunist position increasingly credible, renouncing Leninism and many of the symbols of the past, and following a policy aimed at the consolidation of the institutions. This strategy might not pay much in votes, but it certainly makes things more difficult for old-fashioned anti-Communists. And although there is bitter competition in the trade unions between the Comisiones Obreras (Communist) and the Unión General de Trabajadores (Socialist), there is more room for cooperation on specific issues for the Left in Spain than in Portugal. The electoral geography itself presents the parties of the Left with the dilemma of either conceding a number of seats in local governments to the UCD or moving toward a popular front; adding the vote of Socialists and Communists makes them close to a majority, if not a majority, in many Spanish municipalities. The electoral geography of Portugal seldom imposes the opportunity and need for cooperation on the Left.

Another major difference between the two party systems is that after the emerging right-wing parties were outlawed (following the ouster of Spinola), no Portuguese party could claim continuity and loyalty to the authoritarian past, as the Spanish Alianza Popular (AP) did at its party congress and in the elections—even while committing itself to the new democratic institutions. In Spain, there is no neo-Fascist party like the Italian MSI, which is outside of the *arco costituzionale* and excluded from coalitions represented in the parliament; but for an important sector of Spanish public opinion, the AP, despite its efforts, is not a

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system party. The Portuguese party system in this respect is less centrifugal and fits poorly the model of extreme polarized multiparty systems of Sartori. In fact, as long as the PCP remains isolated, the Portuguese Socialist party (PS), with 35 percent of the vote, the Social Democratic party (PPD), at 24 percent, and the Centro Democratico Social (CDS), which comes close, with its 15.9 percent, to being a Christian Democratic party, could operate like the model of limited multiparty systems in Northern and Central European countries. The PS has shown great reluctance to play such a game and has preferred instead to force other parties to accept a minority Socialist government, even when alternative coalitions were open to it. However, in January, 1978, Soares was forced to accept three CDS members in the cabinet whose fall in August would lead, after the parties proved unable to form a coalition, to a presidentially appointed and supported cabinet and the (temporary) self-exclusion of the parties. It is difficult to imagine that in Spain with the presence of the PCE and AP; the two dominant parties in the center of the spectrum, the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) and the UCD, will limit themselves to competing with each other rather than attracting votes, or will bypass, in the case of the PSOE, those on their flanks at the Right and the Left—as we would expect from the Sartorian model of extreme polarized multipartyism.

Another difference between Spain and Portugal is the level of economic development. Portugal was a much more underdeveloped country. Its GNP in 1975 was $15,000 million—the Spanish was $97,140 million—and their respective per capita incomes are $1,570 and $2,750. The different scale of the economies cannot be ignored when both are facing crisis; bailing Portugal out of its troubles is quite a different process from bailing out Spain. In addition, the more recent economic development of Portugal, the relative backwardness of much of its countryside, the lack of participation of large parts of its population in consumption society, make the contrast between expectations and disillusion with the present economic situation much less visible and painful than it is in Spain, where over the last decade and a half the masses had started to participate in the prosperity of the sixties. In Portugal, retreat to the countryside, which, north of Lisbon, is dominated by small holdings of subsistence farmers, is still feasible; many of the migrants to the Spanish cities, however, sold their rural properties, or never had any, and the loss of a job and return to the village would be unbearable. There is also a fundamental difference between the entrepreneurial class in the two countries: small, regionally concentrated, familistic, and largely oligarchical in Portugal, it is much larger and more socially and geographically heterogeneous in Spain. If Spain had experienced an economic and social crisis similar to Portugal's recent problems, I wonder whether Spanish society and its conservative institutions could have withstood the storm. From a strictly economic point of view, Portugal—particularly after the loss of its colonial empire and the economic disarray created in both city and countryside by the socialization—is likely to be less affected, in its social stability, than Spain. Perhaps because of its higher level of development, greater capital and entrepreneurial resources, and much higher standard of living for its masses, Spain will suffer more. Moreover, a deep economic crisis in Spain would find the government without the reserves accumulated during the thrifty management of Salazar, whose mentality was that of a finance minister rather than a

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minister for economic development. The Spanish economy, though it is much more dynamic, linked more closely with the world economic system, and more bent on investment and development than balancing its accounts, is potentially more vulnerable than the Portuguese. The revolutionary changes that have taken place in Portugal, while costly economically and in part subject to revision, have produced deep changes in the society, particularly in some parts of the countryside. These changes might have contributed to legitimizing the change of regime for important sectors of the population, while the more conservative transition to democracy experienced by Spain is likely to disappoint the hopes for rapid and decisive social change of important segments of the population—particularly in the southern countryside. There is room for serious discontent among the unemployed and particularly the farm laborers, and also, and in this respect the Spanish countryside is more comparable to that of other Western European countries, among owner-farmers caught in the squeeze between industrial and agricultural prices.

It could be argued that Spanish democracy might very well go the way of Italian democracy. The social structure of the two countries presents many similarities; and both, though they have reached a relatively high level of industrialization, are still a long way from the postindustrial era. In both there are important regions that suffer economic underdevelopment, population pressure, and the consequences of an unjust distribution of wealth—even though in the case of Spain the problem is less concentrated in a single region, as it is in the Italian Mezzogiorno, and social disintegration has not reached the same levels as in Italy—with its clientelism, Mafia, and the significant presence of neo-Fascism in the south. The Spanish electorate began its course with a greater strength on the Left than Italy did in 1946. The Spanish Communist party, however, has been weaker—pulling only 9.3 percent of the vote, compared to 18.9 percent in Italy; it has a long road ahead before it reaches the 34.4 percent attained by the PCI in 1976. Will the Spanish Socialists retain their dominant position on the Left (29.4 percent of the vote) or will they follow the course of the Italian Socialists, who started in 1946 with 20.7 percent and were reduced to 9.6 percent for the PSI and 3.4 percent for the PSDI in 1976? It seems doubtful that the UCD could ever attain the extraordinary success of the Italian DC in 1948 with (48.5 percent of the vote) nor even hold onto the 38.7 percent it still polls after thirty years of power and, as many Italians would say, of mismanagement.

The essential difference between the Italian party system and the Spanish is the absence of a Christian Democratic party with all that this implies—the anchoring of party loyalties in a religious subculture, the availability to the party of a network of leaders and activists in every parish, the support of religiously oriented professional associations, the more or less explicit direct or indirect support of the Church, the ideological base in a flexible system of ideas capable of encompassing progressive leftist ideas (but also conservative thought), and the strong international links that made Christian Democratic parties active leaders in the process of European unification. It obviously is not the same to build a party without those supporting structures—and even less so in a period in which the cold war has cooled and in which anti-Communism is more difficult to articulate against a Eurocommunist party.

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The UCD was built by transforming an electoral coalition into a unified party encompassing different ideological strains and personalities, some of whom only reluctantly accepted the leadership of Prime Minister Suárez, whose appeal could assure them a seat. The men in the UCD share many things, particularly their interests as a political class, their social position, education, and style of life, but their political biographies during the Franco regime are quite various. Some were in the opposition, while others were provincial governors of Franco; the latent tensions produced by this difference are likely to be overcome, but the UCD elite will never have a shared frame of reference and all the interpersonal connections that have been the basis of Christian Democrats. Without the religious base it is difficult to build an interclass party and, despite strenuous efforts to place it on the center left and to reject the conservative positions of many party leaders, the UCD is more likely to look like a modern conservative party, like French parties to the right of the Socialists, than like a Christian Democratic one. On the other hand, a party not linked to or identified with the Church in an increasingly secular society antagonizes fewer people and can be more flexible on many of the issues that tied the Christian Democrats in Italy to the Church. The secular character of the UCD, in spite of the presence of Christian Democrats and Opus Dei members on its benches, is an advantage for the Spanish political system, where religiously based conflicts contributed so much to the crisis and breakdown of the Second Republic.

A different question is the capacity of the UCD to expand into regions with an autonomist tradition—Catalonia and the Basque Country—and, therefore, to serve as a national party of integration of the Center-Right. This is a problem the Italian Christian Democrats did not have to face. On the other hand, the UCD is not flanked, if we ignore the Catalanist Pacte Democratic per Catalunya, by minor parties like the Italian Social Democratic PSDI, the Republicans, and even the Liberals, who contributed their leaders and their distinctive clienteles to coalition governments until that possibility was exhausted; then, when the voters of that party had been reduced to 15 percent, the *apertura a sinistra* took its place with the inclusion of the Partito Socialista Italiano (PSI). In Spain the idea of a coalition between the UCD and the PSOE is often mentioned and might even be welcomed by some segments of the electorate. But those who make the suggestion ignore the basic facts until the next election. Electorally such a coalition would represent 64.23 percent of the electorate and hold 291 of the 350 seats. It would be contrary to the idea of the minimum winning coalition encompassing extremely heterogeneous positions; it ignores the relative strength of the PSOE and its ambition to be an alternative government leader—the *alternativa democrática* constantly proclaimed by Felipe González as a goal of his party. In my view such a coalition, except in an extreme crisis situation, would make both parties vulnerable to the appeal of their competitors, the PCE and AP, if not to serious internal crisis that might lead to their breakup and to the further, and sooner, fragmenting of the party system. The Spanish party system, like the Italian, tends to make the Center party (the UCD, and perhaps tomorrow the Center-Left PSOE if it moves in the Social Democratic direction) the only force that can govern; at the same time, it makes it very difficult for the Center party to enter into alliances that would assure it a comfortable parliamentary majority but would also polarize the country. The

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Spanish party system imposes a minority government that can only sustain itself thanks to the parliamentary toleration by one or more opposition parties and the cooperation of minor parties—in the Spanish case, the regionalistic parties, which can exact a heavy price for their support. We do not share the view of some analysts who, forgetting the parties on the extremes of the spectrum, think the Spanish system will allow the emergence of a limited two-party system based alternatively on the PSOE and the UCD. In addition, the internal heterogeneity of the UCD constantly stimulates hopes, on the part of the PSOE, that some deputies of the UCD might defect from the leadership of Suárez and help the PSOE to power—perhaps with the support of regional parties. This hope is itself an obstacle to the institutionalization of government and responsible loyal opposition and encourages tendencies toward the Italian pattern—parties surviving in power without governing and sharing power without sharing responsibility—which was so well described by Giuseppe Di Palma. The desire to win broad consensus to avoid open and public confrontations between government and opposition, the use of transformistic devices, the combination of opposition in the hustings and on the streets, and cooperation in parliament that characterize recent Italian politics already have some parallels in Spain.

The Pacto de la Moncloa, an all-party agreement to face economic problems during the transition period and to institute some basic policies based on consensus, was a step in this direction, even though Suárez has made clear that this might not be the pattern after approval of the constitution. There are, however, strong pressures, inherited from the Franco period, for an all-encompassing polity and an ideology that is also congruent with the Catholic conception of the *bonum comune*, which delegitimizes the selfish defense of interest that characterizes Anglo-Saxon pluralist democracy. Some of the differences between the conception of democracy of British MP's and Italian deputies discovered by Robert Putnam fit very well into this model.[20] Obviously, as the Italian experience shows, the struggle of interest politics continues underneath, but without public legitimacy.

There is, finally, a small but not negligible difference between Spanish and Italian politics: the relative strength of parties to the Left of the Communists. In Spain those parties were able to gather 3.05 percent of the vote in the June, 1978, election, while in Italy they obtained 2.8 percent. In one province, Navarre, these parties managed to get 9.6 percent of the vote. One of the largest local votes they could get in Italy was 3.5 percent in one city. Those figures become even more significant if we contrast a 2.8 percent for extremist Left parties and a 34.4 percent for the Communists in Italy with a 3.05 percent and a 9.2 percent, respectively, in Spain. Even though the PCE totally ignores the competition on its Left, we cannot fail to mention it as one of the differences from the Italian situation.

Up to the present, Spanish democracy has the advantage of not facing a neo-Fascist party like the Movimento Sociale Italiano, which polled 6 percent of the vote in 1976 and has links with extremist *groupuscules*; for the Fuerza Nueva, which is closely linked with extreme Right violence, and other radical Right groups, only managed to obtain 0.61 percent of the vote in 1977. AP, under the leadership of Fraga, clearly does not want to move in this direction even though some of its voters might be tempted to do so if there were a polarization of

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Spanish society. In some respects then, one could say that the Italian party system is more fragmented than the Spanish, disregarding for the moment the presence of regional autonomist and nationalist parties in Spain.

There are tendencies in the Spanish party system that would also make developments similar to those in France possible: that is, the great coalition of the Left based on a common program. Of course, the suspicions of the Socialists toward the Communists, their self-image as the dominant party on the Left, the unwillingness of the PCE to take too many chances in the period of consolidation of democracy, and its distrust of the youthful and more ideological leadership of the PSOE makes such a development unlikely in the immediate future. On the other hand, the Eurocommunist stance of Carrillo makes the PCE a much more eligible party for democratic politics than the PCF. However, historical origins and development of the UCD and AP, in spite of many points of contact, make a cooperation among all the bourgeois parties of the Right more difficult than in France. A bipolar election, like the French election of 1978, would create extremely serious strains for the new Spanish democracy.

The Greek transition to democracy in 1974 is in some respects between the Portuguese and the Spanish model.[21] The process that led to a civilian government under Karamanlis and the call for free elections was not a reform process initiated in an orderly fashion by the colonels' regime; instead it was imposed by the threat of a military coup of the third army, and was, in that respect, similar to the Portuguese development. But rather than leading to a *Machtergreifung* by the military, it led President General Gizikis, in a military-civilian recall, to turn over power to a party leader in exile. There was, therefore, some element of continuity with an authoritarian regime whose characteristics were quite different from the one in Spain. The transfer of power was the result of an unsolvable crisis created for Greece and the Ionnidis regime by the disaster in Cyprus after the Greek intervention against Makarios and the subsequent Turkish invasion. In this respect, the Greek case is similar to the Portuguese: external events impinged on the country and the armed forces and provoked a regime crisis that was suddenly and unexpectedly resolved by a transition to democracy. It is, however, fundamentally different from the Portuguese situation in that it did not create a revolutionary or semirevolutionary crisis, nor provoke a rise to power of the Left; its transferred power to the leader of the national radical union Ethniki Risopastiki Enosis (ERE), a leader and a party that had held the prime ministership (1955-1963) before the coup of April 21, 1967. The duration of the military rule (less than that of a French president); the fact that it had come to power not as a result of a polarization in society, nor of the mobilization of a mass antidemocratic movement, but because of a well-executed coup by a small group of conspirators accepted by the king and internationally recognized; that it proved unable to institutionalize itself and had very little success in coopting civilian political leaders; and that it itself suffered a number of internal crises that led to the displacement of Papadopoulos in a coup in November, 1973—all allow us to speak of a restoration of democracy rather than the installation of a new regime. However, in the years between the 1967 coup and 1974, many things had changed in Greece. The monarchy had contributed decisively to the crisis of parliamentary democracy in the period preceding the coup; it had alienated the political class by allowing Papadopoulos to use the authority of the king; then it attempted to oust the colonels in a badly planned coup that led to

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the exile of the king and, later, to the abrogation of the monarchy by the junta. In spite of some monarchical sentiment in the navy, which manifested itself in mutinies against the military dictatorship, Karamanlis did not reestablish the monarchy; shortly after his parliamentary success, he obtained a 70 percent vote in a referendum in favor of the Republic. In the new democracy Karamanlis found himself in a stronger position than Suárez; as a leader who had suffered exile and the hostility of the colonels, he did not encounter the kind of ambivalent response among the political class faced by Suárez.

The short-lived dictatorship and its repressive policies affected distinguished figures of Greek life—including moderate politicians—with its terror and tortures, its outdated style, its foreign policy failures, and the widespread image of being an instrument, if not the product, of foreign interests. It aroused a deep hostility that makes reviewing the past a lively issue to this day. It also created, in opposition, a degree of convergence among a highly factioned political class and gave rise to active and massive protests—particularly among the students of the Technical University—which required repressive actions on a scale not found in metropolitan Portugal under Salazar and Caetano.

The political history of Greece left to democracy a number of complicating legacies. While the regional conflicts do not have the same intensity they do in Spain, in the absence of autonomist and separatist aspirations, the country faces a greater burden of foreign policy dilemmas because of the Cyprus question, the historical heritage of conflict with the Turks, and upcoming disputes about the Aegean and its petroleum resources. The confrontation between Venizelos and the king, the issue of monarchy-republic, and the Metaxas dictatorship before the war, all contributed to the political fractionalization. An even more important, and still resounding cleavage was produced by the attempt of a Communist takeover (1944) and the subsequent civil war (1946-1949); once more in the long history of Greece foreign linkages—first with Britain and then with the United States—were decisive for the consolidation of the monarchy. The Communist attempt left a bitter legacy and accounts for the radical anti-Communism in the armed forces that was one of the factors in the 1967 coup. More than in any other Mediterranean country, foreign policy issues occupy a central place in the political debate. The whole history of Greek independence has created a consciousness of the importance of international alignments for internal politics. The foreign-supported Communist bid for power and its defeat with Western help, the association of the Greek economy with its commercial and maritime activities, and the weakness of the national industrial entrepreneurial class—together with the importance of emigration to the Common Market countries of its laborers—have made the theme of underdevelopment and dependence central to the Left. The true or alleged intervention of the CIA, the relations between the United States and the junta, and the complexities of American and European politics in relation to the two feuding allies—Greece and Turkey—in the Cyprus question make the issues of relations with NATO and the EEC more controversial than those of the Iberian peninsula. Despite the government's effort to beat the Left at its own foreign policy game, Andreas Papandreou and his Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) have been able to capitalize on a supernationalist stand and a tendency to identify external enemies as a source of evils and misfortunes for the people. As a leading opposition

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Table 1

Percentage of vote and number of seats gained by different parties in most recent election in Southern Europe

Ideological Tendency	Italy (June, 1976) Votes, %	Seats	Greece (November, 1977) Votes, %	Seats	Portugal (May, 1976) Votes, %	Seats	Spain (June, 1977) Votes, %	Seats	France (March, 1978) Votes, %	Seats
Extreme Left	DP (1.5)	6	—	—	Eight parties (4.8)	1	FDI (PTE) (1.46) AET (ORT) (0.44) Other (1.15) Total (3.05)	— — 1	(1st ballot) (3.3)	—
Communists	PCI (34.4)	228	KKE (Ex) (9.3) C. Party of the Interior (2.7)	11 2	PPC (14.6)	40	PCE-PSUC (9.28)	20	PCF (20.6)	86
Socialists	PSI (9.6)	57	PASOK (25.3)	93	PS (35.0)	106	PSP (US) (4.49) PSOE (29.38)	6 118	PS (22.6)	103
Other Left Center Left	PR (1.1) PSDI (3.4) PRI (3.1)	4 15 14	—	—	PPD (24.0)	71	ASD (0.75)		MRG (2.1)	10
Regional and nationalist parties	Svp (0.5) Valle d'Aosta (0.2)	2 1	—	—	—	—	EE (0.34) PNV (1.70) EC (0.74) PDC (3.73) UDC-CC (0.92) Galician parties (0.28)	1 8 1 11 2 —	—	—
Center Christian Democrats	DC (38.7)	262	—	—	CDS (15.9)	41	FDC (1.41)	—	—	—
Other	—	—	Center Union (12.0) Nea-Democratia (41.9)	15 172	—	—	UCD (34.8)	167	Soutien du Pres. Rep. (2.4) UDF (21.5)	4 137
Right	PLI (1.3)	5	—	—	PPM (0.5)	—	AP (8.4)	16	RPR (22.6)	148
Other parties	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Ecologists (2.1) Others (1.2)	— 3
Total, 100% of vote		629		300		259		350		491

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party, PASOK has introduced a style of politics, a new group of political personnel (out of its 93 deputies, 73 were elected for the first time in 1977), and an appeal based on populist social and economic grievances; thus Papandreou's concerns differ from those of the pre-1967 parties—including the Center Union led by his father, George Papandreou.

The Nea-Democratia, which in 1974 gained 54.4 percent of the vote and 220 of the 300 seats and could, therefore, have governed alone (though it chose to enter a coalition with the Center Union of Mavros), saw its support reduced to 41.9 percent of the vote and 172 seats in 1977, while PASOK increased its share from 13.6 to 25.3 percent and, thanks to the electoral law favoring larger parties, from 12 to 93 seats. In view of the difficulties in foreign policy and economic matters that Karamanlis is likely to encounter, the heavy losses of his ally Mavros, and the absence of smaller buffer parties, the possibility of an alternation between the Right and the Left cannot be excluded. On the other hand, there are elements of polarization in the Greek political system: first, the presence and success of the Communist party of Greece, a Moscow-oriented party that gained 9.36 percent of the vote (compared to 2.72 percent for the Communist party of the Interior—in alliance with four other small parties—which advocated a Eurocommunist position, and to 9.45 percent for the United Left (EA) in the previous election); and second, the simultaneous gains of the National Front, the extreme right-wing party identified with the fallen regime, which moved from 1.10 percent to 6.82 percent of the vote. Although the highly unequal electoral system, for the time being, prevents the parties on the extreme ends from playing the role Sartori assigns to them in polarized, centrifugal, multiparty systems, the electoral distributions and tendencies point in that direction.[22]

The dictatorship, by suspending political activity and disrupting established ties, has led to a new pattern—the competition of a conservative party whose electoral support depends in part on clientelistic traditional patterns with a populist mass party that calls itself Socialist, that rejects the Northern and Western European Social Democratic model, and interprets the Greek situation as sui generis from a nationalist perspective. The latter's anti-NATO and anti-EEC position (it advocates a more Norwegian type of connection with the Market) is combined with a program of social reform and benefits for the small people of city and countryside to counteract the advantages of privileged economic groups and foreign capitalists. The confrontation of these conservative and socialist alternatives, led by two forceful leaders in the volatile international situation of Greece and in the shadow of the armed forces, is quite different from the complex politics of consensus in Italy (which some would call "consociational") and from the efforts of Suárez to reach a broader consensus—at least in the constitution-making process—and to face the economic crisis with the Moncloa agreements.

Mediterranean Socialism: An Alternative to Social Democracy?

One of the distinctive elements in the politics of Mediterranean countries is a strong tendency to question the Social Democratic model of society and politics and to advance the idea that the Socialist parties of Southern Europe could offer an appealing alternative that would be closer to true socialism. At many meet-

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ings of the PSOE militants, the chant, "La socialdemocracia no nos hace gracia," expressed exactly this sentiment. In early 1977, Spaniards confronted with the ideological alternatives of "social democracy" and "socialism," in a list that also included liberalism, Christian democracy, communism, and so on, chose one or the other—probably attributing very imprecise meanings to the words; significantly their particular choice correlated well with very different attitudes toward most problems. The PSOE has won votes from both sectors of opinion, even though a wing of the UCD calls itself Social Democratic and has been able to gain some votes among those identifying with that ideological alternative. The activists of the PSOE, however, tend to reject social democracy, and the term has acquired a pejorative meaning; party leaders are much less explicit in their position, although they too studiously avoid the term.

Mediterranean Socialist parties define themselves programmatically as Marxists, though recently Felipe González, perhaps as a reflection of the PCE's abandonment of Leninism, raised the question of whether it might be desirable to drop the commitment to Marxism in the party program without questioning the obvious Marxist contribution to socialism. The distinctive views of southern Socialists were articulated most clearly by the parties not affiliated with the Socialist International; but even among the latter a clear cleavage appeared between two blocs differentiated on certain positions: a northern bloc under the leadership of the Labor party and the SPD, and a southern bloc centered on the PSF and the PSOE (presumably on the basis of their superior strength, compared to the Italian PSI). In 1975 and 1976 at several meetings, particularly at Elsinore, the difference between the two blocs became apparent. The main, and most immediate issue was the position toward the Communist party, an issue central to the Common Program of Mitterrand and his hopes for a Left government in France. The presence of strong Communist parties in all the countries in the area made this issue central. Alfonso Guerra, a member of the executive of PSOE and a close friend of Felipe González, formulated it: "since the Socialist parties have chosen a strategy of rupture and the Communist parties affirm their political autonomy, there is the possibility of unity without any of the parties being hegemonic. . . . The coordination of the forces of the Left requires the collaboration among the socialist parties of different countries, between Socialist and Communist parties, with the progressive forces (Christians, and so on), with the trade unions. . . . To give up irrational competition, the anti-Socialist campaigns of some Communist parties and the anti-Communist of some Socialists which do not favor anyone but the Right in power. Socialist and Communist should become conscious of the common task and act accordingly."[23]

A hope was expressed that the new political conditions in the south of Europe would modify the world political outlook. As Guerra put it: "The American influence in Europe and the politics of defense (NATO versus Warsaw Pact) can be broken by the political presence of the progressive forces in power in the southern European countries."[24] To these ideological differences among the parties one could add the natural tensions derived from the North-South relation between economically less-developed countries and the wealthiest industrial nations of Europe—countries of emigration and recipients of *Gastarbeiter*, countries in which foreign investment comes from the advanced capitalist countries and investing nations. This unequal relationship has led to a degree of

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identification with the Third World, which manifests itself in sympathy for the PLO and support for the Frente Polisario. The neutralist position of the PSOE is reflected in its readiness to question Spain's entry into NATO but not into the EEC, and in its willingness to entertain contacts with leaders of Communist countries and parties—some of which sent delegates to the PSOE congress.

An even more explicit Mediterranean socialism led to two conferences, one in Barcelona in November, 1976, and the other in Malta in June, 1977; a third is planned for Athens in 1979. Those conferences aimed to bring together parties from the European and the Arab sides of the Mediterranean to express their independence from, and opposition to, the Socialist International, which was considered too Eurocentric, too pro-Israeli, and dominated by the Northern European Social Democrats. This gave the Arabs a forum from which to express their views on the Middle East and find understanding partners in Europe; and it gave all the parties an opportunity to focus attention on the Mediterranean and denounce the intervention of outside powers in the area, drum up support for their own favored national or political cause, and accumulate some political capital for domestic use. This latter consideration was certainly important for the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP) and the Federación de Partidos Socialistas (FPS) in relation to their opposition to the PSOE. The Barcelona conference was organized, with Libyan financing, by these two parties, the Maltese Labour party, and the General People's Congress of Libya; PASOK, EDEK of Cyprus, the Algerian party, and the PLO participated. At the second conference, in Malta, the French, Italian, and Spanish Socialist parties, the PCI, the Socialist Alliance from Yugoslavia, and a number of Arab Socialists came but preferred to remain observers. The natural differences in outlook among the various parties—ranging from the religion and socialism linkage of the Libyans, to the European community's rejection of Papandreou, to those advocating that the Mediterranean conferences be related to the North-South and Europe-Arab dialogues—led to few agreements. At Malta, the main points of agreement were support for the Palestinians, the territorial integrity and neutrality of Cyprus, the neutrality and nonalignment of Malta, and support for liberation movements like the Polisario.

It will be interesting to see what influence the former leader of the PSP, which is now fused with the PSOE, will be able to exercise in the direction of a Mediterranean socialism. But even independently of cooperation between parties, there are undeniable differences of outlook between southern and northern Socialists, even though there are social democratic wings in the South and Marxist-leftist tendencies in the North that give each other ideological, and perhaps more than ideological, support. On the other hand, one cannot forget the strong links established between the leading Socialist parties of the Iberian peninsula and the Socialist International, and particularly the SPD; these associations allegedly involve important financial support. The consideration of what practical political significance the divergent ideological positions will have, should some of these parties come to power, is another question.

Communism in Southern Europe

One cannot properly speak of Mediterranean communism, since parties in the area range from the Moscow-oriented Communist party of Greece (the

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stronger of the two competing in that country) the PCP, which made its bid for power supporting the revolutionary factions of the MFA, to the PCI and the PCE, which have become the leading representatives of Eurocommunism. Except for the French PCF, the Finnish, the Communist-dominated People's Alliance in Iceland, and the Luxembourg party, none of the Western European parties have achieved comparable electoral strength.[25] If we average the share of the total vote in the most recent parliamentary elections in the four southern countries, we get 24 percent, in contrast to an average in the Nine, including Italy, of some 10.3 percent of 1973. What is more important is that the PCI is a party with governmental vocation and that in Italy since 1977, the DC is governing—thanks to the "programmatic agreement" in which the PCI participated with all other major parties and, more recently, thanks to the formula of *governi di non-sfiducia*. The prospects of a PCI entry into the Italian government under the formula *compromesso storico* has opened an international political and intellectual debate in which positions range from hopeful expectation to dire predictions.

The increasing use of the expression *Eurocommunism* and its acceptance by some Communist leaders represents a decisive change and introduces a new variant of communism.[26] From the perspective of United States policy-makers and other anti-Communists, the questions of where such parties would stand on the international scene, the relations among them and between these parties and Moscow, and the impact of Eurocommunism in Eastern Europe, are central. A prior question is how to define Eurocommunism and which parties should be considered to be of that tendency. In spite of joint meetings and declarations of the PCI, PCE, and PCF, there seem to be great differences in style and tactics among these parties, especially between the others and the PCF. Since the PCI is the leading exponent of a different type of communism, followed closely by the PCE, it has absorbed the attention of political scientists and sociologists.[27] We read papers with the title "*Compromesso Storico* and Consociational Democracy: Toward a 'New Democracy,' " analyzing the "antagonistic collaboration" (which is also described as a "convergence through hegemony") that would save Italian democracy from its present impasse. Other analysts are more skeptical and outline carefully the scenario of what would happen at various stages after the PCI's entry into government. Lurking back of all these debates is the experience of Unidad Popular and the coup against Allende in Chile,[28] memories of attempts of the Greek Communists to take power after World War II, the recent behavior of the Portuguese party (which was certainly not like the other Communist parties of Western Europe in the critical year of 1975), and the alternative of the now defunct Programme Commun, which, presumably, was a Left alternative with Communist participation, but which remained under the leadership of the Socialists. Communist leaders in Italy and Spain are themselves analyzing the situation within the broader, comparative-historical perspective. Some of the debaters do not go beyond the somewhat naïve and perhaps unanswerable question: Do the leaders of the PCI and the PCE really mean what they are saying at their party congresses and, even more, in their contacts with Western politicians, intellectuals, and businessmen?

Others, like Giovanni Sartori, go much further into the question "What can Communists do?"—even assuming the honesty of their intentions— confronted with the "force of the facts," the constraints of the economic and social systems,

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the expectations they have created among their followers, and, I might add, the images their opponents have of them.[29]

Communist parties in southern Europe have given up the idea of storming the Winter Palace. After the disastrous results of guerrilla uprisings in Greece and Spain after World War II, they have turned to a continuous and effective effort to build a mass party, to make their presence felt, and to achieve hegemony in civil society through a war of positions (to use the Gramscian language), while using the electoral opportunities of liberal democracy (even the marginal freedom granted by a liberalizing authoritarian regime like Franco's in the syndical and professional-association elections) and staunchly claiming their civil rights in the face of discriminatory policies limiting their influence. It was Togliatti, with the *svolta* (turnabout) of Salerno (March 31, 1944), who initiated the policy abandoning opposition to collaboration with the monarchy, which was rejected by other parties; later he helped incorporate the Lateran pacts with the Church into the constitution. Communist historian Paolo Spriano links that term to the rejection of the Greek experience.

As Donald Blackmer has noted, three problems have confronted all the Communist parties: organization, domestic strategy, and international relations. The relative weight given to each of them has characterized different stages and policies of the various parties.

In the early period, which could be described by Guenther Roth's expression, "negative integration into the societies and political systems" (comparable in some respects to the position of the Socialist Labor movement in the hostile environment of imperial Germany), proletarian internationalism, with its links to the first socialist state and its involvement in the conflicts of the international Communist movement, was a serious handicap to the success of other strategies. Only in recent years—through emphasizing polycentrism, taking a more critical attitude toward the Soviet Union (particularly Stalinism but also the intervention in Prague), in some cases allowing a more liberal attitude toward dissent in the East, and finally rejecting the idea of a single model of socialist society—have the parties tried to overcome the handicap.

Organizationally, the changes from a rigid interpretation of democratic centralism to a new style were more cautious; and the range of freedom for internal debate varies greatly from party to party. The relation with flanking organizations such as the trade unions, initially conceived as transmission belts, has also varied over time and from country to country; the Italians go farthest in allowing the CGLI and other groups, such as the Union of Italian Women, more autonomy—partly to establish bridges between the Communist organizations and Catholic groups for common actions and partly to weaken the ties of those organizations with the Christian Democratic party. In fact, some of those developments have created strains for the party and might well present problems if and when the party enters the government—as unions have for Labor parties in power.

Parties have also varied in regard to the ways in which they isolated their militants from the larger society and the degree to which they constituted a closed subculture. Again, Italians, in recent years, have been the most ready to get "out of the tower" and offer their hands to progressive forces outside the party, particularly the Catholics; this policy is symbolized by running non-

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Communists on the party ticket. Conscious of the importance of the religious conflict in the thirties in Spain, the PCE has been particularly adept at welcoming well-known priests and Catholic lay leaders in an effort to neutralize the potential anti-Communism of the Church. The awareness of the Italian Communists of the importance of the middle classes—*ceti medi*—and their role in the rise of fascism, a point on which they have diverged from the Comintern interpretation of fascism, has led them to pay special attention to these classes, hoping to preempt the discontents and fears of those sectors that might otherwise benefit the neo-Fascists. The PCE follows the Italian steps by constantly defending the small and medium entrepreneurs and by classing the intellectual workers and blue-collar workers together, thus rejecting the marked *ouvrierisme* of the PCF and, probably, the PCP. The upsurge of student and youth radicalism after 1968, the emergence of new *groupuscules*, both intellectual and terrorist, on the Left, and the emergence of new forms of working-class action, have posed serious problems for the parties, and they have responded differently from country to country and in different moments. Sometimes they have confronted the groups, as the PCP did in an early stage; at other times, for example the fall of 1975 in Portugal, they have tried to include them in a broader revolutionary alliance led by the MFA and supported by the party. In Italy the reactions have fluctuated, while in Spain—except perhaps for some of the radical nationalist groups on the periphery—the PCE has tended to keep its distance and studiously to avoid any concern with competitors on the Left. The PCI in this respect occupies a privileged position compared to the PCE and the PCP, for in no Italian electoral district does the vote for parties on its left exceed that for the PCI—which is not true for the PCE. In fact, compared to the 34.4 percent PCI vote, the groups to its left obtained only 1.5 percent; while in Spain the 9.3 percent PCE votes confronted 1.3 percent for the extreme Left. The Portuguese PCP also has to contend with a number of parties at its left—14.6 percent versus somewhat less than 5 percent. The success of the presidential candidacy of Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, whose 27 percent of the vote outpaced the Communist candidate Pato with 7 percent, represented a setback. It is important to note that it is not only the Eurocommunist PCE that has to face competition from independent Communist parties; even the more revolutionary, and certainly not Eurocommunist, PCP faces such competition. Building a Communist party in the Europe of the seventies—in the wake of the crisis of Stalinism, the student rebellion, renewed Marxist intellectual ferment, the rise of radical groups on the fringes of the Catholic church, and the Moscow-Peking rift, is not what it was in the late forties when orthodox communism was the only serious contender on the extreme Left.

The Moscow leadership has shown its displeasure with some of the trends noted, but only in Greece has a real split developed—between the Communist party of the Exterior (the dominant group with 9.2 percent of the vote) and the Eurocommunists (with 2.3 percent).

In Spain, the party also faces competition from Marxist-Leninist, more-or-less Maoist groups that advocate national liberation in the peripheral regions; in some of these areas—the industrial Basque country and the underdeveloped Galicia—the PCE was particularly unsuccessful. The multinational character of Spain has obliged the party to present itself in Catalonia as the Partido Socialista

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Unificado de Catalonia (PSUC), and there is some vague speculation that the positions of the PCE and the PSUC are not quite identical.

Communist parties differ widely in their conceptions of how to achieve power, or at least a share in it. One alternative, the Programme Commun, for the time being has been frustrated by the voters and clearly rejected by the PCI with its emphasis on the need of a majority larger than "51 percent"; nor does the idea of a Socialist-Communist alliance find much support among the PCE. In view of the recent history of the relations between Portuguese Socialists and Communists such an alliance is unlikely even if the PCP would wish it. In Spain the line of the party has been successively: (1) since 1956, national reconciliation; (2) creation of broad alliances (these were first attempted by the Junta Democrática with limited success; later there were several "unitary instances" in which the opposition attempted to achieve the *ruptura* with a provisional government of the opposition, or even the *ruptura pactada* with a coalition between the existing government and the opposition); and (3) the present advocacy of a government of democratic concentration. The latter explains the eagerness to participate, at least in programmatic agreements like the Moncloa pacts of 1977, which were proposed by Suárez to deal with difficult economic problems during the critical period of constitution making. For the PCE this represented the first real opportunity to appear as an equal with other parties and to have, indirectly, some control of government policy through the organs overseeing implementation of the pacts. The electorally weak PCE, extremely conscious of the dangers of a weak Left majority in a country like Spain, had learned the Chilean lesson and considers the *via italiana* better than the French way, and one that can save it from the isolation of the PCP.

The PCP found itself in an exceptional situation—a revolutionary situation or one that appeared to offer the opportunity for revolutionary change. Though it was not of its own making, it seemed to offer a unique chance, in alliance with the more radical, but often inexperienced officers of the MFA, to use the "social power" gained in the power vacuum left by the overthrow of the Caetano regime.[30] The PCP, immediately after April 25, 1974, proceeded cautiously to formulate its demands; it acted primarily as a force for order and moderation and made good use of the positions in the government the military had given it, particularly the ministry of labor. The crisis of September 28, 1974, in which the party participated in order to squelch the "Gaullist" aspirations of Spinola and which gave power to the more radical factions within the MFA, offered the opportunity for an alliance with the military Left and the chance to change the economic structure through agrarian reform and nationalization of the banks and a large part of industry. The PCP, convinced of its moral and organizational superiority, increasingly felt that the bourgeois parties were obsolete; it therefore supported the MFA's attempts to establish direct links with the "people" and its "apolitical" and "unitarian" initiatives. The establishment, in January, 1975, of the Intersindical, to maintain the unity of the trade union apparatus inherited from the corporative system (a hope the Spanish Comisiones Obreras shared but could not realize because of the orderly reform process), was a decisive victory. In the spring of 1975, the PCP opted against "electoralism," but the radicals in the MFA could not prevent free elections; they could, however, impose, in the pact between parties and the MFA, a system of dual authority.

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The election returns created a new situation and in northern Portugal led to anti-Communist actions. The PCP supported Prime Minister Gonçalves after the Socialists had abandoned the government in protest over the radical takeover of the media; but the unity of the MFA soon became shaky, especially after the declaration of the Nine under the leadership of Melo Antunes. Gonçalves was ousted; in the new government the PCE held only one portfolio, and the Socialists gained power. Late in 1975, the tensions within the MFA came to a head: the Communists had become the stronger party in the alliance with the left of the MFA; meanwhile the party agitated for a more radical policy. However, when the ultraleftist groups inside and outside the MFA attempted their coup, the Communists were only involved at the level of neighborhood and workers' committees; the leadership preferred to see which way the tide was running.

After November 25, 1975, the new army leadership, opposed to continued military involvement, turned power over to the civilians, and the pact between MFA and the political parties was revised. Since then the PCP has dropped the aggressive, leftist-oriented stance; it has tried to defend its powerful position in the trade unions and in rural south-central Portugal and to establish bridges with the socialists, particularly at the grass roots. But its powerful presence and pressure make it difficult for the Socialist minority government to accommodate the demands of parties to its right, and there has consequently been cabinet instability. It is debatable whether the line taken during those critical years by the PCP was a result of the sociological characteristics of a party that had always operated illegally in the underground or a response to a unique historical situation.

The same question could be asked about the well-known—and diametrically opposite—PCI policy and the still-emerging policy of the PCE.

Ever since 1976, when the PCI obtained an unprecedented 34.4 percent of the vote and 228 of the 629 seats, the question of how one can govern without the Communists, whether the PCI will enter the government, and with what consequences, has been widely debated.[31] The gains of the PCI—from 27.2 percent in 1972—signaled for many the end of the model of peripheral alternation with DC hegemony, the exhaustion of the politics of clientelism made possible by the economic miracle, the impact of new expressions of civil protest, and the growing expression of a civil revolution whose completion had long been prevented by the DC.[32] The crisis of Italian society raised for the PCI—a party with a desire to govern—the question of how to accede to power. Berlinguer, aware of the Chilean experience and fearful of what he called "the division of the state,"—the risks of 51 percent majority rule—excluded the model of alternation and proposed the formula *compromesso storico*—a grand coalition, not as a temporary device, but as the Italian way to socialism.

Analysts differ in the meaning to be attached to a government coalition between the DC and the PCI, with or without participation by minor parties. Some of them see in it a continuation of the traditional Italian model of transformismo; others, like Luigi Graziano,[33] see it as a new type of consociational politics; while Giovanni Sartori, starting from the assumption that the PCI is not a party like the others, focuses on the long-range consequences on the basis of a situational analysis. The arguments are complex, and we can only give a

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bare sketch of the issues involved, leaving aside the question of if and when the PCI will enter the government. The answer to that question will depend on the responses of the electorate to the parties and the prospects of such a coalition, the intensity of the economic, social, and public-order crisis, and, not least, the willingness of the PCI to step into the government, and all the risks it involves for the future of the party.

It can be argued that there have been grand coalitions, like that between the CDU and the SPD in Germany, that have contributed to a transition to alternation. But the data suggest that a significant part of the Italian electorate is still too suspicious of the PCI to allow it to rule alone, that the international community might respond negatively, and that investors might react negatively and destabilize the Italian economy. Therefore, in the minds of the PCI a coalition is conceived as a more or less permanent arrangement. Observers also stress that Communist parties have participated in Western governments since the war, and sit today in the cabinets of Iceland and Finland without provoking major political changes. Against this point of view it is argued that not all coalitions are equal and that it is not the same to have the Finnish Communist party represented in a cabinet (with its approximately 20 percent of the vote) as a PCI backed by one-third of the electorate. In addition, in Finland non-Communist parties can form relatively stable and effective governments without the need of Communist support and participation. This apparently is not the case in Italy.

In recent years, since the work of Arend Lijphart,[34] the concept of consociational democracy has been used to analyze multiparty situations in which potentially divisive conflicts between linguistic, ethnic, religious, and ideological subcultures are handled by political devices other than majority rule: coalition governments, proportionalization of public life, negotiation among the elites binding on their followers, and so forth. It was tempting to use the consociational model to interpret the future of the *compromesso storico* as a way to overcome the mutual blockage in decision making, to allay suspicions and fears between antagonistic partners, and to stabilize the democratic system against the threats from the fringes. Rather than choosing government by a single Center party too weak to rule effectively or taking the impossible alternative of realizing radical changes in society through the dictatorship of the proletariat, the solution is to share power—as it has been shared in many segmented societies in the consociational mode. Those arguing this possibility generally also favor such a solution—though they are aware of some fundamental differences between consociationalism in the smaller European democracies and in today's Italy. The segmented subcultures, in principle, are not expansive. Their support tends to be frozen, and the agreements tend to exclude further expansive drives by any of the partners—a policy of which the school pacts are a good example. Of course, the PCI, with its Gramscian notion of hegemony and its internal dynamism, is inherently expansive; the centrality of the proletariat, the denial of legitimacy to capitalism, the commitment to the ultimate victory of socialism, the conception of the "march through the institutions," the tactics of the "war of positions," do not seem compatible with the consociational model. Certainly there is a readiness to share political power with the DC, but at the same time the Gramscian notion of hegemony is retained for "social power." The objective of consociationalism is not to consolidate, to a greater or lesser

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extent, a status quo and to make reforms possible, but to achieve fundamental changes—it intends, concretely, socialism.

The question is how such a government by two dominant parties who share close to 75 percent of the vote actually would work. Can the core of the coalition be occupied at the same time and for long by two forces of approximately equal strength and clear governing ambitions? Who would be the real leader of such a coalition? Sartori emphasizes that, given the very different position in the society of the DC and the PCI, it would be an unequal coalition. The DC as a patronage party derives much of its power from clientelistic ties, and clients are likely to go where the power is. On the other hand, the DC has lost much of its influence over interest groups, particularly its trade unions, while the organizations in the Communist sphere have gained strength. The DC cannot mobilize the streets in a crisis situation as the PCI can. The inevitable sharing of patronage and influence in the large public sector, added to these strengths of the PCI and to its preeminent role in intellectual life, makes this alliance of antagonistic partners, in Sartori's view, an increasingly unequal one, even if the PCI does not assume any sensitive ministries or violate any of the rules of the democratic game. We might add, as it is played in Italy without well-defined boundaries between civil society and politics, economy and politics, bureaucracy and partitocrazia.

This *diarchia polarizzata* in Sartori's terms, and in Graziano's version a new type of consociational democracy, will face a number of problems that are generally left unanalyzed. It is perfectly conceivable that to legitimize this political formula—both internally and above all internationally—to assure it the support of the world business community, and to neutralize the fears of Italian investors, the coalition would proceed cautiously and make a serious effort to relaunch the economy, moderating, particularly, the demands of the trade unions to which it would be subject. In fact, many conservatives see such a coalition as one for universalism against clientelism, for rationality and productivity against parasitic encroachments, and as the only way to break the present stalemate. Sartori, however, does not stop his analysis at this stage, but calls attention to the serious problems that the PCI would eventually encounter. Those groups, which would have supported the rational policies in that first stage, would ultimately begin asking for the fruits of victory, for all the social reforms so often postponed and proposed by the party. The DC, on its part, could not neglect to defend the interests of its constituency. The result would be growing inflation. With the growing autonomy of the trade unions from the party, the growing awareness that the payoffs of power are limited (and the resultant increase in intraparty debates and tensions), and the need to retain the electoral loyalty of heterogeneous social groups, such a government would confront perhaps even more serious problems than at present. Even assuming the loyalty of the bulk of the party and the interests linked with it, there would be a growing number of true revolutionaries that would have taken seriously the sacred texts and chiliastic hopes and that would exercise pressure. Probably some of them would turn to one form or another of guerrilla warfare. Everybody would expect the party now dominant in government and society to solve the accumulated problems of decades, and expectations would be compounded by continuous assertions that the party would, in fact, be able to solve them.

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Everybody would expect that party, confronted by violence created by small groups of extremists, to put it down. The question raised by Sartori at this point is the following: Will the party then be able to do so within the framework of the democracy it invoked while it was in the opposition, with what we might call its libertarian components? Will it, under such circumstances, be able to govern with a method of government that is not its own? Or will it fall back on another method, forced by the circumstances (even against its wishes) and probably applauded by large segments of the society desiring order and stability more, perhaps, than freedom? Let us emphasize that speculations about the future in Italy do not need to question the sincerity of the commitments to the democratic rules of the game, to pluralism and elections; but they do have to be based on an analysis of the changing dynamics of the situation—economic, social, and international—and these cannot be foreseen by the actors today. Still, situations in the future have their roots in a past we know. It would be a novel experiment of unknown consequences and it would be decisive, not only for Italy. Given the commitment of the PCE to the *via italiana*, its success or failure would certainly have an impact on Spain. In fact, we would argue that the prospect of a PSOE-UCD government today, *servata distantia*, poses, in attenuated form, the same problems we have just described.

Spain: From Centralist Nation-State to Multinational Regionalized State

In our view, the most complex problem faced by the Spanish democracy today, which has no parallel in Italy, Portugal, and Greece, is the transformation of a centralized into a regionalized state. The strong autonomist tendencies in the Basque Country, Catalonia, the Canary Islands, and, to a slightly lesser extent, in Valencia, Galicia, and, increasingly, in Andalucía, have already begun to create complex and difficult problems.[35] If we add that in the Basque Country, particularly in the province of Guipúzcoa, there is a strong nationalist, separatist sentiment that expresses itself through the minority actions of the revolutionary terrorist movement—the military branch of Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)—and through a nationalist party to the left of the PNV, the Euskadiko Ezkerra (EE) (which in Guipúzcoa was able to obtain 9.5 percent of the vote), the complexity of the problem should be obvious.

Spain, for the immense majority of the Spaniards, is a nation-state. Large proportions of the population in the Basque Country and in Catalonia feel that identification with a peripheral nationality is not incompatible with loyalty to Spain; this is particularly true in Catalonia. Still, a very small minority of Catalans and a significant number of Basques do not identify with Spain, but with a nation that might aspire to statehood. The problem is complicated, for these two advanced industrial regions with their high standards of living have attracted a large number of immigrants whose national identity is Spanish. In the Basque Country these newcomers are unlikely to be fully accepted, even if they were to be assimilated culturally and linguistically—which is unlikely given the difficulty of the Basque language. Among these immigrants a centralist sentiment is as strong as the separatist sentiment is among the Basque speakers. Moreover, there is no majority for any particular solution, even among the Basque-born; for they are divided in their aspirations, depending on language

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use and province of residence. The conflict in the Basque Country, which has taken already a heavy toll of violence and caused some brutal murders, is to a large extent a conflict between Basques and not between them and the central government.

The complex junctions of class and nationalist politics, cleavages between natives and immigrants, the very different positions of the population of different provinces—all are factors complicating any solution. No one can speak in the name of the whole Basque people, at least within the boundaries the Basque Nationalists claim as their homeland; and even in Catalonia, where consensus on autonomist aspirations is much higher, class politics divide society. This lack of internal consensus, along with a number of other factors, makes a consociational solution fitting the model of Arend Lijphart very dubious. The internal heterogeneity of two industrialized societies, the assimilation into Castilian language and culture of even part of the native population, the ideological heterogeneity resulting from class cleavages, and to a lesser extent religiosity, make it unlikely that a regional leadership with majority support capable of speaking in the name of the region will arise and reach a consociational agreement with the central government. Obviously there have been and are tendencies in this direction in Catalonia; the negotiations and agreements between President Suárez and Tarradellas, the president of the Generalitat who returned after years of exile, fit the Lijphart model. But even Tarradellas's authority as a spokesman for Catalonia is not unquestioned, and there is no one who could play his role in the Basque Country.

Other factors described in the literature on consociationalism—the small country, threatened from the outside, that has relatively comparable proportions of component elements, a well-established leadership that can negotiate and that has authority to bind his constituency, the absence of constant and close contact of heterogeneous elements creating frictions, and traditions and institutions channeling the aspirations of different segments—all are conditions absent in the case of the Basque Country and rare in Catalonia.

I have dealt at length with these problems elsewhere. Recent survey data and the election returns in the Basque Country, its provinces, and Navarre (which the Basque claim) are further evidence of the saliency of the problem of peripheral nationalism against the state and of multilingualism in a society with a dominant world language like Castilian.

To these two traditional problems of the Spanish state, we have to add the unsettled climate of opinion in the Canary Islands. The islands, which are subject to the pressures of terrorist activities encouraged from abroad, feel far away from the metropolitan region and are strongly affected, economically and psychologically, by the decolonization of the Sahara just across the water. They also feel neglected by a far-away central administration. Although this climate of opinion has not yet been reflected in the political elections—the nationwide parties, the UCD and, to a lesser extent, the PSOE, gained the overwhelming share of the vote—it does show up in the recent trade union elections. And it acquires special importance because of the strategic location of the islands and because of African claims—despite the fact that the whole population is white and Castilian-speaking, except for some small foreign colonies, particularly of Indian merchants.

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In part to counter the argument that the newly granted autonomy of the peripheral, wealthy industrial regions is an inequitable privilege, the government party favors regionalization of other parts of Spain. In some cases the parties of the Left, hoping to control regional governments, have taken up the anticentralist demands. In all parts of Spain there are easily exploitable grievances against the central bureaucracy. For example, the underdevelopment of some regions, like Andalucía and Galicia, can easily be attributed to government neglect, to the extraction of capital, through the banking system, for investment in more advanced industrial regions, and to outside control of its natural resources and industrial enterprises. In this context, demagogic rhetoric has and is creating high expectations that with regional autonomy the problems of underdevelopment might be solved, particularly in Andalucía. The truth is more complex, and it is very unlikely that regional governments without administrative infrastructure could rapidly solve the traditional social and economic problems, which have recently been accentuated by the general economic crisis and the consequent unemployment, especially in Andalucía. It remains to be seen how the relations between central and regional governments, between rich and poor regions, and between government coalitions of different composition at the center and in the regions will be handled. Tensions are likely to develop, and the disappointed expectations, the incapacity of regional governments to respond to the pressures they themselves are likely to have generated, are likely to be among the most complex problems facing the new Spanish democracy.

Conclusion

Southern European societies find themselves at a difficult juncture. In the last decade and a half they have undergone the greatest economic and social changes in their recent history. Perhaps for the first time in centuries, their populations have experienced the hope of a better life. Except for Italy, they have lived under authoritarian regimes that did not provide a channel for participation in political life, that curtailed or trampled on human rights, and that were anachronistic in the new democratic Europe. For very different reasons, and through quite different processes, those regimes gave way to new democracies at a time of economic crisis that affected them quite severely. The transition to democracy also coincided with the moment of ideological crisis and ambiguities and left them no clear models to follow or reject. The Marxist critique of the social democratic or neoliberal model of the stable democracies of Western Europe; the rejection of identification, on the part of Communists, with the Soviet model; the crisis of the Catholic church and, with it, of the Christian Democratic political alternative, have created in the elites of these countries an incertitude about where and how to go in the future. New, sometimes confused, dreams of different solutions to their problems have emerged within a democratic framework. To those elites, formal bourgeois democracy, which was for so long an ideal, seems insufficient now that it is in reach; they are receptive to the criticisms to which it is subject in the politically, economically, and socially more advanced countries. The new regimes suffer under the additional handicap of being born in a moment in which they cannot, within the

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constraints of their economies, carry out progressive policies that would identify the population with them; as a result they face a crisis of legitimation. The past has left a legacy of fears: memories of civil wars, military interventions, and dictatorships; failed revolutionary or pseudorevolutionary attempts that weigh heavily on the decision-makers and lead them toward a search for consensus rather than toward an alternation of governments that might incorporate into the political process those on the extremes. The limited legitimacy of some of the participants, in the eyes of large segments of the population, the potential veto of key groups and their potential for blackmail, creates recurrent problems of legitimacy. In some cases these are solved by perpetuating or extending exclusive coalitions in power and by co-opting heterogeneous interests—hence avoiding the prospect of alternance in government. Many of the actors fear that such alternance will divide the countries or provoke the principled opposition of significant and powerful sectors of the society—specifically, the military, or organized labor, or the polities of the streets. Their extreme multiparty systems confront them with the dangers of polarization, fragmentation, or immobilism—if not all of them simultaneously. In the case of Spain, one has to add the serious threat of peripheral nationalisms, most specifically the Basque separatism, to the unity of the nation.

Political systems that face these problems of institutionalization, of peaceful democratic competition for power, are confronted with difficult choices imposed by their nation's stage of economic and political development and the international situation. Their countries are no longer underdeveloped agrarian societies; they are largely industrial and urbanized, and share, therefore, many of the problems of richer countries; but they have fewer resources with which to solve them. They have reached a level of development that has created new and high expectations. They are too close to the most advanced countries of Europe to be indifferent to the changes that go with the more advanced stages of the welfare state and to the entitlements it grants. But their economies require capital for continuous modernization to reach a higher level of technological complexity, to be competitive within the European framework, particularly since other countries are now at the takeoff stage they occupied a decade or two ago and are likely to catch up with them soon and become their competitors. The inequality between Northern and Southern Europe is a source of tensions that, psychologically at least, are not entirely different from those between the Third World and the advanced industrial nations. Objectively, however, Southern Europe is far ahead of the Third World, including most of Latin America. But since its attention is centered on Europe as a frame of reference, its relatively privileged position is often ignored, and the responses of Third World intellectuals and politicians sometimes find an echo in the Mediterranean. The past has left a heritage of considerable social inequality that economic development, in some cases, has exacerbated, even though most Southern Europeans are better off today than they were two decades ago. And that inequality, constantly made visible, contributes to delegitimize the emerging economic, social, and political order. The important presence of Communist and extreme Left parties, the potential for radicalization of some of the Socialist parties, is both a reflection and a cause of these illegitimacies of the social order. The fact that

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much of the economic change has taken place during the authoritarian period that was itself illegitimate, contributes to the fundamental questioning of the social order.

Will these societies be able to make the transition to more advanced forms of production, to a more efficient use of resources, to a greater integration into the world market of the advanced countries? Can they make technological and scientific breakthroughs and at the same time face a crisis of political integration, strong pressures for redistribution, and, in some cases, a crisis of national identity?

It is almost impossible to give an answer to these questions. To close, we can quote a conclusion written by Giuseppe Di Palma about the same four countries: "Regime transitions and major coalitional crises are accompanied by a deflation of power and by an acceleration and accumulation of often unpredictable events; chance and risk-taking play a role beyond what steady states allow. And when events become aleatory, when political elites and experts must rely on limited and distorted information, when risk calculation is not always rational and universal, it then becomes difficult to predict in what direction regimes and coalitions are moving—unless we are right up against the events."[36]

The transitions to democracy after years of authoritarian rule have created new hopes. And past conflicts have created in many political leaders, and even more among large sectors of the population, a desire for peaceful democratic change and freedom. Recent rapid economic development, in spite of inequities in its distribution, has created the possibility of continuing progress. It is up to the elites of all parties and the leaders of all institutions to assess realistically the possibilities of change within the constraining conditions of the past and of the seventies.

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[1]This paper was written while the author was holding a German Marshall Fund of the United States Fellowship. I benefited from the discussions at the International Political Science Association, Round Table Conference on Mediterranean Europe, Athens, May, 1978, and the assistance of Rocío de Terán.

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[3]On the social structure, see Margaret Scotford Archer and Salvador Giner, eds., *Contemporary Europe: Class, Status and Power* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971), especially chapters by Herminio Martins (Portugal), Luciano Gallino (Italy), S. Giner (Spain), and Nikos Mouzelis and

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Michael Attalides (Greece). On Spain see also Amando de Miguel, *Manual de estructra social de España* (Madrid: Tecnos, 1974), *Recursos humanos clases y regiones en España* (Madrid: Edicusa, 1977), and *La pirámide social española* (Esplugues de Llobregat: Fundación Juan, March-Ariel, 1977).

[4]Banco de Bilbao, *Renta Nacional de España y su distribución provincial, 1975* (Madrid: Banco de Bilbao, 1975).

[5]Ministerio de Economía. Instituto Nacional de Estadística, *La renta nacional en 1976 y su distribución* (Madrid: Ministerio de Economía, Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 1977), pp. 111-135.

[6]National sample surveys by DATA.

[7]Christian Heimpel, "The Cooperation of the EC with Southern Europe: Some Problems in the Integration of Portugal's Agriculture into the Common Market," *Conferencia Internacional sobre Economía Portuguesa*, vol. 1, pp. 253-267.

[8]Banco de Bilbao, *Informe Económico, 1976* (Madrid: Banco de Bilbao, 1977), p. 71.

[9]The German Marshall Fund, Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, *Conferência Internacional sobre Economia Portuguesa*, vol. I, p. 445.

[10]In Spain in January, 1977, 39 percent chose the word *socialism* and 30 percent chose *private property*; 11 percent chose both, and 20 percent expressed no opinion. When asked how enterprises should be run, 16 percent said by their owners, 42 percent said that owners and personnel should participate in the appointment of management, 5 percent were in favor of state ownership and management, and 29 percent wanted ownership by the personnel and management by those elected; 9 percent did not answer. Of those favoring socialization, only 11 percent favored expropriation without compensation.

[11]In response to the question "Can one be a good Communist and a good Catholic at the same time?" in January, 1977, 32 percent said yes and 56 percent no—a figure close to that for Italy in 1963 (respectively, 28 and 56 percent). In Italy in 1973 the proportions had changed to 55 and 34 percent. Self-placement on the Left-Right scale in Spain correlated 0.46 with religiosity, compared to 0.09 with income and −0.21 with education. Among Madrid voters of the PCE, 16 percent declared themselves atheists, 36 percent indifferent (compared to 6 and 14 percent among those of the PSOE). Seven percent of the PCE voters said they were practicing Catholics, along with 22 percent of PSOE voters, 51 percent of UCD voters, and 74 percent of AP adherents (surveys by DATA).

[12]The average age of the UCD deputies in the Spanish Cortes elected in June, 1977, was 44.3 years, that of the PSOE, 43.5, and of the members of the constitutional committee, 44.9 years. Among the PSOE deputies, 35 percent were under 35 years (born 1943 or later), and 60 percent of the UCD deputies were under 45.

[13]Claudio Treves, quoted by Christopher Seton-Watson, *Italy from Liberalism to Fascism 1870-1925* (London: Methuen, 1967), p. 560.

[14]On the last period of the Franco regime, the institutional framework, and the play of forces involved in the change (in English): see José Amodia, *Franco's Political Legacy: From Dictatorship to Façade Democracy* (London: Penguin, 1977); William T. Salisbury and James D. Theberge, eds., *Spain in the Seventies and Beyond: Problems of Change and Transition* (New York: Praeger, 1976); Paul Preston, ed., *Spain in Crisis. The Evolution and Decline of the Franco Régime* (Hassocks, Sussex: Harvester, 1976). An informative survey up to the June, 1977, election is Lothar Maier, *Spaniens Weg zur Demokratie* (Meisenheim am Glan: Anton Hain, 1977).

[15]For a theoretical analysis of the breakdown of authoritarian regimes, see Philippe Schmitter, "Liberation by Golpe: Retrospective Thoughts on the Demise of Authoritarian Rule in Portugal," *Armed Forces and Society* 2 (November, 1975): 5-33. Giuseppe Di Palma, "Italia, Portogallo, Spagna: Ipotesi su tre regimi alla prova," *Prospettive Settanta*, 3 (January-March, 1977): 42-61, is a stimulating essay on the problems of continuity and transition in the politics of these countries.

[16]Juan J. Linz, "Spain and Portugal: Critical Choices," in David S. Landes, ed., *Western Europe. The Trials of Partnership* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1977), pp. 237-296, and sources quoted there; Ferdinand A. Hermens and Peter-Hugo Köppinger, "Von der Diktatur zur Demokratie: Das Beispiel Spaniens und Portugals," *Verfassung und Verfassungswirklichkeit*, 10 (Jahrbuch 1976): 13-190; Giuseppe de Vergottini, ed., *Una Constituzione Democratica per la Spagna* (Milan: Franco Angeli, 1978).

[17]The monarchy that fell in 1931 had limited traditional legitimacy, and the instauration by Franco did not contribute to that legitimacy; even so, when asked (January, 1977) to choose among several political dichotomies, monarchy or republic, 59 percent chose monarchy, 18 percent chose republic, and 19 percent were indifferent. However, the important role of Juan Carlos as a moderating power was approved by 72 percent, with only 25 percent being critical. Even more significant is that 42 percent of those in principle in favor of a republic saw the actions of the king favorably: the king was, in a sense, legitimizing the institutions. In this context we might note that a popularly elected president, General Eanes in Portugal, in the present crisis situation can play, potentially, an independent role as a "neutral power" above parties.

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[18]See Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1976), for the typology of party systems used in our analysis. Jorge Caspar and Nuno Vitorino, *As eleições de 25 de abril: Geografia e imagen dos partidos* (Lisbon: Horizonte, 1976) is an excellent ecological electoral study and analysis of the symbols used by the parties. For the programmatic positions of the parties and the text of the agreement between the parties and MFA, see *1975 Primeiras eleições livres* (Lisbon: Decibel, 1975), and Francisco Pereira de Moura et al., *Esclarecer o eleitor: Inquérito a os partidos políticos* (Lisbon: Afrodite, 1974).

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